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reply
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session
Paris, 14th-l7th June 1993
MONDAY 14th JUNE
Morning l0 a.m.
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Opening of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session by the Provisional Pres-
ident.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session
7. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
8. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thompson on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
Procedures and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft decision.
9. The development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central
European countries:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kempinaire on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.
10. Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order.
TUESDAY l5th JUNE
Morning 10 a.m.
l. Security in the Mediterranean:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
ll
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2. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of
Defence of Luxembourg.
2. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. European security policy 
- 
reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marshall on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
WEDNESDAY l6th JUNE
Morning l0 a.m.
l. United Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee.
Debate.
10.30 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the
WEU Council.
11.30 a.m.
3. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. United Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU:
Resumed debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order.
2. WEU initiatives on the Danube 
- 
reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the
Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Morning 10 a.m. THURSDAY lTth JUNE
l. Anti-missile defence for Europe 
- 
guidelines drawn from the symposium:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
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ll a.m.
2. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland.
3. The Assembly's communication policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order.
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION
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Dear President,
I am pleased to forward to you
since September 1992.
Activities of the IEPG
Letter from Mn tan Eeleelen, Secretary-Generul of WEa,
to Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly
4th February 1993
4th February 1993
IEPG concerning its activitiesan information letter from the
Yours sincerely,
Willem van Exrr-EN
Mr. Hartmut Soru
President of the Assembly of WEU
*{.*
Information letter to the WEU Assembly conceraing
the Independent Europrcan Pmgramme Group (IEPG)
18th December 1992
Introduction
1. Since the last information letter to the WEU Assembly in September 1992, the defence ministers
of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Bonn on 4th December 1992. On this occasion, ministers mainly
discussed the IEPG's future in the evolving European security order. The Bonn communiqud is
attached at Annex A. The IEPG structure is attached at Annex B.
2. At the Bonn meeting, ministers first touched upon the IEPG's regular activities and the transat-
lantic dialogue. In continuation of the work that was started in March in Oslo, they then concentrated
in particular on the national armaments directors' (NADs') work since Oslo regarding the possible
transfer of the IEPG functions into WEU.
IEPG's future rille, notably the incorporation of the IEPG into WEU
NADs' Jindings / conclusions
3. On this highly important issue, an IEPG NADs' report, finalised though before the WEU
Council meeting of 20th November 1992, was presented to ministers.
4. In it, NADs have reflected on the future of the IEPG in the light of an initial analysis of the
question. They took note in particular of the following considerations:
(a) There remains a need for a forum in which European members of NATO may consider all
aspects of armaments co-operation.
(b) WEU is identified as the focus for a European defence identity. Following decisions at Maas-
tricht and Petersberg, WEU is developing a wider r6le.
(c) WEU is a body based on an international treaty and has its own legal personality. This could
provide a more solid and visible framework for European afinaments co-operation th_us
opening new possibilities for its development, including the eventual establishment of a
European armaments agency, if nations so choose. On the other hand, the possibility exists
for European annaments co-operation to continue under WEU in virtually the same form
and with the same policies as under the IEPG. Transfer of the IEPG's functions to WEU
would not therefore pre-empt decisions by nations on the future nature of European arma-
ments co-operation.
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(d) A transfer of the IEPG's functions to WEU would reduce the number of European bodies
dealing with defence matters. It would therefore help rationalise efforts to improve
co-ordination between European nations on these issues.
5. The report also stated that, although there are a number of uncertainties about the direction and
pace of greater cohesion in Europe in the security and defence areas, NADs believe that the trend of
events broadly justifies the consideration of new arrangements in the armaments co-operation area,
subject always to the continued participation of all IEPG members with equal rights and responsibil-
ities. WEU as a destination for the functions of the IEPG offers a number of advantages as an umbrella
organisation for a comprehensive armaments co-operation forum which NADs consider should con-
tinue as a specific activity within WEU. Some nations in particular also believe that while the IEPG
has a number of achievements to its name, the business of armaments co-operation would benefit from
the possibility of more formal arrangements under WEU.
6. Eventually the report concluded that, subject to a satisfactory resolution of WEU 
- 
IEPG mem-
bership and to agreement on the issue of principle, there were no obstacles to incorporate the IEPG
functions into WEU without delay. Further work might be required on a number of organisational
issues but this needed not delay the incorporation of the IEPG into WEU.
Ministerial decision Bonn
7. On 20th November 1992,the WEU Council successfully concluded WEU's enlargement process
and welcomed a possible transfer of the IEPG's functions to WEU. Taking into account these positive
results and on the basis of the above NADs' report, ministers in Bonn formally agreed to incorporate
the IEPG into WEU with immediate effect. They acknowledged that, in WEU, the thirteen nations will
be entitled to participate fully and with the same rights and responsibilities in matters related to
European armaments co-operation and that the linkage with NATO will be maintained. They under-
lined the need to maintain the momentum of the activities currently being taken forward by the IEPG.
Follow-on Bonn decision
8. The practical realisation of this merger might require a certain number of organisational/
procedural issues to be looked into in depth. Ministers therefore tasked NADs to take the suitable mea-
sures to resolve practical details possibly remaining harmoniously and with due consideration of the
interests of the bodies involved. The IEPG NADs' report on the subject, as presented to and agreed by
ministers in Bonn, will form the basis for the finalisation of the required practical arrangements and
has been transmitted to the appropriate WEU's instances. In addition, the European armaments
agency question should now as well be further developed. Its initial analysis, as attached to the above
report but considered not yet sufficiently elaborated for discussion in Bonn, could serve as a basis. The
work on the above issues will be taken forward under a new chairmanship as Denmark is taking over
the Chair in European armaments co-operation matters from Belgium as from lst January 1993.
Regalu activities
Panel I: harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation
9. IEPG continues to place great emphasis on equipment requirements and programmes and Panel
I continues to refine its new practical methods for identifying more quickly viable programmes for
co-operation. As a result, seven new subgroups have been charged with tasks that encompass command
air defence frigate low frequency active variable depth sonar, low frequency deeping sonar for heli-
copters, air defence command and control, short range anti radiation missile, advanced short range air
to air missile and HF radio. On the other hand, it must be mentioned that five subgroups (vehicle
robotics, maritime patrol aircraft, 155 mm artillery system, submarine advanced propulsion and mete-
orological equipment) have been disbanded mainly because of budgetary constraints. The list of
current projects overseen by Panel I is at Annex C.
10. Of particular interest is the progress made on the future large aircraft (FLA) and the microwave
landing system (MLS) progmmmes.
Eight nations are now involved in the FLA programme which is of particular importance in the
light of the Gulf war. The work on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the feasibility study is
progressing well and, according to the latest time schedule, production might start early next decade.
Regarding the MLS programme, a general procurement strategy has been agreed with the aim of
signing a MOU on common procurement in due course.
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Panel II: research and technology, notably EUCLID
11. EUCLID has now reached its cruising speed and most common European priority areas
(CEPAs) are making good progress. The list of current CEPAs/RTPs approved for entering the defi-
nition phase is at Annex D. So far, 39 research and technology projects (RTPs), involving 280 million
Ecus, have been approved and 23 implementing arrangements for RTPs, involving 150 million Ecus,
have been signed by the participating nations. Moreover, the corresponding requests for proposals
have been issued and the first contracts with industry have now been signed. In order to keep up the
present pace in EUCLID, Panel II is actively seeking new research priority areas and new technology
projects within the existing CEPAS.
L2. Besides, and in parallel with EUCLID, a certain number of activities regarding common tech-
nology projects in technical areas continue to progress satisfactorily.
Panel III: defence economics, notably European defence equipment market (EDEM)
13. The guiding principles for the operation of the open EDEM are laid down in the IEPG action
plan 1988 and in the policy document approved by ministers in November 1990. The permanent Sec-
retariat is responsible for collecting data to monitor their correct application. It is obvious that no
organisation should be closed to the implication of new circumstances and conditions. In this light and
given the changes in the international security and defence environment, the EDEM principles are
subject to a continuing review. An interim report on the issue has been presented in Bonn. It acknowl-
edges that significant changes in the security and defence environment with potential consequences for
the policy areas ofjuste retour and developing defence industries (DDIs) support have occurred, espe-
cialfu since 1990. It states however that representative information on cross border trade of at least
three years (1990-1991-1992) EDEM experience is needed to make a fuller assessment. A final repgrt,
taking into account those market data will be presented to NADs as soon as possible. Meanwhile,
marked differences of views on those policy areas have already emerged.
14. Panel III is also devoting attention and support to the reactivation of the working group on DDIs
matters currently chaired by Portugal. This should facilitate the involvement of the DDIs in collabo-
rative programmes and encourage the DDIs to play a full rewarding part in the European defence
equipment scene.
15. On the opening up of the EDEM, the permanent Secretariat reported that, in 1991, a clear
majority of the placed defence equipment contracts followed the IEPG rules set out in the policy doc-
ument. Data collected on contracts covered by the IEPG cross-border competition policy showed that
no cases were raised by industries under the agreed dispute settlement procedures.
16. Panel III is finally trying to reconcile diverging views of nations on the systematic extension of
competition in collaborative projects to industries of non-participating nations.
European Defence Industries Group (EDIG)
17. EDIG, as the European single defence industrial entity which, from a coherent industrial policy
base, is an invaluable discussion partner, has been involved in the regular IEPG activities when and as
appropriate. .
Transatlantic dialogue including NATO defence trade
18. The importance of the transatlantic dialogue, of which the defence trade is an essential element,
has been confirmed. In the light of the value of the European contribution in the field of armaments
co-operation between both sides of the Atlantic, and of the potential benefits that would arise from a
lowering of trade barriers and an increase in technology transfer on a NATO-wide basis, work on the
NATO defence trade initiative is proceeding in parallel with the development of the EDEM.
IEPG Chairmanship
19. At the end of the year, Belgium will have completed two years as IEPG Chair nation and will
hand over this responsibility to Denmark. Ministers agreed to meet again in 1993 in the WEU
framework under the chairmanship of Denmark.
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ANNEX A
Bonn communiqud
Bonn, 4th December 1992
The defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Bonn on 4th December 1992. Noting
that arrangements for a.new.security architecture in Western Europe were progressing, they roppo.t.8
the trend towards a rationalisation of the_Iuropean fora dealing iuittr Oefinc[ mattjis. Iri pi.ticuiir,
they. took-note of the rOle envisaged for Western European Uni]on and welcomed the successful con-
clusion of t!_e_rpgess of enlarging that body. They co-nfirmed that the need remainJ i"i rriop*,
members of NATO 
.to consider together all aspecis of armaments co-operation. Againsr thil 1'u&_ground, they focused their discussions on the future of IEpG activities. ^
._ _ _ 
Recalling their decision at their last meeting in Oslo to task the national armaments directors(N+Dg to examine the IEPG's future r6le in depth, ministers noted with satisfaction the work done.This work has concentrated. on the possible_incorporation of the IEpG into wEU bajed on iii [.1principles dev-elope_{,lgr and approve_d by I_FPG ministers (see annex). Ministers also noted th; p#itive results of the WEU Council on 20th November and agreed that'a transfer of IEPG functioni toWEU would represent an important step towards enhancedEuropean armaments co-operatior. gased
on the work undertaken.by $-. N4D!, IFPG ministers have therefore decided today that this transfer
w^ot1ld 
_take-place fgrtnw!1[Jhey invited the Belgian Minister of Defence, in his cajacity of Chairman
of the.IEPG, to inform.WEU.accordingly. In reaihing this fundamental decision, t-hey ionf,rmeO tfrai
the thirteen nations will continue to have equal rights and responsibilities in the fieid of armameris
co-operation and that the links with NATO will be maintained. They also emphasised the need to
maintain the momentum of the activities currently being taken forward by the'IEPG.
Ministers noted the status of activiti_es t-o develop the European Defence Equipment Market(EDEM). They supported the requirement for further wbrk on coll-ecting data on ItipC cross border
contracts to enable, in due time, a review of the EDEM principles takin[ into account the changes inthe international security and_ defence environment. ihey noted thai the question of a fiirttrer
extension o.f competition in collaborative projects to industries of non-participating nations *as Ueing
studied. Ministers reiterated_their support foi developing defence industry lboI;-countries and thaithe areas of training, scholarship, and transfer of techn-olofy and know-how wiuld lie fully exptoreA.- -
. ^ 
Welcoming the fact that the first contracts with industry had been signed, ministers noted with
satisfaction that the EUCLID research and technology programme was now-well unAerway. ttrey
acknowledged the progress nations were making in the-idJntification of further areas of iosiUt6
research.
Ministers reemphasised that harmonisation of requirements and equipment replacement
schedules should be actively. pursued in order to optimiie the use of resour&s and t<i pio-oi.
standardisation and 
.in particular interoperability. Ministers endorsed the ongoing a.tirltier -i,
equipment collaboration.taking into account the concerns, particularly among DbI nltion., io nnd
solutions affordable to all participating nations. They welcomed the progress rigarOing.ornrnon pio:
curement for the microwave landing system and the work underway aimei at a dasibiliiystuOv for-mefuture large aircraft programme.
Ministers underlined their belief that enhancing the European defence industrial and techno-
!g$rgu! capabilities would facilitate transatlantic cdoperation 
- 
and reiterated the ililrtur.. ofNATO-wide defence equipment co-operation. They discussed the transatlantic defence^ traOe iisuifrom a Furopean perspective. Bearing in mind the advantages to be gained from improuing.tlie condi-tions of defen^ce equipment trade alliance-wide,.they expreJsed the h-ope that the fei .e-ulnirrglir*t
on NATO defence trade would be resolved rapidly. This would enabl-e the NATO code of con-<luct in
defence trade to be applied.
Ministers 91pr9sse.d ttl_e.ij_gratitude to Belgium for chairing the IEPG in tgglltgg2 and agreed to
meet again in 1993 in the WEU framework under the Chairnianship of Denmark.
l7
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Basic principles which have guided the discussions on
the incorporation of the IEPG into WEU
1. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsi-
bilities, in any armaments co-operation forum.
2. There should be a single European armaments co-operation forum, there should be no dupli-
cation in this field.
3. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was to be operational.
4. Any armaments co-operation forum should take over, as starting point, the agreed policies of the
IEPG and maintain existing links with NATO.
5. Armaments co-operation activities in Europe should be managed by the national armaments
directors of all currenf rcpC members, who will be accountable to the defence ministers of those
member governments.
6. The existing basic structure of the IEPG should, initially, be incorporate{lntg any future anTa-
ments co-operation structure and the existing linkage between the IEPG and EDIG should be main-
tained.
l8
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ANNEX B
Structure of the IEPG
Political level
Ministers/State Secretaries
Ad Hoc Grouo
EC/WEU matt6rs Task Force C3
Operational requirements
and equlpment programmes
Research and technolosv
including the EUCLIS'
programme
Procedures and economic
matters including European
defence equipment malket
Ad hoc Working Group
on Competition andiuste [ietour
Ad hoc Working Group
on Technology Transfer
United Kingdom
* Chairmanship on a rotational basis (two years)
1991:1992: Betsium
1993-1994: Derimark
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ANNEX C
Panel I Sub-group overview
(* observer)
l. Future large aircraft
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom*
2. Armoured bridgelayer interoperability
Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom*
3. Aimed control effect-antitank mine
France, Germany, United Kingdom
4. Third generation antitank weapon
Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom
5. Microwave landing system
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Nonvay, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom
6. STINGER
Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Turkey
7. Coastal minesweeper
Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Norway*
8. Mistral
Belgum, France, Italy, Spain, Norway
9. Low caliber/individual/support weapon
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
10. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual
Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom
11. Armoured recce vehicles
Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom
12. Simulation
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
13. Combat support ship 2000
Netherlands, United Kingdom
14. New logistic vehicles
Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom
15. Short-range antitank weapon
Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, France*
16. Stand off air to ground weapons
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom
17. Command A/D frigate
Germany, Netherlands
18. Low frequency active variable depth sonar
France, Netherlands, United Kingdom
19. Low frequency active dipping sonar for EHl01 and NH90
Italy, United Kingdom
20. Air defence command and control
France, Netherlands
21. Short range anti-radiation missile
France, Germany, Greece
22. Advanced short range air to air missile
Greece, Netherlands, Spain
23. HF radio
France, Netherlands
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CEPA I.
CEPA 2.
CEPA 3.
CEPA 4.
CEPA 5.
CEPA 6.
CEPA 7.
CEPA 8.
CEPA 9.
CEPA IO.
ANNEX D
EUCLID: CEPA/RTP overview
(CTPs in italics: IA signed)
Modern radar technology
RTP 
- 
l.l Mission related aspects
Silicon microelectronics
- 
2.2 SOI technology
- 
2.2 Interconnection assembly
- 
2.3 Military qualifications
- 
2.5 SOI cell library
- 
2.7 Mixed analog digital design
- 
2.8 Very high speed A/D converters
- 
2.9 User programmable integrated circuits
- 
2.13 Interconnections and packaging for MMIC
Composite structures
- 3.1 Application technology
- 3.2 Light ballistic optimisation
- 
3.4 Optimised polymer matrix composites for aerospace structures
- -r.5 Development of technology for high temperature composites
- 
3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows
- 
3.8 Naval application technology
Modular avionics
- 
4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study
Electric gun (dormant)
Artifi cial intelligence
- 
6.1 Advanced work station for command and contol systems
- 
6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment
- 
6.3 Knowledge engineering
- 
6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military applications
- 
6.5 Crew assistant
Signature manipulation
- 
7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes
- 
7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics
Optoelectronic devices
- 
8.1 Affordable lightweight IR sensors
- 8.2 Intelligent sensors
- 8.3 Solid state laser sources
Satellite surveillance technology, including verification aspects
- 
9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation
- 
9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology
- 
9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radar
- 
9.4 Real time processing and data handling
- 
9.5 Ground segment technology
Underwater detection and related technologies
- 
10.1 Low frequency underwater sound propagation
- 
10.2 Towed array heading sensors
- 
10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study
Technology in the field of human factors including simulation for training purposes
- 
ll.l Training system concepts
- 
11.2 Simulation techniques
- 
11.3 Mission and/or battle simulation
- 
11.8 Low cost simulators
2t
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2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stolfelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg,Mt. De Decker (Ntemate for Seeuws) (Vice-Chairmen);
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N.B. Iie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
oa the ealargement of WEU
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Council's energetic action, which resulted in a protocol of accession to WEU
with Greece, a declaration on WEU observers regarding Denmark and Ireland and a document on
associate membership regarding lceland, Norway and Turkey within ayear after the WEU declaration
on enlargement issued at Maastricht on lfth December l99l;
(ii) Regretting that the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
(liti 
. 
Noting that at an earlier stage it strongly expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be
admitted simultaneously as full members and regretting that the Council was not willing to accept this
view;
(iv) Welcoming the fact that, according toifr" document on associate membership of WEU, Iceland,
Norway and Turkey will become associate members on the day that Greece becomes a member of
WEU;
(u) Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's
r6le and existence;
(vi) Noting the Council's reply to Written Questions 300, 311and3l2, where it suggests that the
existence of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty does not preclude the Assembly retaining its full
autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in the Assembly's activities of representatives
from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU;
(vii) Stressing that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic should also find expression in
specific relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
(viii) Considering that national parliaments, when examining for ratification the protocol of Greece's
accession to WEU, will have to take account of the proposed suspension of Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty and of Greece's r6le in European efforts to solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
(ix) Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives from new member states, asso
ciate member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will be a signiflrcant burden on
the budget, personnel, oflice space and chamber required for the Assembly to perform its task properly,
RrcouueNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Confirm the Assembly's full autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in its activ-
ities of representatives from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU and provide
sufficient accommodation and financial means for the Assembly to implement the consequencel of the
accession of Greece, associate membership of Iceland, Norway and Turkey, and observer status of
Denmark and Ireland, as decided in Rome on 20th November 1992;
2. Indicate which countries will be asked to participate in the budget of the Assembly, and their
respective contributions to the financing of this budget, so that the Assembly may keep an account of
the effective participation in WEU;
3. Indicate whether Greece, which has not signed the document on associate membership, is never-
theless committed to this text;
4. Take no steps to promote ratification of the protocol of Greece's accession to WEU before
Greece has clarified its position regarding the solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
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Draft Order
oa the enbrgemcnt of lfEU
The Assembly,
(t) Considering the protocol of accession of Greece to WEU,. the declarati-ol oq WEU observers
i6garding Denmaik and Ireland and the document on the associate membership of WEU regarding
Iceland, Nonray and Turkey;
(ii) Stressing the need to formalise the relationship between lhe WE-U Assembly and parliam-entary
representativel from Denmark and lreland on the one hand and from Iceland, Norwqy and Turkey on
thL other, in an 'observer statute' and an " associate member statute " respectively;
(iii) Considering the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
i,Iungary, Iatvia,lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic at various levels;
(iv) Noting that parliamentarians from the states mentioned under (ill) should. be invited to the
Aisembly's ilenary sessions on a permanent basis as guest members, without voting rights;
(v) lnsisting, however, that at all times, the Assembly qhould retain the_ right to suspend par-lia-
mentary dele[itions from countries where the practice of parliamentary democracy is violated or
where human rights are not being respected;
(vt) Considering that the participation of a disproportionate number of p-arliamenlary observers
irom non-WEU riember states in the plenary debates bf the Assembly may affect the character of the
dialogue between Council and Assembly;
(vii) Aware that any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating
in ine Assembly willbe impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommodation and
budget;
(viii) Considering that it is urgent to make a coherent examination of all political and budgetary ques-
tions, including tlhe Rules of Procedure, in order to take full account of the consequences for the
Assembly of WEU's enlargement,
l. hwrrss its Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges:
to examine the creation of a specific " associate member' status for representatives of asso-
ciate member states which will give full participation and voting rights in committees and
the right to participate in the plenary sessions of the Assembly with membership of delega-
tions on the same basis as the present Council of Europe arrangements;
to examine the creation of an " observer status' and a 'permanent observer " or " guest
member status " for representatives of observer states and of the nine Central European
countries assembled in the forum of consultation respectively;
2. INvrrrs the Political Committee to monitor the development of WEU's enlargement;
3. INvrrrs the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to examine in detail the conse-
quences of enlargement for the Assembly's budget and premises;
4. INvnes the Presidential Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the Political Committee, the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges in this mitter, so as to ensure that appropriate reports and recommendations can be put to
the Assembly no later than its December 1993 meeting.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mt Ward, Rapponeur)
I. Introduction
l. For WEU, the signing of the Treaty on
European Union in Maastricht has set in motion
an immensely important process of change
which is already profoundly affecting its activ-
ities. Immediately after having signed the Treaty
on European Union, the nine member states of
WEU issued two declarations. The first decla-
ration referred to the rOle of WEU and its rela-
tions with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance, a subject which has recently
been discussed in the report on European
security policy, submitted on behalf of the
Political Committee by Mr. Goerens,
Rapporteur t. The second declaration concerned
the enlargement of WEU. As is known, the
Council of WEU worked out its intentions on
enlargement in Part III of the Petersberg decla-
ration of 19th June 1992, providing basic guide-
lines for relations between WEU and other
European states, whether members of the
European Union or of the Atlantic Alliance. On
the same day, the WEU Council of Ministers
held an extraordinary meeting with states of
Central Europe, after which a declaration was
issued on their mutual relations.
2. The present report will flrrst provide a
concise review of the Council's activities
regarding enlargement and relations with other
European states. It will then examine the conse-
quences of enlargement of WEU for the
Assembly and the policy to be conducted as
regards parliamentary observers.
3. It should be emphasised here that the
present accommodation and budget of the
Assembly do not allow for any significant
enlargement of the number of parliamentary
delegations participating in the Assembly's
activities. If the Assembly is obliged, through
initiatives of the Council and through the con-
siderable increase of interest in WEU's activities
in general, to increase the number of parlia-
mentary delegations engaged fully or partly in its
activities, it must be granted the accommo-
dation and financial means to meet these new
legal and political obligations. (An analysis of
the effects of enlargement on staff and premises
is given as an appendix to this report.)
II. Relations bctween WEU
and other European states
A. Relations between WEU and the other
European member states of the European
Union or the Atlantic Alliance
4. In a declaration issued on the occasion of
the 46th European Council meeting in Maas-
tricht on 9th and l0th December 1991, the
WEU member states stated the following:
* States which are members of the
European Union are invited to accede to
WEU on conditions to be agreed in
accordance with Article XI of the mod-
iflred Brussels Treaty, or to become
observers if they so wish. Simultaneously,
other European member states of NATO
are invited to become associate members
of WEU in a way which will give them the
possibility to participate fully in the activ-
ities of WEU.
The member states of WEU assume that
treaties and agreements corresponding
with the above proposals will be con-
cluded before 31st December 1992."
5. The principles decided in Maastricht in
December 1991 were followed by detailed pro-
posals set out in Part III ofthe Petersberg decla-
ration in June 19922.
6. Immediately after the Petersberg decla-
ration, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU
Council, invited Denmark, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Norway and Turkey to open discussions
on the detailed proposals for their relations with
WEU.
7. On 20th November 1992, and in
accordance with the timetable envisaged by the
Council, discussions with these states resulted in
different agreements to be examined in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
(a) Greece
8. A protocol of accession to WEU was
signed with Greece 3. It is well known that
Greece made availability of WEU membership
to Greece a condition of agreeing to the Treaty
on European Union. According to this protocol,
Greece accepted the Petersberg declaration in
full, in particular Part III, including the funda-
2. Document 1322.
3. Document 1350.1. Document 1342.
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mental principles on which relations between
member states and associate member states
should be based.
9. These include: settlement of their mutual
differences by peaceful means and refraining
from resorting to the threat or use of force.
Further, the Council excluded the possibility of
evoking Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty in relations between members and asso-
ciate members of WEU.
10. At an earlier stage, the Assembly had
already regretted that the Council had felt
obliged to declare that the field of application of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty was
subject to certain restrictions.
ll. According to the protocol of accession,
" the enlargement of Western European Union
to include the Hellenic Republic represents a
significant step in the development of the
European security and defence identity ". There
is no doubt about Greece's determination to
participate fully in the process of European inte-
gration. On the other hand, the policy of Greece
regarding the crisis in former Yugoslavia did not
appear to give full support to the intentions of
the other EC member states.
12. It is recalled here that in paragraph 3 of
Recommendation 525 to the Council, the
Assembly's Standing Committee * insists that
Greece give the necessary assurances of total
compliance with the United Nations embargo
before continuing the present negotiations for
WEU membership ". In its reply, the Council
stated that it " takes due note of the sug-
gestion ", which in the Assembly's view reflects
the Council's reluctant attitude in this matter.
Greece's traditional good relations with Serbia
have led to friction over the application of the
United Nations embargo. Moreover, Greece has
used its veto to block the EC's recognition of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an
independent state, notwithstanding the fact that
in January 1992 a committee of legal experts
under the chairmanship of Mr. Badinter had
concluded that Macedonia met all the condi-
tions for recognition by the EC.
13. Greece has expressed fears that a new
independent Republic of Macedonia may
become a threat to peace in that region, alleging
in its constitution of lTth November 1991 that
there are references to the possibility of
changing existing borders and intervening in the
internal affairs of neighbouring states on the
pretext of issues concerning the status and the
rights of alleged minorities a. Meanwhile, on 7th
4. For a full recent statement by Greece on this subject, see
the Memorandum of Greece concerning the application of
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia fior admission
to the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly
Document N471877, S/25158, 25th January 1993).
April 1993, the United Nations Security Council
adopted a resolution which cleared the way for
the admission of Macedonia, to be referred to
provisionally as the " former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia " to the United Nations. The
question of both the name and the flag of the
new state should be left to be settled under the
auspices of the international mediators in the
Balkans, Cyrus R. Vance and Lord Owen.
14. Considering the conceivable risks of a
further extension of armed conflicts on the ter-
ritory of former Yugoslavia up to a point where
even neighbouring states may get involved,
WEU member states might postpone ratification
of the protocol of accession of Greece until an
agreement on the Macedonian question has
been reached which would provide enough guar-
antees for the inviolability of existing borders
and for the protection of the rights of minorities.
Failing this, WEU member states may face the
application of Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty, obliging its member states to afford " all
the military and other aid and assistance in their
power... if any of the high contracting parties
should be the object of an armed attack in
Europe ". Greek membership should enhance
the mutual coherence and security which is the
objective of the WEU alliance and not be a
source of additional security risks.
(b) Denmark and lreland
15. Also on 2fth November 1992, the WEU
Council of Ministers issued a declaration on
WEU observers 5. In preceding discussions, both
Denmark and Ireland had indicated their
interest in becoming WEU observers, and their
status has now been formalised in the
abovementioned declaration.
16. After Danish voters narrowly rejected the
Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in June
1992, Denmark was granted the possibility of
opting out on monetary union, common defence
policy and European citizenship and a second
referendum on the Treaty on European Union is
to be held on lSth May 1993.
(c) Iceland, Norway and Turkey
17. On 2fth November 1992,the Ministers for
Foreign Alfairs of the WEU member states and
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Iceland,
Norway and Turkey issued a document on assG
ciate membership of Iceland, Norway and
Turkey 6. Paragraph 5 of this document stipulates:
* The Republic of lceland, the Kingdom
of Nonvay and the Republic of Turkey
will become associate members of WEU
on the day the Hellenic Republic becomes
Document 1348.
Document 1351.
5.
6.
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a member of WEU. In the meantime, the
Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of
Nonvay and the Republic of Turkey will be
considered as active observers to WEU. "
18. A full discussion of Turkey's position in
the European and Atlantic Alliance's security
framework is provided in the report on Turkey
prepared on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Moya (Document l34l).
B. Relations between WEU and Central
European states
19. In an official declaration issued after an
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council with
states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June
1992, it was stated that:
* The enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania should reflect the specific rela-
tions which exist and are developing
between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. "
20. This declaration clearly confirms the exis-
tence of a parallel development in economic and
security relations of the EC/European Union
and WEU with third countries.
21. The ministers also decided that the
foreign and defence ministers of WEU member
states and of the abovementioned Central
European states would meet once a year, while
additional meetings at ministerial level might
be convened if circumstances require. Fur-
thermore, a forum of consultation was estab-
lished between the WEU Permanent Council
and the ambassadors of the countries concerned
which will meet at the seat of the WEU Council
at least twice a year. The first meeting of the
WEU forum of consultation was held in London
on l4th October 1992.ln the Petersberg decla-
ration it was also stated that: * Ministers advo-
cated the development of relations between the
WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the
states concerned. "
22. The Assembly could play a useful r6le in
building bridges with these countries through
various kinds of activities which will be
examined in the second part of this report 7.
III. Relations between the WEU Assembly,
parliaments of other European member states
of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance,
and parliaments of other European states
A. Preliminary remarl<s
23. The declarations, decisions and agree-
ments referred to in Chapter II of the present
7. Relations between WEU and Central European states will
be examined in more detail in a report being prepared on
behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Wintgens.
report oblige the Assembly to adopt and revise
its policy regarding its relations with parlia-
ments of other European states. The objective is
to develop a logical and consistent line of
conduct in order to prevent ambiguities. It
should be noted, however, that with regard to
observers the basic principle as embodied in
Rule 17 should remain intacts.
24. Before discussing the Assembly's policy in
more detail, it may be useful to specify some
principles which should always be observed:
- 
Apart from the obligations laid down in
the Charter of the Assembly and the
modified Brussels Treaty as regards full
members of WEU, the WEU Assembly
also has certain obligations as regards
the parliamentary delegations of states
which will have the status of associate
member or observer in WEU as men-
tioned in Chapter II A of the present
report. It has full autonomy to take
decisions regarding its relations with
the parliaments of other states. In this
respect there is no compulsion to follow
exactly the line of conduct of the
Council. On the other hand, there
should be no misunderstanding that the
Assembly's $anting of special status to
a parliamentary delegation does not
necessarily lead to similar actions being
taken by the Council.
- 
The Assembly will have to create a
special status for parliamentary repre-
sentatives from associate member
states and observer states which will be
unambiguous and easy to understand
for everyone concerned. The status for
these two categories of representatives
should not bring a heavy burden to bear
on the functioning of the Assembly.
- 
Major changes in the Rules of Pro-
cedure should be avoided, while those
changes deemed inevitable should not
affect the specific character of the
Assembly's Rules of Procedure and its
activities.
- 
An increase in the number of delega-
tions participating fully or partly in the
Assembly's activities, which is a direct
consequence of decisions taken by the
WEU Council, should be accompanied
by a proportional increase in the budget
of the Assembly.
- 
The number of members and observers
attending committee meetings and
8. Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly reads:
'On the proposal of the Presidential Committee the Assembly
may admit representatives of parliaments of non-member
states of WEU as observers. These observers shall sit in the
chamber but not be entitled to vote. They may speak with the
authorisation of the President of the Assembly. "
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taking part in other committee activ-
ities may have to be reviewed in order
to maintain the effectiveness of such
meetings and activities.
- 
If the Assembly creates a status of par-
liamentary observer which could also
be granted to parliamentarians from
European states not members of the
EC/European Union or the Atlantic
Alliance, it should take into account (a)
the truly democratic and parliamentary
nature of the country from which par-
liamentarians are invited; to this end,
the Assembly might follow the deci-
sions taken by the Council of Europe;(b) the determination of the country
concerned to play an effective r6le in a
European security organisation.
- 
At all times, the Assembly should retain
the right to suspend the permanent
observer status of parliamentary delega-
tions from countries where the practice
of parliamentary democracy is violated
or where human rights are not being
respected.
- 
The Assembly invites parliamentary
observers with the aim of establishing a
political dialogue that takes into
account the various opinions of both
government and opposition in the
nation concerned. In principle it should
invite not more than two parliamentary
observers from a given country, in the
hope that one of them will represent the
opposition. In some instances, it might
issue an invitation to more than two
observers for a particular meeting in
order to hear a broader spectrum of
opinions.
- 
The Assembly should retain the ability
to invite, whenever it deems necessary,
parliamentary observers from any
country without this constituting an
obligation to renew such invitations.
- 
Any reasonable enlargement of the
number of parliamentary delegations
participating in the Assembly's activ-
ities will be impossible in the present
accommodation.
B. Proposals regarding dffirent categories of
European states
(i) Member states of the EC which will be full
members of or observers in WEU
(a) Greece
25. After admission, Greece will be entitled to
send a full parliamentary delegation, i.e. its dele-
gation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe.
26. As regards Greek parliamentary represen-
tation in the Assembly, during the period
between 20th November 1992, when the Pro
tocol of Accession of Greece was signed, and the
entry into force of the Protocol, Greece would
like the Assembly to adopt the same procedure
as it adopted for delegations from Spain and
Portugal.
27. It is recalled here that in an early stage of
preliminary talks between Spain, Portugal and
WEU, the Assembly had invited parliamentary
observers from Portugal and Spain to partic-
ipate in all committee meetings and plenary
Assembly sessions with a right to speak but
without the right to vote. It should also be
noted, however, that these invitations were
inspired by the Assembly's desire to see both
countries to accede to WEU as soon as pos-
sible.
28. In the case of Greece, it is Greece itself
which has exerted maximum pressure on the
European Council and on the Council of WEU
to be admitted to WEU. The Assembly has
never seen any specific advantage in early Greek
accession to WEU and, as a consequence, there
would be no reason at the moment to provide
preferential treatment for Greek parliamentary
observers as long as the protocol of accession of
Greece to WEU has not been ratified in the sig-
natory countries.
29. The proposal is to continue inviting
Greek parliamentary observers to Assembly ses-
sions with a right to speak until the accession
protocol has been ratified, after which date the
members of the Greek parliamentary delegation
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe may
assume its rights as a full parliamentary dele-
gation to the Assembly of WEU. The conse-
quences of full Greek participation in the
Assembly's activities as regards the provision of
oflice space, interpretation facilities and per-
sonnel should be worked out as soon as the
Council has provided the necessary financial
means.
30. As regards these financial consequences,
reference is made here to paragraph 15 of the
draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 e. In
view of the process of ratification of the Pro-
tocol of Accession, it is now clear that Greece's
accession to WEU will not take place before
1994, but the document referred to here still
provides an order of magnitude of additional
costs for the Assembly.
(b) Ireland and Denmark
31. With Ireland having become an observer
in WEU, representatives from Ireland should be
invited to be observers in the Assembly.
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32. Denmark has also responded positively to
the invitation to become an observer in WEU.
For several years now, observers from the
Danish Parliament have attended sessions of the
Assembly with the right to speak.
33. It seems logical to grant representatives of
both observer states the right to be observers,
including the right to speak in committee
meetings and at plenary sessions of the
Assembly. As regards the size of parliamentary
observer delegations from Denmark and
Ireland, reference should be made to the size of
their delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, i.e. 5 and 4 representa-
tives respectively. The number of representa-
tives to be observers in meetings of the various
committees may then be deduced from the
breakdown given in Rule 40 of the Assembly's
Rules of Procedure. It is known that, for several
years now, parliamentary observers from
Denmark have attended sessions of the
Assembly.
34. By inviting parliamentary observers from
both Ireland and Denmark, the Assembly can
act as a bridge to enable parliamentarians from
these countries to familiarise themselves with
discussions in WEU.
(ii) European member states of the Atlantic
Alliance which will be associate members of
WEU: Iceland, Norway and Turkey
35. These countries may participate fully in
the meetings of the WEU Council 
- 
without
prejudice to the provisions of Article VIII of the
modified Brussels Treaty 
- 
subject to certain
conditions, which are listed in the Document on
Associate Membership ro.
36. Turkey expressed very clearly its wishes
about the status of its parliamentary representa-
tives in the Assembly. The Turkish authorities
consider that the following essential principles
should be retained in determining Turkey's
associate member status in the WEU
Assembly:
- 
as the Charter and Rules of Procedure
of the WEU Assembly at present make
no provision for the status of associate
member, these texts should be revised
and modified accordingly;
- 
it should be made possible for Turkey
to participate fully in all the Assembly's
activities;
- 
in this context, Turkish parliamen-
tarians participating in the WEU
Assembly should be given the right to
speak, vote and originate documents;
- 
in the same context, Turkish parlia-
mentarians should be represented at all
levels in all the Assembly's committees
and assume corresponding responsibil-
ities.
37. In fact, the WEU Council has strongly
encouraged the Assembly to grant as many
rights as possible to parliamentary representa-
tives from states which are associate members
of, or observers in, WEU in order to enable
them to participate fully in the Assembly's activ-
ities.
38. In order to clarify a number of legal
problems in connection with associate mem-
bership, members of the Political Committee
submitted Written Questions 300, 3ll and 312
to the Council. In its answers, the Council con-
firmed the Assembly's view that, in accordance
with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,
only representatives of the Brussels Treaty
powers can be full members of the WEU
Assembly. However, it added that * In the
Council's view... this does not preclude full par-
ticipation in the Assembly's activities of repre-
sentatives from states which are associate
members of, or observers in, WEU, on a basis to
be decided by the Assembly. " The Council con-
tinued, saying that " the Assembly therefore
retains its full autonomy for resolving the
problems in question. "
39. In the Assembly's view it is indeed fully
autonomous to resolve the problems in
question, but only within the limits of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. It can therefore grant full
participation in its activities to representatives
from associate member states within the limits
of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,
which reads:
" The Council of Western European
Union shall make an annual report on its
activities and in particular concerning the
control of armaments to an Assembly
composed of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consul-
tative Assembly of the Council of
Europe. "
40. This article does not prohibit full partici-
pation in the activities of the Assembly by repre-
sentatives of associate member states. However,
they cannot be full members of the Assembly.
What then should be the difference between full
members and the representatives of associate
member states? There is a clue in Article IX,
here to be seen in connection with the Council's
answer to Written Question 300. In thisquestion, it was asked whether associate
members took part in the drafting and adoption
of the annual report of the Council. In its
answer, the Council stated:
" As regards the drafting and adoption of
the Council's annual report, the modified10. Document 1322.
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Brussels Treaty clearly states that a
Council created by the High Contracting
Parties (Article VIII, paragraph 1) 'shall
make an annual report on its activities...'(Article IX). It is pointed out that Part III
of the Petersberg declaration specified
that neither associate members nor
observers are parties to the modified
Brussels Treaty. "
41. Since associate members are clearly not
entitled to participate in the drafting and
adoption of the Council's annual report, it would
be odd and even contrary to the intention of
Article IX and the democratic principle which is
the basis of this article to allow representatives
from a given state to vote on a recommendation
regarding an annual report for which the gov-
ernment of that same state is not responsible.
42. As a consequence, representatives ofasso-
ciate member states can be granted the right to
participate and vote in committee meetings and
to participate in the plenary sessions of the
Assembly with the right to vote on all matters
except the Annual Report of the High con-
tracting Parties of the modified Brussels Treaty.
As regards the number of representatives from
associate member states which should be
allowed to participate in the Assembly's activ-
ities, reference should be made to the size of the
parliamentary delegations from Iceland, Norway
and Turkey to the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, i.e. 3, 5 and 12 represen-
tatives respectively. The number of representa-
tives participating in meetings of the various
committees can then be deduced from the
breakdown given in Rule 40 of the Assembly's
Rules of Procedures. A number of formal details
regarding the participation of representatives of
associate member states will have to be worked
out by the Assembly's Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges in an " associate
member status ". In that framework, many ques-
tions may arise, such as whether associate
members should participate in meetings of the
Presidential Committee and whether they would
have an influence on the quorum required in
committee meetings. It seems, however, that the
" associate member status " can be regulated in a
limited set of rules.
43. In order to provide normal working con-
ditions for these associate member delegations,
each of them should have a delegation office at
its disposal in the Assembly's premises.
(iii) Central European states participating in the
forum of consultation: Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lith-
uania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak
Republic
44. As set out in the declaration issued after
the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council
of Ministers with states of Central Europe on
l9th June 1992, ministers have decided to
strengthen existing relations by restructuring the
dialogue, consultations and co.operation in
order to enable the Central European nations to
acquaint themselves with the future security and
defence policy of the European Union and find
new opportunities to cmperate with WEU.
45. It should also be recalled here that the
ministers advocated the development of rela-
tions between the WEU Assembly and the par-
liaments of the states concerned. It is in the
Assembly's interest to continue to intensify the
political dialogue with parliamentary delega-
tions from these countries that had been estab-
lished in previous years. But the question could
be asked whether they should be given a status
of permanent observer or whether they should
be invited each time by special decision. Taking
into account the standing practice and the
opinion of the Assembly as expressed in several
previous recommmendations, it would be
logical to grant delegations from these countries
a status of permanent observer at the Assembly's
plenary sessions with a right to speak if there is
sufficient evidence that the members of the par-
liaments concerned have been elected democrat-
ically. Moreover, a status of permanent observer
would also, albeit partly, accommodate the
strong desire ofthese countries to be included in
discussions on European security and defence at
all possible levels. Finally, it should be said that
any other decision would be contrary to expecta-
tions raised earlier.
(iv) Neutral and other European states which
have applied 
.for membership of the
European Union or which are considering
doing so: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Maha,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland
46. Most of these countries have shown an
interest in the activities of WEU, and in par-
ticular of its Assembly, and an increasing
number of them are asking for parliamentary
observers to be invited. Although public opinionin the countries which are neutral or have
adopted a policy of neutrality is only changing
gradually, their governments are mostly aware
that after the cold war the concept of neutrality
makes much less sense. As an indication of the
changing atmosphere it should be mentioned
that, at the Assembly's December 1992 session,
Mr. Fasslabend, Austria's Federal Minister of
Defence, said that accession to the European
Community had become the key to Austria's
security and that his country accepted the
objective of a common defence policy as
included in the Treaty on European Union. The
Minister also wished WEU to take steps to
institutionalise its relations with countries that
had applied for accession to the European
Union. Sooner or later, the Assembly will have
to invite parliamentary observers from all these
states.
30
DOCUMENT 1360
47. Accession negotiations have started with
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden and the
Commission hopes to achieve EC membershipby 1993 if their governments win public
approval. The Commission's opinion on the
Cyprus and Malta applications is expected this
year. For the time being, the Swiss Government
is not in a position to apply for Swiss mem-
bership since, in a December 1992 referendum,
the Swiss rejected accession to the European
economrc area.
48. It should be noted here that, when the EC
approved Norway's application for membership,
the EC Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and
Security, Mr. Hans van den Broek, stressed that
all the applicants had to accept existing EC rules
and laws and the Maastricht Treaty. He also
restated the EC policy that there was no
prospect of granting the applicants the possi-
bility of opting out on monetary union, common
defence policy and European citizenship.
(v) The Russian Federation and other inde-
pendent republics on the territory of the
former Soviet Union, Albania and the new
independent republics on the territory of
former Yugoslavia
49. The states mentioned in this section do
not constitute a homogeneous group.
50. The Russian Federation is by far the most
important power in Eastern Europe and it will
certainly try to reaffirm its position as a leading
nation once it has overcome the present crisis.
However, the mere fact that the Russian Fede-
ration has special guest status in the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
cannot be a reason for giving it similar or com-
parable status in the Assembly. On the other
hand, it should be kept in mind that Russia is
recognised as the legal successor to the former
USSR, with which the Assembly established
relations as early as 1987.
51. The Assembly should therefore try to
pursue the existing dialogue with representatives
of the Russian Federation in a way which is satis-
factory to both sides. As regards the other inde-
pendent republics on the territory of the former
Soviet Union, it seems too early for the Assembly
to invite representatives from all these new states
as observers, knowing that their participation in
NACC and CSCE meetings is already causing
problems for them in many ways. An exception
may have to be made for Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova, each of which has borders with states
having closer links with WEU.
52. The Chairman of the Supreme Rada of
Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament, recently
requested the WEU Assembly to consider the
possibility of granting Ukraine observer status
in the Assembly, the objective being to initiate a
step-by-step development of special relations
between WEU and Ukraine.
53. It seems unwise to think of inviting
observers from the new republics ofthe territory
of former Yugoslavia and from Albania on a
regular basis before a balanced and lasting peace
agreement has been reached which would also
guarantee the existence of parliamentary democ-
racles.
(vi) The European Parliament
54. The invitation to observers from the
European Parliament must be the subject of ajoint agreement between the two assemblies,
giving equal and reciprocal status to the
observers of both assemblies.
55. As there is no observer status in the
European Parliament, there is no reason for the
WEU Assembly to offer such status to members
of the European Parliament. Relations therefore
have to be considered on a different basis.
56. On 23rd September 1992, the Presidents
of the WEU Assembly and of the European Par-
liament met in Brussels. The two Presidents
have now:
(a) decided to meet regularly. Some
members of the Political Committee
have asked that representatives of
each political group be invited to
attend these meetings;
(b) examined the possibility of exchanges
of ideas and documents between
rapporteurs from the two assemblies
dealing with matters of joint interest.
Such exchanges were obviously
desirable provided they did not allow
a representative of one assembly to
have a prior view of the work of the
other, thus respecting Rule 42, paru-
gaph 10, of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly;
(c,) examined the possibility of meetings
between committees or subcommittees
of the two assemblies.
57. Moreover, a proposal has been made in
the Political Committee for delegations of not
more than six members of the Assembly's
Presidential Committee and the European
Parliament's Bureau to meet in the future in
order to make sure that the ag"reement between
both Presidents is implemented.
Conclusions
(i) As a consequence of the WEU Council's
decisions on enlargement, the creation of the
status of associate member state and observer
state and the establishment of a forum of consul-
tation, the Assembly is obliged to revise its
policy regarding parliamentary representatives
from non-WEU member states having a specific
relationship with WEU.
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(it) Notwithstanding the abovementioned, the
existing Rule 17 of the Assembly's Rules of Pro-
cedure should be maintained since it offers a sat-
isfactory framework for inviting observers of
any kind from any state.(it) While working out a status for different
categories of representatives, a clear distinction
should be made between, (a) a provisional situ-
ation, lasting until the ratification of the Pro-
tocol of Accession of Greece and during which
no new status can be introduced, and (b) the new
situation after ratification of the Protocol of
Accession of Greece when a newly established
status can be launched.
(iv) Once the principles set out in this report
have been adopted by the Assembly, the
Assembly's committees should take the fol-
lowing action:
- 
the Political Committee should monitor
the development of WEU's enlargement;
- 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration should consider the
consequences of enlargement for the
Assembly's budget and premises;
- 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges should prepare the nec-
essary changes in the Rules ofProcedure.
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APPENDIX
Effects of enlargement on the premises and staff
of the Assembly
(a) Chamber
1. At present the Assembly has 108 members
and an equal number of substitutes representing
the nine countries. There will be ll5 members
when the accession of Greece is ratified.
2. If observer and associate members were to
be represented by their delegation to the Council
of Europe, there would be 144 members and an
equal number of substitutes.
3. Nine other countries belong to the WEU
forum of consultation. If they were to be repre-
sented permanently by two observers at each
session, 162 parliamentarians from 24 countries
would be convened to sessions.
4. The Assembly has shown its intention to
continue inviting observers from non-member
countries to attend sessions. If it were to do this
for the eleven countries likely to wish to send
observers here and now, with two observers per
country, invitations would have to be sent to
about twenty observers, making in all 184 par-
liamentarians from 35 countries.
5. The Council has already asked for repre-
sentatives from governments of observer coun-
tries and associate members to be invited to sit
in the Chamber during sessions, which, with two
representatives per country, four for the
Secretariat-General and four reserved for min-
isters and their advisers, would mean reserving
38 seats for governments, which would make a
total of 222 seats.
6. In view ofthe need to reserve a few seats
for substitutes, secretaries ofgroups or ofdelega-
tions, interpreters for countries without simulta-
neous interpretation, etc., it would be necessary
to have 250 seats.
'1. Since the Chamber of the Economic and
Social Council has 238 seats, it would still be
possible to use it provided there was not a full
attendance. Any increase in these figures,
however, would make it necessary for the
Assembly to hold its sessions elsewhere, which
would involve considerable expenditure (the
excess cost ofholding a session in Strasbourg has
been assessed at between F 1 and 1.5 million).
8. For any session held in Paris, the
Assembly, for its part, would have to take a
number of essential but hardly satisfactory steps,
such as:
- 
terminating the right of honorary
members to sit in the Chamber;
- 
reserving the galleries for honorary
members and the press, as long as the
installation of a Greek interpretation
booth has not been decided upon. After
that, a televised system would have to
be installed in the press room;
- 
restricting access to sessions for the
public which would have to follow the
debates by television in the lobby and
extending the atea for viewing 
.byincreasing the number of television
sets.
9. If the Assembly decides to keep its seat in
Paris, it would have to examine, together with
the Economic and Social Council and with the
association of interpreters, the possibility of
installing permanent interpretation equipment
and, to this end, using television sets in the
interpreters' booths, which would no longer be
placed on the balcony.
(b) Committee rooms
10. The Assembly has two fully-equipped
committee rooms. They each have forty seats
around the table and twenty seats at the side. It
is clearly essential to provide a seat at the table
and to leave a certain number of seats for alter-
nates at the side. The two largest committees
now have thirty-four members. There will be
thirty-seven with the accession of Greece. Three
places have to be reserved for the Office of the
Clerk.
ll. In these conditions, if delegations from
observer and associate member countries are to
be invited to attend committee meetings, they
would have to be limited to twelve, i.e. four for
Turkey and two for each other country. They
would then have to sit at the side.
12. Should these limits not be respected, it
would become impossible to use the committee
rooms at the seat of the Assembly in normal
conditions and the Assembly would have to
have new premises.
(c) Delegation ffices
13. It would seem essential to provide the
parliamentary delegations of observer or asso-
ciate member countries with premises adapted
to their requirements.
14. It would also seem desirable to provide
other delegations of observers with a certain
number of offices. If nine delegations are
planned for the countries of the forum and
about ten others for neutral or former members
of the Soviet Union, i.e. about twenty delega-
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tions, it would seem necessary to make ten
offices available in a manner yet to be deter-
mined.
15. The Assembly should therefore have at
least twenty-five more offices.
16. Furthermore, if new posts are to be
created in the Office of the Clerk, more offrces
would be necessary.
(d) Use of languages
17. Present rules allow parliamentarians of
each member country to use the official lan-
guage of their country at both committee
meetings and during sessions and to have simul-
taneous interpretation into that language at ses-
sions. This application would mean installing a
Greek booth for sessions and recruiting inter-
preters for Greek during committee meetings
once the accession of Greece is ratified.
18. The installation of a Greek booth would
preclude the use of the gaflery for the public
during sessions due to the weight and thc space
occupied by eight interpretation booths. The use
of an additional language would make it impos-
sible to use the Chamber of the Economic and
Social Council.
19. Conversely, limiting the number of lan-
guages used would make it possible to continue
using that Chamber. An initial consultation of
the Presidential Committee on this matter gave
the impression that there might be strong oppo-
sition to any limitation of the number of lan-
guages used and that the Assembly would ask for
Greet to be given the same advantages as the
other offrcial languages. It would then become
very diffrcult to oppose the acceptance of the
language of any further country joining WEU.
20. If this were so, it would have to be
expected that any new country joining WEU, or
even here and now certain associate members,
would wish their oflicial language to have the
same advantages as the official languages of the
present member states. There are therefore firm
grounds for fearing a proliferation of oflicial lan-
guages which would be a heavy burden on the
budget of the Assembly, would exclude the use
of the Chamber of the Economic and Social
Council, would make extremely complicated
any travelling by the committees and would take
more time for translations.
2L. Clearly, any increase in the number of
'languages 
used would mean increasing the staff
of ihe -Office of the Clerk, particularly in the
translation and sittings services (verbatim and
summary reporters) and also throughout the
other services. This would also mean additional
offices being made available for the new staff
during the sessions and there is little hope of
obtaining them in the premises of the Economic
and Social Council.
22. A wise course would certainly be to adopt
the rules of the Council of Europe which limit
the number of languages authorised. The legal
grounds for this ruling are dubious, however,
ind it is not certain that parliamentarians will
asree. nor even that the Council of Europe will
bE able to maintain its position for very long.
There is reason to fear that the Assembly will
quickly be obliged to adopt a practice similar to
that of the European Parliament where all the
languages of the member countries are
accepted.
(e) Ollicials in the Ofrice of the Clerk
23. When Spain and Portugal joined, the par-
liamentary delegations of these two countries
strongly insisted on having at least o1_e grade A
official of their nationality in the Offrce of the
Clerk. The Council, which refused to create
posts to correspond to the increase in the
workload of the Oflice of the Clerk, agreed to
the creation of posts for one Spanish and one
Portuguese national. There are grounds for
thinkihg that the accession of Greece will lead to
similar claims with a like response.
24. At the same time, it is not excluded that
associate members, and in particular Turkey,
will claim the same right.
25. Furthermore, the management of rela-
tions with an increasing number of countries,
their governments, parliaments and various
instituaes would require a significant increase in
the number of oflicials in the Oflice of the Clerk
who can no longer meet all the obligations
devolving from the development of WEU's
activities and its external relations.
(/) Budget of the Assembly
26. The development of WEU's activities in
1993 led to an increase in the budget of the
Secretariat-General that can be estimated at
about 7570, whereas the Assembly's budget has
been kept to the principle of zero $owth. A sig-
nificanCincrease in the budget of the Assembly
is still, therefore, essential. Its magnitude will
depend on whether the seat of the Assembly
stays the same or whether another will have to
be-found. Even if the Assembly stays in its
present premises, it will have to be given the
means necessary for holding sessions or
meetings elsewhere as and when necessary.
Should-the seat of the Assembly be maintained,
it is expected that expenditure would have to be
increased from 30 to 500/0. Ifthe seat is changed,
the increase will depend on factors that cannot
be assessed at present but, in any event, it would
be much gfeater.
27. The Petersberg declaration said that asso-
ciate members would be invited to make a
financial contribution to the budgets of WEU.
Consequently, it would seem nonnal for coun-
tries with the status of associate member of the
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Assembly of WEU to contribute to its budget in
accordance with a cost-sharing formula on
which the governments concerned should reach
agreement. According to the Petersberg decla-
ration, this might be the case for associate
members but nothing is said about observers.
Clearly, the countries concerned will wish to
limit their contributions in a manner commen-
surate with the advantages of the status the
Assembly grants them. Conversely, it is not pos-
sible to ask for contributions from countries
without the benefit of a status, even if expend-
iture is incurred by the presence of their parlia-
mentary delegation.
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I. Introduction
The second half of 1992 was marked by
the Ministerial Council of 2fth November at
which a number of major decisions were taken
pursuant to the objectives laid down in the dec-
larations made by WEU Ministers in Maastricht
and at Petersberg. These decisions on
enlargement, the development of WEU's opera-
tional r6le, the transfer of the Council and
Secretariat-General to Brussels in January 1993,
practical measures concerning relations with the
European Union and with the organs of the
Atlantic Alliance and, lastly, on the dialogue
with third countries 
- 
illustrated just how far
WEU has enhanced the European defence
identity since the Rome Declaration in October
1984 at which the basic guidelines for the
organisation's reactivation were set. In that
sense, the Rome Ministerial Council may be
considered as having been the starting point for
a reactivation which has been an undeniable
success in the process of building a European
Union.
WEU's enlargement to a tenth member -
Greece, 
- 
to two observers 
- 
Denmark and
Ireland 
- 
means that its European dimension is
complete and carries forward the process of con-
vergence between the main body responsible for
European intergovernmental co-operation on
security and defence and the Twelve. In a way,
therefore, the obstacle which the Genscher-
Colombo proposals encountered all those years
ago has been overcome. The European inte-
gration process now has a security and defence
dimension without which it would have been
incomplete.
Enlargement also, through an association
arrangement, to three European members of the
Atlantic Alliance who are not members of the
European Community, likewise brings a true
dimension to the European pillar of NATO. It
opens up the prospect for increased cohesion
among Europeans within a revamped alliance. It
gives them the possibility to prepare joint posi-
tions with a view to their introduction, in a
spirit of openness, into the alliance's politico-
military consultation process. These positions,
formulated with due regard to the obligations
arising from the North Atlantic Treaty, will be
compatible with the decisions taken within the
alliance framework. On the basis of this funda-
mental compatibility, the organs of WEU and
the alliance will co-operate under flexible
arrangements and in accordance with the
twofold principle of complementarity and trans-
parency, plus the necessary reciprocity.
The development of WEU's operational
r0le with the aim of building it up as the future
defence component of the European Union and
enabling it to make an effective contribution to
humanitarian assistance missions, peace-keeping
and peace-making and hence to the promotion
of international peace and stability has con-
tinued with the following results:
- 
an examination of questions regardingthe creation of military units
answerable to WEU;
- 
the establishment of the WEU planning
cell on lst October 1992;
- 
a decision favouring the transfer of
IEPG functions to WEU;
- 
alterations, with a view to fitting out
the Torrej6n building for the WEU sat-
ellite centre.
The consultations on anns control and
disarmament continued within WEU as did
work on the practical arrangements in the field
of verification and the implementation of the
Open Skies Treaty.
Lastly, ministers decided to continue the
dialogue with the countries of Central Europe,
principally within the forum of consultation,
and gradually to establish a dialogue with the
Maghreb countries.
1992 was the last year of activity of the
Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General
in London, where they had been for over 25
years. On l6th December 1992, on the occasion
of its last meeting in Belgravia, the Council
expressed its gratitude to Her Majesty's Govern-
ments for their hospitality and very effective
support.
II. Situation in former Yugoslavia
The Permanent Council was regularly
briefed by the United Kingdom Permanent Rep
resentative, in his capacity as Chairman-in-
Office, on the European Community's medi-
ation efforts and diplomatic initiatives in the
face of a steadily worsening situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
On lOth July 1992 in Helsinki, in the
margins of the CSCE summit, WEU ministers
took two decisions: to implement the moni-
toring operations in the Adriatic in co-
ordination with NATO and to step up humani-
tarian aid. The United Nations Secretary-
General and the CSCE Chairman-in-Oflice were
informed of these decisions.
With the situation worsening in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and new resolutions being passed
by the United Nations Security Council, the
Ministerial Council 
- 
on the initiative of the
Council Presidency 
- 
met on 28th August 1992
in london to demonstrate Europe's resolve and
to adopt a position on the contribution it could
make in three areas: humanitarian aid, moni-
toring of heavy weapons and implementation of
the embargo.
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Following the ministerial meeting on
28th August, the Chairman-in-Offtce, Mr.
Colombo, wrote to the United Nations Secretary-
General to inform him of the decisions taken by
the WEU ministers and to apprise him of
WEU's plans flowing from those decisions for
the escort of humanitarian convoys and the
monitoring of heavy weapons, and to enclose a
list of contributions which WEU member states
were prepared to make to the United Nations
humanitarian operations.
The results of the planning carried out
within WEU were also fonrarded to the NATO
Secretary-General and the plans relating to the
monitoring of heavy weapons were sent to the
Chairman-in-Offrce of the CSCE.
The CSCE ad hoc group met on 4th SeF
tember to consider the question of the moni-
toring of heavy weapons and heard a statement
given by a WEU delegation made up of repre-
sentatives ofthe Presidency and the Secretariat
concerning WEU's plans in this connection.
In the final months of the year, the work
of the Contingency Planning Group continued
under the auspices of the ad hoc group. Each
group met ten times under Italian chair-
manship.
Among the topics discussed were:
- 
the preparation of the ministerial
decision on 20th November concerning
the implementation of the Sharp Fence
operation to monitor the embargo in
the Adriatic;
- 
monitoring the conduct of the naval
operation;
- 
at the request of ministers, made on
2fth November, a study of the possibil-
ities of setting up of * safe areas for
humanitarian purposes " (United
Nations Security Council Resolution
787);
- 
possible control of the no-fly zone;
- 
examination of what assistance might
possibly be given to riparian states to
enforce sanctions on the Danube.
III. Contacts with the countries of Central
and fustera Europe
On l4th October in London, the first
meeting of the forum of consultation took place,
bringing together members of the Permanent
Council and the eight heads of the diplomatic
missions in London of the countries of Central
Europe.
The purpose of this meeting was first to
inform the latter of WEU's activities regarding
the former Yugoslavia and the progress made in
implementing the Maastricht and Petersberg
declarations.
Thereafter, participants put their views on
how they saw their relations developing within
the forum of consultation and commented on
the future agenda.
Participants also discussed ways and
means of carrying forward the work of the CSCE
Forum for Security Co-operation in the wake of
the adoption of the Helsinki document. They
raised the prospect of interaction between the
CSCE and the main European and transatlantic
oryanisations. Some participants called for the
establishment of an ad hoc mechanism to
address emergency situations which might arise
and the development of co-operation on arms
procurement and conversion and peace-keeping
or peace-making operations.
The representatives of the Baltic states
drew attention to the continued presence of
foreign troops on the territory of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. They made it clear that this situ-
ation, which was contrary to the wishes of the
peoples concerned and of their governments,
was a threat to stability in the region and they
called for the final withdrawal of all these troops
by 3rd August 1993.
Between 30th November and 2nd
December, the Iondon embassies of the eight
countries of Central Europe were briefed on the
outcome of the Ministerial Council in Rome.
The Institute for Security Studies will con-
tinue to play a key rOle in contacts between
WEU and the countries of Central Europe both
by oryanising seminars and by welcoming
holders of research grants.
IY. Activities of *e Coancil
Apart from those meetings where circum-
stances dictated that a specific subject be
addressed, the Council's agendas have con-
tinued to contain an item devoted to the report
on working group meetings and an item on
topical questions.
The Permanent Council has paid par-
ticular attention to the work of preparing draft
decisions for submission to the Ministerial
Council and to their implementation once
adopted. The Council has been kept directly
informed of the activities of the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, of the establishment of the
satellite centre in Torrej6n, and of the estab-
lishment of an advance party for the planning
cell and its installation in Brussels. It continued
to acknowledge the vital importance of the insti-
tutional dialogue with the Assembly and fol-
lowed with great interest the debates of the
second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session.
Lastly, the Council took a number of adminis-
trative and budgetary decisions, as appropriate,
on the basis of opinions submitted by the
Budget and Organisation Committee.
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1. Topical questions
(i) The Council was kept regularly
informed of developments in Yugoslavia (cf.
item III of this report).
(ii) The Council also monitored the main
events in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the Russian Federation.
(iii) The Council continued to follow the
work being done by the CSCE. It was repre-
sented at the Helsinki summit, in the margins of
which a WEU ministerial meeting was held on
10th July 1992.
(iv) The Council was kept informed of the
results of meetings of the EC's ad hoc group on
security questions.
2. Activities of the intergovernmental organs
(i) Council working groups
At each of its meetings, the Council took
note of the results of its working groups' activ-
ities since the previous meeting. The summary
records were discussed as necessary.
(ii) WEU Institute for Security Studies
r1s0
The Institute's Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted
his presence. The Institute's quarterly reports to
the Council provided an opportunity for
exchanges of view on the current work of the
ISS.
3. Relations between WEU and the other
European member states of the European Union
or the Atlantic Alliance
With the backing of its working group, the
Council held regular exchanges of view on this
twofold topic i.e. the enlargement of WEU and
practical measures concerning co-operation
between WEU, the European institutions and
the Atlantic Alliance.
The Enlarged Council on lOth November
1992 took note ofthe fact that since the texts of
the draft protocol ofaccession and ofthe decla-
ration on observers had been adopted by the
Nine and the countries concerned, discussions
between the Nine and the three other European
Community countries came to an end on 6th
November. That same day, the draft texts on
association were again discussed with the three
other European member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance.
These discussions culminated in the
adoption of the draft document on associate
membership, the draft minutes in connection
therewith and the draft Presidency declaration
made on the occasion of the discussions between
the Nine and the countries applying for asso-
ciate membership.
The Permanent Council was thus able to
draw great satisfaction from having concluded
in under four months 
- 
and six weeks ahead of
schedule the WEU enlargement process
announced by the Maastricht Declaration, a
process which had been set in train on l6th July
1992 in Rome by a meeting of permanent repre-
sentatives, political directors and defence min-
istry representatives.
Y, Activities of the Special Working Gmup
The Special Working Group's main task
during the period under review was to conduct
the discussion sessions with the countries
applying for membership or observer status and
with the countries applying for associate mem-
bership. These sessions were conducted in par-
allel with the aim of reaching simultaneous deci-
sions at the ministerial meeting in Rome. The
group drafted a protocol of accession of the Hel-
lenic Republic to WEU, a document on WEU
associate membership and a declaration on
WEU observers, having first discussed the
content and legal implications.
The group continued its discussions on
developing WEU's relations with the countries
of Central Europe, thus paving the way for the
first meeting of the forum of consultation. It also
carried forward its work on a global approach to
relations with third countries. A discussion
document was submitted to ministers, who took
due note on 20th November.
The group discussed informal contacts by
the WEU Presidency in the context of the CSCE
Forum for Security Co-operation.
The group had a number of exchanges of
view on the question ofglobal protection against
limited missile strikes (GPS).
The group also turned its attention to the
politico-military aspects of designating and
setting up military units answerable to WEU. At
the Council's request, it considered problems
associated with implementing proposals made in
the Franco-German memorandum on the cre-
ation of a European corps.
The group prepared two interim reports
on the transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup
and IEPG functions.
The group's meetings also provided an
opportunity to consider the organisation of
WEU's work in Brussels, the discussions
focusing on how it would operate in times of
cnsls.
Under topical questions, finally, the group
monitored developments in Yugoslavia and dis-
cussed the possibilities for co-ordinating
member states' contributions to humanitarian
operations in Somalia.
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YI. Activities of the Defence
Representatives Group
(i) The DRG's work, on the other hand,
was taken up with an examination of the reports
on meetings of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia
and reports drawn up by the Groups of Experts
in this connection.
(ii) The DRG played a decisive r6le in
implementing the practical arrangements arising
from Council decisions on the planning cell.
Pending the time when a suitable building
became available, it was decided to set up an
advance party consisting of senior oflicers who
would be available in Brussels from lst October
1992. This team was given the task of organising
work on the planning cell's internal structure,
deflrning tasks and building up the personnel
establishment. To this end, the Belgian Gov-
ernment made available premises in the Institut
Royal Sup6rieur de D6fense. The DRG prepared
all the Council's decisions in all their various
aspects, namely personnel, budget, equipment,
etc. In this connection, a number of experts
meetings were needed, particularly on commu-
nications requirements and computer equip-
ment. Preliminary consideration was given to
the priorities to be set for the generic planning
work of the cell based on the tasks set out in the
Petersberg declaration. The planning cell's terms
of reference stipulate that the Council will issue
to the planning cell general directives con-
cerning planning options and priorities, taking
account of the views of the CHODs at their
meetings held under WEU auspices and in con-
sultation with military delegates of member
countries.
As regards the military units answerable
to WEU, the group examined ways and means
by which units could be assigned to WEU in
times of crisis. It also considered the choice of
headquarters and the organisation of head-
quarters staff. At the same time, the Eloup gave
consideration to WEU'S structure in times of
crisis.
The group was apprised of the proposal
for co-operation between the air and naval
forces of WEU member states, initially formu-
lated by the Spanish, French and Italian Defence
Ministers with the aim of developing the pro-
posal with the participation of all the member
countries. The practical outcome of this pro-
posal was a European pre-planned air-maritime
force ready to carry out missions which might be
assigned to it by WEU.
The group prepared the agenda for the
CHODs meeting on l6th Octobbr 1992.
Taking as its basis the contribution from
the Italian Presidency, the group drew up a pre-
liminary report on the consequences for
European security of the military changes taking
place in the former Soviet Union. This report
was updated several times in the light of com-
ments by delegations.
The group monitored the ongoing discus-
sions on the possible incorporation of the IEPG
within WEU. Following up the report submitted
to ministers on 20th November, the Permanent
Council tasked the DRG with evaluating the
activities of Eurogtroup with a view to preparingjoint WEU positions prior to the establishment
of a joint WEU/Eurogroup working group.
(iii) The veriflrcation experts continued
their work on active and passive inspections in
the implementation of the CFE Treaty and also
their work on the opening of national inspection
teams. The experts studied the initial activities
of the multinational inspection teams as well as
the application of the set of rules for these
teams. The formation of multinational
inspection teams with the participation of
inspectors from countries ofCentral and Eastern
Europe was discussed in depth. Also discussed
was the training of CFE inspectors.
(iv) The Open Skies Experts Group had,
by the end of the year, passed the stage of pre-
paring a feasibility study. Its activities were now
centred on the establishment of an aircraft pool
based on the number of aircraft actually
available.
YII. The Meditenanean Sub-Gmup
The Mediteranean Sub-Group held four
meetings between July and December 1992.
The situation in the former Yugoslavia
figured prominently in the sub-group's ex-
changes of view and discussions. Given the work
being done by the Special Working Group and
the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia during this
period, however, this sub-group turned its
attention to an analysis of the possible repercus-
sions of a spread of the conflict in the Balkans. It
based its work on a document drawn up, at its
request, by the Secretariat, which identified
where the conflict might spread and the interna-
tional crisis scenarios likely to result. Having
been revised and adopted by the sub-group, the
document was forwarded to the WEU Council
and then to the competent bodies of the alliance
and European Political Co-operation. It has
been regularly updated.
At the request of the SWG, the sub-group
also addressed the situation in Kosovo and Mac-
edonia on the basis of a text drawn up by the
Presidency; it contained concrete suggestions for
action to deal with possible crisis scenarios. The
operative part of this document, converted into
a sub-group document, was submitted to both
the SWG and the Council.
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At Petersberg, the WEU Ministerial
Council mandated the group " to establish a
gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb
countries, taking into account the political
developments both in these countries and in the
region " . The sub-group agreed on a first phase
involving a number of exploratory d6marches
with the London embassies of the countries con-
cerned. The Presidency and Secretariat-General
duly initiated this dialogue and the ddmarches
met with a positive response.
The sub-group considered it appropriate
to resume these contacts in Brussels and to con-
tinue the preliminary dialogue initiated with
these countries following the transfer of the Per-
manent Council to the Belgian capital.
The sub-group finished drafting and
updating the section of the document on
security in the Maghreb entitled " Spread of
weapons and military risks ", on the basis of
Spanish, French, German and Italian contribu-
tions. This document was forwarded to the
WEU Council.
The sub-group also had preliminary dis-
cussions on the possibility of a study on the
" dissemination of Islamic fundamentalism and
its implications for security in the Mediter-
ranean region " on the basis of a consolidated
document on the problem prepared by the WEU
Institute for Security Studies.
At each of its meetings, and in keeping
with the usual practice, the sub-group exchanged
views informally on various topical questions
including developments in the Western Sahara,
Algeria, Cyprus and Albania.
YIIL Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space
The sub-group's meetings were mainly
devoted to following progress with the setting up
of the satellite centre on the site and in the
building provided by the Spanish Government
at the Torrej6n airbase near Madrid. The
agreement relating to this concession was signed
on lst December 1992 in Paris by H.E. Mr.
Felipe de la Morena, Spanish Permanent Repre-
sentative to the WEU Council, Ambassador to
the Court of St James's, and Dr. Willem van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU (cf. text of
this agreement annexed to this report).
As part of the invitation to tender pro-
cedure, the group examined and compared bids
submitted by competing consortia to supply
equipment for the centre. The decision to accept
the offer by the MARCOL consortium was taken
by the Ministerial Council on 20th November.
The group took stock of the progress of
the medium- and long-term studies on the main
system feasibility and benefit assessment. Pro-
posals for special studies were also discussed.
IX. Activitia of the Agency for the Control
of Armaments (ACA)
The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued its residual tasks as regards the limi-
tation of atomic, biological and chemical
weapons, at a level of activity corresponding to
that obtaining at the time of the 1984 Rome
Declaration and in accordance with the proce-
dures approved up to that time.
As regards atomic weapons, the ACA did
not carry out any controls.
As regards biological weapons, all
member states decided to renew the current list
of biological weapons subject to control. As in
previous years, the ACA did not carry out any
controls in this field.
In the field of chemical weapons, all the
member states notified the agency of their
agreement to renew the current list of
equipment and chemical products (chemical
weapons) subject to control.
In accordance with the usual procedure,
the agency asked the member states if there had
been any effective production of chemical
weapons on their mainland territory. All
member states replied in the negative. No
country reported that it held chemical weapons
on the mainland of Europe.
In accordance with the usual procedure,
four chemical factories were inspected as part of
the " controls on the non-production of
chemical weapons " In no case did the ACA
find any evidence that the undertaking not to
manufacture chemical weapons was being
breached.
For 1992, the thirty-seventh year of con-
trols carried out by the ACA, the legal sources
used to justify the levels and control procedures
were unchanged.
The ACA continued to monitor the activ-
ities of the Geneva Disarmament Conference,
especially work on the negotiations on a con-
vention to ban chemical weapons which culmi-
nated in the signing in Paris of a convention in
mid-January 1993.
X. Auivities of the WEU Institute
for Securiy Studies
A seminar on problems of European
security in the 1990s was organised jointly with
the Polish Institute of International Affairs and
held at Pultusk, Poland. A seminar was jointly
organised in Rhodes on lTth-l9th September
with the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and
Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, on security
challenges in south-eastern Europe.
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A seminar on security and cooperation in
the western Mediterranean was organised in
Madrid with the Centro Espafiol de Relaciones
Internacionales. A small working goup was con-
vened to discuss a paper on the security problems
of Hungary and of its minorities in neighbouring
countries by Dr. George Schtipflin of the London
School of Economics. A further meeting of the
task force on Russia and the CIS was held.
Dr. Dieter Mahncke of the German Min-
istry of Defence spent three months as a Visiting
Fellow at the Institute. Four guest Fellows (from
France, Germany, Spain and the United
Kingdom) spent some time at the Institute. A
number of study awards were made to Central
and East Europeans to visit West European
institutes.
Chaillot Paper No. 4, Algeria: adversaries
in search of uncertain compromises, by R6my
Irveau, was published in September, and
Chaillot Paper No. 5, European integration and
nuclear deterrence after the cold war, by
Roberto Zadra, was published in November.
The Quarterly Newsletter was published in July
and October.
XI. Administrative qaesrions
During the second half of the year, the
Council Working Group, assisted by the
Secretariat-General, continued its work of
selecting a building which would meet the
current and future requirements of the Council
Secretariat and the planning cell. The Council
finally chose a building located at 4, rue de la
Rdgence, 1000 Brussels. Once this decision had
been taken, practical preparations for the
transfer were put in hand.
All these measures were taken to enable
the planning cell and the Secretariat gradually to
move into the new building from the first week
of January 1993.
XII. Activities of the Public Administration
Committee (PAC)
The Public Administration Committee(PAC) met in London at the WEU Council's
headquarters on 8th and 9th October 1992. This
meeting provided an opportunity to carry
fonryard the discussion on the future of the com-
mittee and of its open and informal meetings
which facilitate the regular exchange of infor-
mation on public administration in the WEU
member countries.
The report on this meeting may be con-
sulted at the Assembly Secretariat.
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ANNEX 7
Agreement between Westera European anion (WEU)
and the Kingdom of Spain
regarding the concession of a site
situated on the Torrejdn airbase (Madrid)
and a building located thereon to be used as
the seat of the Western European Union (WEU) satellite centre
The Kingdom of Spain, further to the decision by the Western European Union (WEU) Minis-
terial Council in Bonn on l8th November l99l to accept the offer made by the Kingdom of Spain,
wishing to collaborate actively in the achievement of Western European Union's objectives and to
place at WEU's disposal the necessary resources for the installation of the satellite centre whose cre-
ation was decided upon by the Western European Union Ministerial Council meeting in Vianden in
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 27th June 1991,
grants a concession to Western European Union (WEU), represented by its Secretary-General,
Dr. W. van Eekelen, who accepts the land and building indicated on the attached plan by a shaded rec-
tangle and by the figure 457 in that rectangle, situated at Torrej6n (Madrid), in the military zone of the
airbase, on the following conditions:
Article I
The concession, against consideration, shall be granted with effect from the date on which the
present agreement comes into force, for a term of ten years, renewable by tacit consent.
Article 2
The Kingdom of Spain undertakes to negotiate, in the same spirit of collaboration, any extension
ofthe centre's operational capacity over and above its initial capacity ifthat extension calls for a larger
area or building.
Article 3
Western European Union (WEU) shall be entitled:
to withdraw from the concession
l. on expiry of the centre's experimental phase specified by the Ministerial Council (WEU);
2. at any other time subsequent to the abovementioned experimental phase in the event of a
change in the political or technical circumstances which motivated the decision to set up the
centre.
in the event of assignment of the functions associated with the satellite centre or of WEU's incor-
poration, merger or the delegation of its responsibilities, to transfer the right to the concession to
any other international organisation taking over its functions in the field ofspace-based surveil-
lance, on condition that the Kingdom of Spain is a member of that organisation and consents
thereto.
Article 4
Western European Union (WEU) shall pay a rent of 0.1 million Ecus per year, at the oflicial
value of the Ecu as at lst January each year. The rent may be reviewed by common consent, and within
the limits of inflation, at the initiative of either party after the end of the experimental phase or, more
generally, in the event of a change to any of the key elements of this agreement.
(a)
(b)
43
DOCUMENT 136I ANNEX 7
Article 5
The Kingdom of Spain shall, by mutual agreement with the centre's management, and at a total
price for WEU of 321 000 000 pesetas (three hundred and twenty-one million) payable after acceptance
of the refurbished building, ensure:
- 
the fitting out of the building, as specified in Chapter 3 of the oflicial offer made by the
Kingdom of Spain to Western European Union (WEU),
- 
the supply and installation of the internal security measures described in paragraph 1.8.1 and
in Chapter 4 of the said offer,
- 
the supply and installation of oflice furniture and equipment as listed in Chapter I, section
1.8, and
- 
the supply and installation of communications equipment, to include:
(a) c,onnection to the public system of a low-speed network for fax machines, telephones and
electronic messaging,
(b) the installation of an internal high-speed network.
Article 6
The Kingdom of Spain undertakes to provide a ten-year guarantee for the refurbishment and
installation work carried out on the building and a one-year guarantee for the furniture and equipment
supplied, with effect from the date of the minute referred to in Article 7. This guarantee will cover
faults or imperfections in the work, furniture or equipment but shall exclude maintenance, wear and
tear and operating costs.
Article 7
Western European Union's entry into possession of the building and the land covered by the
concession shall be recorded in a minute, to be drawn up by the competent authorities of the Kingdom
of Spain and Western European Union (WEU).
Article I
Western European Union (WEU) undertakes to maintain the building and the land to which it
has concession in good order.
WEU and the Spanish authorities concerned shall, before WEU's entry into possession of the
building and the land covered by the concession 
- 
which is to be recorded in the minute referred to in
Article 7 
-, agtee on appropriate arrangements for paying the running costs (water, electricity, etc.)
arising from the centre's internal use of the common services of the military zone.
The same duties shall be incumbent upon any international organisations to which the con-
cession may be assigned.
Article 9
The building and adjoining land shall be used by Western European Union (WEU) for the
purpose for which they are initially assigned (for WEU's satellite centre). This provision shall not,
however, prevent the organisation 
- 
by mutual ag;reement with the Spanish authorities concerned 
-
from allowing the use of offrces or rooms by the governments of member states or by other states, or by
international institutions or agencies whose aims are similar to those of Western European Union(wEU).
Article 10
Western European Union 0\fEU may make such improvements and alterations to the building
and installations as it deems necessary to add to their performance or comfort, with the agreement of
the competent Spanish authorities when the chang'e or alteration is likely to have any repercussion
outside the centre's building.
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Article 11
This concession shall be terminated:
(a) if an objection is made to its tacit renewal. Notice of such an objection shall be given by one
party to the other at least 24 months before the normal expiry of the ten-year term;
(b) three months after the date on which Western European Union (WEU) has vacated the
building for one of the reasons listed in Article 3, without assigning the right to the con-
cession to another international organisation.
Article 12
If Western European Union (WEU) were to withdraw from the concession (either at the end of
the centre's experimental phase or at a subsequent date), the Kingdom of Spain will regain possession
of the building and the land covered by this agreement. In that case, compensation could be agreed by
mutual consent between WEU and the Kingdom of Spain, due account having been taken by both
parties of the state of the said building and installation. In the event of a dispute as to the amount of
ihe said compensation, Western European Union (WEU) and the Kingdom of Spain shall refer the
matter to arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 14.
Article 13
Although the building and land covered by the present agreement are situated within a military
zone, the Kingdom of Spain shall guarantee access to the building to any person authorised by Western
European Union (WEU). Special security arrangements shall be agreed for this purpose between the
Spanish security officer for the zone and the centre's Director. These arrangements are designed to
ensure that the Spanish authorities concerned have access to the building for security reasons or any
other reason that might be agreed between the parties.
Article 14
In the event of a dispute as to the interpretation or perfornance of the present agreement, the
Kingdom of Spain and Western European Union (WEU) agree to refer that dispute, unless it has been
settled by negotiation or other means of settlement as agreed by the parties, to the decision of a tri-
bunal of three arbitrators, one of whom shall be designated by the Western European Union Secretary-
General, the second by the Kingdom of Spain Minister of Foreign Affairs and the third by the former
two or, failing agreement, by the President of the International Court of Justice. This tribunal shall
reach its decisions by a majority in accordance with the clauses of this agreement and, additionally,
with Spanish law.
Article 15
This agreement shall come into force once the Kingdom of Spain has notified the Secretary-
General of Western European Union (WEU) that the internal formalities for concluding the interna-
tional treaties have been completed.
This agreement shall be applied provisionally with effect from the date of its signature.
Done, at Paris, this first day of December 1992, in three languages, English, French and Spanish,
each text being equally authoritative.
Fon WesrrnN EunopenN UNIoN
Willem VeN Erxslrr.t
Secretary-General of
Western European Union
Fon rHr KrNcoona or Spnm
Felipe or m MonrNe v CeI-wt
Ambassador of Spain
Permanent Representative
of Spain and Counsellor to
Western European Union
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The crisis in former Yugoslavia
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
'
tabled by Mr. de Puig, Iard Finsberg and others
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a requesl for urgent procedure
The Assembly,(i) Recalling the series of recommendations adopted in an effort to help resolve the crisis in former
Yugoslavia, but regretting that the advice given by the Assembly over the past eighteen months has
been accepted only belatedly and in part;(ii) Pleased that the United Nations Security Council has now agreed to strengthen the sanctions on
Serbia and Montenegro and that, in particular, the WEU Council is to give technical assistance to
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
Uncrs WEU Meusrn GovenNMENrs
Now to examine, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, all possible means to bring
peace to the area, including the use of force as necessary, and to maintain the principle that territory
must not be seized illegally.
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, De Decker, Finsberg, Lopez Henares, Pdcriaux, Pinto, de Puig,
Reddemann, Tummers, Baumel
1. Urgent procedure agreed to by the Standing Committee at its meeting in Rome on lgth April 1993.
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Anti-missile defence for Europe -
guidelines drawn from the symposium
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerosprce Committee2
by Mr. I*n4er, Rapporteut
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Draft Recommendation
oa anti-missile dcfcnce for Eurupe - guidelines drawn lrom the symposium
The Assembly,
(, Welcoming the recent progress achieved in international efforts to strengthen disarmament mea-
sures and to promote non-proliferation by concluding the START I[ Treaty and the chemical weapons
convention (CWC) and by extending the scope and membership of the missile technology control
r6gime (MTCR) ;(ii) Concerned, however, about certain Far Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries
which do not yet intend to join the chemical weapons convention and the MTCR regime;(iii) Disturbed by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty;(iv) Observing that the proliferation of theatre and strategic missile technology into sensitive regions
which might affect the security of Europe is still continuing;(v) Concerned that certain countries in unstable regions are continuing their attempts to try to
obtain ABC and missile capabilities;
(vt) Gratified that the symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe held in Rome provided a useful
opportunity to draw the attention of decision-makers to the risks stemming from missile prolife-
ration;
(vii) Convinced therefore that the European governments, and in particular those of WEU member
countries, must shoulder their responsibilities by taking appropriate decisions to guarantee the security
of their populations and military forces before risk becomes threat;
(viii) Taking note of the recent decision by the United States to abandon further research and devel-
opment of an orbital-based anti-missile global protection system (SDI) in favour of a land-based
system;(ix) Convinced that all the discussions and negotiations so far initiated on a bilateral or multina-
tional basis on possible means of creating a system of protection of any kind whatsoever should lead to
openness and enhanced international confidence and not a new anns race between a privileged group
of states and others outside the system;(x) Reiterating that Western European Union has made great progress in taking a leading rOle in
space observation and that 
- 
as demonstrated at the symposium 
- 
European industry has excellent
experience and expertise of anti-missile technology;(xi) Convinced that the appropriate approach in the present situation should first be to create a uni-
versal early warning and surveillance system, concrete defence and protection requirements remaining
initially under regional or national control,
RncouurNos rHAT rnB CouNclr.
l. Take a leading r6le in promoting, in relevant international conferences and institutions, further
initiatives for developing and strengthening disarmament, confidence-building measures, non-
proliferation r6gimes and political dialogue;
2. Take an initiative in the United Nations with the aim of establishing an international early
warning and surveillance centre open to all countries interested in sharing data and information on
missile activities and linked to an obligation to notify all missile firings and space launches;
3. Adopt without delay its position on a global protection system discussed between the United
States and Russia and ask for there to be prior consultations between the United States and its allies
before resuming these talks;
4. Decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to
mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-
effective anti-missile protection system for Europe.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. LanzteL Rapportear)
I. Introduction
l. When the Technological and Aerospace
Committee presented its first report on anti-
ballistic missile defence to the Assembly in
December 1992 | it came to the conclusion that
the problem of risk assessment regarding the
development of advanced missile technologies,
their worldwide proliferation and the appro-
priate response to these new challenges left open
so many questions that the organisation of a
public debate in the form of an expert sym-
posium seemed to be an appropriate means of
starting a more in-depth debate on the subject,
the aim being to circumscribe the problem and
provide the basic data for defining concepts and
answers. Such a symposium was held in Rome
on 20th and 2lst April 1993 2.
2. At the same time, the Assembly drew the
attention of the WEU Council to the subject in
submitting a number of proposals contained in
Recommendation 533 and asking the Council to
submit its conclusions to the Assembly. It
appears from the Council's answer to Recom-
mendation 533 3, that:
" 1. The Council is fully aware of the
need to assess the risks to Europe
stemming from 'the development of
strategic and theatre ballistic capa-
bility and nuclear proliferation of
ballistic technology in countries closeto Europe's southern and south-
eastern flanks'.
2. Questions pertaining to a global pro-
tection system (GPS) are on the
agenda of the Council's Special
Working Group.
3. An in-depth study of questions per-
taining to a global system would nec-
essarily have to precede any
'adoption of a joint European
position towards the American pro-
gramme for global protection against
limited strikes (GPALS)'.
4. The Council will bear in mind the
Assembly's request to 'promote the
participation of the largest possible
number of countries and competent
international and national institu-
tions to share the burden ofthe estab-
l. Document 1339, 6th November 1992.
2. See Appendix I.
3. Document A/WEU/DG (93) 2, 19th February 1993.
lishment of a global protection
system'.
5. Additional information will become
available to the Assembly in due
course.'
3. While it is understandable that at the
present stage the Council is unable to provide
any concrete guidelines for the complex problem
of anti-missile defence, it is to be welcomed that
these questions are now being discussed in its
special working group, which is an indication
that the matter is considered first and foremost
as a fundameital political problem.
4. As Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the
committee, pointed out in Rome, the anti-
missile symposium, like previous symposia
organised by the committee, should hopefully
give considerable impetus to the shaping of
ideas and in such a way as to help the govern-
ments concerned decide what position to adopt
and to take appropriate joint decisions; it is to
be hoped that the guidelines to be drawn from
this symposium will help the Council to keep its
promise that " additional information will
become available to the Assembly in due
course. "
II. The imlnnance of new international
developments for an appmpriate evaluation
of the lcssons learned from the symposium
5. In the period between the Assembly's
December 1992 session and the holding of the
Rome symposium at the end of April 1993, a
number of significant events of a very different
nature have occurred on the international scene
which cannot be without consequences for the
conclusions to be drawn from the abundance of
information, ideas and proposals presented by
the various experts in Rome.
6. On 3rd January 1993, the United States
and Russia signed the START II Treaty, aimed
at the further elimination of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multiple war-
heads (MIRVs), the entry into force of which
depends on the fate of START I, for which the
attitude of certain successor states of the Soviet
Union, namely, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, will
play a crucial r6le.
7. On l3th January 1993, more than 120
member countries of the United Nations signed
the chemical weapons convention (CWC), which
is to constitute a worldwide ban on the pro-
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duction, acquisition, stockpiling and use of
chemical weapons. By 29th March 1993, the
number of signatories had increased to 143.
8. A comprehensive ban on chemical
weapons had been on the agenda of the Con-
ference on Disarmament in Geneva since
August 1968. The importance of the successful
outcome of twenty-three years of negotiations
resides in the fact that the treaty is historic in
the scope of its provisions and in particular
regarding verification.
9. The conclusion of this treaty is the more
important as it became evident that the threat of
chemical and biological weapons has become
global. According to the United States Congress
Armed Services Committee, thirty-one nations
either possess or could develop an offensive
chemical weapons capability and eleven others
are in the same category for an offensive bio-
logical weapons capability 4.
10. The member states of the Arab League,
however, decided to boycott the treaty as long as
Israel did not adhere to the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless, four Arab
states, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and
Tunisia, broke this boycott and signed the
treaty, followed later by Saudi Arabia and
Kuweit. The refusal of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea to sign the chemical weapons con-
vention implies that the threat of using chemical
weapons is still virulent in two sensitive regions
and concerns countries whose efforts to obtain
theatre and strategic missile technology are well
known.
I l. Furthermore, whereas international
authorities are seeking to establish ways and
means of reviewing, strengthening and
extending the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
which will expire in 1995, North Korea
announced on l2th March 1993 that it was with-
drawing from the treaty which it signed only two
years ago, following its dispute with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was
asking to inspect military sites in the country
where production of weapons-grade plutonium
was suspected.
12. In this context it is noteworthy that the
Government of India confirmed at the end of
March 1993 its decision not to join the non-
proliferation treaty which it considers as a dis-
criminative treaty. South Africa, which hadjoined the treaty on l0th July 1991, admitted at
the same time in public that the country had
produced nuclear weapons in the seventies and
eighties but they had been totally destroyed in
1990.
13. In the area of the missile technology
control r6gime (MTCR), the United States and
its partners in the r6gime adopted on 7th
January 1993 revised guidelines to extend the
scope of the r6gime to missiles capable of deliv-
ering biological and chemical weapons as well as
nuclear weapons. Initially, the MTCR was
intended to control the proliferation of missile
systems capable of carrying conventional or
nuclear warheads of at least 500 kg over a dis-
tance of at least 300 km. The new guidelines
mandate * a strong presumption of denial' for
the transfer of " any missiles which are judged to
be intended to carry any weapon of mass
destruction, not just nuclear weapons " 5. Con-
sequently, partner governments would pre-
sumably deny the transfer of all missiles with a
500 kg payload capacity and a minimum range
of 300 km, plus any other missiles that " might
be intended for use with any weapons of mass
destruction - chemical, biological or nuclear 6.
14. In March 1993, member countries of the
MTCR agreed on further details of the enforced
control rdgime welcomed Iceland as a new
member and noted the application of Argentina
and Hungary to become members. The major
suppliers of missiles which are not members of
the MTCR rdgime are Israel, China, Russia and
North Korea. Whereas the first three
abovementioned countries made more or less
firm commitments to observe MTCR guide-
lines, North Korea has expressed no intention of
observing them.
15. In the area of comprehensive confi-
dence- and security-building measures, the rati-
fication procedure of the Open Skies Treaty
seems to be progressing smoothly so that the
treaty may enter into force before the end of this
year. The possibilities offered by agreed
unarmed aerial observation over almost the
whole northern hemisphere might be an addi-
tional useful means of detecting missile pro-
duction and deployment. But all the more it is
important to extend such a rdgime to other
regions, including the Far East and the southern
hemisphere.
16. During the Rome symposium, the conse-
quences of the new United States administra-
tion's security and defence policy on the
American anti-missile defence programme and
in particular on the future of the United States
strategic defence initiative organisation (SDIO)
was not yet foreseeable. The Clinton adminis-
tration had not appointed a new SDIO director.
In the absence of new political guidelines, no
SDIO representative was able to present the
oflicial United States position at the sym-
posium.
5. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher,
according to US Wireless File, No. 4, 8th January 1993.
6. Richard Boucher ibid.4. US Wireless File No. 37, lst March 1993.
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17. Yet in the Pentagon the 1994 budget pro-
posal by the SDIO met with a critical reaction
and the new United States Defence Secretary,ks Aspin, had directed the SDIO to make
theatre defences its top priority in cutting the
agency's 1994 budget proposal by $2.S billion to
$3.8 billion, the same as its i993 fundings.
Defences of the United States territory were to
be given second priority and Brilliant Pebbles
was to be at the bottom of the priority list.
18. On l3th May 1993, however, the United
States Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, announced
in public 7 the * end of the Star Wars era ":
" We are renaming and refocusing the
Strategic Defence Initiative Office to
reflect the Clinton administration's
changes in priorities. From now on, the
SDIO will be the Ballistic Missile Defence
Organisation...
That is why we have made theatre bal-
listic missile defence our first priority, to
cope with the new dangers in the post-cold
war, post-Soviet world. After theatre
missile defence, BMDO's priorities are
going to be the national missile defence,
which is a defence of the American people
from ground-based systems. And the third
point of emphasis or third priority will be
the follow-on technologies that offer some
promise in both tactical and strategic
defence. These changes represent a shift
away from a crash programme for
deployment of space-based weapons
designed to meet a threat that has receded
to the vanishing point 
- 
the all-out, sur-prise attack from the former Soviet
Union.
... Since its inception in 1984, SDIO has
reported directly to the Secretary of
Defence. The new arrangement has theMBD organisation reporting to the
Under-Secretary of Defence for Acqui-
sition and Technology, who is John
Deutsch. This shift reflects the fact that
the programme will be shifting from
research to development 
- 
to the devel-
opment and acquisition of systems. And it
will allow us to manage our work on bal-
listic missile defence in a way appropriate
to its place in the overall defence pro-
gramme. "
19. These new orientations, the consequences
of which will still need careful examination, will
also affect the follow-up of the United States-
Russian dialogue on the creation of a global pro-
tection system (GPS) initiated in June 1992 by
the then United States President George Bush
and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
20. In Europe most governments were
absorbed by the continuing problem of finding a
solution to the continuing Balkan crisis or by
various internal political difficulties or elections.
Thus the Rome symposium was held in a period
during which none of the governments and
countries concerned was in a position to present
final concepts or even detailed and agreed
assessments on the symposium subject.
21. All the more, the Assembly should be
grateful for the very helpful and interesting
orientation given by the Italian Defence Min-
ister, Mr. Andd, in presenting an anti-missile
defence system as a possible universal
confidence- and hence stability-building
measure, open for wide participation, and notjust as a means of deterrence and protection of a
privileged group ofstates against other countries
with supposed hostile intentions.
22. According to such a concept developed by
Mr. Andd:
" ... a system of anti-missile protection,
mainly the detection and the monitoring
components, might be able to carry out
some of the following essential func-
tions:
- 
observing, possibly with the assistance
of its sensors, the proliferation of mis-
siles in relevant areas;
- 
deterring states intending to use their
capabilities for terrorist intimidation
purposes from taking any such action;
- 
on a reciprocal basis, offering a guar-
antee to countries participating in the
system.
A defence system restricted to the North
Atlantic or NATO Europe might fulfil the
frrst of these two functions; conversely, if
the system of protection were to be global
and open to the participation of other
countries, even ifthey had diflerent levels
of economic and technological means, it
might fulfil all three functions. By this I
mean that globalisation 
- 
and I use this
word to indicate a tendency and not an
immediately attainable goal 
- 
of such aprotective network might encourage
gf,eater confidence and subsequently give
rise to a mechanism allowing crises to be
controlled.
The need to increase confidence is con-
firmed by the growth, in and around
Europe, of tensions and conflicts that are
often marked by great violence. "
23. The following task of analysing the lessons
to be learned from the Rome symposium should
be carried out starting from such an initial
political approach.
7. See Appendix II.
8. Space News, 22nd-28th February 1993.
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III. Risk assessment, a tosk neYer completed
24. One of the most diflicult enterprises is
defining the appropriate criteria which should
govern ihe method of identifying sources of pos-
iible new security dangers for Europe. One
method is to collect and keep all available infor-
mation and data on who develops and supplies
to whom any kind of sophisticated weaponry.
25. But this method has to be combined with
an effort to explore the motivations for such
activities and analysis of the political situation
and evolution in the relevant world region. In
this respect, the expos6s presented by Mr.
Nativi, General Jean and Mr. Tan Eng Bok were
particularly helpfut.
26. Regarding the political risks, Mr. Nativi
mentioned the growing pressure from Islamic
fundamentalists in countries such as Algeria and
Egypt, whereas General Jean feared that
democratisation and political pluralism in a
number of Mediterranean countries would in
the short term help the accession to power of
these fundamentalist forces which openly
declare that, once in control, they would elim-
inate the democratic institutions imported from
the comrpt West in order to restore the purity of
Islamic law.
27. Islamic fundamentalism can in fact
become a potential security risk for Europe
when it is combined with a complex of inferi-
ority vis-i-vis the technical superiority of the
weslern world. In this context, both Mr. Nativi
and Mr. Minicucci came to noteworthy identical
conclusions with regard to possible motivations
of countries seeking to obtain ballistic missile
technology.
28. Mr. Nativi considered that, studying the
lessons of the last part of the second world war
today, countries which do not have the aircraft
to conduct a strategic bombing campaign might
adopt the less complicated and less costly alter-
native of an indiscriminate missile attack.
29. Mr. Minicucci's assessment comes to a
similar assessment when he says that:
" Paradoxically, success in the Gulf war
stimulated proliferation because it
showed that it was impossible for third
world states to withstand the West's high
technology conventional megasystems,
particularly those of the United States,
whatever the scale of conventional
weapons held by the third world.
The only possibility still open to trouble-
makers, apart from the choice of guerrilla
warfare and terrorism, is to imPose
restrictions on the massive use of the
West's high technology military power.
The only means of doing this is to
threaten western territories and peoples
with direct retaliation and to limit oper-
ation and logistic concentrations of
intervention forces by threatening to use
missile-borne weapons of mass des-
truction. "
30. If one follows such considerations, one
has to admit that a potential risk for Europe
would be directed first and foremost at popula-
tions and cities as underlined by a number of
other speakers, such as General Graham, Mr.
Steinicke and Mr. Burnham.
31. However, one should assess the motiva-
tions of recipients of missile technology and also
those of the producers and suppliers. Mr.
Barth6lemy rightly remarked that little had been
said during the symposium about the motiva-
tions of the proliferating countries. According to
his assessment, they are probably mainly
regional, in terms of prestige, powel or security,
there is sometimes also talk of aggressive
sanctuarisation.
32. A very comprehensive study of these
questions made by Andrew W. Hull e identifies
three main motives: the devise for self suffr-
ciency in key defence areas, the devise to dem-
onstrate highJevel technological advancement
in order to place the country on the same general
industrial phase as the most technologically-
advanced western nations, and, thirdly, eco
nomic motives by gaining foreign exchange in
exporting their military products. As an
eximple, only l09o of Brazil's total defence
industrial outbut stays in the country, but 95%
of its aerospace production goes abroad.
33. According to the same author, the interest
in earning foreign exchange by exporting missile
technology may be especially developed in coun-
tries like North Korea, China and Russia and
Ukraine too. Yet motivations may differ consid-
erably from country to country and should be
studied carefullyto.
34. No clear picture could be gained from the
situation regarding the People's Republic of
China. It is therefore interesting to note that Mr.
Karp did not name China as main proliferator
in one of the three categories of supplier coun-
tries he had established. On the other hand, Mr.
Tan Eng Bok underlined the increase in China's
military expenditure, and its technical co-
operation with Iran and Pakistan for the devel-
opment of theatre ballistic missiles.
35. In spite of China's assurance to comply
with the MTCR r6gime, there are still reports
about Chinese exports of ballistic missile com-
9. Jane's lntelligence Review, February 1993, Interna-
tional.
10. Cf. John R. Harvey, Regional Ballistic Missiles and
Advanced Strike Aircraft, International Security, Fall 1992,
volume 17, No. 2.
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ponents, namely to Pakistan concerning the
Chinese M-l I missile, which has a range of
about 400 km and a payload of 800 kg.
36. After all, one should bear in mind the con-
cluding remarks of Mr. Tan Eng Bok when he
said that:
" A stable, prosperous China would do
more good for international security and
the common interest of the West as a
whole than a new outbreak of disorder.
China's political stability is still fragile
because of post-Deng Xiaoping uncer-
tainty and paradoxically, the success of
economic reforms without a political quid
pro quo. This precarious balance should
not be jeopardised by openly encouraging
democratisation which is certainly nec-
essary but might lead to the reversal of a
progressive evolution. Finally, Beijing's
isolation on the international stage would
remove any reason for it to take part in
limiting nuclear and ballistic proliferation
in the third world in general and in the
Middle East in particular. "
37. The important r6le of North Korea as a
missile supplier was already mentioned in the
committee's previous reportrr. This r6le was
confirmed by Mr. Tan Eng Bok, stressing that a
successor of the Rodong I missile, the Rodong
2, with a range of I 500 to 2 000 km, is now
being developed in North Korea. However, it
appears that assessments of North Korea's capa-
bilities are not unanimous. Thus Mr. Karp said
that, with a 1 000 km version under devel-
opment, North Korea has reached the limits of
Scud technology and seems unlikely to make
further advances unless a new source of tech-
nology can be forwarded.
38. Turning to the technical nature of future
risks, one should not neglect the words of those
who stressed that other threats than those
stemming from ballistic missile technology
should be taken into account. John R. Harvey,
in a comprehensive article on " Regional bal-
listic missiles and advanced strike aircraft " 12
stresses that, by focusing too strongly on ballistic
missiles, we risk diverting attention from prolif-
eration of other advanced weapons which may
be more destructive ".
39. Thus several speakers at the symposium,
such as Mr. Nativi, Mr. Zalonis, Mr. Delaye and
Mr. Minicucci, underlined the growing problem
of cruise missiles. According to Mr. Nativi:
. " The devastating effects of the cruise
missiles launched by United States naval
surface vessels and submarines and air
force bombers during the 1991 Gulf war
ll. Document 1339.
12. International Security, Fall 1992, vdlume 17, No. 2.
certainly attracted the attention of many
countries which are now actively pursuing
the aim of procuring or, better, devel-
oping weapons similar in design indepen-
dently. "
Ranges vary from a few hundred kilom-
etres to 2 500 or 3 000 km. Cruise missiles
can be launched from the gSound or from
ships, submarines or aircraft. The usual
weight of warheads ranges from 500 to
1 000 kg. In the last few years, several
types of warheads have been developed:
high explosive, chemical or nuclear with
a choice of sub-munitions or special
conventional unitary warheads. The
miniaturisation of nuclear devices allows
countries such as China to develop small
nuclear warheads compatible with the
stringent requirements of a typical cruise
missile.
While the low speed facilitates the work of
air defence radar and interception by
surface-to-surface missiles and fighter air-
craft, in reality the small dimensions of
the missiles, the lowJevel flight profile,
the use of ground features to conceal the
weapon from radar, the use of stealth
technology to reduce RCS (radar cross
section) as well as IR signature and the
great flexibility in preparing the flight
plan and penetration run make cruise
missiles very diflicult targets, even for
integrated, modern air defence systems.
For a number of years, cruise missile
development was a matter for the super-
powers alone, but today several devel-
opment projects are under way in a
number of countries, including India and
China. To be more detailed, China's
scheduled procurement of the technology
and production tools (this is a typical
turnkey contract) needed to procure small
turbo-fan engines from the United States
firm Garrett should be considered part of
this picture. The crisis in the former
Soviet Union now makes it easier for
Russian cruise missiles to proliferate in
several countries. It is estimated in the
United States that, by the end of the
century, both Iran and Iraq will be able to
deploy this type of weapon. During the
IDEX military show in Abu Dhabi (UEA)
a few months ago, Russia, for the first
time, exhibited the air-launched cruise
missile AS-15 (X-65CE) in an anti-ship
version armed with a conventional
warhead and a redesigned fuselage
embodying stealth technology to reduce
RCS. Even in this version, the Russian
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cruise missile, weighing I 250 kg and 6 m
long, armed with 410 kg warhead and
having a range of 280 km, is quite inter-
esting, but it should not be forgotten that
its strategic version is credited with a
range of 2 500 km. This is only one
example of the noteworthy Russian cruise
missile design range. Jhe Russians con-
sidered AS-15 technology to be obsolete
and a new-generation weapon was being
developed: the AS-19 Koala, which is to
be l0 m long with a range of 4 000 km.
This programme has now been stopped,
as has work on the SS-N-24 Skorpion, but
the SS-N-21 Sampson, with a range of
I 700 km, has been in service for a few
years and is considered to be the Russian
equivalent of the United States Toma-
hawk.
Several countries are currently working on
stand-off long-range missiles as well as
self-propelled launchers, not to mention
surveillance RPVs and even some target
drones that can easily be converted into a
type of cruise missile. "
40. In the SDIO, too, thought is given to
finding the most cost-effective way to address
the missile threat, * without closing our eyes to
the fact that there also is the threat from aircraft,
cruise missiles and unmanned/remotely piloted
vehicles'.
41. According to a new Pentagon report on
missile proliferation, low-flying cruise missiles
are even becoming the number one proliferation
threat. The report concludes that Syria, Iran and
China will have cruise missiles with some low-
observable or stealth capabilities between 2000
and 2010. All three countries are expected to
have both chemical and biological warheads for
their cruise weapons13.
42. Consequently new plans are being con-
sidered in the United States air force and navy
to counter cruise missiles whereas some Pen-
tagon planners believe that SDIO has erred by
focusing on ballistic missile defence and paid
short shrift to the cruise missile threatra.
43. There are however more radical voices
denying the usefulness of anti-missile prG
tection, claiming that " if a terrorist or fanatical
dictator gets a nuclear bomb, he should deliver
it with a fishing trawler rather than risking it on
a ballistic missilet5". But such an opinion
cannot explain why so many countries with
dubious reputations or uncertain intentions
13. Aviation Week and Space Technology,
1993.
14. Aviation Week and Space Technology,
1993.
lst February
22nd March
15. Joseph Romm, Space News, l8th January 1993,
volume 4, No. 3, page 15.
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make such efforts to obtain missile techno-
logy or a nuclear, chemical or biological capa-
bility.
44. If one tries to sum up the situation, none
of the speakers at the symposium was able to
define an absolute imminent concrete threat
directed against Europe stemming from a spe-
cific country or region if one excludes the par-
ticular danger of the Balkans which is of a dif-
ferent type. While it was stressed that the old
saying that today's friends {nay gq tomorrow's
enemres was never more topical, this is not alto-
gether a new discovery.
45. There was a clear consensus, however,
that continuous proliferation of missile tech-
nology constitutes the main threat today and has
to be considered as a reality. Furthermore,
overall concern was expressed that a possible
danger would affect first and foremost the
civilian populations and that it was crucial for
the population not to be put at risk.
46. It might be useful at this stage to quote
from the latest threat assessment issued on 24th
March 1993 by the Parliamentary Secretary of
State of the German Defence Ministry
answering a parliamentary question on the fol-
lowing lines:
'l. There is no longer any well-defined
military threat from the CIS. Never-
theless, the military potential of the
CIS and China continues, in prin-
ciple, to be a risk. The use of this
potential against Germany or its
NATO partners seems very unlikely
at present, however.
Real risks are now emerying from
hotbeds of political instability
throughout the world, this instability
being accompanied in certain cases
by a build-up of armaments.
2. Thie Gulf war has recently demon-
strated the military and political
importance of ballistic means of
delivery, particularly for third world
countries, and has led, in the crisis
area that extends from Morocco to
India, to intensive armaments efforts
in this area. These armaments efforts
are of special importance since they
aim to associate these means of
delivery with non-conventional war-
heads.
If the range of these missiles were
increased, the NATO countries
would come increasingly within the
range of weapons held by third world
countries.
3. The present position of arsenals
which include operational ballistic
means of delivery outside NATO
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allows the following conclusions to be
drawn:
- 
Germany is within range of inter-
continental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) belonging to the
CIS and China;
- 
NATO territory is within range of
ballistic missiles with conventional
and chemical warheads from Iran,
Syria and perhaps even lraq. Ifthe
third world countries manage to
increase the range of their ballistic
missiles, all the countries round
the shores of the Mediterranean
will be in danger.
Furthermore, intervention forces
deployed in the third world are
exposed to an increasing risk of
attack by ballistic missiles.'
IY. Strategies for protecting Europe
from existing and future security dangers
47. The in-depth study of possible risks and
their reasons in the previous chapter has been
discussed at such length, because your
Rapporteur is convinced that appropriate
answers can be given only if the assessment of
the situation is appropriate. The problem of
accidental attacks by a nuclear-armed ballistic
missile or such an attack by terrorist groups
mentioned at the symposium must not of course
be neglected.
48. In spite of the absence of a high-level
political presence at the symposium (with the
exception of the Italian Defence Minister) and
in spite of the overwhelming industrial represen-
tation; it is to be welcomed that the contribu-
tions and proposals were certainly not one-
sided.
49. Of course, the important choice to be
made is whether the political or the defence and
technological approach should have priority in
coping with the new challenges. But perhaps
there will be no real contradiction between the
two approaches.
50. Before evaluating the different scenarios,
it might be interesting to see how the German
Government answered the abovementioned par-
liamentary question about what measures of
protection it is considering taking in this
respect.
51. The answer was as follows:
" The Federal Government will give high
priority to the pursuit of its efforts to
strengthen the fight against the prolife-
ration of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles. In the context of a policy
of co-operation concentrating on
confidence-building, the government is
endeavouring to eliminate the tension
that is at the origin of the build-up of mil-
itary equipment. However, an active non-
proliferation policy will not, in the near
future, remove the risks linked with pro-
liferation (transfers of nuclear weapons).
That is why long-term plans are also being
implemented in parallel in order to give
air defence systems that already exist
or are being developed a limited anti-
ballistic missile defence capability. "
52. It is interesting to note that the impor-
tance the German Government attaches to apolicy of co-operation concentrating on
confidence-building in this field finds a certain
corollary in the approach of Mr. Andd already
quoted. This kind of approach was nevertheless
fairly isolated at the symposium.
53. Only General Jean and Mr. Karp
developed ideas in this direction. General Jean
stressed the efforts to create a Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean(CSCM) following the CSCE example, men-
tioning:
"... the Euro-Arab dialogue between the
European Community and the Arab
League; the Five plus Five Group for the
western Mediterranean to which the
European Community and Germany
belong; the MAU (Maghreb Arab Union)
which has started a regional dialogue and
which, at the Casablanca conference in
October 1991, laid the foundations for its
institutionalisation; the Mediterranean
conference, which has taken interesting
co-operative initiatives in ecology and
civil protection. "
54. Finally, on security problems in the Medi-
terranean, he proposed the following European
measures:
(a) " installation of a multilateral safety
belt to protect itself against the insta-
bility and crisis prevalent among the
countries of the southern shore of the
Mediterranean, priority being granted,
inter alia, to deterring clandestine
immigration, at least until Europe
has solved the problems of Eastern
Europe and can concentrate its efforts
on the development of the South;
(b) mainly bilateral co-operation between
the various western countries and
countries of the South, the latter being
divided into areas of economic
influence; this would be supported by
regional policing countries such as
Egypt and Turkey backed by mobile
reinforcements provided mainly by
the United States; encouragement
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would be given to policies of
co-operation and development
directed initially towards the eco-
nomic interests of each of the
European countries;
(c/ multilateral cooperation in security,
the economy, demograPhy, etc.,
centred on development assistance.
The third solution, i.e. multilateral
co-operation, particularly in terms of sta-
bility and security, is certainly the most
effective and the one that would lead to
the greatest stability. "
55. With regard to the necessary fight against
the proliferation of mass destruction and missile
technology, the overwhelming majority of
speakers emphasised the importance of con-
tinuing the efforts in this direction. But most of
them were convinced that the fight against
missile proliferation would at best slow down
proliferation but would not be able to stop it
once and for all.
56. On the other hand, nobody discussed or
explained the contradictions stemming from the
fact that while ballistic systems and their tech-
nologies are the target of vigorous export control
efforts, the export ofadvanced strike aircraft by
a number of western countries and Russia to
third world countries does not arouse similar
alarm.
57. In spite of the progress made recently in
extending regional and universal disarmament
and anns control regimes as described in
Chapter II, only one speaker, Mr. Karp, came to
the conclusion that 'it may be true that the
battle against missile proliferation cannot be
won in an absolute sense, for there will always
be future threats, but nor need the battle be per-
manently lost'.
58. In this context he made some interesting
proposals of which the idea of a ballistic missile
test ban might be the most original and also the
most controversial. According to Mr. Karp,
'A ballistic missile test ban is one way to
ameliorate not only competitive pressures
for regional missile acquisition, but also
their prestige. Such proposals have been
around since the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, but won little support so long as
ballistic missiles played a major r6le in
great power forces. Now that the United
States and Russia agreed at the June 1992
Washington Summit to eliminate all but a
few hundred ground-based ICBMs, the
prospects for a test ban are much better.
Unlike nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles
cannot be developed without extensive
testing nor can operational missiles be
kept reliable. Many serious problems
would have to be resolved first, including
differentiating allowable space launchers
and the status of sea-launched missiles,
but these do not seem insurmountable.
The most straightforward and extreme
answer to missile proliferation would be
an outright comprehensive ballistic
missile ban. Previously students of missile
proliferation have gone no further than to
advocate a global INF treaty, banning the
missiles of greatest danger in most
regions. But this does not satisfy regional
demands for equal treatment since it
would leave great power ICBMs and
SLBMs. The Bush-Yeltsin Washington
Summit, however, made the universal
elimination of ballistic missiles seem fea-
sible for the first time. The biggest
obstacles are the independent nuclear
forces. Tailoring a proposal to permit
some SLBMs would meet the objections
of Britain and France, but Chinese and
Israeli resistance may be harder to
overcome. While a ballistic missile ban
remains distant, it no longer can be dis-
missed as fanciful. "
59. It is worth noting in this context that,
according to Indian sources, India might agree
to such a global missile ban but only if it also
prohibited sea- and air-launched cruise mis-
siles.
60. It is obvious that such an approach brings
us to the hub of the problem and the funda-
mental question of how to find a synthesis
between four main strategies, such as
- 
extending global disarmament and
arms control agreements to compre-
hensive weapon bans;
- 
maintaining nuclear (and conventional)
deterrence;
- 
maintaining the option of preventive or
pre-emptive offensive strikes;
- 
establishing a system of protection
against missile strikes.
61. The idea of a test ban creates the most dif-
ficult problems. Apart from the fact that such a
policy would raise major difficulties for a
number of western countries, in particular
France, with regard to their plans for developing
the new strategic missiles M-5 and M-45, as well
as a new cruise missile weapon, but also Great
Britain with respect to its Trident programme,
the more fundamental problem is to define the
criteria which could determine when a new
weaponry is considered so dangerous that a test
ban should be imposed. That could apply, for
instance, to stealth bombers, laser weapons and
many others and would lead to the unrealistic
endeavour to stop researching and developing
new military technology.
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62. Incidentally, there is a certain contra-
diction in Mr. Karp's approach when he at one
and the same time advocates the development of
active defences against the missile threat which
of course means comprehensive anti-missile
weapon tests.
63. Nevertheless one should not rule out con-
tinuing in-depth study of these ideas since the
nuclear limited test ban agreed between the two
principal world powers after all had exemplary
and positive results.
64. Future reliance on deterrence was men-
tioned by several speakers, but it is not sur-
prising that opinions were divided in this
respect. Whereas General Stainier came to the
conclusion that in the Kuwait crisis, deterrence
did not work and that it could work only
between well informed and rational adversaries,
Dr. Payne considered it would still continue to
be useful in some cases, but could not, however,
be considered a reliable substitute for missile
defence in the emerging international envi-
ronment. Mr. Martre considered deterrence was
still an essential means but underlined that its
methods of implementation must be diversified
to be able to respond to all situations and that
the dialectics were still uncertain. It is thus inev-
itable that the doctrine of deterrence will need
careful reconsideration in all relevant European
and Atlantic institutions.
65. The option of pre-emptive offensive
strikes was presented by Dr. Payne who
admitted however that this means might be
appropriate in some circumstances but that it
generally would not be politically acceptable and
could prove very difficult to implement effec-
tively.
66. Coming now to the option of creating an
anti-missile protection system, it might be useful
to recall, as Mr. Barth6lemy did, that the French
Government proposed in the United Nations, as
a measure of confidence-building in space,
arrangements aimed to notify ballistic missile
firings and space launches with provisions for
world-wide data processing that might be sup-
plied by regional warning or observation satel-
lites.
67. This approach constitutes the necessary
link to the fundamental problem of defining and
elaborating the nature, objective, range, feasi-
bility, and participants of a protection system
based, first and foremost, on technological
means.
68. In this context, the presence of both
American and Russian representatives at the
symposium was particularly useful. Europeans,
who are still in a phase of forming their opinion,
cannot remain indifferent to the fact that the
United States entered into serious discussions
on this topic with the Russian Federation, on
which the Assembly had so far obtained very
little precise informationt6, in particular
regarding its objective.
69. One might speculate on the reciprocal
motives for these contacts. According to certain
sources, the United States objective in launching
these talks was to modify the anti-ballistic
missile treaty (ABM) to enable a truly elobal
defence to be deployed, whereas the Russians,
on the other hand, seek access to United States
technology and wish to ensure that America
does not proceed unilaterally with a global
defence systemrT.
70. More important for Europe are two
factors: first, the fact that, as practised in several
previous cases, the United States engaged nego-
tiations on a subject in which Europe has vital
security interests, exclusively with their main
counterpart, the Russian Federation, as suc-
cessor of the Soviet Union, in the absence of
Europe 
- 
NATO was informed only after the
negotiations; secondly, the advanced stage these
talks have already reached.
71. The information released so far at the
symposium by the American and Russian repre-
sentatives was not very comprehensive nor con-
sistent, but it now seems more clear that the
concept envisaged is to establish a multinational
anti-missile force and create a global protection
centre (its location still has to be determined)
" where former Soviet states and other United
States allies could witness missile launches and
intercepts' r8.
72. The implementation of the project is
envisaged in three phases:
- 
in the first phase, the United States as
well the Russian Federation would
provide each other with early-warning
information;
- 
in the second phase, the early-warning
system would be enlarged to other par-
ticipants, and
- 
in the third phase beginning 1995 both
a multinational anti-missile force and a
Clobal protection centre (similar to the
United States Canadian early-warning
centre in Cheyenne Mountains, Col-
orado) would be established, where
missileJaunches could be detected and
tracked on an electronic displayte.
73. According to Defense News:
" Details of the administration's plan
were presented to Russian, Ukrainian and
Belarussian offrcials, in October and
November and talks were continuing
16. Document 1339, paragraphs 55-56.
17. Defense News, 22nd-28th February 1993.
18. Defense News, llth-l7th January 1993.
19. Defense News, llth-l7th January 1993.
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through early January, Pentagon sources
said. Graham, co-chairman of a GPS
working group established to promote the
global protection pact, said he and other
administration colleagues have briefed
NATO oflicials as well as officials from
Israel, Egypt, Japan, Korea and Aus-
tralia.'
74. According to General Graham, nations
outside NATO would be welcome to participate,
including East European states, but he was con-
vinced that NATO was the only existing interna-
tional organisation capable of planning and
co-ordinating such a global protection system.
75. The fact that the United States-Russian
talks have been adjourned since the beginning of
1993 allows a first assessment regarding the con-
sequences Europe should draw from these
United States-Russian initiatives. For this
purpose the presence of an official represent-
ative of the Russian Government, Mr.
Tchuvakhin, was particularly helpful. It
appeared from his presentation that major dif-
ferences still existed between the two negoti-
ators.
'16. First, there are continuing differences
over the future r6le of the ABM Treaty which,
according to Mr. Tchuvakhin, was to be main-
tained and strengthened. It was even considered
as a Russian condition for the implementation
of the START I and START II treaties. Second,
the Russian representatives insisted on the
importance of developing all international
agreements limiting armaments and prolife-
ration. In this context, it was particularly note-
worthy that he made a special reference to the
MTCR r6gime which he wished to strengthen
and render more effective. At the same time, he
challenged a number of " ambiguities " in this
r6gime which favoured missile proliferation
within the western alliance and the European
Community which, in his opinion, made it dif-
ficult for Russia to join the r6gime as announced
in principle by President Yeltsin.
77. Thirdly, his positive reaction to the
French proposal2o already mentioned to create
within the United Nations a system based on
previous notifications of ballistic missile firings
which could lead, at a later stage, to an interna-
tional space control centre. According to the
Russian view, the creation of an early warning
centre discussed with the United States could
constitute a first step in this direction.
78. Fourthly, the Russian assessment that it
was unlikely that third world countries would
possess in the near future ballistic missiles with
a range of more than 2 000 or 2 500 km.
79. Even if some important ambiguities and
uncertainties remain, in particular regarding dif-
ferent notions and intentions, one conclusion
may be drawn already at this stage. The idea of
creating an international early warning and sur-
veillance system is a matter which seemed to
secure the agreement of the majority of the par-
ticipants concerned. An early warning system
open to all interested countries would not arouse
the concern mentioned by Mr. Fituni, regarding
a global protection system which could be con-
sidered as * an endeavour of most developed
industrial nations. Thus the less-developed
countries would permanently feel threatened by
it " with the danger of intensifying political and
strategic division between the North and the
South.
80. The question of participating in a multi-
national anti-missile force under United States
leadership or ofcreating a proper European anti-
missile defence system depends on purely
political and military decisions. So far, in
Europe, preliminary studies are being conducted
in both NATO and WEU, but European govern-
ments are far from having reached firm indi-
vidual, not to mention joint positions.
81. On the other hand, the comprehensive
and convincing presentations of all the different
industry representatives at the symposium have
clearly demonstrated that the European indus-
tries have the capabilities and the technical
means for establishing a protection system in all
its possible variants and architectures. Your
Rapporteur can rely on the very detailed presen-
tation made and by the summary of the General
Rapporteur, Mr. Martre, when he said:
'It would appear that all the technology
necessary for producing an ATBM
defence system is available in Europe. For
warning and targeting, infrared sensor sat-
ellites and communications satellites are
necessary.
Europe has produced few military satel-
lites, but its effort in the civil space area
has given it excellent capabilities and
made it very competitive in the area of
satellites and launchings. It may therefore
be thought that the satellites necessary for
an ATBM system might be derived from
existing civil satellites and even that some
communication satellites might be used in
part for the ATBM system. In view of
these capabilities and for a simple
warning system adapted to the needs of
Europe alone, the cost of a warning
system might be about $250 million.
The command and control system of an
ATBM system raises the problem of the
overall architecture of the system and
depends on national and allied authorities
who would be required to intervene in the20. Paragraph 66.
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process. Such a system may be conceived
as an extension of existing air defence
systems or as an independent system. It is
essential to ensure the interoperability of
the various components of the system to
ensure its integrated operation. In all
these areas, European countries have
excellent mastery of the main system and
good experience.
For firing units, there must be high per-
formance electronic scanning radars and
missiles on board infrared sensors and
considerable mobility. Several types of
missiles might be considered, some
endo-atmospheric and other upper endo-
atmospheric or even exo-atmospheric.
In this area, anti-missile systems are now
being developed in Europe for defence
against cruise and air-to-surface missiles,
for instance the FSAF family being pro-
duced in the framework of EUROSAM.
Consideration might be given to devel-
oping an ATBM system on the basis of
these projects and research conducted
elsewhere. "
82. At this stage it seems to be important to
make certain reservations concerning in par-
ticular the idea of using civil space capabilities
for military purposes. While it was common
practice in the past to use the civil satellite
network as a basis for military means, one
should be very cautious about establishing a
general rule enforcing mixed co-operation
between the military and civil sectors in space
matters. This question arises notably when it is
to be discussed whether the European Space
Energy Agency (ESA) could be used for devel-
oping or operating systems in connection with
anti-missile defence. This also concerns the
question of whether the Ariane launcher may be
employed for military missions too.
83. Regarding co-operation with the United
States, Mr. Martre's assessment was of a
remarkable clarity:
" The only parts of the American GPALS
programme that might interest Europe are
the warning system and the ATBM
system. The space-based weapons system
cannot be transferred to foreign countries
under the ABM treaties in their present
form and its achievement seems very
improbable. Defence of the Grand Forks
site against intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles is a specifically American defence
matter.
For the warning system, there might be
co-operation between Europe and the
United States, but this raises the problem
of access to data in all circumstances. For
ATBM systems, the Americans are
studying certain types of missiles suited to
such defence: Erint, Thaad and the ter-
minal stage Leap which might be adapted
for Patriot, for instance.
Co-operation between Europe and the
United States for the establishment of an
ATBM system in Europe seems possible
and is certainly desirable if it can lead to
savings being made. However, we must
start from the idea that no system ofthis
type exists at present and there is
therefore no question of procuring a
system off the shelf. "
84. Even if it may be true that the main
European interest should be concentrated on the
establishment of a warning system and an
eventual theatre anti-ballistic system capable of
protecting our populations, the question of
space-based weapons should not leave Europe
indifferent because this question does not
concern just the ABM Treaty, of which Europe
is not a party, but also the more general question
of the militarisation of space, which everybody
wishes to be avoided in particular if this were to
lead to an arrns race in space.
85. It was therefore crucial to learn from the
legal expert, Mr. von Kries, in Rome that
according to existing space law:
" There are no legal restrictions on aux-
iliary and complementary anti-missile
defence 
.(eOU) systems like surveillance,
reconnaissance and early-warning satel-
lites. The stationing of space-based inter-
ceptors is permitted as long as they are
non-nuclear and not of a similar mass
destruction type."
86. The expert further explained that
attempts to restrict the Outer Space Treaty
(OST) arms control provision have not been suc-
cessful:
* Italy's proposal of 1979 to prohibit not
only weapons of mass destruction in outer
space but also 'any other types of devices
designed for offensive purposes', by
adding a respective protocol to the OST,
as well as the Soviet treaty proposal of
1981 aimed at banning 'weapons of any
kind in outer space' did not come to
fruition.
The same holds for the various proposals
made during the eighties to keep outer
space free from anti-satellite weapons,
which could have an AMD potential.
Also, efforts by certain nations to formally
delineate an airlspace boundary and
thereby to clearly separate sovereign air
spaces from the international outer space
domain remained unsuccessful and very
probably will not materialise in the
forseeable future.
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The military space law rdgime in place, as
established by the Limited Test Ban
Treaty and the OST in the sixties,
therefore, has proved to be highly stable,
and there are no signs of up-coming
changes or alterations.'
87. Your Rapporteur believes that this situ-
ation is not satisfactory and he would be in
favour of using the general debate on the use-
fulness of and need for an appropriate anti-
missile defence system for reviving efforts to
complete international space-law.
Y. Conclusions
88. In the extremely short time available for
analysing the various contributions presented at
the Rome symposium, the conclusions can be
only provisional at the present stage. The sym-
posium was held at a time when very substantial
progxess was being made in international dis-
armament, arms control and confidence-building
measures.
89. On the other hand, there is a continuing
danger stemming from the Balkan crisis and a
particular problem with the future policy of
North Korea, one of the most important missile
suppliers to the third world.
90. Europe has to face up to the question of
what consequences it will draw from the situ-
ation in which, at present and in the near future,
there is no clear risk of a deliberate attack on
populations or targets in Europe by states pro-
cessing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, as rightly states Mr. Leira, but in
which the continuing proliferation of such
weaponry into regions which may affect Europe
constitutes an undeniable risk.
91. What is important for the decision-
makers is that, according to estimates, by the
beginning of the next century more than half a
dozen countries may have ballistic missiles with
ranges between 3 000 and 5 500 km.
92. Decision-makers must carefully assess the
balance between the probability of the risk of
endangering their populations (or their military
forces) and the financial burden of creating
a sophisticated production system, which
European industry is quite capable of devel-
oprng.
93. They have to decide how much time they
have for taking appropriate decisions. The
present situation, where American, Russian and
European governments are reviewing their
security policies, provides an appropriate oppor-
tunity for joint consultations on this matter.
94. The first priority in these consultations
should be to strengthen and extend all arms
control, non-proliferation and confidence-building
measures to the Far East and the South.
95. All efforts to create a protection system
based in the first instance on the establishment
of a space surveillance system should be based
on a policy of confidence-building measures in
order to avoid a new anns race initiated by
countries feeling excluded or threatened.
96. The Western European Union Council
should assume a leading rOle in this respect
bearing in mind their plan for creating an
independant European space observation
system.
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APPENDIX I
Programme of the symposium on anti-missilc defence for Europe
heW in Cecchignola on 20th and 21st April 1993
Tuesday, 20th April 1993
9.30 a.m. First sitting
Opening of the symlnsium
Mr. Sorrr
President of the WEU Assembly
Mr. FoscHr
Chairman of the Italian Delegation
Mr. Lopsz HeNlRes
Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
Prublcms raised by the development and proffiration of advanced ballistic missile tech-
nology
Situating the problem:
Mr. ANroO
Minister of Defence of Italy
Proliferation and analysis of the risl<s for Europe:
Mr. Nerwr
Editing Director, Rivista Italiana di Difesa (RID)
Discussion
The new international order and problems south of the Mediterranean:
General JrnN
Italy
The evolution of the military situation in Eastern Eurasia:
Mr. TrN ENc Bor
Chargd de recherche, CNRS, France
Discussion
2.30 p.m. Second sitting
How to cope with the challenges
The United States and the ueation of a worldwide system of protection:
Dr. PevNr
Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University, President of the
National Institute for Public Policy, United States
General Gnennu (Ret.)
Director of High Frontier, United States
Russia's anti-missile defence:
Mr. TcsuverulN
Deputy Director for Missile Technology, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation
Russia and the organisation of a world system of security or protection:
Mr. FtruNI
Director of the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies, Academy of Sciences of Russia,
Moscow
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Future prospects for disarmament, arms exports contol and non-proliferation:
Mr. Kenp
SIPRI (Stockholm), Sweden
Discussion
Current state of industrial studies on anti-missile systems in Europe
High technology security co-operation:
Mr. SrsNtcrc
Director, Planning and Research Division, Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), Germany
Industrial cooperation in limited anti-missile defence:
Mr. Znr.oNrs
President of Eurosam, Italy
Architecture of possible protection systems in Europe:
Mr. Deuve
Director, Adrospatiale, Espace et Ddfense, France
Conffol, command and cost of systems:
Mr. Vrnpoux
Director, Electronic Systems Division, Thomson-CSF, France
Discussion
Wednesday, 21st April 1993
10 a.m. Third sitting
Cunent state of industrial studies on anti-missilc systems in Europe (continued)
Observation and warning: mastery of complex systems:
Mr. Rocnr
Directeur, Systdmes Matra D6fense Espace, France
Mr. Gnrcount
Matra Marconi Space, France
The use of satellite systems for protection against ballistic missiles:
Mr. MrNrcuccr
Amministratore Delegato, Telespazio, Italy
Impact of ballistic missile defence on European military space programmes:
Mr. Rooorn
General Manager, Alenia Spazio S.p.A., Italy
Discussion
Conditions for a European anti-missile defence policy
Strategic lessons of the Gulf war:
General SrntnIr,n
Commandant of the Institut sup6rieur de d6fense, Belgium
Anti-missile defence in a global European strategy:
Mr. Lrnn
Counsellor to the Secretary of State for Defence, Spain
Discussion
Anti-missile defence for Europe; an industrial perspective:
Mr. BunNrnu
British Aerospace Dynamics Ltd., United Kingdom
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Interoperability and cooperation requirements of anti-missile defence:
Mr. Foxwrll
Ferranti International System lntegration, United Kingdom
A worldwide, regional or national system 
- 
implications of the choice:
Mr. BenrnEI-ruv
Sous-Directeur i la D6l6gation aux affaires stratdgiques, Ministry of Defence, France
Discussion
3 p.m. Fourth sitting
Anti-missile defence and the law of outer space:
Mr. von Knrrs
MST Aerospace GmbH, Germany
Discussion
General report:
Mr. Mnnrnr
President of GIFAS (Groupement des industries frangaises adronautiques et spatiales),
France
General discussion
Conclusions:
Mr. LeNzrn
MdB, Vice-Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
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APPENDIX II
Extracts from the press conference given by Mr. Aspin,
United States Secretary of Defence
13th May 1993
;;. ASPIN. 
- 
Today we are here to observe another point of passage, which is the end of the
Star Wars era. We are renaming and refocusing the Strategic Defenc-e Init-iative Offrce to reflect the
Clinton administration's changes in the priorities. From now on, the SDIO will be the Ballistic Missile
Defence Organisation, and it will not report directly to the Secretary of Defence.
- . 
These changes are possible because of the end of a battle that has raged in Washington for
decades over the best way to avoid nuclear war. That battle was over whether we should-build a
massive defence against a missile attack from the Soviet Union, or whether we should press for arms
reductions backed by traditional deterrents.
. 
Like many Washington battles, that was not decided on the merits. It just went on so long that
circumst_ances changed the terms of the debate. The fate of Star Wars was seaied by the collapse 6f tne
Soviet Union.
The Star Wars decade began on 23rd March 1993, when President Ronald Reagan announced he
w_as launching a programme to, quote: * render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.' End quote.
His strategic defence programme was quickly dubbed Star Wars after the popular movie of the time.
. 
Ten years later we find that we have a different need for a ballistic missile defence, not the
massive programme of space-based weapons that Ronald Reagan envisioned. Saddam Hussein and the
Scud missiles showed us that we needed ballistic missile defence for our forces in the field. That threat
is here and now. In the future, we may face hostile or irrational states that have both nuclear warheads
and ballistic missile technology that could reach the United States.
- 
That is. wlv we have made theatre ballistic missile defence our first priority, to cope with the
new dangers-in the post-cold war, post-Soviet world. After theatre missile defence, BMDO's priorities
are going to be the national missile defence, which is a defence of the American people from ground-
based systems. And the third point of emphasis or tlird priority will be the follow-on iechnologlies that
offer some promise in both tactical and strategic defence. Thes-e changes represent a shift awa| from a
clash programme for deployment of space-based weapons designed toheet a threat that has receded to
the vanishing point 
- 
the all-out, surprise attack from the former Soviet Union.
We 11e changing the way the organisation fits into OSD. Since its inception in 1984, SDIO has
reported directly_ tg th_e Secretary of 
-Defence. The new arrangement has the BMD organisation
rep. orting to tle Under-Secretary of Defence for acquisition and technology, who is John Deu-tsch. This
shift reflects the fact that the programme will be shifting from research to-development 
- 
to the devel-
opment and acqui,sition of systems. And it will allow us to manage our work on ballistic missile defencein a way appropriate to its place in the overall defence progmmme.
Question. - Do you still intend to spend $3.8 billion in the 1994 programme?
Mr. ASPIN.- No, the 1994 programme is as it was sent to Congress because it is focused in this
new direction of heavy_priority on theatr-e missile defences, number one; the second priority is national
defence of the United States, missile defence of the United States; and-third is theidvan6ed technoi-
ogies. The $3.8 billion programme in 1994 still stands.
Question. - Mr. Secretary, do you see a future in the intermediate term for space-based missile
defence systems yhi_ctt some veteran advocates say is still the most effective way even to deal with
medium-range missiles?
Mr. ASPIN. 
- 
I think we need to follow it 
- 
we do not need to answer that question yet, but we
need to follow the technology and do the research and development to see how weli it can bi: done and
how much it is going to cost.
- 
Qugltion. - Does this mean you- have given up on former President Reagan's dream of a system
that would render nuclear weapons obsolete?
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Mr. ASPIN. 
- 
Impotent and obsolete. I think that the world has changed, and that what we aredoing is that that need is lo longer!here.. The vision that Ronald Reagan nia *aJa vision io protectthe security of the United States of America by establishing a defensive-system. He proposed tnirij an
alternative to what was then the system, which was deteLence, a balance of terr6r.
_ 
The thing that protected the United States without Star Wars was the notion that if you attack
me,.I am going to attack you and it is going to be suicidal and we are both going to get killed so Oo noi
oo lt.
. 
Ronald Reagan and a number of_people in the right wing of the political spectrum were very
unhappy with that prospect and what they proposed then 
- 
ani you know Daniei Graham and thi:
others_that w€re proposing this said what wsneed to do is developdefences and establish ttre OeienCi
of the United States which did not shoot down incoming missiles and would not be a 
- 
and we would
not have to depend on the balance of terror which with one slight mistake, the whole thing can blowup.
. .Tht difficulty.with it-was as we. proceeded with it was first of all, there were a lot of physics and
scientific and technical and engineering questions about what you could do. It is ore ifrii,g'to inoJ
down individual weapons, it is another fo deal with a whole masi of what kind of counter meisures you
Pight have. So there is a whole technical question about its capability. The second issue is whettrei in
{act you really wanted to do that and whether in fact that kind of a-thing might not be destabilisintfrom an arms control point of view because it would probably be better as fropf,ing u, agairst tG;r;
strike attack than against the first strike attack.
So the debate rage$..An$, 
^I mean, you had a debate in this country for six, seven, eight years,
laged about the nature of the defence in the United States. Do you protect the dei"ence of tfe Uniied
States through a balance of terror plus some arms control to try and reduce the destabilising weap-ons ai
the margin, or do you do.it.through.try!ryJg build the defence of the united States ana-howito iou
mesh those two. As t say it is a classic Washington case 
- 
nobody won the argument, the situation on
the ground changed and th-e. argument. became moot and then the Soviet Uiion went away and the
whole business 
- 
we are suddenly now in the business of arms reductions of a kind that are so massive
that we can look forward to the-possibility.of.being able to do away with this concern altogethei- Bui
there still is. The point is made that there still is a nuclear threat. It ii a different kind of nuciearlnrLi;
it is a different people that the nuclear threat comes from; it is a nuclear threat of a half a dozen oi
fqwer nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist state. Andihat is the threat now and that is a differentkind of thing and there 
- 
so 
- 
and in that context, I think most people see defencer ai t uuing ; ;;6i
r6le to play.
That is what we are doing is we are refocusing the whole programme here and the organisation of
the_way we deal with defences towards the new threat and awiy from the old threat-not because
anybody won the argument about the old threat but the old threit went away.
-Question. - Will we honour or amend the existing ABM treaties? Some of the CIS states have
said they are ready to sign up for it. Is the United Statls ready to make that commitment?
Mr. ASPIN. 
-_Y_es, this is all part of the negotiations that are ongoing. If we have a missile
defence of the United Slqtes_lhat goes beyond the current limit of one site,-we ire going to trave to gii
an amendment to the ABM Treaty. So clearly it is nothing to do with the theatre missiljs. What we ire{g$ 1o* is developing theatre missile defences, and thaiis fine, we do not have any problem with thiABM Treaty.
. .. 
If we go on to the next stage, which is to protect the continental United States against ballistic
missile attacks from a-terrorist state, and to do that well I think will require some chang6J intfre AnM
Treaty, but we would be able to do that working with Russia and with the other nucleaistates to maker"r. ,l.l]..t, is consistent with what they want to do, too.
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Draft Remmmendation
oa tehnical co-operution ia the frurnework ol the Opea Shies Trctty
The Assembly,
(i) Welcg-ming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and
activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and ihe Asian parts of the
Russian Federation from Vancouver to Madivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the
Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992;(ii) Emphasising that this important confidence- and security-building measure can reach its goal of
creating a new multinational cb-operative security approach 6nry if a[ member states of the-Com-
munity of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded;(iit) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of
WEU member states should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full
implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures;(iv) Welcoming the decision of the WEU Council to form a single group of states in the framework of
the Open Skies Treaty;(v) Ngling however the diffrculties encountered by the WEU Open Skies Expert Group in
harmonising the different options for practical WEU co-operation during nearly two years of diicus-
sions which made it impossible to reach an agreement for the use of a sihgle type of observation air-
craft;(vi) Noting that the WEU aircraft pool envisaged now is to be based on the number of aircraft
actually available equipped with appropriate sensors in order to conduct joint air observation missions
in accordance with the treaty in its most cost-effective conditions;
(viil Considering that a number of questions are still open such as:
- 
the selection of appropriate sensors to equip the aircraft;
- 
the status of associate 'members and observers within the WEU group of states;
- 
cost-sharing;
- 
whether and to what extent should the WEU Satellite Centre be asked to take on the task of
interpreting the images gathered by the sensors;
(viii) Welcoming the efforts of the Council to negotiate the conditions of cmperation with the
Russian Federation, in particular regarding its participation in the WEU aircraft pool;(ix) Stressing however that the WEU contacts with the Russian Federation should not be exclusive
and that co-operation should be enlarged to include all interested countries of the Community of Inde-
pendent States and also the eight Central and Eastern European countries with which the Council has
established regular consultations;(x) Deeming it necessary for WEU as a gxoup of states within the Open Skies Treaty to elaborate at
an early stage concepts for the possible extension of the open skies rdgime to wider areas as provided
for in the treaty and to establish close working contacts with the Open Skies Consultative Commission,
RrcouurNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr,
1. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on its decision regarding the creation of a WEU
aircraft pool intended for air observation missions in the framework of tne open skies r6gime;
2. Ensure that no type of aircraft made available by a member country shall be excluded from the
pool;
3. Inform the Assembly:
(a) whether Greece, the associate members and the observers are already part of the group of
states created by the WEU Vienna declaration;
(b) whether WEU has decided in the meantime to transform this group in accordance with
Article III, Section II, paragraph 3 of the Open Skies Treaty, as announced in Vienna;
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4. Give an enlarged mandate to the WEU expert Sroup:
(a) to examine all the additional consequences not yet tackled and which arise from the decision
taken in Vienna to act as a group of states;
(b) lo evaluate the conditions for mandating the WEU Satellite Centre to interpret sensor
rmagery;
(c,) in liaison with the NATO Verification Co-ordinating Committee, to determine how to use
the open skies observation means for the CFE Treaty;
(d) to examine the possible extension of the open skies rdgime to wider areas such as conflict
prevention, crisis management and protection of the environment;
5. Take a joint initiative urging Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkme-
nistan and Uzbekistan to accede to the Open Skies Treaty;
6. Seek co-operation similar to that envisaged with the Russian Federation also with other member
states of the Community of Independent States, in particular with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and
inform the Assembly of the results of the relevant negotiations;
7. Establish a permanent WEU representation with the Open Skies Consultative Commission in
Vienna.
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Draft Raolution
oa tcchnical co-opemtion in thc franeworh ol the Opn Shil;s Trctty
The Assembly,
(y' 
. . 
Welcoming- the_ new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and
activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and ihe Asian parts of the
Russian Federation from Vancouver to Madivostok for reciprocal aerial observation ag;eed by the
Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992; -(i, 
. 
Emphasising-that this important confidence- and security-building measure can reach its goal of
creating q new multinational co-operative security approach bnf if all member states of thJCom-
munity of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded;
(il4_ 
_ 
Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of
WEU member states and of all the other signatories should shoulder their respoirsibiliiy for allowing
eirly entry into force and full implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procel
dures,
. 
U^n9rs1he go_vernments and the parliaments of WEU member states and of all the other signa-
tories of the Open Skies Treaty to ensure that the ratification procedure is concluded before the en-cl of
1993.
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Draft Order
oa tehaical q-owrfiion in tha franuworh of tlu Opea Skies Treav
The Assembly,
Irvrrrs the President of the Assembly to transmit the resolution on technical co-operation in the
framework of the Open Skies Treaty to all signatories of the Open Skies Treaty.
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Expltnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Tummcn, Rappor"teur)
I. Introduction
l. There are several reasons why the Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee and the
Assembly take a special interest in the Open
Skies Treaty.
2. The f,rrst is that this treaty establishes a
new type of confidence-building measure in
opening to aerial inspection for the first time in
history the airspace of the whole of North
America, Europe and the Asian part of Russia
from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
3. The second reason is that so far only five
states have ratified the treatyr. Consequently it
is necessary to urge the parliaments of member
countries and of other states to proceed to early
ratification, so that the treaty may enter into
force.
4. The third reason is that, in conformity
with the treaty, WEU member countries have
decided to act as a group for the practical and
technical implementation of the treaty which
raises a number of problems which will be
studied in this report, with particular regard to
WEU Council plans to establish a pool of air-
craft and sensors for joint use in conducting
observation flights with a view to cost sharing
and facilitating WEU co-operation with the
Russian Federation in these matters. Your
Rapporteur will complete this report later in the
light of decisions to be taken by the WEU Minis-
terial Council on l9th May on WEU
co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies
Treaty.
5. The fourth reason is that there is a need to
monitor the willingness of signatory states, and
in particular that of WEU member countries, to
bear the cost of effectively implementing the
treaty. Another risk is that for financial reasons
interest in implementing the treaty may flag in
certain countries. As your Rapporteur has
already done in his report on disarmament 
-
reply to the thirty-third annual report of the
Council in December 1988 2, he wishes to point
out again that disarmament and its verification
are not cheap and need appropriate financial
means. This is also true for the confidence-
building measures envisaged in the Open Skies
Treaty. It is therefore very important to verify
whether member governments are ready to take
1. Canada, Denmark, the Czech and Slovak Republics and
Hungary.
2. Document 1158.
advantage ofall reasonable industrial offers and
proposals regarding the appropriate technical
observation means allowed by the Open Skies
Treaty.
6. The fifth, but not last, reason is the
importance of raising political interest in the
possibilities offered by the Open Skies Treaty
for verifying a number of other existing or future
agreements for aflns control, conflict pre-
vention, crisis management and possibly the
extension of its r6gime to additional areas such
as the protection of the environment.
II. The truo$
7. The Open Skies Treaty was signed in Hel-
sinki on 24th March 1992 by twenty-five coun-
tries, including the sixteen member countries of
the Atlantic Alliance, the former East-European
members of the Warsaw Pact, and Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia as successor states
to the Soviet Union. The treaty is open for sig-
nature by all the other successor states to the
Soviet Union such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but so far only
Kirgizstan has signed it.
8. Certain diffrculties have prevented the
full participation of all CSCE member countries
in the treaty negotiations and in the signature
process in Helsinki. First, there were differences
between France and the United States over
France's position that the Open Skies r6gime
should become part of the CSCE process.
Second, Turkey refused to agree to the inclusion
of Cyprus.
9. As a compromise, during a six-month
period after the treaty's entry into force, Article
XVII of the treaty now allows any of the CSCE
member states to apply for accession to the
treaty, although this requires the agreement of
all the signatory states. It is to be hoped that the
difficulties raised so far to the participation of a
number of countries will be resolved in the
meantime.
10. A CSCE declaration 3 linked to the Open
Skies Treaty initiated by Finland offers certain
countries 
- 
such as Sweden and Finland 
- 
the
possibility of participating in the implemen-
tation of the treaty prior to their accession. On
that basis, they were granted a quota of three
7t
3. Appendix I.
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observation flights over the territory of Russia
and Belarus.
11. Furthermore, six months after its entry
into force, the signatory states may decide on
the accession to the treaty of any other inter-
ested countries outside the CSCE. According to
the leader of the German Delegation in the
negotiations a, participants had in mind in par-
ticular Japan and China, but at a later stage the
treaty will be open to any members of the
United Nations or might be used as a model for
later regional agleements.
12. The cornerstone of the treaty is that all
participants shall have the right to conduct
observation flights, at short notice, over the ter-
ritory of any other signatory state and shall be
obliged to accept observation flights over their
territory in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty.
13. Restrictions are allowed only for reasons
offlight security, but not because ofthe national
security interests of the observed country.
Article III and Appendix A of the treaty
establish the rules for active and passive flight
quotas 5.
14. The number of observation flights every
state party is obliged to tolerate over its territory
(passive quota) depends in general on the size
and importance of the observed country; for
instance the quotas'for the United States and
Russia/Belarus are forty-two each; for France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey
and Ukraine, twelve each; for smaller countries
such as Bulgaria and Hungary, four each, or for
Portugal, two.
15. Every state party shall have the right to
conduct a number of observation flights over the
territory of any other state party equal to the
number of observation flights which that other
state party has the right to conduct (active
quota, Article III, Section I, paragraph 3). The
total active quota of a state party shall not
exceed its total passive quota (Article III,
Section I, paragraph 5 at the end). However, in
the first three years after the entry into force of
the treaty, the number of observation flights is
limited to 7501o of the passive quota 6.
16. After the entry into force of the treaty, the
distribution of active quotas shall be subject to
an annual review for the following calendar year(Article III, Section I, paragraph 7). The results
of such a review will depend on the individual
interests of states parties and on the devel-
opment of the general political situation. So far,
the main interest during the negotiations was
4. Europa-Archiv, 10th September 1992, page 486.
5. Appendix II.
6. Appendix II.
concentrated on observation flights over the ter-
ritories of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
17. The treaty allows the establishment of dif-
ferent kinds of " groups of states parties ".
According to Article XIY, Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Luxemburg are to be considered as a
single state party, called Benelux. The Russian
Federation and Belarus have formed a group of
states parties sharing their total active and
passive flight quotas in accordance with Article
III, Section II, paragraph 3. On the other hand,
the member countries of WEU have formed a
group of states parties sharing their active flight
quotas, while retaining their individual passive
quotas in accordance with Article III, Section II,
paragraph 2 ofthe treaty.
18. Furthermore, the Head of the German
Delegation, representing the Chairman-in-Office
of the WEU Council, declared at the plenary
Open Skies Conference in Vienna on lSth
March 1992:
'We also reserve our right to transform in
due course this group according to para-
graph 3 of the section referred to. In this
connection I should like to recall the invi-
tation which the member states of WEU
have extended to a number of other states
in their declaration issued on the occasion
of the 46th European Council meeting on
9th and l0th December 1991 at Maas-
tricht.'
19. That means that all countries invited to
become full members or associate members of
Western European Union or observers, may join
the WEU group of states parties in the
framework of the Open Skies Treaty.
The choice of tha obscnation aircrufi
20. In Article II, paragraph 4, the treaty
defines as 'observation aircraft " an unarmed,
f,rxed wing aircraft designated to make obser-
vation flights, registered by the relevant author-
ities of a state party and equipped with agreed
sensors. The term * unarmed " means that the
observation aircraft used forthe purposes ofthe
treaty is not equipped to carry and employ
weapons. Furthermore, each observation air-
craft shall be capable of carrying the flight crew
and the necessary personnel (Article V, para-
graph 5).
21. Article II, paragraph I I and Appendix A
define, for the length ofthe observation flights,
individual " maximum flight distances " in
accordance with the size of the relevant country.
The term means the maximum distance over the
territory ofthe observed country from the point
at which the observation flight may commence
to the point at which that flight may terminate.
The maximum flight distance for Germany, for
instance, is I 200 km; for the United States,
4 900 km; for Russia/Belarus, 6 500 km.
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Senson
22. The treaty allows two different kinds of
sensor configuration, i.e.:
- 
a podded installation (outside the air-
craft) which shall be denoted by the
code * POD ";
- 
an internal installation (inside the air-
craft) which shall be denoted by the
code " INT ".
23. After the expiration of an initial phase of
three years beginning from the entry into force
of the treaty, the sensors installed on an obser-
vation aircraft shall permit observation of mil-
itary activities and installations even during
darkness and in all weather conditions. Article
IV, paragraph l, allows equipment with sensors
only from amongst the following categories:
(a) optical panoramic and framing
cameras;
(b) video cameras with real time
display;
(c) infta+ed line scanning devices and
(d) sidewaysJooking synthetic aperture
radar (SAR).
24. The allowable ground resolution of the
sensors 
- 
which means the minimum distance
on the ground between two closely-located
objects distinguishable as separate objects 
- 
is
determined specifically in order to permit the
identification of significant types of military
equipment such as tanks, artillery and armoured
personnel carriers.
25. The maximum obtainable resolution from
the optical, framing and video cameras is 30 cm,
this makes it possible to distinguish a tank from
a truck for instance, but it is not sufficient to
distinguish one type of tank from another. For
infra-red devices, the maximum resolution is
50 cm. These sensors allow viewing in poor light
conditions and, thanks to their ability to detect
sources of heat, the operational state of installa-
tions such as airports, military bases and indus-
trial sites can be determined. The maximum
SAR (sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar)
resolution of three metres will enable overflights
to locate potential concentrations of equipment,
which could then be more thoroughly investi-
gated using the other sensors 7.
26. Since all the treaty's signatories do not
now possess the same sophisticated sensor tech-
nology, Article XVII of the treaty stipulates that
during the initial three-year phase-in period,
only camera-type sensors will be allowed. The
use of infra-red line scanning devices will not be
permitted during that period, unless otherwise
agteed between the observing and observed
parties.
27. In the final stage, all states parties shall
have equal commercial access to sensor systems
capable of producing the maximum allowable
image resolution. The treaty also establishes a
procedure for the introduction ofadditional cat-
egories and improvements to the capabilities of
existing sensors. (According to Peter Jones,
member of the Canadian delegation to the Open
Skies Conference 8, air sampling devices have
already been discussed as one type ofnew sensor
package. These devices would permit open skies
overflights to monitor environmental degra-
dation and could assist in the verification of the
chemical weapons convention).
Raw daa
28. Article IX of the treaty provides that all
raw data are to be fully shared between the sig-
natories on a shared-cost basis. This provision
enables the smaller countries to have access to
the entire raw-data pool of the r6gime, rather
than being limited to the data obtained from
their small number of overflights.
Opea Skiu Consultative Commission
29. The treaty provides for the creation of an
" Open Skies Consultative Commission " in
Vienna which started its activities on 2nd April
1992. Its objectives are to settle practical and
technical questions in connection with the
implementation of the treaty, details of which
are defined in Article X and Appendix L.
30. Its first task was to settle a number of
questions not resolved at the date of signature,
for instance the details of cost-sharing, whereas
a general consensus exists that the observing
country in principle bears the cost ofthe obser-
vation flights. Other open questions e were
settled by the commission prior to 3fth June
1992, thus fulfilling the conditions for the ratifi-
cation of the treaty..
31. At a later stage, the Open Skies Consul-
tative Commission will also be responsible for
questions of treaty amendments and examining
the possible accession of new member countries
to the treaty.
Entry into force, durutioa aad pmtisional applicarton
of tlu trutty
32. The treaty shall be of unlimited duration(Article XY). It enters into force sixty days after
the deposit of twenty instruments of ratification,
including those of the depositaries, and of states
parties whose individual allocation of passive
8. Arms Control Today, May 1992, page 15.
9. Appendix III.7. Peter Jones, Arms Control Today, May 1992, page 14.
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quotas is eight or more (Article XVII, para-
gaph 2).
33. Some treaty provisions are already provi-
sionally applicable in order to facilitate its
implementation. This applies in particular to the
work of the Open Skies Consultative Com-
mission, the transmission of notifications and
reports required by the treaty and the desig-
nation of personnel who will carry out duties
relating to the conduct of observation flights,
including monitoring of sensor output.
III. Importonce of the air observation rdgime
34. The treaty is inherently of political impor-
tance: it constitutes the flrrst confidence-building
r6gime to include all of the territory of North
America, Europe and the Asian part of Russia
for aerial inspection, with the possibility of
extending the r6gime to other countries and
regions in the world.
35. A proposal made already in July 1955 by
President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union,
which was revived thirty-four years later by
President Bush, in May 1989, led to negotiations
between the two alliances in Ottawa in February
1990 which successfully concluded after two
years of negotiations with a comprehensive mul-
tilateral treaty open for the accession of any
interested country. Experience gained in
bilateral reconnaissance overflight agreed in the
framework of the Egyptian-Israeli disen-
gagement agreements in 197411975, then from
the trial Canadian-Hungarian open skies over-
flight in January 1992 and the conclusion of a
bilateral Open Skies Treaty between Hungary
and Romania on l lth May 1991, were certainly
helpful in demonstrating the usefulness and fea-
sibility of establishing an overall open skies
r6gime.
36. For this purpose, it may be assimilated to
the confidence- and security-building measures
(CSBM) drawn up in the CSCE. CSBMs form a
special chapter among overall arms control mea-
sures. Their main aim is to reduce the possibility
of a conflict breaking out as a result of an
incident. However, their main purpose is to
improve in a tangible manner the standard of
the political environment at bi- and multilateral
levels. They are in fact part of a highly psycho-
logical process designed to reduce suspicion in
the perception of another country's military
posture. To this end, the application of a CSBM
must give rise to an accurate, reliable exchange
of information between the parties concerning
the state and posture of their respective forces
and such information can be verified by on-site
inspections.
37. However, the Open Skies Treaty is wider
in scope than the CSBMs which were described
in the 1990 Vienna document and then further
developed in the 1992 document. On the one
hand, they are the first confidence-building mea-
sures to extend beyond the territory normally
covered by the CSCE process (Atlantic to the
Urals). Indeed, the area covered by the treaty
also includes the entire territory of Canada, the
United States and Russia, i.e. almost the whole
of the earth's northern hemisphere. Moreover,
the treaty is the first example of a confidence-
building measure being introduced by treaty and
thus having a juridical and consequently binding
status, unlike those introduced by the CSCE,
which are merely a moral constraint. Thus, the
Open Skies Treaty is perhaps the most extensive
confidence-building measure ever introduced by
multilateral agreements. As John H. Hawes, the
United States representative at the open skies
negotiations in Ottawa, wrote: " Open skies is
intended as a serious confidence-building
measure, that is, one in which international con-
fidence derives from the substance of what the
rdgime produces, and not solely or even pri-
marily from the symbolism or novelty of the fact
that the rdgime exists at all. "
38. The treaty implies no obligation for a
state to declare beforehand the state and number
of its forces, each party consenting a priori to be
observed. In this context, the accuracy (reso-
lution) of the images supplied is less decisive
than for a verification rdgime. The most
important aspect of such a rdgime would lie,
according to Joe Clark, former Canadian Sec-
retary of State for External Affairs, in the * pos-
itive political act of opening a nation's activities
to detailed, intrusive monitoring 
- 
a symbolic
opening of the doors. It would be a clear,
unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions
are not aggressive "ro.
39. The end of the East-West confrontation,
the transformation of the Soviet Union into a
Community of Independent States and the new
quality of relations with Russia might have
revitalised the initial western interest in the
rdgime. But in view of the uncertainty of future
developments in this region and other areas, the
possibility of conducting regular observation
flights can have a stabilising effect.
40. Regarding the military importance of the
rdgime, one has to admit that its observation
means are not as intrusive as those for the verifi-
cation of a number of disarmament and arms
control agreements. Furthermore, the rdgime
represents only a relatively modest enhancement
of the existing satellite surveillance capabilities
of the United States and Russia. As the United
States representative of the open skies negotia-
tions reported to the Senate, the sensors will
not provide very much new information tothe United States but will primarily
10. In an article in the New York Times, 5th June 1989,
quoted by Ralph J. Lysyshyn in 'Open Skies ahead " in
Nato Review No. l, February 1992, page 23.
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benefit nations which do not have sophisticated
national technical means such as satellites.
41. On the other hand, many satellites are
limited in their ability to maneuvre in response
to events, whereas aircraft can revisit an area
quickly and can remain there for extended
periods rr. More generally, an open skies system
is flexible and economical, making it certainly
interesting, particularly compared with satellite
means, which are an expensive solution within
the reach only of the great powers. The open
skies system, on the contrary, allows each partic-
ipating state to have information about the mil-
itary activities of other countries. The use of air-
craft is also more flexible and observation flights
can be made in the least foreseeable manner.
42. The trajectories of satellites are imposed
by their orbits. Their possibilities of maneuvre
in the light of events and their ability to follow
different courses are fairly limited. Conversely,
an aircraft can follow a flight plan for observing
several different sites during the same mission,it can hover over an objective, etc., all this
within a very short lapse of time. To effect the
same type of observation with a satellite, several
readjustments would have to be made to its
orbit at considerable expenditure and loss of
time. Finally, it is easier for an airborne system
to have sensors: for instance, a faulty system can
be repaired, systems can be inspected before,
during and after the flight, etc.
43. Furthermore, the observation means of
the Open Skies Treaty have a special advantage
over the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) whose area of application is
limited from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU
area). Shortly before the CFE Treaty was signed
in 1990, the Soviets transferred vast quantities
of military equipment to regions east of the
Urals. These transfers released this equipment
from the CFE requirement to be destroyed and
from CFE verification provisions as well.
44. Therefore, apart from satellite surveil-
lance, the observation means of the Open Skies
Treaty became the only way to keep an eye on
military equipment beyond the Urals and to
verify the destruction of many of these weapons
promised by the Soviet Union in 1991.
45. On the other hand, there is no formal link
between the Open Skies and CFE Treaties. Con-
ceptually, they concern two distinct areas: open
skies 
- 
confidence; CFE 
- 
verification. In spite
of this distinction, which was intentional in
order to avoid reducing the scope ofthe treaty, it
is generally accepted that the two treaties are in
some respects complementary. This is mainly
due to the fact that the CFE Treaty contains no
11. Peter Jones, Arms Open Skies:
parency, Arms Control Today, May
A New Era of Trans-
1992, page lO.
provisions relating to aerial verification. This
question had a direct influence on the Open
Skies Treaty negotiations.
46. Since then, a number of people have
wished a link to be established between the two
r6gimes. Some even consider that the open skies
rdgime is de facto the aerial verification r6gime
of the CFE Treaty. This matter was in fact left
open in the text of the treaty, which lays down
that:
" lJpon completion of the 120-day
residual level validation period, each state
party shall have the right to conduct an
agreed number of aerial inspections
within the atea of application. Such
agreed numbers and other applicable pro-
visions shall be developed during negotia-
tions referred to in Article VIII 12. "
47. Thus, aerial inspections under the CFE
Treaty are merely a future possibility after an
initial stage of armament reductions, i.e. not
earlier than 1995-96. Clearly, if there were to be
such a protocol, it would necessarily be the
result of experience acquired through appli-
cation of the Open Skies Treaty.
48. Moreover, the CFE Treaty as such estab-
lishes a very elaborate verification system to be
conducted by site inspection teams13. However,
the scope of the treaty is limited by the fact that
the area concerned by CFE reductions extends
only from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU
area). The reductions provided for in the treaty
concern only certain categories of equipment:
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery
pieces with a calibre over 100 mm, aircraft and
helicopters defined as equipment limited by the
treaty (TLE). A fortiori, these reductions
concern only certain units.
49. The Open Skies Treaty, or the other
hand, covers a much broader area of application
but is not really appropriate in its present form
for carrying out verification tasks. With the
sensors provided for in the treaty and the
accompanying limits, it is not possible to
identify equipment limited by the CFE Treaty.
The Open Skies Treaty nevertheless offsets some
of the limitations of the CFE Treaty. Inter alia,
the entire territory of the former Soviet Union
can be monitored. Furthermore, the state of
forces not included in the TLE category can be
monitored, and in particular:
- 
conventional equipment not corre-
sponding to the specific definitions laid
down in the treaty;
- 
equipment covered by the treaty but
deployed outside the ATTU area;
12. CFE Treaty Article XIV.6.
13. CFE Treaty, Protocol on lnspection.
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- 
naval equipment;
- 
space equipment;
- 
missiles;
- 
air transport means, etc.
50. These measures therefore help to com-
plete the CFE framework and avoid the emer-
gence of major imbalances and reductions under
the CFE Treaty leading to increases elsewhere.
51. In the framework of the application of the
treaty itself, open skies flights would allow
on-site inspections to be better directed, in par-
ticular challenge inspections of suspect areas.
The Open Skies Treaty would allow detection.
This would avoid mistakes relating to the
interest of the site to be inspected. It can thus be
seen how the two r6gimes might in practice be
complementary.
52. This leaves open a number of further
options for enlarging its application areas which
will be examined more closely in Chapter VII of
the report. It should therefore not be considered
as the end but rather as a beginning and a chal-
lenge not only for establishing new standards for
security relations between former enemies but
also for enhanced international co-operation.
IY. Co-operation betwun WEU
member countries
53. The implementation of the open skies
r6gime requires considerable financial means.
To take only two examples: according to United
States sources, the equipment of the first United
States aircraft with the necessary sensors for the
mission would cost $18 million to $20 million.
Each United States flight would cost approxi-
mately S200 000. The German defence budget
for the financial year 1993 provides DM 24
million, for 1994 approximately DM 37 million,
for 1995 approximately DM 40 million and for
1996 approximately DM l0 million, for aircraft
alterations and for meeting equipment and staff
requirements for the implementation of the
treaty.
54. It is not so much the procurement of air-
craft for aerial observation purposes that has to
be taken into account, since, in most countries,
appropriate types of aircraft are already
available, it is rather the investment necessary
for sensors, the cost of films and their analysis
and running costs. This is why almost no states
will in the long run be able to carry out obser-
vation flights by means of their own aircraft.
The treaty offers the following cost-sharing pos-
sibilities:
- 
co-operation by groups of states;
- 
participation in the observation flights
of another state party, i.e. by means of
multinational teams of observers;
- 
chartering observation aircraft from
another state party;
- 
purchasing a copy of the film
obtained.
55. These possibilities of lowering costs allow
all states parties to carry out their own aerial
observations or use the results obtained by
another statera.
56. After the decision taken by Western
European Union member countries to form a
* group of states parties in accordance with
Article III, Section II, paragraph 2 ofthe treaty "
(see paragraph l5), it was necessary to work out
the objectives, consequences and ways and
means of such WEU co-operation. Two new
WEU working groups have been created: one on
verification in 1991, one on open skies in
1992t5.
57. After the mandate addressed to the WEU
expert groups by the declaration of Vianden on
27th June l99l 
'6 to explore the possibilities ofpractical co-operation regarding the implemen-
tation of the Open Skies Treaty, WEU ministers
agreed according their Petersberg declaration of
l9th June 1992t7:
'...in principle to a feasibility study to
identify the most cost-effective means of
implementing the Open Skies Treaty
co-operatively among member states.
They tasked the group ofexperts to agree
assumptions for the study, to identiS the
options which merit further study and to
consider the question of costs, with a view
to taking a decision at their next ordinary
meeting to proceed with the study,
stressed the readiness of WEU to
co-operate with third parties at a later
stage, and in this context welcomed the
contacts which had taken place with other
European allies, as well as with the
Russian Federation. They agreed that
experts should investigate the possibilitiesfor intensified cooperation with the
Russian Federation, which could include
a joint feasibility study and/or a trial over-
flisht.'
58. According to the Secretary-General's
information letter of lst July 1992t8:
'The Expert Group on the verification of
arrns control agreements held several
working meetings on the implementation
of the Open Skies Treaty. On 26th and
27th March, a WEU fact-finding mission
14. Europa Archiv, lfth September 1992, page 489.
1 5. See the French Government's answer on 23rd Jlly 1992
to a question put by Mr. Jeambrun.
16. Document 1282.
17. Document 1322.
18. Document 1323.
76
DOCUMENT 1364
visited Moscow to examine the possibility
of using a single type of observation air-
craft for open skies, as proposed by
France. When, in three years' time, the
treaty is implemented in full, there will be
a need to use specially equipped aircraft.
A fleet of between five and eight aircraft
should be sufficient for dhe 200 obser-
vation flights planned each year. A
solution consisting of developing a single
type observation aircraft which could also
be used for CSCE transport missions
might be adopted, and would offer major
advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness.
The Russians taking part in the WEU
mission suggested two types of aircraft
which might be suitable. All the practical
arrangements for technical co-operation
were considered during the discussions in
order to provide experts with the nec-
essary information for subsequent feasi-
bility studies on the pooling of aircraft
and/or sensors.
At an informal meeting in Vienna on 29th
April of heads of delegation, these explan-
atory talks on co-operation with Russia
were continued and other options were
discussed, such as a common WEU Pool
with national aircraft being used in
rotation. Then, on l3th May, experts met
in London at the WEU Secretariat to hear
a presentation on the German national
study and to prepare the activity report
for ministers. "
59. In their Rome communiqud of 20th
November 1992 te
" Ministers reiterated their commitment
to the early entry into force of the Open
Skies Treaty. They took note of the
progress report prepared by experts and
tasked them to continue the search for
cost-effective solutions for imple-
mentating the Open Skies TreatY,
including the possibilities for establishing
a WEU pool. Ministers stressed the read-
iness of WEU to co-operate with third
parties and welcomed the intention of the
presidency to inform them ofthe state of
play of WEU's work.'
60. The Secretary-General's information
letter of 24th November 1992 20 specified that:
'The Expert Group on the verification of
anns control agreements held several
working meetings on the implementation
of the Open Skies Treaty (6th July, 25th
September and 27th October). Since the
Ministerial Council had given its agree-
19. Document 1345.
20. Document 1352.
ment in principle on 19th June 1992 for a
feasibility study to be carried out to
determine the most cost-effective means
of implementing the Open Skies Treaty
within the framework of co-operation
between the WEU member states, the
experts discussed the assumptions on
which the study should be based, the defi-
nition of options meriting further study
and considered the study's likely costs and
the way in which it might be funded. "
61. So far, the last oflicial information on the
subject is contained in the second part of the
thirty-eighth annual report of the Council to the
Assembly which states that:
* The Open Skies Experts Group had, by
the end of the year, passed the stage of
preparing a feasibility study. Its activities
were now centred on the establishment of
an aircraft pool based on the number of
aircraft actually available.' 2r
62. Your Rapporteur is grateful for certain
additional information he was able to obtain
from the Secretary-General and a number of the
WEU member countries concerned.
63. It follows from this additional infor-
mation that the idea of elaborating a single joint
feasibility study has been given up since it
appeared impossible to harmonise the various
interests and proposals of member countries.
64. The discussions are now concentrated
mainly on ways and means of establishing a fleet
of WEU aircraft (WEU pool) to which each state
might assign one or more aircraft equipped with
appropriate sensors.
65. The treaty provides for two stages of
implementation. In the first stage, the parties
will use available aircraft and sensors that will
not have to meet all the criteria laid down in the
treaty. However, studies concerning co-
operation in the framework of WEU relate
mainly to the second stage of implementation,
which would start in 1997.
66. Four options have been selected from a
series of proposals concerning the formation of
the fleet:
- 
France: a totally integrated
WEU fleet (on the
lines of AWACS,
using a single type
of aircraft);
a fleet of national
aircraft that can be
made available to
the WEU fleet;
- 
Germany:
77
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- 
United Kingdom: fleets of national
aircraft assigped in
turn to the WEU
fleet;
- 
Benelux: national C-130 air-
craft using a jointly-
procured pod of
sensors.
These options would require more detailed
study. In particular, the question of man-
agement and financing required close exami-
nation. A collective WEU study should therefore
be conducted for this purpose.
67. The report submitted to the ministers at
their meeting on 20th November 1992 con-
tained the following observations and recom-
mendations:
- 
the mandate for the study was
approved;
- 
at the stage reached at that time, none
of the four options could be rejected; all
were to be studied in greater detail;
- 
a ministerial decision on carrying out a
single study was not expedient at this
stage; conversely, the report asked the
Council to approve a six-month explan-
atory stage during which identical cri-
teria, parameters and structures would
be worked out for conducting, in a
national framework, four studies on the
various options, so as to be able to
make a comparative estimate and take
an appropriate decision.
68. At their meeting at the beginning of
January 1993, the WEU experts terminated
their discussion of the WEU study which, on the
whole, was neither fruitful nor progressive, and
concentrated their work on a pragrnatic initi-
ative in order to achieve rapid results that were
as concrete as possible. This new step was based
on the principle that conducting the four feasi-
bility studies so far envisaged would take up too
much time and their results would probably be
overtaken by events in the various countries. It
emerged from relevant declarations made by
member countries that the WEU fleet would ini-
tially be composed of a German Tupolev-l54, a
British Andover (until 1995) and national
C-130s equipped with the Benelux sensor pod.
Consequently, two working documents were to
be devoted to the organisational and financial
aspects of joint facilities of this type.
69. The United Kingdom and France have
assumed responsibility for preparing the
working document on the organisation of the
fleet, Benelux the study ofthe special case ofthe
C-130 equipped with a pod and Germany the
financial aspects. The result of these studies was
endorsed by the Open Skies Working Group on
l6th April 1993 and will be submitted to the
ministers for approval at the next meeting of the
Council of Ministers on l9th May. This doc-
ument consists of definitions and various
chapters on training, organisation and the oper-
ation of the fleet.
70. AU member countries agree that the
effective implementation of the treaty should
not be delayed until the aircraft pool is brought
into service but that it should be used from the
very start after the treaty comes into force.
71. It appears from the expert studies that a
majority of member countries is inclined to
organise the WEU pool on the basis of the
Benelux option, using Hercules C-130 22 aircraft
equipped with a special pod. C-130s are used in
the airforces of most NATO member countries
with the exception of Germany.
72. The Belgian airforce, for instance, is pre-
pared to equip its C-130 Hercules with a pod
developped by Lockheed's Airlift Derivatives
Programs Division, called SAMSON (Special
Avionics Missions StrapOn Now). This system
is described by Lockheed as a high-technology
surveillance system 'housed in a pod beneath
the (C-130) aircraft's wing in place of an
external fuel tank, it can be installed in less than
six hours with no permanent modifications to
the aircraft.'
73. Normally, the C-130 is already designed
to receive control cables allowing instruments in
the pod to be linked to the operators'control
panels in the airframe. The panels and the seats
for inspectors are installed on loading pallets in
the cargo compartment of the airframe. The
various elements composing the system can thus
be installed or removed relatively quickly. As
the C-130 requires no structural changes, the
system can be transferred from one aircraft to
another and thus be available for several suc-
cessive operators.
74. This system therefore seems a practical,
economical solution but is nevertheless not
without drawbacks. In the event of the sensors
not working properly during an observation
flight, it would be impossible for the operators
to repair them. For instance, the reels of film
could not be replaced when they run out. So far,
tests have been carried out only with sensors of
American origin that do not correspond to the
treaty limitations. Thus, it would also have to be
checked whether all types of sensors allowed by
the treaty can be properly installed in the pod.
This is the case of the SAR, for instance which
sports a fairly large antenna. Finally, doubts
have been expressed about the possibility of a
C-130 aircraft being authorised to overlly the
territory of the former Soviet Union for reasons
connected with air control and ground support,
etc. However this may be, this system is cer-
tainly a simple, economical solution.
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75. So far, however, countries which have
C-130s are not yet unanimous about the condi-
tions for a joint use of pods. The following ques-
tions remain to be settled:
- 
what type of sensor will be installed in
the pod?
- 
how many pods should be procured?
- 
how many consoles should be procured
to ensure that the sensors work?
- 
who will share the cost of procurement
and operation in the long run and what
will be the breakdown of costs?
It is mainly on the last point that a decision still
has to be taken, and also the question of whether
all countries with C-130s will participate or not
in solving the abovementioned problem.
76. Other member countries, in particular
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, are
studying alternative solutions regarding aircraft
and sensors. Whereas the United Kingdom
favours the Andover aircraft, Germany was the
only member country presenting a compre-
hensive national study containing proposals for
using a Tupolev 15423, internal installed sensors
and a number of operating arrangements.
77. The German solution, which is actually
rather isolated within the WEU group of states
parties, might be rather more expensive than the
pod solution. It has, however, according to its
advocates, a number of advantages, such as:
- 
facilitating sensor installations and
supervising, during observation flights,
that all sensors are working properly;
- 
offering possibilities for European
industry to provide the necessary
sensor technology;
- 
improved sensors output; and
- 
facilitating eventual co-operation with
the Russian Federation.
78. The United States seems to favour using
an adapted C-135 aircraft with internal installed
sensors, whereas Canada seems to advocate the
C-130 pod solution. Within a minority of
member countries, in particular in Germany,
there is strong concern that the outcome might
be that the pool envisaged between WEU
member countries might finally be reduced to
C-130 Hercules aircraft equipped with a pod.
Y. Prosprcc'ts of WEU co-operation
with the Russian Federation
79. After the first WEU fact-finding mission
in Moscow at the end of March 1992, the
Russian representatives insisted, at an informal
meeting in Vienna on 29th April 1992, on their
" taxi-option " which means that an important
part of the flights over the Russian territory
should be conducted by Tu-l54 M aircraft pro-
vided by the Russian Federation. This is allowed
by the treaty as an exception to the general rule
according to which flights are conducted in prin-
ciple by aircraft of the observing party.
80. When the WEU Ministerial Council
approves the management rules of the WEU
pool, it is planned to contact the Russian Fede-
ration again in order to start official negotia-
tions for elaborating arrangements allowing the
Russian side to co-operate with the WEU group.
Co-operation to be arranged with Russia will
have to relate to the management of the pool
and flight quotas. This should also allow the
question of " taxi-option " to be settled in view
of the fact that setting up a joint fleet with the
Russian Federation depends on the possibility
of using all the aircraft in it, including, therefore,
those of WEU, to overfly Russia.
81. WEU may therefore invite the Russians
to make one or more of their aircraft available to
the joint fleet. This aircraft will thus be in com-
petition with the other aircraft in the pool. It is
an open question whether the Russians will
agrce to such a solution or whether they will
insist on guarantees that their aircraft really will
be used. It is therefore to be foreseen, that the
co-operation envisaged with the Russians will be
preceeded by difficult negotiations.
82. To that are to be added a number of tech-
nical problems, too. Greater co-operation with
Russia means using common standards for the
equipment to be used (e.g. sensitivity of the
film). However, western and former Warsaw
Pact equipment are notoriously incompatible.
These matters are now being discussed in the
Open Skies Consultative Commission and, for
the time being, each party is clinging to its own
standard.
83. Furthermore, limits on exports of
products and technology in the framework of the
Cocom rules seem to have put a subsequent soft
pedal on the extent of the co-operation
envisaged. Some authorities believe the Cocom
rules even place a physical limit on the devel-
opment of co-operation with the Russian Fede-
ration.
84. Furthermore, the Cocom list should have
been revised to make it less discriminatory
against Russia at the end of 1992, but this was
not done.
85. On the other hand, it has been said that
problems with the Cocom list will not be very
likely since the open skies technical standards
for sensors are so low that western partners were
obliged to downgrade their technical means, in
particular in the radar areas. Furthermore, all
technical sensor means provided by23. Appendix IVa.
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the treaty have to be commercially available to
all state parties. A Cocom problem might arise
in a later stage, when additional categories and
improvements of sensors are introduced in the
Open Skies Consultative Commission.
86. Finally, one should recall that the treaty
refers several times to the rules established by
the International Civil Aviation Organisation(ICAO) ;as a consequence, Belarus, which forms
with Russia a gtoup of states party within the
open skies r6gime, should join ICAO, of which it
is not yet a member.
87. A fruitful outcome of the efforts to create
conditions for satisfactory co-operation between
Western European Union and the Russian Fede-
ration is no doubt in the interest of all who wish
the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty to
be successful. Nevertheless, co-operation with
the Russian Federation should not be con-
sidered exclusive.
88. There are good reasons for developing
close co-operation with the other successor
states of the Soviet Union, in particular with
Ukraine, and for encouraging all the member
states of the CIS (Community of Independent
States) to sign the treaty. It appears from the
Petersberg declaration that WEU Ministers
envisaged consultations with the eight Central
and Eastern European countries regarding the
Open Skies Treaty too, but it seems that these
discussions have not been very fundamental so
far. It is therefore important that these talks
should be intensified.
YI. Imagery evaluation 
- a rdle for the
WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejdn?
89. Whereas each state party has the right to
request and receive the raw data collected by
sensors during an observation flight, it is up to
each state party to use proper means of image
interpretation and evaluation. It does not seem
that WEU member countries have discussed in
depth the possibility of using the WEU Satellite
Centre for such imagery interpretation. It would
therefore be useful for the Council to pay more
attention to this problem.
90. A number of questions have to be studied
carefully in this context:
- 
have member countries any interest in
giving a mandate to the Satellite Centre
for open skies imagery interpretation?
- 
when the centre is fully operational and
executing its interpretation duties
drawn from the various satellites and
space organisations with which it is to
work on a contractual basis, will it still
have enough capacity to work for open
skies purposes?
- 
who will be responsible and what will
be the criteria for deciding the kind of
open skies imagery which should be
submitted for interpetation by the
Torrej6n Centre?
- 
who will have access to the results
obtained by the centre?
So far experts from Greece, associate members
and observer states (with the exception of
Iceland) are participating in the work of the
WEU Open Skies Group, but their status is not
clearly defined. In particular, it is not clear
whether these countries have already officiallyjoined the WEU group of states party estab-
lished by the Vienna declaration.
91. So far Greece and associate members are
not involved in the WEU space activities.
Before the WEU Satellite Centre is given
responsibility for imagery interpretation in the
context of the Open Skies Treaty, the procedure
for these countries to participate should be
agreed.
92. So far the centre has eight double-screen,
high-definition image processing works stations
in Torrej6n. They will be in an experimental
phase until 1995. As Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-
General of WEU, pointed out at the inaugu-
ration of the WEU Satellite Centre on 28th April
1993:
'in its initial experimental phase, the
centre will train analysts in the interpre-
tation of the satellite imagery. This will be
done using data available from com-
mercial sources such as SPOT,
LANDSAT and ERS. The aim will be to
achieve a certain amount of integration by
pooling knowledge and standardising
working procedures. The work of the
centre will be assessed towards the end of
the three-year period and its future devel-
opment then reviewed. "
93. Subsequently, the centre could become
more operational particularly for crisis moni-
toring and verification by using data from satel-
lites with better resolution such as Helios 
- 
due
to be launched in 1994. In this context, a memo.
randum of understanding has been drawn up
under which the Helios partners (France, Italy
and Spain) would make data available to the
WEU Satellite Centre. This data could then be
analysed by the image-interpreters trained in the
centre, and the results passed back to national
capitals. In its ultimate phase, the centre could
be responsible for operating WEU's autonomous
satellite observation capability, currently the
subject of medium- and long-term studies.
94. Thus, the centre has not so far obtained
any mandate in connection with the Open Skies
Treaty. Nevertheless, it would be very regret-
table if the capabilities of the centre could not be
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used also for the interpretation of open skies
observation imagery. Since the centre is still in
its experimental phase, it would be crucial for
WEU member countries to elaborate as quickly
as possible a concept enabling the centre to act
also as an open skies imagery interpretation
body. As a first step, the Council should ask the
centre to present a study in which it would
explain whether its present capabilities will be
sufficient to conduct open skies image interpre-
tation as a supplementary task.
95. Thanks to a first contact with the Director
of the WEU Satellite Centre, the latter has
kindly transmitted some first considerations in
this respect which are reproduced as follows:
* The centre will have the capability to
accept information from a wide variety
of sources. All the information will be
loaded into the centre's computer data-
base in a standard form. In addition to the
scenes from a number of different satel-
lites, it will be possible to use imagery
from airborne systems, data from normal
paper maps, data from digital terrain
models and images which are received as
high quality photos.
High quality photos are converted to com-
puter format using a high resolution laser
scanner. Paper maps can also be scanned
or the data transferred using a " digitising
tablet ". The digital terrain models are in
various forms. Products which give
terrain elevation information will be the
first which are used. Where the full digital
feature models (i.e. digital maps) exist,
they have many advantages over paper
maps and will be used by the centre. The
method of using airborne imagery
(optical, infra-red or radar) will depend on
actual sensors used. Arrangements could
be made to accept the aircraft tapes. in
any event, selected images can be used via
the scanner.
Geographical linkage
A major feature of the facilities of the
centre is that all the information men-
tioned above can be directly compared.
Each piece of information can be trans-
formed, scaled, rotated and locked to a
geographical reference. Direct compar-
isons and output which mix information
from a number of sources is then pos-
sible.
Requirement
Open skies missions are expensive,
subject to quotas and can be difficult to
mount. While the data which can be col-
lected is more detailed than that which
can currently be obtained from the sat-
ellite sources available to the WEUSC,
any site being considered for an open
skies mission should first be surveyed
from space. Such a task would enable a
final decision to be made as to whether an
open skies mission is necessary. The
survey from space would also provide val-
uable material for planning the open skies
mission if it is required.
Mission planning
Open skies missions need considerable
planning to obtain the best possibilities of
their effectiveness taking into account
political, practical and technical limita-
tions. Material obtained from a prior
space survey can be used to plan aircraft
approach and fly pass routes taking into
account the details of the sites, the par-
ticular locations ofinterest, preferred look
angles and directions for the sensors and
the surrounding terrain features.
Data analysis
The full analysis of the data collected
during an open skies mission could be a
long and complex task. The data collected
must be compared with many other
sources of information so that the differ-
ences can be identified between what can
be seen from the mission imagery and
what is already known or expected about
the sites. It is these differences which will
form the main conclusion of the mission.
Effective data analysis therefore requires
the availability of facilities and databases
similar to those which will be available in
the WEUSC.
Distribution of data
Data collected during open skies missions
will be the product of a costly and
complex collection process. Full use
should be made of any such data col-
lected. Even if the WEUSC is not directly
involved with the planning or analysis of
a particular open skies mission, a copy of
all data collected from open skies mis-
sions should, if possible, be provided to
the WEUSC. This data would then be
available for use in any subsequent
tasking of the WEUSC by the wEU
bodies or member nations. "
YII. Future prosyrccts for the funher
development of the open skies rigime
96. The Open Skies Treaty has to be con-
sidered as a starting point of an evolutionary
process for further confidence- and security-
building measures and not as the culmination of
8r
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such a development. The preamble of the treaty
indicates areas in which aerial observation could
be of help in strengthening peace, stability and
co-operative security.
97. It thus notes in particular the possibility
of employing such a r6gime to improve openness
and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of
compliance with existing or future arms control
agreements and to strengthen the capacity for
conflict prevention and crisis management in
the framework of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe and in other rel-
evant international institutions, but also the
possible extension of the open skies rdgime into
additional fields such as the protection of the
environment.
98. It is obvious that any further thoughts
along these lines first depend on the ratiflrcation,
full implementation and satisfactory functioning
ofthe present treaty. Interest in accelerating the
implementation process and in joining the Open
Skies Treaty might be enhanced by comparing it
with existing disarmament and anns control
agreements and confidence- and security-
building measures in the framework of the
CSCE and their verification means 2a.
99. It appears from this synopsis that the
open skies r6gime could serve or be developed as
a useful additional verification means for a
number of agreements such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the INF Treaty and the
START I and II Treaties; (information provided
by sensors during observation overflight could
complete information gained from on-site
inspections, national technical means and data
exchanges agreed in the abovementioned
treaties. In future, the open skies r6gime could
even serve for verifring unilateral renunciation
of tactical nuclear wealx)ns, an area where no
systematic verification is possible.
100. The possibilities of using the open skies
observation means for verification tasks in the
framework of the CFE Treaty has already been
mentioned in Chapter III2s. In NATO, a special
verification co-ordinating committee was
created in order to monitor the implementation
of the CFE Treaty and also the Open Skies
Treaty. Whereas so far the interest of the NATO
verification co-ordinating committee was con-
centrated on the CFE Treaty, there seems now
to be some interest in debating the question of
whether the Open Skies Treaty should serve as
the aerial inspection means for the CFE Treaty
or whether the CFE Treaty should work out its
own aerial inspection procedure. The first
solution would have the advantage of avoiding
new financial burdens, but so far no decisions
have been taken.
24. Synopsis in Appendix V.
25. Paragraphs 43-51.
101. Taking into account the improved rela-
tionships between all partners of the CFE Treaty
and other arms control agreements as well as
between participants in the CSCE process, all
faced with budgetary problems, the interest in
expensive verification, inspection and obser-
vation procedures will probably decrease. The
use of open skies observation means for veri-
fying the CFE Treaty might therefore offer a rea-
sonable solution.
lO2. If such a way were chosen, the purpose
would be to make the open skies r6gime more
intrusive by improving the. performances of the
sensors, increasing their resolution and
authorising overflying at lower altitudes than
those now authorised. All this, plus an increase
in overflight quotas, would allow more detailed
information to be obtained on the basis of which
TLE might be accurately identifted. This special
r6gime would be limited to the ATTU area and
be the subject ofa specific protocol added to the
original treaty.
103. Such a solution would make verification
of the CFE Treaty more effective and probably
enable a number of ground inspections to be
eliminated. Conversely, it would mean some
reduction in the scope of the Open Skies Treaty.
It may, moreover, be wondered whether some
participating states would be prepared to
authorise such an intrusive r6gime when they
have not done so before.
104. The second possible option would be the
conclusion ofthe aerial verification protocol ini-
tially intended for the CFE Treaty. This itself
might be based on the open skies rdgime by
incorporating in it the modifications already
referred to above and which would be specific to
it. An ad hoc open skies rdgime would thus be
set up without changing anything at all in the
original Open Skies Treaty. There too the con-
sensus problem arises. Moreover, such a r6gime
would duplicate the one set up by the Open
Skies Treaty. In fact, these two options are
equivalent. It would mprely be a question of
finding the most suitable juridical form.
105. The third possible option is, on the con-
trary, much less binding. It would mean estab-
lishing a link, no longer juridical but political,
between the two r6gimes, in the CSCE. This task
would be a matter for the Conflict Prevention
Centre in particular. The latter is already in
close touch with the Open Skies Consultative
Commission and with the Joint Consultative
Group, a consultative body set up to apply the
CFE Treaty 26. It would then perhaps be a matter
of the two bodies exchanging information
through the Conflict Prevention Centre. These
exchanges would hence be made offtcial.
Whatever the option chosen, it will have to be
26. Cf. CFE Treaty, Article XIV, and the Protocol on the
Joint Consultative Group.
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negotiated among all the parties involved.
However, there would then be a risk of reaching
compromising solutions that would reduce the
effectiveness of the link between CFE and Open
Skies that it would thus be possible to
establish.
106. Another, more internal option, i.e. a
matter for each government, would be to
establish an administrative-type link between
the two r6gimes. An elaborate system of infor-
mation and command, specific to each national
administration, would then have to be set up to
manage inspection operations and the exchange
of data, as well as the optimisation of inspection
programmes. This would allow the integration
and co-ordination of the various aspects of
the verification of arms control agreements
depending on " national technical means ", open
skies flights, on-site inspections and those pro-
vided for in the various confidence-building
measures practised. Such an option is certainly
the most pragmatic solution. It could just as well
be applied in the context of a group of states
parties such as WEU. To a certain extent, it
resembles the proposal considered on several
occasions by the WEU Assembly and aimed at
creating a European verification centre whose
nucleus should be WEU 27.
107. The Convention on Chemical Weapons,
signed in Paris on l3th January 1993, includes
one of the most extensive intrusive verification
r6gimes ever contained in an arrns control
agreement. It might constitute another area of
application for open skies flights. In that case,
too, open skies flights would mainly be comple-
mentary and might prove particularly useful in
the event of a crisis concerning chemical
products. Sensors already provided for in the
treaty allow information to be obtained about
plants producing or stockpiling chemical
products. It would suffice to add an air sampling
device to those sensors in order to carry out
analyses of the air.
108. A more sensitive area is the question to
what extent the open skies rdgime might serve
for conflict prevention and cruirs management,in
the framework of the CSCE process. The Open
Skies Consultative Commission would act here
mainly on behalf of the competent CSCE insti-
tutions and whether the open skies observation
means can be used in such cases will depend on
their ability to prevent conflicts and manage
crises. One should take into account that in a
concrete crisis situation any state party con-
cerned may use its right to withdraw from the
Open Skies Treaty (Article XV). It is therefore
crucial, first and foremost, for the as yet insuffi-
cient capabilities of the CSCE for conflict pre-
vention and crisis management to be improved
and completed.
109. Carrying out crisis management tasks in
the open skies framework would mean
increasing the resolution ofthe sensors. In order
to respond to the emergence of tense situations
in the most flexible manner, at the negotiations
consideration was given to the possibility of
resorting to a special one- or two-flight quota.
This proposal, which was backed by France, is
known as the " joker ". Another proposal sought
to assign a quota of overflights to the Conflict
Prevention Centre which would be carried out
on its own behalf in the event of crises. These
proposals were not adopted at the negotia-
tions.
110. The emergence of ethnic conflicts, as is
now the case in former Yugoslavia and the
increase in the number of areas of tension are
nevertheless making political leaders wish to
have the widest possible range of means for
averting conflicts that may break out. Hence,
whatever the option envisaged, it is quite clear
from what has been said above that the Open
Skies Treaty has considerable development
potential.
lll. Extending the open skies rdgime to prr
tection of the environment is considered in the
text of the treaty itself. This possibility was
indeed considered when the negotiations were
resumed in Vienna in January 1992, on the pro-
posal of the Russian Delegation. It is now being
discussed in the Consultative Commission
which wants a serious study to be made of the
possibilities of extending the open skies r6gime
to this area. With this in mind, a seminar on the
environment was held in Vienna in December
1992 under the auspices of the CSCE and theOpen Skies Consultative Commission.
However, for the time being, the project does
not seem to have gone beyond the stage of
reflection. The open skies r6gime could be a
useful tool for developing the crisis management
r6le of the CSCE, in particular through the
Vienna Conflict Prevention Centre.
ll2. One may therefore consider observation
flights being used, for instance, to detect cases of
atmospheric pollution and other damage to the
environment or to measure radioactivity due to
accidents in nuclear reactors. They may also be
used to monitor respect for atmospheric pol-
lution commitments or to identify offenders.
Alongside the open skies r6gime, observation
aircraft might be used for the purposes of scien-
tific or practical co-operation, for instance to
study the subsoil or water pollution. For that
purpose, supplementary agreements would have
to be concluded providing inter alia for the
introduction of sensors specially designed to
sample the air and, if appropriate, procedure to
be followed in case of suspicion 2E.
28. Riidiger Hartmann,
1992, page 489.27. Recommendation 481, Document 1223.
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113. The provisions relating to sensors would,
therefore, require major changes. For instance,
these might include ail samplers, allowing radio-
activity and chemical pollution to be measured,
multispectral sensors (multifrequency infra-red)
and radars with longer wave-lenghs allowing
information to be obtained concerning humidity
or the composition of the soil.
YIII. Conclusions
ll4. The importance of the Open Skies Treaty
resides first and foremost in the achievement of
a new understanding of security based on
openness and transparency in military matters
instead of secrecy. This new kind of concrete
confidence- and security-building measure
based on the spirit initiated and developed in
the framework of the CSCE can be successful
only if all states parties are prepared to
co.operate in order to ensure the full implemen-
tation of the treaty.
115. Furthermore, it is crucial for all members
of the Community of Independent States (CIS)
to accede to the treaty and no member country
of the CSCE should be excluded. A successful
solution of outstanding problems of technical
co-operation and cost-sharing will be most
important for promoting interest among other
countries of the world and inciting them to join
the.r6gime or to use it as a model for other world
regrons.
116. This is the first time that WEU member
countries have decided to act as group ofstates
parties regarding the practical and technical
implementation of a treaty. This a very positive
signal and should be followed in the framework
of future international agreements wherever this
seems appropriate. In a final stage, WEU
cooperation should reach a level at which it
may be deemed to be a single state party fol-
lowing the Benelux example.
ll7. At present, however, we are still far from
such a goal. The difficulties encountered by the
WEU expert group in finding an appropriate
solution for a WEU aircraft pool for open skies
purposes is a new saample of how painful the
task of harmonising national interests still is,
even between close allies. It is obvious that, even
after the Council has reached a decision on the
WEU aircraft pool, many questions will remain
unsolved and the WEU expert group will still
have its work cut out if it is to elucidate all the
consequences of WEU's Vienna decisions to act
as a gxoup of states parties.
118. Of the remaining questions, only two
might be mentioned in particular: first the status
of associate members of WEU and observers in
this group and, second, if and to what extent the
Torrej6n Satellite Centre will be mandated by
the Council to handle the interpretation of infor-
mation obtained from the open skies sensors.
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APPENDIX I
Thc CSCE Declaration on the Opn Skies Treaty
Helsinki, 24th March 1992
The. Foreign Ministers of the participating States of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe on the occasion of the signaiure of the Treaty on Open Skies have issu-ed the
following declaration:
. 
Welcomin_g_the signing of the treaty on an open skies r6gime for the security of states partici-
pating in the CSCE process,
- 
Assessing the t-reaty.as an important element in the process of enhancing security and confidence
between members of the international community,
Reiterating the importance of the principle of equal security for all their countries,
Noting the interest expressed by a number of states not full participants in the negotiations, and
believing that their adherence to the treaty as well as signature by all the newly independent states, as
mentioned in Article XVII of the treaty, would enhanEe the effectiveness ofitre opJn it iir rEgiiiri,
1.. 
. 
Recognise lle_qignifrcant contribution of the open skies negotiations made by a number of par-
ticipants in the CSCE who are not original signatories to the Tieaty on Open Skies,
2_. Recognise also that these states may participate, on the basis of the active and passive quotas
they.would hold as state parties, in the implementation of the treaty and that they may take part in Ois-
cussions regarding practical arrangements for the rdgime which will continue-in Vienna within the
framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional
application,
3. 
. 
Acknowledge the interest of the states which are participants in the CSCE but not original signa-
tories to the Treaty on Open Skies in information obtained-through open skies observatibn fligf,ts,
4. Welcome the interest shown by states which are participants in the CSCE but not original signa-
tories to the Treaty on Open Skies to accede to it as provided for by Article XVII of the treaty-,
5.., Call upon all parties of the treaty to allow the accession of such interested states as soon as pos-
sible and to act, in all matters related to it, in the spirit of co-operation which the treaty commands.-
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Qyotos and mo,ximum flight distances
Country Allocation ofpassive flight quotas
First distribution of year I
Passive quotas Active quotas
(lerma t2
42
42
6
4
t2
6
4
t2
t2
4
4
4
L2
7
6
2
6
4
t2
t2
5
4
28
2
3
2
2
0
3
3
3
3
0
3
2
5
0
4
3
5
9
4
8.5
26
2
3
4.5
2
I
4
4
2
2
0
3.5
3
3
0
4
2
4.5
6
Ilnited Stafes
Rrrssia/Reln
Benelur
Brrlsaria
aeneda
Denmark
Snein
-E-'-'France
United Kingdom/Ireland
Greeee
Hunsaru
Iceland
Italv
Nnrwc
Poland .
Portrroal
R
Czechoslovakia
Trrrkev
f flrreine
Source: Annex A, Sections I and II of the treaty (extracts).
Sution II
First distribution of active qtotas
for observation flighx
l. The first distribution of active quotas pur-
suant to Article III, Section I, paragraph 6 ofthe
treaty shall be such that each state party shall be
obliged to accept over its territory a number of
observation flights no gfeater than 7501o,
rounded down to the nearest whole number, of
the individual passive quota allocated as set
forth in Section I, paragraph I of this annex. On
this basis, and for those states parties which
have conducted negotiations in the framework
of the Open Skies conference in Vienna, the first
distribution in respect of each other shall be
valid from the date of entry into force of the
treaty until 3lst December following the year
during which the treaty has entered into force
and shall be effective only for those states
parties having ratified the treaty. This first dis-
tribution is set forth as follows:
The Federal Republic of Germany shall
have the right to conduct three observation
flights over the territory of the Republic of
Belarus and the Russian Federation group of
states parties, and one observation flight over
the territory of Ukraine;
The United States of America shall have
the right to conduct eight observation flights
over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and
the Russian Federation group of states parties,
and one observation flight, shared with Canada,
over the territory of Ukraine;
The Republic of Belarus and the Russian
Federation group of states parties shall have the
right to conduct two observation flights over the
territory of Benelux, as referred to in Article
XIV of the treaty, two observation flights over
the territory of Canada, two observation flights
over the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark,
three observation flights over the territory of the
French Republic, three observation flights over
the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany, one observation flight over the ter-
ritory of the Hellenic Republic, two observation
flights over the territory of the Italian Republic,
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two observation flights over the territory of the
the Kingdom of Nonvay, two observation flights
over the territory of the Republic of Turkey,
three observation flights over the territory ofthe
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and four observation flights over the
territory of the United States of America;
The Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, referred to as the Benelux, shall
have the right to conduct one observation flight
over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and
the Russian Federation group of states parties,
and one observation flight over the territory of
the Republic of Poland;
The Republic of Bulgaria shall have the
right to conduct one observation flight over the
territory of the Hellenic Republic, one obser-
vation flight over the territory of the Italian
Republic, and one observation flight over the
territory of the Republic of Turkey;
Canada shall have the right to conduct
two observation flights over the territory of the
Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation
group of states parties, one observation flight
over the territory of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, one observation flight over
the territory of the Republic of Poland, and one
observation flight, shared with the United States
of America, over the territory of Ukraine;
The Kingdom of Denmark shall have the
right to conduct one observation flight over the
territory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties, and
one observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Poland;
The Kingdom of Spain shall have the
right to conduct three observation flights over
the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic;
The French Republic shall have the right
to conduct three observation flights over the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties, and
one observation flight over the territory of
Romania;
The United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland shall have the right to
conduct three observation flights over the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties, and
one observation flight over the territory of
Ukraine;
The Hellenic Republic shall have the right
to conduct one observation flight over the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Bulgaria, and one
observation flight over the territory of
Romania;
The Republic of Hungary shall have the
right to conduct one observation flight over the
territory of Romania, and one observation flight
over the territory of Ukraine;
The Italian Republic shall have the right
to conduct two observation flights over the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties, one
observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Hungary, and one observation
flight, shared with the Republic of Turkey, over
the territory of Ukraine;
The Kingdom of Norway shall have the
right to conduct two observation flights over the
territory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties and
one observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Poland;
The Republic of Poland shall have the
right to conduct one observation flight over the
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany,
one observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation
group of states parties, and one observation
flight over the territory of Ukraine;
Romania shall have the right to conduct
one observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Bulgaria, one observation flight
over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, one
observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Hungary, and one observation flight
over the territory of Ukraine;
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
shall have the right to conduct one observation
flight over the territory of the Federal Republic
of Germany, and one observation flight over the
territory of Ukraine;
The Republic of Turkey shall have the
right to conduct two observation flights over the
territory of the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states parties, one
observation flight over the territory of the
Republic of Bulgaria and two observation
flights, one of which is shared with the Italian
Republic, over the territory of Ukraine;
Ukraine shall have the right to conduct
one observation flight over the territory of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, one obser-
vation flight over the territory of the Republic of
Hungary, one observation flight over the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Poland, one obser-
vation flight over the territory of Romania, and
two observation flights over the territory of the
Republic of Turkey.
2. Following this first distribution and until
the date of the full implementation of the treaty
specified in Article XVII to that effect for the
use of active quotas, annual distributions shall
be based on the 750lo rule established in para-
graph 1 of this section in relation to the allo-
cation of individual passive quotas.
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3. From the date of full implementation of
the treaty each state party shall accept during
subsequent distributions of active quotas over
its territory, if so requested, a number of obser-
vation flights up to the full amount of its indi-
vidual passive quota. Whenever possible or
requested and unless otherwise agreed, those
distributions shall be based on a proportionate
increase of the active quotas distributed in the
first distribution.
4. In the event that an additional state rat-
ifies or accedes to the treaty in accordance with
Article XVII, the distribution of active quotas to
such state shall be considered during the regular
session of the Open Skies Consultative Com-
mission following the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification or accession, subject
to the following provisions:
(a) the ratifuing or acceding state shall
have the right to request observation
flights over the territories of states
parties within the passive quota alle
cated to that state in accordance with
the provisions of Section I, para-
graph 3 of this annex, and within the
passive quotas of the states parties
requested for observation flights,
unless otherwise agreed by the states
parties involved; and
(b) all states parties shall have at the same
time the right to request observation
flights over the territory of that
signing or acceding state within their
active quotas and within the passive
quotas allocated to that state.
The Kingdom of Spain
Getafe I 300Gando 750Valencia 1 300Valladolid I 300Moron 1300
The French Republic
Orl6ans-Bricy ... I 400
Nice-C6te d'Azur 800Toulouse-Blagnac 700
The United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
Brize Norton.....
Scampton
kuchars
with Scilly Islands
with Shetland Islands
The Hellenic Republic
Thessaloniki
Elefsis
with Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes,
Kos Islands
The Republic of Hungary
Budapest-Ferihegy 860
The Republic of Iceland .. .. I 500
The Italian Republic
Milano-Malpensa I 130
Palermo-Punta Raisi I 400
The Kingdom of Norway
Oslo-Gardennoen
Tromsoe-Langnes .
Seaion III
Maximum flight distances of observation flights
The maximum flight distances of obser-
vation flights over the territories of observed
parties commencing from each Open Skies air-
field are as follows:
kilo-
metres
The Federal Republic of Germany
Wunstorf 1 200
Landsberg-Lech ... I 200
The United States of America
Washington-Dulles ...... 4 900
Travis AFB . ...... 4 000
Elmendorf AFB . .. 3 000Lincoln-Municipal . 4 800
The Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation group of states
parties
Kubinka .... 5 000
Ulan Ude ... 5 000Vorkuta .... 6 500Magadan ... 6 500
Benelux
ZaventemlMelsbroek
The Republic of Bulgaria
Sofia .
Burgas
Canada
Ottawa
Iqaluit
Yellowknife
The Kingdom of Denmark
945
s 000
6 000
s 000
Metropolitan
Faroe Islands
150
150
150
500
500
900
900
r00
660
660
800
250
s 600
l 700
l 700Greenland
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The Republic of Poland
Warszawa-Okecie .
The Portuguese Republic
Lisboa
Sta Maria
Porto Santo
Romania
Bucharest-Otopeni
Timisoara
Bacau
The Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic
Praha
Bratislava
Kosice
The Republic of Turkey
Eskisehir
Diyarbakir
Ukraine
Borispol .. ....
l 400
t 200
600
700
400
I 500
1 500
I 700
l 030
900
900
900 2 r00
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APPENDIX III
Information transmitted by the Erecutive Secretariat CSCE Yienna, CFE, JCG, OSCC
Technical questions that could not be
solved when the Open Skies Treaty was signed
were handled in the Open Skies Consultative
Commission.
All questions that have already been
solved were adopted in the form of " Decisions
relating to the Open Skies Treaty ":
- 
cost-sharing resulting from the appli-
cation of the Open Skies Treaty(Decision I of 29th June 1992 with
specifications of lOth December
1992);
- 
additional measures for non-
destructive tests (Decision 2 of 29th
June 1992) ;
- 
method of calculating the minimum
height above the ground at which each
optical camera on board an observation
aircraft may be used during an obser-
vation flight (Decision 3 of 29th June
1992);
- 
minimum speciflrcations applicable to
cameras on board an observation air-
craft of an observed party exercising its
right to provide an observation aircraft
for an observation flight (Decision 4 of
29th June 1992);
- 
responsibility for processing films used
during an observation flight (Decision 5
of 29th June 1992);
- 
internal regulations and working
methods of the Open Skies Consul-
tative Commission (Decision 6 of 29th
June 1992);
- 
methods to be used to determine the
ground resolution of synthetic aperture
radars (Decision 7 of lfth December
1992).
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Option, using an aircraft equipped with a special pod
OPERATOR'S CONSOLE
Source: Lockheed.
9l
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TYPE: Tupolev Tu-154M
(date of entry into service: December 1984)
External dimensions:
Wing span
Length overall
Weights:
Basic operating weight empty
Maximum payload
Range:
With maximum payload
With maximum fuel and 5 450
kg payload
Source: Jane's All the World Aircraft 1988-1989.
TYPE: Lockheed C-130H Herculos
(date of entry into service: 1964)
External dimensions:
Wing span
kngth overall
Weights:
Basic operating weight empty
Maximum payload
Range:
With maximum payload
With maximum fuel, inclu-
ding external tanks, and 7 081
kg payload
37.55 m
47.90 m
55 300 kg
18 000 kg
3 740 km
6 600 km
40.41 m
29.79 m
34 686
19 356
kg
kg
3 791 km
7 876 km
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Synopsis
\o(.)
Treaty Subject Dateof signature
Date of entry
into force States parties
Area
of application Verification means
Assembly reports
and recommendations
Nuclear non-
Proliferation
Treaty (NTP)
Preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons
while promoting the
peaceful use of nuclear
energy
l5th July 1968 5th March 1970 150 countries(September 1992)
No limits Safeguard agreements,
on-site inspections
Recommendations 189,
264,310, 524
Treaty on the eli-
mination of Inter-
mediate Nuclear
Forces (INF)
Elimination and ban
on all intermediate-
range ground-launched
ballistic and cruise
missiles
8th December
1987
lst June 1988 United States and
Soviet Union
United States and
Soviet Union
On-site inspections Recommendation 383(Doc. 918), Resolution
77 (Doc. 1116 adden-dum), Recommenda-
tion 460 (Doc. ll47)
Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty(START r)
Limitation of inter-
continental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) and
of submarine-launchedballistic missiles(SLBM), and their
launchers and war-
heads, and also heavy
bombers, including
long-range nuclear air-
launched cruise mis-
siles
3lst July l99l Not yet in force United States and
Soviet Union
United States and
Soviet Union
National Technical
Means (NTM), data
exchange, on-site ins-
pections
Document 918 (1982),
Recommendation 383,
Document 1288 (1991),
Recommendations 513
and 514
Lisbon START
Protocol
\
I
Supplementation of
START I Treaty fol-
lowing the dissolution
of the Soviet Union
commitment to accede
to the NPT
23rd ivday 1992 Not yet in force United States,
Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan,
Ukraine
United States,
Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan,
Ukraine
None None
START II Further elimination of
intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBM),
and multiple warheads(MIRVS)
3rd January
1993
Following ratifi-
cation by United
States and Russia,
and entry into
force of START I
United States,
Russia
United States,
Russia
National Technical
Means (NTM), data
exchange, on-site ins-
pections
None
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APPENDIX Y (continued)
Treaty Subject Dateof signature
Date of entry
into force States parties
Area
of application Verification means
Assembly reports
and recommendations
Treaty on Con-
ventional Forces
in Europe (CFE)
Reduction of and
ceilings for the con-
ventional armaments
essentials for conduc-
ting surprise attacks
and initial large-scale
offensive operations
l9th November
l 990
9th November
1992
29 states parties From the Atlantic
to the Urals
Exchange of infor-
mation, on-site inspec-
tions, challenge ins-
pections
Document 1223 (1990),
Recommendation 481,
Document 1288 (1991),
Recommendations 513
and 514
CFEIa Limitation of man-
power
l0th July 1992 lTth ltuJy t992 29 states parties(April 1993) From the Atlanticto the Urals On-site inspections None
Open Skies
Treaty
Enhance mutual confi-
dence by ganting all
participants the right
to conduct observa-
tion flights over each
other's territory
24th March
1992
60 days after the
deposit of 20 ins-
truments of ratiflr-
cation (5 ratifica-
tions April 1993)
27 states parties(April 1993) Vancouver toYladivostok Unarmed observationflights over the entire
territory of partici-pants. All partici-
pating states have the
right to purchase data
collected by any state
party during an obser-
vation flight
Document 1288 (1991)
Recommendations 5l i
and 514, Document
1306 (1992), Recom-
mendation 524
Chemical
Weapons
Convention(cwc)
Ban chemical weapons
worldwide
l3th January
1993
180 days after
deposit of 65th
instrument of rat-
ilication, but not
earlier than 2
years after being
opened for sig-
nature
143 states parties(29th March 1993)
No limits On-site inspections,
challenge inspections
None
Conflrdence- and
security-building
measures
(CSBM)
l. Stockholm Docu-
ment (ground and
aerial inspections)
2. Vienna Document(improved communi-
cations)
3. Vienna Document(transparency regar-
ding military (forces)
l.
ber
l9th Septem-
l 986
2. tTth
November 1990
3. 4th March
1992
l. lst January
l 987
2. lst January
l99l
3. lst May 1992
CSCE members l. Atlantic to
Urals (ATTU)
2. Atlantic to
Urals (ATTU)
3. Eurasia and
North America
l. Mandatory ground
and aerial inspection
2. Improved commu-
nications and contacts
3. Transparency regar-
ding military forces
Document 1223 (1990)
Recommendation 48i',
Document 1306 (1992),
Recommendation 524
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The develapment of relations between the WEU Assembly
and the parliaments of Cenfial European countries
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations
by Mr. Kempinaire, Raplnfieurz
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on the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parlia-
ments of Central European countries
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III. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 5 votes to 0 with one abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer, Sir John Hunt (Yie,-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Biihler(Alternate: Junghanns), Caldoro (Alternate: Paire), Colombo (Alternate: Visibelll), Sir Anthony Durant, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk,
Mrs. Frias, Mr. Ghesqui0re, Dr. Godman, Mr. Gouteyron, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Kempinaire, kmoine, lopez Henares,
Martins, Nufiez, Pfuhl, Reimann, RodotA, Seitlinger, Speroni, Vial-Massat.
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Druft Order
on the dcvebpneat of rclatioas btwcen thc WEU Assembg
and the parlianunts ol Ccatrul Europcan countries
The Assembly,(t) Considering the declaration issued at the close of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council
of Ministers of WEU with states of Central Europe held in Bonn on l gth June 1992 in which the min-
isters * advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the
states concerned';(it) Stressing the importance already achieved in recent years in relations between the Assembly and
its committees and the parliaments of those states;(iiil Convinced of the need for the parties concerned to strengthen and develop these relations;(iv) Aware that exchanges of views on the building of Europe, particularly on security and defence
questions, cannot be restricted to the governmental level but that parliamentarians must play an active
part in them;(v) Considering that the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments
of Central European countries will help to make this debate more useful and fruitful,
INsrnucrs rrs PnrsDsNrnr Couurren
l. To encourage visits by Assembly committees to Central European countries, particularly when
they prepare reports concerning that region;
2. To promote the Assembly's participation in symposia and any other type of meeting at which
parliamentarians are present that might be organised by those countries;
3. To extend regular invitations to ministers for foreign affairs and defence from the forum of con-
sultation to speak at Assembly sessions;
4. To send reports, the letter from the Assembly and other publications to the largest possible
number of interested persons and institutions in Central European countries;
5. To arrange for parliaments, governments and specialised institutions and associations in those
countries to send the Assembly any documents and information they consider useful in order to ensure
a better knowledge and greater understanding of their opinions, aims and decisions.
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Expbaatory Memorandam
$ubmined by Mn Kempinaire, Ropporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The declaration issued at the close of the
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers with Central European States held in
Bonn on l9th June 1992 stated inter alia that
" intensifying the relations between WEU and
the states of Central Europe will contribute to
stability and the emergence of a new peaceful
order in Europe based on partnership and
co-operation, greater security and confidence, as
well as disarmament ".
2. The declaration also specified that the
strengthening of these relations " should reflect
the specific relations which exist and are devel-
oping between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other appropriate
forms of co-operation could be set up as
required in the light of the development of these
relations ".
3. Finally, the text adds that * in this way,
WEU's Central European partners will be able
to acquaint themselves with the future security
and defence policy of the European Union and
find new opportunities to co-operate with the
defence component of the Union and with the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these
develop ".
4. It was therefore in this context that the
ministers 'advocated the development of rela-
tions between the WEU Assembly and the par-
liaments of the states concerned ". Your
Rapporteur believes this is tantamount to
recognising that the debate on " the emergence
of a new peaceful order in Europe' cannot be
kept within the intergovernmental framework
but must include a very substantial parlia-
mentary aspect.
5. The WEU Assembly must pursue its
internal debate, closely linked with the one
being held in the parliaments of member coun-
tries, to promote a European security and
defence identity and also foster the participation
of the parliaments of Central European coun-
tries in this debate by encouraging an in-depth
dialogue with them which should facilitate
mutual knowledge, allow reciprocal, easy com-
munication and help to achieve a consensus
thanks to an understanding of the respective
positions of all concerned.
6. It is thus in this framework that relations
between our Assembly and the parliaments
of Central European countries should be
developed. Starting in 1990, the Assembly has
been in the habit of inviting delegations from
the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe
to attend its plenary sessions. So far, these invi-
tations have not been permanent and have been
made for one session at a time, the Assembly
always reserving the right to renew them as it
considered them appropriate.
7. Parliamentary delegations from Hungary,
Poland and Yugoslavia were the first to attend a
session of our Assembly (the extraordinary
session held in March 1990). Since then, other
parliamentary delegations have been present at
our sessions: from Hungary and Poland (at all
sessions since that date), Yugoslavia (in March,
June and December 1990 and June l99l), the
Soviet Union (December 1990, June and
December 1991), Czechoslovakia (June and
December l99l), Bulgaria (December 1990 and
December 1992) and Romania (as from June
l9el).
8. Furthermore, the parliaments of the eight
Central European countries which, since the
meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992, have been
known as the WEU forum countries, were
invited to attend the symposium on a new
security order in Europe held in Berlin from
3lst March to 2nd April 1992. That symposium
was also addressed by the Minister of Defence of
Lithuania, the Miniiters for Foreign Affairs of
Romania and Poland and the Vice-Minister for
Foreign Alfairs of Czechoslovakia.
9. Finally, starting in 1991, the Defence
Committee, the Political Committee, the Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee and the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions have visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bul-
garia and Romania, thus proving our Assembly's
great interest in countries in the region and our
desire to improve mutual knowledge and
develop existing relations.
l0. Moreover, the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and
Romania have been able, in recent years, to
explain their respective countries' foreign policy
to the Assembly.
I l. The determination shown by our
Assembly in the last three years to establish and
develop relations with the Central European
countries in the interest of both sides is conse-
quently clear.
12. In the following pages, your Rapporteur
will endeavour to give a concise description of
the political situation in the Central Euiopean
countries, referring almost exclusively to the
presidential and parliamentary elections held in
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those countries and to the composition of their
governments and chambers, as well as the ideas
expressed by their parliamentarians on how tlqy
infend to develop their relations with the WEU
Assembly. Conclusions setting out the initiatives
that should be taken to this end will conclude
the present report.
13. Lastly, your Rapporteur believes it is
worth drawing attention to the knowledge that
the people of the Central European countries
have of our organisation. According to the
Eurobarometer of the Commission of the
European Communities (No. 2, Jantary 1992),
in a-poll of l0 000 persons in Central and
Eastern Europe who were asked in October 1991
whether or not they had heard of WEU, affirm-
ative answers were as follows: Hungary 56Y0,
Estonia 49Vo,l-atvia 4590, Poland 43Vo, Bulgaria
40olo, Czechoslovakia 400/0, Lithuania 4090 and
Romania 3990. Alfirmative answers to an iden-
tical question concerning the European-Com-
muniti range from 83% for Poland to 6970 for
Bulgaria.
14. It may be assumed that, in 1992 and
during the current year, knowledge of WEU
among the people of Central Europe has
increaied steadily. In any event, the above-
mentioned figures, which show a degree of
knowledge relatively comparable with that of
citizens -of member countries, indicate a high
level of information, thus suggesting the
probable interest of Eastern European countries
in an organisation such as WEU: it is indeed a
guarantee of the security of its memLers now
that the disbandment of the Warsaw Part, the
far-reaching changes in the region and the con-
flicts develbping there make more obvious to
those countrits the need to belong to a defensive
organisation ensuring its own security.
II. The Central Europnan countries
(a) Bulsaria
15. The present Bulgarian constitution was
adopted by the Grand National Assembly on
l2th June 1991 by 309 of the then 400 mem-
bers. This constitution stemmed from the deter-
mination of the large majority parties, in face of
the crisis in the institutions arising from the
reformed communist authorities, to pursue
peacefully the process of transition to
democracy.
16. On 13th October 1991 and in accordance
with the new constitution, which provides for a
single chamber system, the National Assembly,
which now has 240 members, was elected for a
four-year period. With a rate of participation of
almoit 8470 of the electorate, the Union of Dem-
ocratic Forces (UDF) obtained 34.3601o of the
votes cast, giving it a total of I l0 seats, the Bul-
garian Soclalist Party (BSP, ex-Communist)
33.14o/o and 106 seats and, finally, the Move-
ment for Rights and Liberties (MRL, repre-
senting the Turkish minority) 7.55% alad 24
seats.
17. On 8th November 1991, on the proposal
of the President of the Republic, the National
Assembly elected Mr. Dimitrov Prime Minister.
He formed a government consisting of members
of the various parties and movements com-
posing the UDF; this government has the
support of the MRL.
18. Presidential elections with majority
voting and two ballots were held on l2th and
19th lanuary 1992. In the first ballot, Jelio
Jelev, President of the Republic since August
1990 and UFD candidate supported by the
MRL, obtained 44.630/o of the votes cast, fol-
lowed by the PSD candidate, JvIr. Valkanov,
with 30:440lo and then Mr. Gantchev, with
16.80/0. The latter, a former emigrant and inde-
pendent candidate, had the support of the
Business Bloc, a movement grouping the heads
of private firms. In the second round, Jelio Jelev
ob[ained almost 530/o of votes cast compared
with just over 47o/o for his rival Valkanov.
19. In May 1992, the Prime Minister, Mr.
Dimitrov, reshufned his government; on 28th
October 1992, following a vote of confidence in
the National Assembly, the government was
overthrown, mainly because of the support
hitherto afforded, with some reservations, by the
MRL. President Jelev had already shown his
disagreement with the government's_ attitude
towards trade unions, the media, the Orthodox
Church and the opposition outside parliament.
The economic problems the country is encoun-
tering on its way to a market economy and the
difficulty it is having in restoring lan-d to the
Turkish-minority, accompanied by differences
between the various groups and persons of
which the UFD is composed, have also been key
factors in this crisis: this led to the formation of
a government of technocrats with the support of
th; MRL and the more or less clear consent of
the UDF.
20. Independently of all these differences,
your Rapporteur thinks he has discerned a wide
Lonsensus among all the parliamentary political
forces, particulaily about the irreversibility of
the democratic process the country has
embarked upon. The strengthening of demo-
cratic principles, the ggarantee of the supremacy
of law and the move towards a market economy
are generally considered to be the necessary
basei for bringing about stability and civil and
political peace. The same consdnsus exists vis-
l-vis foreign and security policy. It is also unani-
mously agreed that the targets set will be more
swiftly and effectively reached if the European
countries help Bulgaria. It regards the treaty on
European Union as the first step towards
building the common European house that
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should accommodate the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe instead of keeping them
some distance from the door.
21. It is also the general opinion of Bulgarian
parliamentarians that Bulgaria must be inte-
grated in all the European bodies as soon as pos-
sible. Integration will nevertheless have to be
preceded by a period of co-operation. Contacts
and co-operation with the institutions already
mentioned are a factor of stability for the
country. It should be underlined that, at the
beginning of March 1993, Bulgaria and the
European Community signed an agreement of
association and an interim agreement antici-
pating the application of trade arrangements,
the main aspects of which are the establishment
of a regular political dialogue at the highest
level, the creation, within ten years, of a free
trade area and economic, cultural and financial
co-operation.
22. Our Bulgarian colleagues considered that
the process of integration in the European struc-
tures has a fundamental aspect: security. They
believe this problem to be linked with the coun-
try's relations with its immediate neighbours,
the European Community and the Mediter-
ranean countries.
23. Inter alia, Bulgarian parliamentarians
have unanimously expressed the wish for close
contacts with NATO and WEU. They have
stressed that they have associate member status
in the North Atlantic Assembly, while in the
WEU Assembly they have merely been invited
on an ad hoc basis. Following a joint initiative
by the Bulgarian National Assembly and the
North Atlantic Assembly, there is also to be a
meeting in the very near future to study regional
security problems to which our Assembly will be
invited. Our Bulgarian colleagues have said they
wish to take part in the preparation of WEU
Assembly reports dealing with security problems
in the region; at the same time, they have
expressed their interest in co-operating in the
preparation of reports that try to solve ethnic
problems in view of their experience which they
consider might be useful to other European
countries.
24. According to one Bulgarian parliamen-
tarian, participation in the preparation of our
reports would help to avoid it being deduced
from a report emanating from our Assembly
that Bulgaria has expansionist aims, whereas its
foreign and security policy is based more on the
principle of non-interference, on which there is a
national consensus.
25. The President of the Bulgarian National
Assembly, Mr. Yordanov, stressed the need to
associate with European security a country
which could guarantee security in an area so
important for the continent. He considered his
country's present situation, i.e. as an ad hoc
guest, should lead subsequently to other forms
of co-operation allowing Bulgaria to become a
full member of our organisation.
26. According to Mr. Yordanov, there were
many possibilities for co-operation between the
two parliamentary assemblies and they were not
confined to the abovementioned participation in
drafting reports and presence at committee
meetings; Mr. Yordanov proposed a meeting
between Bulgarian parliamentarians and mem-
bers of our Assembly's Political Committee with
the aim of drawing up a programme for
Bulgaria's accession to WEU.
27. Finally, your Rapporteur considers it
worth pointing out the existence in the Bul-
garian National Assembly of six groups for
friendship with the German, French, Greek,
Japanese and Polish Parliaments and with the
International Association of French-Speaking
Parliamentarians in view of the r6le that can be
played by such groups in the development of
interparliamentary relations. It should also be
recalled that Bulgaria has been a member of the
Council of Europe since 7th May 1992.
(b) Estonia
28. For Estonia, the elections in March 1990
marked the start of a peaceful process and were
largely an example of the restoration of national
independence and the return to democratic
institutions.
29. The new Supreme Soviet resulting from
the elections was composed of three main blocs:
the Popular Front, resolutely in favour of inde-
pendence, consisting of the Peasant, Social
Democrat and Liberal Groups with 49 of a total
of l0l representatives; an electoral coalition
dominated by the former Communists, with
29 seats; and, Iinally, the Russian minority bloc,
with 27 seats.
30. On 2fth August 1991, the Estonian Supre-
me Council proclaimed the restoration of the
country's independence. The Russian Federation
recogrised the country ola24th August, followed a
few days later by Mr. Gorbachev, President of
what was at that time still the Soviet Union, once
the attempted coup d'6tat that took place in the
country at the same time had been overcome.
31. In September of the same year, a con-
stituent assembly composed of an equal number
of representatives of the Estonian Supreme
Council and Congress started to draw up the
new constitution of the Republic of Estonia. The
fact that this basic law was approved by refe-
rendum on 28th June 1992 by a majority of
more than 9090 of the votes cast gives an idea of
the extent of the consensus obtained.
The new constitution came into force on
July 1992 and citizens went to the polling
32.
3rd
99
DOCUMENT I365
booths again on 20th September to elect the
President of the Republic and Parliament
(Riigikogu).
33. According to the new constitution, the
Presidency of the Republic is mainly cere-
monial; nevertheless, the prestige of the candi-
dates (one had been Chairman of the Supreme
Council since 1982, having, at that time, been
appointed by Yuri Andropov) and the fact that,
for the first time since 1938, Estonians had an
opportunity to elect their President gave the
presidential campaign greater political signifi-
iance than anticipated by the constitution for
the post in question.
34. The former Chairman of the Supreme
Council, Mr. Ruutel, obtained 42.70/o of the
votes, followed closely by Mr. Meri, standing on
behatf of Pro Patria, a group composed of five
parties (Conservative, Christian Democrat [two
partiesl, Liberal and Republican), an ardent
defender of the market economy, who obtained
28.8o/o of the votes; in third place was the can-
didate of the Popular Front, Mr. Taagepera,
with 23.80/o of the votes. Since none of the candi-
dates obtained half the number of votes cast
plus one, parliament had to elect the President
of the Republic. It was the Pro Patria Group
candidate, Mr. Meri, who was elected by 59
votes, his opponent, Mr. Ruutel, obtaining 31.
35. As a result of the elections, the Riigikogu
was composed as follows:
Pro Patria 29 members
Moderaten (M66dukad) .. 12 members
Central Faction (PopularFront) 15 members
Estonian National
Independence Party .... l0 members
Coalition Party Alliance .. 9 members
Rural Union Alliance .... 8 membersRoyalists 8 members
Estonian Citizen 8 members
Miscellaneous ... 2 members
36. The leader of the majority group, Pro
Patria (ISAMAA), once appointed Prime Min-
ister by the President of the Republic, reached an
agreement to form a coalition government with
the Estonian National Pro-Independence Party
and the M0Odukad (moderate) Group. The main
aims of this government agreement were:
(a) to stretgthen the state and develop the
constitution;
(D/ to stabilise the economy and create
conditions favourable to the intro-
duction of a market economy;
(c) to gtarantee social stability;
(d) to integrate Estonia in Europe.
37. The agxeement on the latter point
(European integration) is the sign of Estonia's
opening to the world. An essential aspect of this
process was the improvement of the country's
relations with Russia. The existence of 557 000
non-Estonian (800/o Russian) immigrants and the
presence of 7 000 Soviet troops (officers and
men) I and approximately l0 000 retired Soviet
oflicers, combined with trade diffrculties, were
the main problems between the two countries
and to which it is proposed to pay special
attention. Furthermore, the government
agreement demonstrates its concern about the
fate of Finno-Ugrians in Russia (mainly in
Siberia) and Estonian citizens in Petserimaa 2.
38. The Estonian Government believes that
the early establishment of a network of
embassies, consulates and trade representations
will help to counter what it considers to be a
propaganda war waged by Russia against
Estonia's interests.
39. The government programme also pro-
poses to tighten links with the Scandinavian
countries and with the Nordic Council, to con-
clude a treaty of association with the European
Community, to promote co-operation with the
Central European countries in trade and
reforms, experience of which might be of
interest to Estonia and, finally, to develop rela-
tions with Japan and the United States.
40. Lastly, the programme emphasises the
importance of Estonia's integration in the
European security system and its co-operation
with NATO and Western European Union.
41. The Republic of Estonia is a member of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Assembly of
Baltic States, the Assembly of the CSCE and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
and is an associate member of the North Atlantic
Assembly. It has close parliamentary relations
with the parliaments of latvia, Lithuania,
Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany.
(c) Hungary
42. The parliamentary elections in March and
April 1990 were the first free elections held in
Hungary since 1947. Prior to the elections, the
communist rdgime had started making changes
helping to transform the country into a demo-
cratic state with the adoption of a series of laws
such as the 1987 electoral law allowing a quarter
of members of parliament not to be members of
the Communist Party, the 1986 law II granting
gleater freedom of expression to the press, the
1987 law I laying thejuridical bases for the new
l. According to Estonian estimates. It should be underlined
that the Russian authorities have given no official figures in
this connection.
2. A small region in the south-east of the country which,
under the Tartu peace treaty between Estonia and Soviet
Russia signed in 1920, belonged to Estonia; however, since
the frontiers were modilied it 1944, it is on Russian territory.
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rdgime of land ownership and a whole series of
measures that allowed political organisations to
exist openly.
43. The communists withdrew their former
leader, Janos Kadar, from the political scene,
dropped their former name and, in May 1989,
became the Hungarian Socialist Party. Finally,
on l8th October 1989, parliament approved a
whole series of amendments to the 1949 consti-
tution, indicating in the preamble to the
amended text that it was transitional and conse-
quently needed to be replaced by a new consti-
tution.
44. 670/o of the electorate voted in the elec-
tions to the National Assembly 3 (Hungary
having a single chamber parliamentary system).
Only six parties managed to reach the minimum
of 4Vo required to be entitled to a seat: the Dem-
ocratic Forum (a movement grouping various
tendencies ranging from the extreme right to the
centre) with 24.7o/o of the votes cast, the Alliance
of Free Democrats (Liberal Social-Democrat),
with 21.4o/o, the Independent Smallholders'
Party (members of the European Democrat
Union), with 11.70/o, the Hungarian Socialist
Party, with 10.9010, the Federation of Young
Democrats (Liberals), with 9Vo, and the
Christian Democratic People's Party, with
6.50/0.
45. As a result of the elections, the compo-
sition of the 386-member National Assembly
was as follows:
Members
Democratic Forum 164
Alliance of Free Democrats ... 94
Independent Smallholders'
Party . 44
Hungarian Socialist Party . ... . 33
Federation of Young Demo-
crats . 22
Christian Democratic People's
Party . 2l
Independents .... 8
46. Under the extremely complicated elec-
toral system, there are constituencies in which
individual candidates stand and then there are
party lists, so that each elector votes twice, once
for a candidate and once for a party. An indi-
vidual candidate must have the support of
750 electors in the constituency to be eligible to
stand and the same requirement applies to the
list sponsored by a party. To be entitled to a
regional list, a party must have presented candi-
dates in at least a quarter ofthe constituencies in
the region concerned. To be included in the
national list, it must have presented at least
seven regional lists.
3. In the by-elections held in Budapest and Esztergom in
l99l and in Kisber in 1992, the rate of participation was
22.l4Vo arl,d 27Vo respectively.
47. The government resulting from these elec-
tions was based on a coalition between the Dem-
ocratic Forum, the Christian Democrats and the
Smal lhsf dsls' Party. In February 1992, the latter
was split into two factions, the most important
of which in terms of numbers continued to
support the government coalition.
48. Since its election, the National Assembly
has been carrying out very intensive legislative
work, including the reform of the constitution.
In-fighting between the various political
organisations, generally caused by the under-
lying ideological differences affecting many of
them, did not have a significant effect on parlia-
mentary activities. During the three years of the
present legislature, a series of changes has been
made to the composition of the parliamentary
groups, but they have had no major impact on
the balance of forces in the government coa-
lition or the opposition, initially 302 (gov-
ernment coalition) to 84 (opposition) and now
280 to 106.
49. In 1991,' Hungary obtained the with-
drawal of Soviet troops from the country and its
admission to the Council of Europe: the Hun-
garians therefore believe that the latter thus
recognised that political and juridical institu-
tions in Hungary and the level of development
of human rights were quite comparable with
those in other European democracies. Hungary
therefore made full accession to the European
Community a priority goal in its foreign and
security policy. The agreement of association
with the Community, although considered of
great importance, is viewed as a temporary
solution. In the interest of both parties con-
cerned, Hungary also wishes to hold exchanges
of views, establish ceoperation in foreign policy
matters and adopt joint positions, particularly in
regard to the security of the continent.
50. Mr. Rockenbauer, a member of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian
National Assembly, told our Assembly last year
that the establishment of a European defence
system meant setting up jointly the institutions
necessary for ensuring lasting peace in the region
and he added that the Hungarian Government
and Parliament wished to take part in this
undertaking.
51. Hungary therefore wishes to tighten its
links with WEU, which the treaty on European
Union defines as a component of the future
European defence system. Insofar as Hungary is
already an associate member of the future
European Union, Mr. Rockenbauer said it
seemed logical to establish relations between
Hungary and WEU based on a similar status. In
view of the fact that, in our organisation, the
status of associate member is reserved for
member countries of NATO that are not
members of the European Community, the Hun-
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garian parliamentarian showed a keen interest
in Mr. Cox's proposal for the creation of the
status of affiliated member, which might
concern his country.
52. As examples of co-operation, the Hun-
garian parliamentarian also referred to the pos-
sibility of becoming familiar with the work of
the planning cell and taking part in the estab-
lishment of the European armaments agency,
WEU assistance in applying the Danube
embargo and the possibility of co-operation
between WEU and Hungary with a view to
applying the Open Skies and CFE Treaties and
more down-to-earth proposals relating to staff
training and improving budgetary man-
agement.
53. On relations between the WEU Assembly
and the Hungarian Parliament, the delegation
from that country believes possible affiliate
status should allow it to participate to some
extent in the activities of the political groups
and committees and in the preparation of
reports, particularly those dealing with matters
linked with security problems in the region.
Finally, the Hungarian Delegation stressed the
usefulness of defining with our Assembly the
form of future co-operation and participation.
(d) Iatvia
54. The Supreme Council is the present legis-
lative institution in Latvia. It was elected on
l8th March 1990 in accordance with a majority
electoral system that divided the country into
201 electoral districts each of which could elect
one deputy.
55. All citizens over the age of 18 were
entitled to vote provided they were resident in
Latvia and were Soviet citizens. Nevertheless,
the special nature of the electoral system
favoured native Latvians whose representation
in parliament is therefore greater than their per-
centage of the overall population. It should be
emphasised that native Latvians represent about
55Yo of the population of the country.
56. On 4th May of the same yea\ the 1922
constitution was restored. In accordance with
the constitutional law of 2lst August 1991 on
the status of the Republic of Latvia as a state,
the 1922 constitution is considered to be thejuridical basis of the Latvian state. Nevertheless,
only a few articles of that constitution are
actually in force, the others having been sus-
pended and are thus not applied. In accordance
with the law on the organisation of the activities
of the Supreme Council of the Republic of
Latvia until the Saeima (parliament) meets, the
1922 constitution will come into full force with
the convocation of the fifth Saeima, i.e. after the
elections to the new parliament that are, in prin-
ciple, to be held in June 1993.
57. The Supreme Council at present has
180 members. Seats which have become vacant
have not been filled since there are no substi-
tutes and there have been no by-elections to fill
them. The Supreme Council's leadership con-
sists of the Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and
one Secretary.
58. At the end of 1992, there were three par-
liamentary groups: the Latvian Popular Front
(53 members), the Latvian Popular Front Group
(Satversme) (34 members) and the Agricultural
Group (20 members). Provisional legislation
governing parliamentary groups stipulates that
ihere must be at least twenty members to form a
group. Deputies who do not manage to form a
group or join existing groups may form
groupings whose activities are not covered by
the legislation; they have no particular rights.
59. The Chamber has sixteen standing com-
mittees and may set up temporary committees
and committees of investigation. Bills are given
three readings in the Supreme Council except in
urgent cases when they are given only two. They
require a simple majority vote and, in the final
stage, one-third of the total number of deputies
is suffrcient. Decrees on the application of laws
are issued by the Presidium of the Supreme
Council, which consists of the Chairman, Vice-
Chairmen and Secretary of the Council and the
Chairmen of the sixteen standing committees.
60. Contrary to what happened at the 1990
elections, when all persons resident in the
country were entitled to vote and stand for
election, at the June 1993 elections only persons
with Latvian citizenship may vote and be eli-
gible to stand; although your Rapporteur under-
stands this situation, he considers it paradoxical
since some members of the Supreme Council
will be unable either to be re-elected or to vote.
61. The Republic of Latvia has now applied
for membership of the Council of Europe. In the
conclusions to the note submitted on 19th
January 1993 by Mr. Vogel, Rapporteur of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
of the Parliamentary Assembly of that
organisation, it is stated that the problem of citi-
zenship might prevent accession for the time
being. It will be necessary to await the outcome
of the legislative elections on 5th and 6th June
and the adoption of a satisfactory law on citi-
zenship.
62. The Republic of Latvia and the other two
Baltic republics have also been very active in the
United Nations and the Council of Europe with
a view to obtaining the total, immediate with-
drawal of foreign forces from their territory.
63. On 25th November 1992, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
backing efforts made in this sense by states par-
ticipating in the CSCE, calling on the parties
concerned to conclude without delay agteements
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allowing the early, organised and complete with-
drawal of foreign troops and urging its Secretary-
General to use his good offices to facilitate the
withdrawal of foreign troops from the three
Baltic countries.
64. Furthermore, in a letter to the Chairman
of the Political Alfairs Committee of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the
Chairman of the Supreme Council of Latvia
expressed the wish, on behalf of the three Baltic
countries, that the committee prepare an emer-
gency report on the withdrawal of ex-Soviet
troops, while protesting " at the recent events of
the various anti-state organisations acting under
the cover of the ex-Soviet army, directly inter-
fering in the internal affairs of Latvia " and
expressing alarm " at the decision taken by
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to suspend tem-
porarily the withdrawal process... subject to theprior resolution of other outstanding issues
between Russia and [the Baltic] countries ". In
view of the above and because they 'are con-
vinced that the stability, security and respect for
national sovereignty in the Baltic region are
indispensable prerequisites for the long-term
security of Europe as a whole ", the Chairman of
the Supreme Council requested the Council of
Europe to hold an emergency debate during the
session to be held from lst to 5th February
1993. However, at the time of writing, such a
debate still has not been held.
65. The position of the Supreme Council of
Latvia in regard to relations with WEU was
described to your Rapporteur by Mr. Indulis
Berzins, leader of the majority group and
Chairman of the Foreign Alfairs Committee of
the Supreme Council. He believed that WEU,
whose objective is European security, will play a
rOle as " a bridge or a link between NATO and
the European Community ". To date, the
European security system had proved ineffective
in the crisis in former Yugoslavia and Latvia
considered that WEU, thanks to closer associ-
ation with NATO and the involvement of new
states, might more effectively accomplish the
task of guaranteeing European security. In this
context, Latvia wished to be given aspociate
status in WEU.
66. In regard to our Assembly, Mr. Berzins
said Latvia might take part in plenary sessions
as a guest or observer. Similarly, it might takepart in seminars or other such activities
organised by WEU and establish a regular
exchange of information on matters of interest
to both parties.
(e) Lithuania
67. The policy of reforms started in the Soviet
Union by Mikhail Gorbachev immediately
received the active support of the Lithuanian
population. The Lithuanian reform movement,
Sajudis, the nucleus cf which was the scientific
and artistic intellegentsia and whose Chairman
was Vitautas Landsbergis, was started in mid-
1988. Initially, the movement's action was based
on the restoration of democratic and national
rights and it subsequently called for the resto-
ration of national independence. The movement
received the immediate support of the Lithu-
anian public. Efforts by the Lithuanian Com-
munist party to adopt some of the Sajudis's pro.
posals were not enough to avert its temporary
loss of influence in the country.
68. As from 1988 and until the first electionsin 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet
Socialist Republic of Lithuania adopted a series
of important decisions: it declared Lithuanian to
be the official state language, approved a consti-
tutional amendment giving Lithuanian legis-
lation supremacy over Soviet laws, annulled the
decisions taken by the People's Sejm in 1940
proclaiming Lithuania a Soviet Socialist
Republic and consequently decreeing its union
with the Soviet Union and, finally, legalised the
multi-party system.
69. At the same time, the Lithuanian Com-
munist Party broke all its links with the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (in December
1989) and, in 1990, took the name of Lithuanian
Democratic Labour Party. A few of its former
members kept the Lithuanian Communist Party
in existence, tied to its old principles: it ema-
nated from the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and was opposed to the country's inde-
pendence. Following the failure of the coup
d'6tat in the Soviet Union in August 1991, the
Lithuanian Supreme Council banned the party's
activities, considering it to be a foreign
organisation which had, furthermore, supported
the attempted coup d'6tat.
70. The first free elections since 1926 were
held in February 1990. Electors had to choose
between two proposals on which the electoral
campaign was concentrated: independence
immediately or after negotiations with the
Soviet Union. The Sajudis, resolutely in favour
of the immediate restoration of independence,
obtained a sweeping victory while those in
favour of the second possibility, the Democratic
Labour Party and its fellow travellers, were
severely defeated. Following the elections, par-
liament had the following groups: united
Sajudis, 15 members, Concord (broken away
from the Sajudis), ll, Nationalist, 10, National
Progressive, I l, Moderate, 16 (all these groups,
upholders of right-wing positions, afforded the
government more or less stable support), Polish
Minority, 8, Liberal, 10, Centre, 20, and Demo-
cratic Labour Party, I l, plus 29 deputies not
belonging to a group.
71. On l lth March 1990, the Supreme Coun-
cil declared, by legislative means, the restoration
of the independence of the Republic of Lithua-
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nia and the partial, provisional re-establishment
of Lithuania's 1938 constitution. The Soviet
Union refused to recognise this law and insisted
that it be repealed. Lithuania's refusal to move
backwards immediately led to an economic
blockade by the Soviet Union and, a few months
later, in January 1991, the Soviet army occupied
the radio and television building, the national
printing works and a few other establishments.
According to offrcial Lithuanian flrgures, Soviet
armed interventions caused 14 dead and 800
wounded. A national plebiscite on Lithuania's
independence and the establishment of a demo-
cratic rdgime was held on 9th February 1991.
90.5Y0 of the votes cast, i.e.760/o of all potential
voters, voted in favour. The Soviet Union
finally recognised Lithuania's independence on
6th September 1991, a few days after the failure
of the coup d'6tat in that country. Shortly
before, in June of the same year, the Supreme
Council had passed a constitutional law to
prevent Lithuania taking part in post-Soviet
eastern alliances. This law provided for the
development of relations of mutual interest with
all states that were previously part of the Soviet
Union but it aflirmed that in no event would
Lithuania be associated with new alliances of
states, be they political, military or economic,
based on the structures of the former Soviet
Union. Any attempt in this sense would be con-
sidered a hostile act vis-i-vis Lithuania's inde-
pendence and would consequently be punished
by law. Finally, the law provided that no mil-
itary base or unit of the army of Russia, the CIS
or any of its component states might be sta-
tioned on the territory of the Lithuanian
Republic.
72. At the same time, the economic situation
was deteriorating sharply: the reduction in
energy supplies from the Soviet Union, on the
one hand, and the economic reform, particularly
in agriculture, on the other, caused great concern
among the population. On top of this, there was
the chaotic situation of the political groups. As
long as independer,rce was a common goal, the
consensus was marntained, but, once indepen-
dence was acquired, the disparity between cri-
teria and the almost total lack of experience and
tradition among the political parties led to an
almost complete paralysis of parliamentary
activity.
73. These events led to early elections being
called. Two ballots were held on 25th October
and 15th November 1992. At the first ballot, the
new constitution, which had previously been
approved by parliament, was also submitted to
referendum.
74. The new electoral law under which the
elections were held kept the total number of
seats at 141 and, in order to avoid the parlia-
mentary chaos of the previous legislature, stipu-
lated that only 71 deputies would be elected by
direct suffrage, the other 70 being elected in
accordance with a proportional system: candi-
dates on each list would be given a number of
seats proportional to the number of votes cast.
Each elector therefore had to vote twice, once
for a candidate standing in a uninominal ballot
and once for a party, coalition or movement
standing at national level. In order to be elected
on the first ballot, more than 5090 of the votes
cast had to be obtained; ifno candidate obtained
this majority, the two best-placed candidates
continued to the second ballot. To accede to
national level, candidates had to obtain a
minimum of 4% of the votes cast, but this
requirement was not applicable to national
minorities, who could be represented simply by
obtaining the necessary number of votes.
75. The independence question having been
settled and the referendum on the new consti-
tution having received wide public support (with
7570 of the electorate voting, 75.501o of votes cast
were in favour of the new text), practically the
only issue in the electoral campaign was ecG
nomic problems. ln 1992, the country's indus-
trial production was half what it had been the
previous year: this collapse may be attributed to
various factors of which the most important is
probably the breaking of links with Russia. The
situation in the agricultural sector is no better,
as shown by estimates for meat production for
the current year which represent 30% of 1990
figures. Furthermore, inflation rose to almost2Wo in 1992.It is hardly surprising, there-
fore, that a majority of citizens decided to
support those who promised that relations with
Russia would be improved and agricultural
policy radically changed, i.e. the Lithuanian
Democratic Labour Party. Its leader, Algirdas
Brazauskas, was elected First Secretary of the
Lithuanian Communist Party in 1988 thanks to
the support of reformists; after separating his
party from the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, he transformed it, as stated above, into a
social-democrat party. Brazauskas said of the
ex-communist label attached to his party in an
attempt to discredit it that only 6% of its present
members had been members of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and that his sepa-
ration from the latter preceded that of Yeltsin:
nevertheless, the Russian President is not
defined as a former communist.
76. The Seimas (parliament) stemming from
these elections comprises the following Etroups:
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Putty, 7l
members, Sajudis, 16, Liberty (Lithuanian
political prisoners and deportees), 12, Christian
Democrat, 10, Charter of the Citizens of the
Lithuanian Republic, 10, Social Democrat 8,
Polish, 4, Lithuanian Democratic Party, 4, plus
5 members who do not belong to a political
Sroun
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77. In regard to the Polish and other minor-
ities, it should be stressed that, according to
official figures for 1989, 79.60/o of the population
was of Lithuanian nationality, 9.40lo Russian and
70lo Polish. The other minorities (which are
generally stable or dwindling) include l.7o/o
Belarussians and 0.lolo Germans.
78. Although the result of these elections
cannot be extrapolated and applied to the other
countries that used to be part of the Soviet
Union or its satellite countries, there are clear
signs that a whole sector of the population is
becoming disenchanted with the reforms intro-
duced largely in a doctrinary spirit that takes
little account of reality. In many cases, this
voluntaristic policy is aggravating the crisis
throughout the production system inherited
from the past without really favouring the emer-
gence of new productive forces.
79. On l4th February 1993, presidential elec-
tions were held. There were two candidates,
Mr. Brazauskas of the Lithuanian Democratic
Labour Party and Mr. Lozoraitis, Ambassador
to the United States, who had the support of the
other political groups. The results obtained by
Mr. Brazauskas, elected President, far exceeded
those obtained by his party three months earlier.
This may be considered largely due to wide
support for him as a person and as a reward for
the success obtained by the government in a
very short lapse of time in the economic sector:
a halt in the fall of industrial production and an
inflation rate of only 90/o in January compared
with a monthly average of more than 1000/o
under the previous government. Moreover, the
new President, while considering it essential for
Lithuania to have close relations with the West
and benefit from its assistance, recognises that
relations with Russia must be improved and
include advantages for both parties; however, he
is continually insisting that Soviet troops be
withdrawn from Lithuania by 3lst August of
this year.
80. It is clear that the parliamentary and,
more generally, political stability achieved by
Lithuania offers the best chances of successfully
meeting the difficult challenges facing the
country, be they internal or external. One of
them is to fulfil Lithuania's desire to be inte-
grated in the process of building Europe. On
l lth May 1993, it became a full member of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europb.
(f) Poltrd
81. The Polish constitution now consists of
two texts: the old constitution of the People's
Republic of Poland (now the constitution of the
Republic of Poland), modifed in December
1989 by a law that removed Marxist-Leninist
principles and the characteristic terminology,
and the constitutional law of lTth October 1992
(known as the small constitution), whose main
aim was to strengthen the executive by intro-
ducing a presidential parliamentary rdgime. A
new constitutional text is now being prepared.
82. The Polish Parliament consists of the
Sejm (or Diet) and the Senate, the Sejm being
the main representative body. In accordance
with the law of 28th June 1991, the first free,
democratic elections were held on 27th October
of the same year. The results of these elections,
set out below, gave the Sejm eighteen political
groups with between 2 and 62 seats out of a total
of 460:
"o/o . Number
cast ot seats
Democratic Union 12.31 62
Democratic Left Alliance . . . 11.98 60
Catholic Electoral Action ... 8.73 49
Polish Peasant Party . 8.67 48
Confederation for an Inde-
pendent Poland
Centre Citizens' Alliance ...
Liberal Democratic Congress
Peasant Accord
Solidarity
Beer Lovers' Party
German Minority .. :.......
Christian Democracy
Labour Solidarity
Party of Christian Democrats
Polish Western Union
Party X
Union of Real Politics
Silesian Autonomy Movement
7.s0 46
8.71 44
7.48 37
5.46 28
5.05 27
3.27 16
t.t1 7
2.37 5
2.05 4
l.ll 4
0.23 4
0.47 3
2.25 3
0.35 2
Eleven other political parties and groups
obtained 10.850/o of the votes cast without man-
aging to obtain any parliamentary seats.
83. The electoral law provides for the election
of 391 members of the Diet by local constitu-
encies. No less than seven candidates may be
elected in each constituency. The candidates for
the remaining 69 posts are elected on a national
list. Mandates are shared out between lists
having obtained a seat in at least five constitu-
encies or a minimum of 5Yo of the votes cast in
all the constituencies. These rules are not appli-
cable to lists of national minorities. In both
cases, the election is by proportional voting.
84. Elections to the Senate are by majority
voting. Electoral constituencies do not neces-
sarily have to correspond to those for the Diet.
There arc 49 of them and each elects two sen-
ators, except for Warsaw and Katowice, which
each elect three.
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85. In the Sejm, the political parties form par-
liamentary groups, each of which must have a
minimum of 15 members, and groups of
members which are not subject to this rule but
have more restrictive conditions for working in
the chamber.
86. In the Diet, a total of 33 friendship goups
have established relations with parliaments
throughout the world, eight of them having rela-
tions with the parliaments of all WEU member
countries except the Netherlands.
87. It is evident that the composition of the
Sejm, where the two main political parties -
Liberal Democrats and former Communists -
each obtained barely 120/o of the votes cast and,
percentage-wise, have similar parliamentary rep-
resentation, does not facilitate the formation of
homogeneous, stable governments. There have
been four governments or attempts to form a
government since the formation of the Bieleki
cabinet in January 1991. Its nomination and
approval took parliament a month in an atmo-
sphere of dissension.
88. The present government of Mrs. Suchoka,
formed on l lth July 1992, is a coalition between
the Democratic Union, the National Christian
Union (the Catholic Electoral Action parlia-
mentary group), the Peasant Alliance, the
Christian Democrat Party, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Congress, the Polish Peasant Party and
part of the Beer Lovers' Party.
89. Certain opinion polls carried out in April
and May 1992 to which your Rapporteur had
access revealed that 50% of the population was
very unsatisf,red with the political situation and
only 6Vo satisfied. The conclusions were even
more negative in respect of the economic situ-
ation.
90. More recently, following the appointment
of Mrs. Suchoka as Prime Minister, this ten-
dency has started to change. Thus, public conf,t-
dence in the government rose from l59o in May
1992 to 390/o in September of the same year. On
that date, the percentage approving the Prime
Minister was 58Yo and she thus became the
country's third most popular person, after the
Minister of Labour, Mr. Kuron (660/o), and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Skubiszewski
(6lolo).
91. Throughout the visit by the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations to
Warsaw on l0th and I lth March 1993,
attention was paid to the question of the devel-
opment of relations between WEU and Polandin general and between our Assembly and
the Polish Parliament in particular. Mr.
Wielowieyski, Diet representative to the WEU
Assembly, referred to the initiative taken by the
Sejm, which is proposing to organise a sym-
posium on " Western European Union thinking
on security in Central Europe " in which the
countries of the forum of consultation and the
WEU member countries would take part. The
initiative was well received by the Presidential
Committee and preparations are now under way
to hold it next autumn. Mr. Wielowieyski was
also afraid the process of integrating Poland into
the European Community might be a two-speed
affair: one for purely economic matters and
another, more rapid one for the other aspects,
particularly those concerning security and
defence. The Vice-President of the Diet, Mr.
Kurczewski, said no more when he said Poland's
membership of the Community would have to
be preceded by a political co-operation stage
to cover, inter alia, as he stressed, security
policy.
92. Our Polish colleagues also referred to the
fact that NATO was showing a more con-
structive attitude towards Poland than WEU.
Nevertheless, Poland applied for membership of
NATO without success. This application was
made without any debate having been held on it
in parliament, as Mr. Iwinski, member of the
Democratic Left Alliance Group (former Com-
munist Party) complained. The Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ananicz, said
his country was ready for full co-operation with
WEU while considering relations with NATO
were more flexible than with our organisation;
however, he added that this might be due to
WEU being in the midst of a transformation
stage.
93. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence
told our committee that Poland had already
adopted a position on security policy: it wished
to be associated with Euro-Atlantic security, i.e.
embark upon a process of rapprochement with
NATO and WEU designed to lead to full
accession to both organisations. The document
entitled 'Principles of Polish security policy "
emanating from the Presidency of the Republic
and dated 2nd November 1992 is very clear on
this subject and affrrms that Poland's strategic
target for the nineties is to ensure membership
of NATO and WEU, the European pillar of
NATO and an essential link in the European col-
lective security system.
94. Our Polish hosts were also dissatisfied
with the status they now have in the Assembly(since 1990, they have been invited to each
session and have participated in each of them
without exception). They believe more thought
should be given to the idea of a possible affrliate
status or of creating a status for countries that
were candidates or wished to become candi-
dates. It would, moreover, be necessary to
intensify or extend co-operation between the
Institute for Security Studies and the
Department of Strategic Studies of the Ministry
of Defence and also contacts between chiefs of
defence staff and, among other forms of
co-operation, associate staff of the Polish Minis-
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tries of Defence and Foreign Affairs with all
WEU working groups.
(g) Romaaia
95. The first legislative and presidential elec-
tions held in Romania after the fall of the com-
munist r6gime were held on 20th May 1990. As
a result of the elections, the Chamber of Dep-
uties had 263 members belonging to the
National Salvation Front (NSF) and 124 from
the other seventeen parties and movements, 29
of whom formed the Democratic Union of
Romanian Magyars. As the representatives of
groups belonging to the minorities did not
obtain sufficient votes to accede to the
Chamber, they were oflicially given nine seats.
The presidential elections brought Mr. Iliescu to
power. He was the NSF candidate and was
elected with 850/o of the votes cast, a percentage
significantly higher than that obtained by his
party in the legislative elections (670/o).
96. The government emerging from these
elections, presided by Mr. Roman, stayed in
power until October 1991, with a cabinet
reshuffle in the meantime. During that period,
the confrontation between Mr. Roman and Mr.
Iliescu, i.e. between reformers and conservatives
in the NSF, paved the way for the future sepa-
ration of the movement. Miners from the Jiu
valley, spearhead of a population which is suf-
fering considerably from the consequences of
the economic reform movement, demonstrated
in Bucharest and contributed to the fall of the
Roman government. A new government was
then formed with Mr. Stolojan, Prime Minister,
and the participation of other parliamentary
political groups (Agrarians, Liberals and Ecolo-
gists) and independent persons. Moreover, the
new Romanian constitution was adopted by par-
Iiament on 2lst November l99l; submitted to
referendum on 8th December of the same year,
it was approved by an ovenvhelming majority of
the population. Once the new constitution came
into force and the new electoral laws on legis-
lative and presidential elections were adopted,
on 27th September 1992 the country was called
to the polling booths to elect the President of the
Republic and representatives to the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate. There are two rounds
in the presidential election if no candidate
obtains a majority during the first round. Mr.
Iliescu was elected President of the Republic in
the second ballot, with 6l.43Vo of the votes cast.
The legislative elections led to the following
composition of parliament:
Chamber of Deputies
Seats
Parliamentary Group of the Demo-
cratic National Salvation Front(Mr. Iliescu) . ... . .. ll7
Parliamentary Group of the
National Christian Democrat
Peasant Party and the Romanian
Ecological Party . 44
Parliamentary Group of the
National Salvation Front (Mr.Roman) 43
Parliamentary Group of the
Romanian National Unity Party 29
Parliamentary Group of the
Romanian Magyar Democratic
Union
Parliamentary Group of the
Romdnia Mare Party (Greater
Romania)
Liberal Parliamentary Group .....
Parliamentary Group of the Civic
Alliance Party .
National Minorities Parliamentary
Group
Socialist Parliamentary Group(former Communists) ...
Social Democrat Parliamentary
Group of the Romanian Social
27
l6
t4
l3
l3
l3
Democrat Party . l0
Independents .... 2
Senate
Seats
DNSF Parliamentary Group 49
Parliamentary Group of the
National Christian Democrat
Peasant Party. 22
NSF Parliamentary Group l8
Liberal Civil Guidance Parlia-
mentary Group 12
Parliamentary Group of the
Romanian National Unity Party 13
Parliamentary Group of the
Romanian Magyar DemocraticUnion 12
Partida Nationala Parliamentary
Group (Romdnia Mare and
Romanian Socialist Party, formerCommunist)..... ll
Agrarian Democratic Party . 5
Independent ..... I
97. In the light of the results of the elections,
President lliescu nominated as a candidate for
the post of Prime Minister Mr. Vacaru, a tech-
nocrat with no party affiliation, who received a
vote of confidence from the Chamber of Dep
uties and Senate meeting in joint session on l9th
November 1992. His government is composed
of members of the DNSF and independents. In
his speech opening parliament, the President of
the Republic, Mr. Iliescu, stressed that one of
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Romania's principal political aims was to
strengthen links with NATO and WEU which he
considered essential for the defence of national
security and territorial integrity; this position
would, he said, lead to Romania's accession to
both organisations. On lTth February 1993, Mr.
Iliescu visited WEU headquarters in Brussels,
where he was received by the Secretary-General,
Mr. van Eekelen, and met the WEU Council.
98. The Romanian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Melescanu, addressing the WEU
Assembly on lst December 1992, announced
that his country proposed to set up a special
body * with the priority objective of integration
in European structures and, first and foremost,
the European Communities, WEU and the
Council of Europe'. This specialised body
would be " responsible for marshalling
resources, identifying activities and working out
a strategy to speed up the process which could be
lengthy ". The Minister referred to the process
started in Petersberg between the member coun-
tries of WEU and the Central European coun-
tries, which he believed to be 'a qualitatively
new stage in the field of European
co-operation'. He welcomed the idea of cre-
ating * affiliated' status for the Central
European countries. The Minister reiterated
" the importance of the parliamentary
dimension, the key democratic component of
the process of redefining the architecture of
security and co-operation in Europe to which
the recently-elected Romanian Parliament
wishes to make a more active contribution ".Mr. Melescanu concluded his address by
affrrming that " WEU and its Assembly are
models of international action and co-operation
at governmental and parliamentary level for the
whole of Europe ".
99. During the visit by the Assembly's
Political Committee to Romania from 3fth
March to 3rd April 1993, your Rapporteur, who
was taking part in his capacity as Rapporteur
and as a member of the Political Committee,
was able to note, mainly at meetings with
members of the Defence and Foreign Affairs
Committees of the two chambers, the degree of
consensus between the various parliamentary
groups vis-d-vis foreign policy and security con-
cerns and aims. This consensus may be
explained by the fact that the disbandment of
the Warsaw Pact allowing Romania to recover
its freedom also gave the country a feeling of
insecurity that nationalist tension in the region
is tending to amplify. Romanians believe that
integration in European economic and security
institutions would bring stability to the region
and this would be a very important factor for
European security.
100. On relations with WEU, our hosts found
the creation of afliliate status would be inter-
esting in a first stage of the integration process.
Mr. Vacaroiu, Leader of the DNSF Parlia-
mentary Group and a member of the Romanian
parliamentary delegation invited to WEU
Assembly sessions, told your Rapporteur that,
initially, he wished our Assembly to increase the
number of members of that delegation (two at
present) so as to allow really multi-party repre-
sentation of Romanian parliamentarians and a
division of tasks that would make their presence
more effective. In a second stage, they should
take part in the work of committees, including
the preparation of reports.
101. The WEU Assembly has invited the
Romanian Parliament to send a delegation to
each ofits plenary sessions since June 1991 and
two Romanian parliamentarians have regularly
attended all our sessions without exception.
102. Your Rapporteur considers it worth
adding that, at the meeting held during the visit
to Romania with members of the Euro-Atlantic
Centre (an institute studying security problems
in the region and composed of representatives of
communications, cultural and political circles),
the latter unanimously expressed the wish to
support Romania's integration in the European
institutions, including WEU.
103. Finally, the Romanian Parliament has set
up a series of groups for friendship with other
parliaments, including those of Germany,
Belgium, Spain, France and the United
Kingdom. Your Rapporteur believes it would be
expedient to use such resources to tighten links
with all parliaments and more particularly with
those with which we are concerned in this
report.
(h) TIE Sloto* Republic and the Cztch Rcpublic
104. As from lst January 1993, the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic have been
independent, sovereign states but, until 3lst
December 1992, they formed the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic. For practical reasons
and to avoid repetition, your Rapporteur has
therefore had to include them in the same
chapter.
105. Once initial enthusiasm for the velvet rev-
olution had waned, coming to grips with hard
facts, i.e. the immense problems arising, pro-
gressively undermined the internal cohesion of
the principal Czechoslovak political move-
ments. Splits began to form in the Civic Forum,
in the Czech part of the country, and Public
against Violence, in the Slovak part.
106. In 1991, the Civic Forum divided into
what might summarily be called the right and
the left: those in favour of the most rapid
progress possible towards a market economy,
whatever the social cost (Mr. Klaus) and those
who, while approving the aims pursued, paid
greater attention to the social costs, thus calling
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for a stage-by-stage transition (Mr. Dienstbier).
These dissensions led to the creation of the Civil
Democratic Party by Mr. Klaus's followers and
the Civic Movement under Mr. Dienstbier; what
happened to them will be examined in the para-
graphs dealing with the 1992 generul legislative
elections.
107. At the same time, in the Slovak part of the
country, Public against Violence underwent a
similar schism but for different reasons that
were nationalist rather than economic. Under
Mr. Meciar, the nationalist tendency became the
Movement for Democratic Slovakia while the
federal, minority tendency retained the party's
original name.
108. In those days, the principal task of the
Constituent Assembly, elected in June 1991, was
to draw up the constitution. It proved incapable
of reaching the consensus that was necessary to
accomplish its task. The fundamental questions
- 
Should it be a federal or a confederal state?
Should the constitutions of the two republics, in
any event, retain a certain degree of concor-
dance with that of the state? 
- 
obtained no def-
inite answer. The possibility of a treaty uniting
the two republics approved by their respective
parliaments and of an exclusively internal
nature was also discussed. Eventually, President
Havel proposed holding a referendum to find a
way out of the political and constitutional
deadlock in which the country was caught. The
proposed referendum was rejected by the
Federal Parliament (with the support of the
Slovaks and the Communists) and by the Slovak
Parliament itself. This was the situation in
which the legislative elections to the Federal
Assembly and the Czech and Slovak Parliaments
was held on 5th and 6th June 1992. The Federal
Assembly, consisting of the Chamber of the
People and the Chamber of Nations, with a total
of 300 seats (74 for the Czech parties and 126
for the Slovak parties), was as follows:
Czech parties
Seats
Civic Demoratic Party - Christian
Democratic Party .:. ..... . .. .. . 85
Left Bloc 34
Social Democrats 16
Republicans and Christian Demo-
cratic Union (R-CDU) 4
Christian Democratic Union
Czechoslovak People's Party(CDU-PP) 13
Liberal Social Union ....... 12
The Civic Movement obtained a little under 5Yo
of the votes cast and obtained no seats.
109. Slovak parties
Seats
Movement for a Democratic Slo-
vakia (MDS) .... ........ 57
Party of the Democratic Left . .... 23
Slovak National Party . 15
Hungarian Minority Coalition .... 12
Social Democratic Party in Slovakia 5
860/o of the electorate voted.
110. The composition of the national parlia-
ments was as follows:
Czech National Council (200 members)
Seats
Civic Democratic Party and
Christian Democratic Party . .... 76
Left Bloc 35
Social Democracy 16
Liberal Social Union ....... 16
Christian Democratic Union
Czechoslovak People's Party .... 15
Republicans and Christian Demo-
cratic Union. .... 14
Civic Democratic Alliance .. 14
Movement for Self-Administered
Democracy in Moravia andSilesia 14
Slovak National Council (150 members)
Seats
Movement for a Democratic Slo-
vakia . .... -. 74
Party of the Democratic Left .. ... 29
Christian Democratic Movement .. 18
Slovak National Party . 15
Hungarian Minority Coalition .... 14
1ll. Following these elections, the Federal
Government has been composed of a coalition
between the Civic Democratic Party, the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the
Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak Peo-
ple's Party. The Prime Minister and four
Deputy Prime Ministers, as well as the Ministers
for Foreigrr Affairs, Defence, the Economy,
Finance and the Interior, form this gov-
ernment.
ll2. Since it had been agreed to transfer wide-
spread powers to the Czech and Slovak institu-
tions, the majority of the leaders of the latter
avoided taking part in the Federal Government
in order to exercise governmental duties in their
respective republics. The Czech Government,
formed on 2nd July 1992, was a coalition
between the Civic Democratic Party-Christian
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Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic
Alliance and the CDU-PP. Mr. Klaus was Prime
Minister. The Slovak Government, set up on the
same date, had Mr. Meciar as Prime Minister at
the head of a cabinet including a member of the
Slovak National Party and an independent, the
rest of the ministers belonging to the majority
party, the Movement for a Democratic Slo-
vakia.
ll3. In a last attempt to avoid the disinte-
gration of the country, Mr. Havel decided to
stand for the Presidency of the Republic in the
Federal Assembly which, once constituted after
the June elections, had to elect the head ofstate.
ll4. In the first round, Mr. Havel did not
succeed in obtaining the three-fifths of the votes
needed in the three constituent bodies of the
Federal Assembly 
- 
the Chamber of the People
and the Chambers of the Nations (Czech and
Slovak), mainly because of the opposition of the
Slovak Nationalists and former Communists. In
the second round, when a simple majority was
required, the Slovak Chamber of Nations gave
him only 18 votes when he needed 38. The
defeat of Mr. Havel was one of the last mishaps
in the swiftly accelerating process of the coun-
try's separation.
ll5. Finally, on 25th November 1992, the
Federal Assembly approved by a narrow margin
the law on the partition of Czechoslovakia. In
the Chamber of the People, 92 of the 150
members voted for the law (2 more than the
number needed) while in the Chambers of the
Nations, composed of 75 members each, those
for the division of the country obtained 45 votes
in the Czech part and 46 in Slovakia, the
number required being 45. On lst January 1993,
the disappearance of the Federal Czech and
Slovak Republic, born in 1918, became a
reality.
I16. The parliamentarians from the two states
then prepared to elect the presidents of their
respective republics.
ll7. On 26th January 1993, Vaclav Havel was
elected President of the Czech Republic by 109
of the 200 members of parliament. He had the
support of parliamentarians belonging to the
government coalition, the Civic Democratic
Party-Christian Democratic Party, the Christian
Democratic Union-People's Party and the Civic
Democratic Alliance, but ran into the radical
opposition of the extreme right-wing Repub-
licans.
I 18. In Slovakia, after various attempts, it was
Mr. Kovak who was elected President of the
Republic after obtaining the votes of 106 of the
150 parliamentarians composing the Slovak Par-
liament. He had the support of some of the
members of the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic kft and
the Slovak National Party.
I19. Your Rapporteur has tried several times
to ascertain the views of the Czech and Slovak
Parliaments regarding our Assembly and the
best means of developing relations with them,
but there has been no answer as yet.
III. Conclusions
120. The parliaments of most of the Central
European countries grouped in the forum of
consultation have expressed their agreement
with the proposal to develop their relations with
the WEU Assembly as set out in the declaration
issued at the extraordinary meeting of the WEU
Council and the Central European states in
Bonn on l9th June 1992.
l2l. Some of those parliaments have also
made relatively firm proposals about how they
consider these relations might be developed.
122. As has already been seen, these proposals
related mainly to obtaining permanent guest
status, an increase in the number of parliamen-
tarians invited to attend our sessions and their
participation in meetings of committees and the
preparation of reports. Other proposals sought
to organise meetings between our Assembly's
Political Committee and members of the foreign
affairs and defence committees of the Central
European parliaments to consider the possible
accession of those countries to WEU and to
draw up a programme to meet that aim.
123. Information contained in the introduction
to this report shows the initiatives taken by our
Assembly in recent years to promote the devel-
opment of relations with the parliaments of
those countries. However, it should be pointed
out that any decision that might be adopted on
the development of those relations will have, on
the one hand, to respect scrupulously Article IX
of the modified Brussels Treaty and, on the
other, to take account ofthe present provisions
of the Rules of Procedure of the WEU
Assembly, in particular Rules l7 (observers) and
42.7 (procedure in committees).
124. In any event, your Rapporteur believes
the Assembly's invitation to the Committee on
Rules of Procedure and Privileges in Order 85
on the enlargement of WEU, adopted by the
Standing Committee in Rome on l9th April
1993,
'to examine the creation of an 'observer
status' and a 'permanent observer' or
'guest member status' for representatives
of observer states and of the nine Central
European countries assembled in the
forum of consultation'
and the invitations in the same order to the
Political Committee " to monitor the devel-
opment of WEU's enlargement', to the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
ll0
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" to examine in detail the consequences of
enlargement for the Assembly's budget and
premises' and to the Presidential Committee
a to co-ordinate the activities of the Political
Committee, the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration and the Committee
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in this
matter, so as to ensure that appropriate reports
and recommendations can be put to the
Assembly no later than its December 1993
meeting " are appropriate answers to the basic
problems and to the equally important practical
problems raised by this question. Your
Rapporteur therefore considers that the pro-
posals our committee can and must implement
at the present time to cope with the devel-
opment of our relations with the parliaments of
the Central European countries must above all
aim to intensify action already carried out.
Visits by Assembly committees to those coun-
tries have proved extremely useful and shouldbe continued so as to improve mutual
knowledge. Encouraging such visits should
therefore be one of the Assembly's priority tasks.
These visits might also coincide with the prepa-
ration of reports dealing with the region in
question, thus helping to depict more closely in
those documents the opinions of those con-
cerned. Visits should be organised on the basis
of meetings with parliamentarians and govern-
mental authorities and also with institutions and
associations dealing with security and defence
and with higher education establishments and,
of course, the media.
125. The Assembly must also be prepared to
take part in symposia held in those countries on
matters within its purview and to hold symposia
of its own on matters of particular interest to the
said countries and in which they might take
part.
126. Invitations must continue to be sent to the
ministers for foreign affairs and defence of the
Central European countries to speak at
Assembly sessions; an attempt should even be
made to ensure the more frequent presence of as
many such speakers as possible.
127. Finally, our Assembly should take the
necessary steps to send our publications, the
letter from the Assembly, reports and other doc-
uments to as many people and institutions as
possible in those countries. It should also
arrange to receive documents from those coun-
tries ihat might enable better knowledge and
understanding to be obtained of their opinions
and aims.
128. All these initiatives will no doubt con-
tribute to the continued development of our
relations, to a broadening of our possibilities of
consensus and to preparing for closer
co-operation in the future.
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Prefoce
- . 
Your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate in preparing the present report to receive muchkind.h-elp and as,sistance from all the authorities consulted aird sh6 *ouio tite to futi ini. 
"pp".t"-"iivpublicly to thank all concerned for their co-operation.
Arrangements for visits to the United Nations in Geneva and New york were co-ordinated
respectiv-ely by Ambassador Boddens-Hosang and Ambassador Biegmar, ierm"nent Representatives
of the. Ki-nsdqq of the Netherlands. MI. lra:rr Bjdrckl the S;4,edis'h DeiJnce rvrin-iiter, tinoivauthorised a visit to the swedish UN Training centre at Almn6s.
Yot[Rappgrteur was invited to take part in a conference sponsored by the Naval War College inNewport, Rhode Island,, on " Options for United States particiiration in UnitiO NationJ sanctiSned
military-operations ".fh. conference participants include& e*perts from -uiry ctntinent anO proriOiO
an excellent opPortunity to explore the intricacies of the UN Charter, the Secrltary-Cenera'i a ngeoaufor Peace " and the often conflicting attitudes of the countries represented, not leait the United States.
- 
Of-special help in 
^Newport in framlng the ideas expressed in the following chapters wereVr. Bo-Huldt, Director of the International Institute for Straiegic Studies, It4r. lact fifcNeif, GoeiACounsel in the Pentagon and Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius fronithe Swediih f"finistry oiOiienri. - -
palicPar problem discussed throughout has been traditional US reluctance to becomeinvolved iq uN operations.per se (arguing thal as the UN is so ill-iquippiOio tale aciioo, ine uniieOStates itself must act 
-.a " chicken and egg " way of reasoning) and an ge'n-erul reiurAio allow US fofiito serve under other than US comman_d (except for the UN-Sinai miision). However now in Somaia
with the withdrawal of the bulk of US folceithe remaining + 0oo amiricans *" 
"o-i"gild;i[;command of the Turkish General, Cevik Bir.
.. . 
Anolher aspect which became obvious as the fact-finding missions progressed was a tendencydisplayed by a_number of alliance countries to want to " re-inv-ent the wh6el ; where the UN is con'-
cerned and to dismiss the experience of others. Very few of our countries are able to match the Nordic
nations as a whole for their dedicated commitment to the UN. Which is why 
" 
cnapte. ofine iepo.t iidevoted to the Nordic experience in some detail in the hope that the e*ai"pf. ,fitt Ue of benifit to
others. WEU countries should consider recruiting vohlntiers specificauiJo; UN operations ifoiexample by proposing two-year contracts at the end of the normal period of nationaliervi.+ '
All WEU member states are currently participating in a wide variety of UN operations, in one
way or another. Some countries are making contributionJ which are propoitionally 
"iocn 
gr"uiei thin
what miglt be expected (in financial terfrs arO *itn reguiO to popuf-ation s-iie),-another is in theprocess of reconsidering its own constitutional position. -
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
15th February 1993 
- 
United Nations, Geneva
H.E. Ambassador Boddens-Ho_salg, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;
H.E. Ambassador Di Lorenzo Badfu, Permanent Representative of Italy (represiniirig the WEUPresidency);
H.E. Ambassador Larssen, Permanent Representative of Denmark (representing the ECPresidency);
H.E. Ambassador_Ahtisaari, Permanent Representative of Finland, Chairman of the WorkingGroup on Bosnia and Herzegovina;
H.E. Ambassador Berasategui, Permanent Representative of Argentina, Chairman of the CSBMWorking Group;
Colonel Graham Messervy-Whl1ing (United Kingdom), Military Adviser to Lord Owen;Mr. Fouinat (Fra!ce), Head of Yugoslavia nesk, UNfiCR;
Mr. von Blumenthal (Germany), UNHCR;
Mr. Ritz, UN Working Group on Minorities.
15th February 1993 
- 
International committee of the Red cross, Geneva
Mr. F. Bellon (Switzerland), Head of ICRC operations in former Yugoslavia.
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30th March 1993 - United Nations, New York
H.E. Ambassador Biegman, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;
H.E. Ambassador Vieri Traxler, Permanent Representative of ltaly;
H.E. Ambassador Bent Haakonsen, Permanent Representative of Denmark;
H.E. Ambassador Sir David Hannay, KCMG, Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom;
- Mr. Hervd Ladsous, Deputy Permanent Representative of France;
Mr. Inderfurth, Senior Counsellor to H.E. Ambassador Albright, Peace-keeping Operations,
United States Mission to the United Nations;
Mr. Riza (Pakistan), Deputy to Mr. Kofi Annan, OSG Peace-keeping Operations;
Colonel Heikki Purola (Finland), Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peace-keeping
Operations;
' Mr. Derek Boothby (United Kingdom), Oflice of the Co-Chairmen of the International
Conference on the former Yugoslavia.
3tst March to 2nd April 1993 - Newport, Rhode Island
United States Naval War College Conference on " Options for United States participation in
United Nations sanctioned military operations ":
Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for
Peace-keeping Operations;
Dr. Inis Claude, University of Viryinia;
Dr. Bo Huldt, Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, GCB, former First Sea Lord of the United Kingdom;
Mr. Julien LeBourgeois, State Department Policy Department;
Mr. Marc Palevitz, Oflice of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs,
Global Affairs;
Vice Admiral Henry Mustin, USN (Ret), Fellow, Centre for Naval Analyses;
Dr. Gwyn Prins, Cambridge University;
Commander lan Bartholomew, RN, Cambridge University;
Rear Admiral Frank Bowman, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs;
Major Brennan, US Army Staff, Chief, Slrategtc Plans and Policy Division;
Major General John Lorber, US Air Staff, Director of Plans; 
-Major General Indar Rikhye (India), US Institute for Peace, Former Peace-keeping Force
Military Commander;
dear Admiral William Wrieht IV, USN, Navy Staff, Director, Political, Military and Current
Plans;
'Brigadier General Thomas Wilkerson, USMC, Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
Director of Plans;
Dr. Robert Staley, University of Colorado.
7th April 1993 
- 
SIPR/ (Stockholm International Peace Research Instilute), Stockholm
Mr. Ove Svensson (Sweden), Deputy Director;
Dr. Madimir Baranovsky (Russia);
Dr. Thomas Stock (Germany);
Ms. Evamaria Loose-Weintraub (Germany);
Ms. Elisabeth Skdns (Sweden);
Mr. Chris Ulrich (United States);
Mr. Richard Nystriim (Sweden).
\th April 1993 
- 
Stockholm
Ministry of Defence
Mr. Michael Sahlin, Under Secretary of State;
Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius;
Mr. Jan Hyllander, UN desk offtcer.
UN Training Centre, Almntis
Lt. Col. Wadensjii, Commanding Officer;
Major Jershed, Training Oflicer.
Colonel Adolf Ludin, Swiss Military Attach6.
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21st April 1993 
- 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome
H.E. Ambassador Fabio Migliorini, Permanent Representative of Italy to WEU.
The committee as a whole received evidence from the following:
llth and 12th March 1993 
- 
Rome (Cecchignola)
Seminar on * New defence models ":
Mr. Salvo Andd, Italian Minister of Defence, Co-Chairman-in-office of the WEU Council;
Dr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU;
Ambassador Amedeo De Franchis, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO;
Mr. Hans Haekemrp, Danish Minister of Defence;
Mr. Relus Ter Beek, Netherlands Minister of Defence;
Mr. Joaquim Fernando Nogueira, Portuguese Minister of Defence;
Mr. Julian Garcia Vargas, Spanish Minister of Defence;
Mr. Jorg Schiinbohm, German State Secretary of Defence;
Mr. Stathopoulos, Greek Deputy Secretary of Defence;
Ambassador Richard Duque, Representative of the French Minister of Defence and French
Permanent Representative to WEU;
Lt. Gen. Joseph Charlier, Representative of the Belgian Minister of Defence'
Li. C-in. Svtrig Rasmussen, fl.epreientative of the forwegian Minister of DJfence;
Mr. David Gould, Representative of the British Minister-of Defence;
Lt. Gen. Domenico Corcione, Italian Chief of Defence Staff;
Mr. Michael Legge, Assistant Secretary-General of NATO.
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior
officers who gave evidence for the preparation of this report.
The opinions expressed, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
oa Unitcd Naions opcrutbas 
- 
iaterrction with WEa
The Assembly,
O Determined to uphold the authority of the United Nations Oryanisation and to support moves
to make it much more effective;(it) Welcoming therefore the UN Secretary-General's intention to improve 
-the working of theUnited Nations anO in general supporting the ideas expressed in " An Agenda for Peace ";(iit) Strongly supporting the establishment of a UN military planning staff together with a 24 hour
iituation cenfre, ippropriate training, logistics, transport, communications and intelligence-gathering
facilities to enable the UN to play its proper r6le in command of its own operations;(iv) Pleased that increased links are now evident between Westem European U.nign and the United
Nitions and that the presidency of the WEU Council has taken a series of initiatives to that end;(v) Convinced that the example shown by those nations which have traditionally supported the UN
could serve us in good stead for the future conduct ofUN operations, and congratulating tlrose govern-
ments which havi made forces available for UN, NATO and WEU operations, and the men and
women who serve in those forces, often in difficult, trying and frustrating circumstances, at sea, on
land and in the air;(vi) Believing that WEU's experience of operations both during the Gulf conflict and now con-
cerning the former Yugoslavia is worth sharing with the UN and that there are many parallels between
the two organisations which may be used to mutual benefit;
(vii) Considering that the question of whether or not WEU may be declared a regional organisation
under the terms of the UN Charter should be fully debated and that in general WEU should take action
in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty only under the aegis of a UN mandate;
(viii) Recognising that sanctions can be an alternative to war and believing that when such sanctions
have been approvid by the United Nations they must be enforced, calling therefore on the Council of
Ministers and national administrations to publish the evidence available to them of significant
breaches of sanctions;(ix) Seeking support in national parliaments to ensure that defence budgets are restructured to take
account of the need to participate in UN operations,
Rrcouunuos rHAT rnr Cor-rNcIr
l. Include the subject of participation by member countries in UN operations promptly and regu-
larly on its agenda and on that of the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the planning cell, the
Secietariat-General and its various working gtroups and keep the Assembly informed;
2. Study the possible participation in UN operations by WEU p€r se, with appropriate WEU
co-ordination;
3. In parallel with the Assembly, make a thorough examination of the pros and cons of declaring,
WEU a regional organisation within the meaning of the UN Charter and reaffirm WEU's acceptance of
the principle of possible action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty under
the aegis and in support of the UN;
4. Establish a working relationship with the UN Secretary-General using both the WEU Chairman-
in-Office's good offrces and those of the WEU Secretary-General and his staff and instruct the planning
cell to offer advice for the UN Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York, especially with a
view to facilitating the creation of a similar planning cell for the UN;
5. Direct the WEU planning cell to examine ways in which WEU governments might support the
UN in terms of:
- 
logistic co-operation and procuremenL
- 
transport pooling;
- 
communication arrangements;
- 
intelligence gathering;
- 
command and control for operations;
- 
the formulation of rules of engagemen!
- 
training co-ordination.
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Draft Resolution
on Uaited Natioas operaiou 
- 
interuetion with WEU
The Assembly,
. 
INvnrs the parliaments of member, associate and observer countries to support the United
Nations and the general ideas expressed in the " Agenda for peace ".
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Draft Order
on Uaitcd Noioas owmtions - interuction with WEU
The Assembly,
Reeuesrs its President to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to address the next
plenary session of the WEU Assembly.
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Expbnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mrs. Baameld-Schlanan, Yice-Chairmaa and Roilnrtcut)
I. Introduction
l. Since the end of the second world war, the
world has experienced some 400 further con-
flicts, less global in character, but which never-
theless have resulted in a total of some 16
million deaths. Only a comparatively small
number of these conflicts have had any par-
ticular impact on our western nations, but now,
with the ' ending of the cold war " our per-
ception is changing. Firstly, such conflict
appears less and less tolerable. Secondly, such
conflict is now on our doorstep in Europe.
2. One of the main effects of the end of
East-West confrontation is the new freedom of
maneuvre now available for the Security
Council of the United Nations together with the
revitalisation of the organisation. The Security
Council's success of late has led many to believe
that at long last the Security Council might be
going to play the r6le envisaged by those who
drafted the UN's Charter. In fact in the last four
years the UN has become involved in numerous
and varied peace-keeping operations: Cam-
bodia, Angola, Kurdistan, Mozambique,
Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, etc. 
- 
thirteen opera-
tions in total, as many as tackled in the pre-
ceding forty years.
3. With what results? Security Council reso-
lutions flaunted in the former Yugoslavia. The
Khmer Rouge back in power in part of Cam-
bodia and making a laughing stock of the UN.
Certain military operations run in reality by the
United States in the name of the United Nations
with no real control from the Security Council.
Civil wars and massacres continue in Liberia, the
Sudan, Tajikistan and elsewhere, with the UN
unable to intervene. The right of interference,
hastily defined, conflicts with the traditional sov-
ereignty of states. Peace-keeping operations in
Croatia, Somalia, Cambodia and elsewhere risk
running into the sand. Is it the " new world
order " which actually justifies such actions? Just
as we are witnessing a large increase in peace-
keeping operations we are also posing questions
regarding the legal basis for such operations as
well as on the political and military aims and the
fitting of the means to these ends.
4. Such considerations have prompted the
Defence Committee to examine the whole range
of UN operations with the aim of discovering
how they are organised and carried out, how
they are financed and constrained and, above
a[, how Western European Union should
endeavour to support appropriate action under
the UN mandate.
5. The aim therefore of the present report is
to acquaint colleagues with the range of issues
arising from the LIN's vocation:
'To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression ofacts ofaggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in con-
formity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or set-
tlement of international disputes or situa-
tions which might lead to a breach of the
peace; ". I
II. The realities of the new world order
6. As asserted above, the current interest in
" peace-keeping " results from the end of
East-West confrontation. In fact, at the
inception of the United Nations, the Charter
established principles for a system to protect
world peace and security. The international
community, and in particular the five per-
manent members of the Security Council acting
in concert, would recall to order any country
which was not respecting the " rules of the inter-
national game " . In cases of necessity the use of
troops acting under the UN's authority was
envisaged.
7. It was the cold war which paralysed the
efficient working of such a system. The power of
veto was used on some 279 occasions against
draft resolutions in the Security Council. With
only a very few exceptions (Korea 1950-53 and
the Congo 1960-64), operations under the aegis
of the United Nations were explicitly conducted
with the consent of all parties and a consensus
not to use force. The de facto solution meant
that many of the original principles of the UN
Charter (respect for the sovereignty ofstates, the
right of intervention, the rights of minorities,
the inviolability of frontiers, the use of force to
maintain peace) went by the by. The current
freeing of the Security Council has brought all
these questions under the spotlight as we ponder
the nature of the * new wodd order ".
8. In conceptual terms it is necessary to con-
sider the notion of the * new world order " from
a specific angle: the basis in international law for
military intervention in order to maintain or
restore peace. The * prime contractor " is obvi-
ously the United Nations itself but the UN must
ll9
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be seen in context which from a European angle
means the relationship with the European
organisations: CSCE, NATO, the Twelve and
WEU. In passing it is worth pointing out that
not all the states exhibit the same enthusiasm for
the United Nations as an organisation. The most
reserved such attitude has been demonstrated
on a number of occasions by the United States
which has had a peculiar (in all senses of the
word) stance which is not necessarily shared by
the majority of its partners. Rather, what your
Rapporteur believes is now required, and will
seek to demonstrate, is that the UN should be
given adequate structures and funds to accom-
plish the types of mission originally envisaged
nearly 50 years ago and for which there is an
increasingly urgent need today, with our * new
world order ".
9. It was President Bush who defined this
* new world order " in a speech before Congress
on 19th September 1990. His vision was ideal-
istic, in global terms, less militaristic than eco-
nomic in its expression. The aims: peace,
security, democracy and the rule of law, would
be achieved by using the Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions (CSCE, NATO and the EC) as well as those
with a world-wide base (the UN, IMF, GATT,
the World Bank), thus implicating politico-
economic means above all. Seen from the single
superpower the vision was decidedly imperial:
there would be two types of operation for
the future: US operations with the agreement of
the UN or IIN operations with the agreement of
the US.
10. The present proliferation of conflicts
would rather indicate that we are now in a new
world " disorder " . We should be looking now
for a more democratic world such as that
envisaged by the idealists who drafted the UN
Charter and longed for by those nations who are
newly-escaped from the yoke of totalitarian
communism. What we are finding is often
somewhat removed from that seeming utopia. In
Africa and Eastern Europe after the end of
empire there is still much difficulty in achieving
democracy. Nationalist passions, xenophobia
and demagogy all lie in wait for the unwary. The
Paris Charter of November 1990 with its solemn
agreement by the Europeans to respect frontiers,
human rights and those of religious, ethnic or
linguistic minorities, should serve as the
example to follow.
11. This image of a democratic community of
nations, living in peace and harmony, also
evokes the reactivation of the UN, made pos-
sible by the unfreezing of the Security Council.
The UN however remains fundamentally an
inter-state organisation and is in no way a supra-
national authority as the precursor of a sort of
world government. In particular this means that
the UN can act only when member states (and
especially the United States) decide on such
action. In cases of flagrant aggression, the UN
Charter provides for the Security Council to
vote resolutions authorising the use of military
force to defend the victim. Such was the case in
Korea (1950-53) and for Kuwait (1990-91). In
many ways these may be seen as " international
police operations ".
12. One of the bases of the security system
stemming from the second world war is the sov-
ereignty of states and the ensuing non-
interference. According to Article 2.7 of the
United Nations Charter, * nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorise the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tiatly within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state " .
13. The principle of non-interference is due to
the experience and supposed wisdom of nations.
As a safeguard of sovereignty, it expresses the
flrrm rejection of so many anned interventions,
particularly in Balkan Europe or Latin America,
by the strong against the weak. The sovereignty
of a nation is the first condition of its
freedom.
14. It was probably the genocide in Cam-
bodia, when a government systematically exter-
minated part of its own population, that led to
the absolute principle of non-interference being
questioned. In 1988, the United Nations
General Assembly accepted the principle of
humanitarian interventions by non-govern-
mental organisations under the aegis of the
United Nations and, if necessary, with the
support of armed forces, since assistance to
victims must not be hindered either by the state
affected or by neighbouring states. Humani-
tarian operations to protect the Iraqi Kurds
stem from this new guideline.
15. What has been called " a right to inter-
fere " is rather " a duty to intervene " or " a duty
to assist' allowing, outside any inter-state con-
flict, a reaction to serious, systematic violations
of human rights or the rights of minorities com-
mitted by or with the complicity of a gov-
ernment.
16. It is plain that there is a risk of conflict
between two equally respectable principles: state
sovereignty and right to assist. Mr. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali has denied the right to interfere
because this rather unfortunate expression con-
tradicts one of the essential principles of the
Charter, which is precisely non-interference in
the internal affairs of states. However, he has
admitted that a decision might be taken in
special circumstances for emotional reasons,
thus paving the way for new jurisprudence.
L7. The international community will
therefore have to draw up new jurisprudence. It
will be a matter of measure and balance and
it will be diffrcult to avoid contradictions.
t20
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18. The present proliferation of conflicts
underlines the weaknesses of action by the
United Nations:
- 
Operations require the agreement of a
majority in the Security Council and
the approval of the five permanent
members. However, the Council has
often been paralysed and this might
happen again. Moreover, is not the
privileged rOle that the five great victo-
rious powers gave themselves in 1945
excessive? Other states should be given
the same prerogatives, to better reflect
different world regions.
- 
Interventions are liable to be selective
in the light of the interests of the per-
manent members of the Security
Council.
- 
There can be no peace-making if the
parties concerned do not wish to stop
the fighting. Failing this, at best, the
intervention of United Nations forces
can but freeze an existing situation. At
worst, it accustoms minds to accepting
the results of aggression.
- 
In the absence of a political solution,
United Nations interventions are liable
to drag on. United Nations observers
and military forces have been in
Kashmir since 1949, in Jerusalem since
1948 and in Cyprus since 1964. The
perpetuation of large-scale operations
would pennanently jeopardise the
organisation's finances and credibility.
- 
Security Council resolutions, which are
laborious political compromises, rarely
provide a clear basis for correctly
defining the aims of a (military) oper-
ation. Was Kuwait freed to restore the
sovereignty of a state that your
Rapporteur considers not very demo-
cratic and to punish the Iraqi
aggression or to shatter Iraq's military
power and nuclear ambitions and
ensure supplies of cheap oil? Humani-
tarian operations should not be a dis-
guised form of imperialism or neo-
colonialism.
19. The creation of a world-wide system of
rules of democratic conduct has become more
than ever necessary with the increasing interde-
pendence of states. The notion of interdepen-
dence is progressing here and there. The signing
of the treaty on the European economic area and
the opening of negotiations for the accession of
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway herald
the enlargement of the area of European interde-
pendence, the best guarantee of stability for our
continent.
20. In his ambitious " Agenda for Peace ",
submitted to the United Nations General
Assembly on lTth June 1992, the Secretary-
General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outlined
future United Nations operations:
" The terms preventive diplomacy, peace-
making and peace-keeping are integrally
related and as used in this report are
defined as follows:
- 
Preventive diplomacy is action to
prevent disputes from arising between
parties, to prevent existing disputes
from escalating into conflicts and to
limit the spread of the latter when they
occur.
- 
Peace-making is action to bring
hostile parties to agreement, essentially
through such peaceful means as those
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of
the United Nations.
- 
Peace-keeping is the deployment of a
United Nations presence in the field,
hitherto with the consent of all the
parties concerned, normally involving
United Nations military and/or police
personnel and frequently civilians as
well. Peace-keeping is a technique that
expands the possibilities for both the
prevention of conflict and the making
of peace.
The present report in addition will
address the critically related concept of
post-conflict peace building - action to
identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Pre-
ventive diplomacy seeks to resolve dis-
putes before violence breaks out; peace-
making and peace-keeping are required to
halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is
attained. If successful, they strengthen
the opportunity for post-conflict peace
building, which can prevent the recur-
rence of violence among nations and
peoples.
These four areas for action, taken
together, and carried out with the backing
of all members, offer a coherent contri-
bution towards securing peace in the spirit
of the Charter. The United Nations has
extensive experience not only in these
fields, but in the wider realm of work for
peace in which these four flrelds are set.
Initiatives on decolonisation, on the envi-
ronment and sustainable development, on
population, on the eradication ofdisease,
on disarmament and on the growth of
international law 
- 
these and many others
have contributed immeasurably to the
foundations for a peaceful world. The
world has often been rent by conflict and
plagued by massive human suffering and
deprivation. Yet it would have been far
t2t
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more so without the continuing efforts of
the United Nations. This wide experience
must be taken into account in assessing
the potential of the United Nations in
maintaining international security not
only in its traditional sense, but in the
new dimensions presented by the era
ahead. "
21. The r6le of regional organisations is
explicitly set out:
'... should the Security Council choose
specifically to authorise a regional
arrangement or organisation to take the
lead in addressing a crisis within its
region, it could serve to lend the weight of
the United Nations to the validity of the
regional effort. "
22. This is why it is necessary to examine the
possibilities and means of the CSCE, NATO and
WEU (see Chapter VII).
23. In recognising, in Helsinki in 1975, the
intangibility of frontiers resulting from the
second world war and human rights, the CSCE
allowed ddtente to be started. It was in the
framework of the CSCE that the thirty-four
European countries subscribed to an order of
peace and security in Paris in 1990. In Helsinki
on lfth July 1992, it declared itself to be a
regional organisation within the meaning of
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In
accordance with the same declaration the CSCE
will intervene only with the agreement of all the
parties to a conflict and after the establishment
of a true cease-flrre. Interventions might cover a
wide range of activities:
- 
deployment of a buffer force;
- 
assistance to the administration;
- 
observing respect for a cease-fire, dis-
armament or the withdrawal of bellig-
erents;
- 
humanitarian assistance and protection
of refugees.
24. In fact, the CSCE has hardly any effective
instruments for settling disputes and preventing
crises. Only since the Stockholm meeting on
l5th December 1992 has it had a permanent
Secretary-General. The crisis prevention centre
set up after the Paris conference in November
1990 and the high commissioner for minorities,
appointed on l5th December 1992, still have to
prove their effectiveness. It is not compulsory to
have recourse to the court of arbitration, also
set up in December 1992, and its verdicts are
not binding. Its creation was endorsed by only
twenty-one of the fifty-four members.
25. So, when the United Nations Secretary-
General asked it, on 3lst July 1992, *if the
CSCE could play a r6le in mediating the peace-
keeping requirement in Yugoslavia, in particular
managing a mechanism for supervising the
heavy weapons of the parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina ", the CSCE was not able to
propose effective action in time. It merely sent
a mission to examine the situation in the
detention camps and sent observers to
Vojvodina, Kosovo and the Sandjak to try to
prevent the conflict spreading. While this was at
least a start, the organisation of the CSCE will
need considerable reinforcement if it is to be
effective. However, at present it lacks eflicient
decision-making mechanisms and the orga-
nisational structures to mount peace-keeping
operations.
26. As for the means and r6les of the Atlantic
Alliance, this is essentially a defensive alliance
whose members have undertaken to intervene to
defend their countries against attack. It
organises the participation of the North
American allies in the defence of Western
Europe and manages the security aspect of the
transatlantic relationship. However, these tasks
lost much of their raison d'6tre with the end of
East-West confrontation.
27. Some have therefore sought other r6les
for the alliance: NATO interventions outside the
area covered by the Washington Treaty or
making available to the United Nations or a
regional organisation, NATO infrastructure,
communications, headquarters and, possibly,
units.
28. In Oslo in June 1992, the North Atlantic
Council decided to take action on request under
the aegis of the CSCE. On 2nd September
NATO offered its support to the United Nationsto protect humanitarian assistance and to
control heavy weapons in Bosnia. NATO
AWACS aircraft are monitoring Bosnian air
space. In the Adriatic, the Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean is helping to impose the embargo
decided by the Security Council. A headquarters
drawn from NORTHAG Headquarters is
co-ordinating action by troops made available to
the United Nations in Bosnia. On 17th
December L992, the allies agreed to develop
their co-ordination for peace-keeping and said
they were prepared also to act under the aegis of
the United Nations on a case-by-case basis.
Until now, several allies have ensured that con-
tributions to out-of-area operations emanated
clearly from individual nations. In this way, they
wish the Atlantic Alliance to retain its main
defence function and remain within the terri-
torial and juridical limits of the treaty.
29. At the time of writing however something
of a struggle is developing between those on the
one hand who would like to see NATO as such
acting as the authority to implement the
Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and those who
prefer to develop the United Nations own
embryonic organisation 
- 
an organisation which
is little known and appreciated. Which is why
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your Rapporteur now includes a chapter in the
present report to provide an overview of the
'status quo ante ": essential reading as an aid to
understanding present problems with United
Nations operations.
III. The United Nations operational organisation
- an ovemiew
30. Like many political institutions, the
United Nations has been faced, virtually
throughout its existence, with a deep gulf
between theory and practice, between the prin-
ciples and objectives of the Charter and political
realities. The effort to bridge this gulf has been
the main theme of nearly fifty years of the
United Nations.
31. Nowhere has the gulf between theory and
practice been so evident as in the primary
function of the United Nations, the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. The
Charter's provisions for this purpose, based pri-
marily on the activity of the Security Council
and the unanimity of its permanent members,
have never been permitted to function fully.
Being unable to exercise the magisterial but rela-
tively simple powers prescribed in the Charter,
the Council has had to fall back on less well-
defined measures - good oflices, conciliation,
mediation and delegation of responsibility to the
Secretary-General.
32. Of these less well-defined measures, the
form of conflict control which is now known as
peace-keeping is perhaps the most original and
most ambitious. Peace-keeping is a technique
not mentioned, let alone described, in the
Charter. In fact it is in many ways a reversal of
the use of military personnel foreseen in the
Charter. It has been developed for situations
where there is no formal determination of
aggression. Its practitioners have no enemies,
aie not there to win, and can use force only in
self-defence. Its effectiveness depends on vol-
untary ceoperation.
33. It is therefore remarkable that the United
Nations has turned to various forms of this tech-
nique no less than twenty-six times and that
peace-keeping is widely regarded as one of the
organisation's most successful innovations.
(a) The Charter
34. The first of the purposes of the United
Nations listed in its Charter is * To maintain
international peace and security, and to that end
to take effective collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international dis-
putes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace ".
35. Concrete measures to be taken by the
United Nations Security Council, the principal
organ which was vested with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, to achieve this
purpose are set out in Chapters VI and VII of
the Charter. Chapter VI provides that interna-
tional disputes " likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security " can
be brought to the attention of the Security
Council or the General Assembly. The Security
Council is expressly mandated to call on the
parties to settle their disputes by peaceful
means, to recommend appropriate procedures
or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to
recommend actual terms of a settlement. The
action of the Security Council in this context is
limited to making recommendations: essentially,
the peaceful settlement of international disputes
must be achieved by the parties themselves,
acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the deci-
sions of the Council in accordance with the
Charter.
36. If the Security Council determines that a
threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace or act of
aggression exists, the Council may use the broad
powers given it in Chapter VII of the Charter. In
order to prevent an aggravation ofthe situation,
the Security Council may call upon the parties
concerned to comply with such provisional mea-
sures as it deems necessary or desirable. Next, it
may decide, under Article 41, what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed by the members of the United
Nations, including the complete or partial inter-
ruption of economic relations, communications,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Should the Security Council consider such mea-
sures inadequate, it may take, under Afticle 42,
" such action by air, sea and land forces as may
be necessary to restore international peace and
security'. For this purpose, all members of the
United Nations undertake to make available to
the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with special agreements, the nec-
essary armed forces, assistance and facilities.
Plans for the application of armed force are to
be made by the Security Council with the
assistance of a Military Staff Committee.
37. The measures outlined in Articles 41 and
42 constitute the core of the system of collective
security envisaged by the Charter. A basic
feature of this system is the determining r6le
assigned to China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America. These powers
are perrnanent members of the Security Council
and can block any of its substantive decisions by
their veto. They also control the activities ofthe
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Military Staff Committee, which is made up
exclusively of their military representatives.
Consequently, the United Nations collective
security system, and especially its key provision
concerning the use of armed force, can work
only if there is full agreement and co-operation
among the permanent members.
(b) A holdiag action
38. During most of the United Nations
history this condition has not been met. The
evolution of international relations after the
second world war quickly brought to the fore
differences which existed among the member
states, and in particular the five permanent
members of the Security Council, and these
inevitably affected the functioning of the
organisation. New conflicts arose, particularly
during the process of decolonisation, and many
could not be resolved by peaceful means. A way
had to be found to stop hostilities and to control
conflicts so that they would not develop into
broader conflagrations. Out of that need, United
Nations peace-keeping operations evolved as,
essentially, holding actions. There was not, and
still is not, any particular theory or doctrine
behind them. They were born of necessity,
largely improvised, a practical response to a
problem requiring action. The term * peace-
keeping operation " did not gain currency until
much later.
39. As the United Nations practice has
evolved over the years, a peace-keeping oper-
ation has come to be defined as an operation
involving military police and civilian personnel,
but without enforcement powers, undertaken by
the United Nations to help maintain or restore
international peace and security in areas ofcon-
flict. These operations are voluntary and are
based on consent and co-operation. While they
involve the use of military personnel, they
achieve their objectives not by force of arms,
thus contrasting them with the " enforcement
action " of the United Nations under Article 42.
40. Peace-keeping operations have been most
commonly employed to supervise and help
maintain cease-fires, to assist in troop with-
drawals, and to provide a buffer between
opposing forces. However, peace-keeping opera-
tions are flexible instruments of policy and have
been adapted to a variety of uses, including
helping to implement the flrnal settlement of a
conflict.
41. Peace-keeping operations are neverpurely
military. They have always included civilian
personnel to carry out essential political or
administrative functions, sometimes on a very
large scale, as, for instance, in the Congo oper-
ation or in the independence process in
Namibia. In both those operations, and in
several others, civilian police have also played
an important rOle.
42. It is diflicult to subsume all these various
operations under any one clause of the Charter.
It is clear that they fall short of the provisions of
Chapter VII described above, which deal with
enforcement. At the same time they go beyond
purely diplomatic means or those described in
Chapter VI of the Charter. As former Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjiild put it,
peace-keeping might be put in a new Chapter
* Six and a Half ". Initially, questions were
raised about the legality of the United Nations'
use of military personnel in a manner not specif-
ically provided for in the Charter. In recent
years, however, something close to consensus
has developed that these operations can be con-
sidered as having a basis, apart from the prin-
ciple of consent, in the broad powers conferred
by the Charter upon the United Nations and
especially the Security Council.
(c) Chamcteristics
43. In practice, there has evolved a broad
degree of consensus on the essential character-
istics of peace-keeping operations and on the
conditions that must be met if they are to
succeed.
44. The first of these essential characteristics
is that peace-keeping operations are set up only
with the consent of the parties to the conflict in
question. Their consent is required not only for
the operation's establishment but also, in broad
terms, for the way in which it will carry out its
mandate. The parties are also consulted about
the countries which will contribute troops to the
operation. It is a key principle that the operation
must not interfere in the internal affairs of the
host countries and must not in any way favour
one party against another. This requirement
of impartiality is fundamental, not only on
grounds of principle but also to ensure that the
operation is effective. A United Nations oper-
ation cannot take sides without becoming a part
of the conflict which it has been set up to control
or resolve. For their part, the parties to the con-
flict are expected to provide continuing support
to the operation by allowing it freedom of
movement and other facilities which it needs to
carry out its task. This co-operation is essential.
The peace-keepers have no rights of enfor-
cement and their use of force is limited to self-
defence, as a last resort. This means that if a
party chooses not to co-operate, it can effec-
tively defy a peace-keeping operation.
45. In line with the Security Council's primary
responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, peace-keeping opera-
tions have mainly been established by the
Council (though two were, exceptionally,
authorised by the General Assembly). This
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means that no operation can be established
without a broad consensus within the interna-
tional community that it is the right thing to do.It is the Security Council's responsibility to
ensure that the operation is given a mandate
which is clear, accepted by the parties concerned
and practicable in the situation existing on the
ground. Also essential is the continuing support
of the Security Council, which may be asked by
the Secretary-General to intervene if one or
other ofthe parties fails to provide the necessary
support and co-operation. If the mandate is
unclear or ambiguous, the operation is likely to
face recurrent difficulties and its activities may
become controversial with the consequent risk
that it may lose the necessary support of the
Security Council or the necessary agreement of
one of the parties concerned. Nevertheless, there
have been times when the mandate of a peace-
keeping operation has not been as clear as could
have been wished, o.8., when the Security
Council has decided that the primary
requirement of international peace and security
requires the creation ofan operation even ifit is
clear from the outset that the operation will not
easily achieve the objectives given to it.
46. The military personnel who serve in
peace-keeping operations are provided by
member states on a voluntary basis. Once so
provided, they pass under the command of the
Secretary-General in all operational matters, as
the Secretary-General is responsible for the
direction of the operation and is required to
report thereon at regular intervals to the
Security Council. Those who serve in military
observer missions are almost invariably
unarmed. Those who serve in peace-keeping
forces are equipped with light defensive
weapons but are not authorised to use force
except in self-defence. This right is exercised
only sparingly because of the obvious danger
that if a United Nations force uses its weapons
its impartiality is, however unfairly, called in
question. This requirement sometimes demands
exceptional restraint on the part of soldiers
serving in United Nations peace-keeping forces.
Exceptional after-care for the troops is necessary
on return home (both medical and sometimes
psychiatric) and is emphasised in the Nordic
countries.
47. Finally, it is essential that the operation
should have a sound financial basis. The
financing of peace-keeping has been one of its
most controversial and least satisfactory aspects.
All operations should now be financed as agreed
by obligatory contributions levied on member
states. If the member states do not pay their con-
tributions promptly and in full, the Secretary-
General lacks the financial resources needed to
reimburse to the troopcontributing govern-
ments the sums due to them. This means, in
effect, that those governments have to pay an
unfairly high share of the cost of the operation
in question, in addition to sending their soldiers
to serve in unpredictable and sometimes dan-
gerous situations. Furthermore many countries
are now seconding staff to UN Headquarters in
New York at their own expense.
(d) Peoce-koeping and Nace-mahing
48. Peace-keeping operations have usually
been mounted only after hostilities have already
broken out. However, the Charter of the United
Nations aims at a system of international rela-
tions wherein the use of force as a means of
foreign policy is eliminated altogether. Conse-
quently, the Charter deals at length with the
peaceful settlement of disputes. This may be
achieved by various means, including multi-
lateral diplomatic efforts within the framework
of the Security Council, bilateral efforts of
member states, or through the good oflices of
the Secretary-General. These approaches to
peace-making are by no means mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, the organisation has
been most successful when co-ordinated efforts
were undertaken at all levels.
49. In recent years, there has been a marked
increase in the demand for the Secretary-
General's good offices, with a view to helping
the parties to a conflict to compose their differ-
ences. In responding to these demands, the Sec-
retary-General has usually been able to rely on a
formal request of the Security Council or the
General Assembly. In some cases, peace-keeping
operations were established as a direct result of
agreements reached through his and others'dip-
lomatic efforts, and in some cases - West Irian
and Namibia are the best examples - as part of
complex arrangements for the final and, in the
end, peaceful settlement of the conflict.
50. Peace-keeping operations are intended to
be provisional and thus temporary measures.
They can never, alone, resolve a conflict. Their
tasks are essentially two: to stop or contain hos-
tilities and thus help create conditions in which
peace-making can prosper; or to supervise the
implementation of an interim or final settlement
which has been negotiated by the peace makers.
Ideally, peace-keeping should move in step with
peace-making in a combined effort leading to
the peaceful resolution of a conflict. In practice
this ideal cannot always be attained. Sometimes
it is less diffrcult to keep a cease-fire in being
than to negotiate away the causes of the original
conflict. In such cases it is right for the Security
Council to ask itself from time to time whether
the peace-keeping operation has * become part
of the problem " by protecting the parties from
the consequences of their negotiating stands.
But it should not be assumed that longevity
means that a peace-keeping operation has failed;
on the contrary, longevity may be a measure of
its success in preventing a recurrence of hostil-
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ities in spite of the intractability of the conflict
between the parties.
51. United Nations peace-keeping operations
can be divided into broad categories: observer
missions, which consist largely of officers
who are almost invariably unarmed; and peace-
keeping forces, which consist of lightly armed
infantry units, with the necessary logistic
support elements. These categories are not, how-
ever, watertight. Observer missions are some-
times reinforced by infantry and/or logistic
units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief
period of time. Peace-keeping forces are often
assisted in their work by unarmed military
observers.
IY. Composition and organisation
of UN operations
(a) C,omposition
52. A United Nations peace-keeping oper-
ation is considered a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations, established consequent to a res-
olution of the Security Council or, exceptionally,
of the General Assembly.
(b) Chaia of command
53. United Nations peace-keeping operations
are normally established by the Security Council
and fall under its authority. The Secretary-
General is responsible to the Council for the
organisation, conduct and direction ofthe oper-
ation, and he alone reports to the Council aboutit. The Secretary-General keeps the Security
Council fully informed of developments relating
to the functioning of the operation. All matters
which may affect the nature or the continued
effective functioning of the operation are
referred to the Council for its decision.
54. The Secretary-General is assisted in this
regard by the Office for Special Political Affairs.
(i) Command in the Jield
55. Command of the operation in the field is
exercised by a Force Commander, Chief Military
Observer or Chief of Staff appointed by the Sec-
retary-General with the consent of the Security
Council. The commander is responsible to the
Secretary-General. The commander exercises full
command authority over the operation except for
disciplinary questions. The commander has full
authority with respect to all assignments of
members of his headquarters staff and, through
the chain of command, of all members of the
operation, including the deployment and move-
ments of all contingents in it and all units
assigned to it. The contingents comprising the
operation are integral parts of it and take their
orders exclusively from the commander. The
commander has general responsibility for the
good order and discipline of the operation.
(ii) Administration
56. The Field Operations Division, in general
terms, is responsible for organising the civilian
administrative staff to support the operation
and, in close collaboration with the Oflice for
Special Political Affairs and the OfIice of Pro-
gramme Planning, Budget and Finance, makes
arrangements for airlift of the contingents, pre-
pares the final budgetary proposals for the oper-
ation and presents those proposals to the
General Assembly's Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions and
the Assembly's Fifth (Administrative and Budg-
etary) Committee. Additionally, it arranges for
the procurement of the necessary stores for the
maintenance of the operation and directs the
operations of the civilian administrative staff in
the field.
57. The following chart indicates the standard
chain of command for United Nations peace-
keeping operations.
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Y. Command and control of UN oprutions:
theory and pructice
58. The UN appears now to enjoy the widely
accepted authority and legitimacy needed to
invigorate the Security Council's mandate to
" decide what measures shall be taken...to
maintain or restore international peace and
security " (Article 39 of the Charter of the
United Nations). But the organisation has yet to
develop the minimal structural competence
needed to initiate and direct the military opera-
tions which, if the last two years are a guide, are
likely to be authorised by the Security Council.
In other words, the UN lacks the necessary
expertise to orchestrate who does what, when,
where and how 
- 
that is, to exercise command
and control (C2, or more properly as will be dis-
cussed below, 6' C3I " 
- 
to include communica-
tions and intelligence).
59. Since there is little doubt that the post-
cold war increase in calls upon the UN's peace-
keeping and enforcement functions is a trend
rather than an aberration, such an
organisational defect is central to the question of
the future effectiveness of the UN per se.
Whether the UN can, or should, exercise direct
control of military forces operating under its
mandate, or whether it should delegate the
conduct of operations to a lead state, or to
ad hoc groups of nations, or to a regional
organisation, is a closely related subject, but not
one that can be adequately dealt with before the
fundamental issue of political control has been
resolved.
60. Any C2 system must be structured to
accommodate a broad range of inter-related
political and military variables. Given that, fol-
lowing the stalemate of the cold war, the debate
as to how best to promote the goal of interna-
tional peace and security is just restarting, few,
if any, of these variables may be considered in
any way fixed. The aim is therefore to review
some of the current issues and concerns
regarding the political control of UN forces and
examine the pressing need to establish some
form of " UN military planning cell ". The link
with Western European lJnion's very recent
experience is obvious.
61. It is worth restating that the first purpose
of the UN, as enshrined in Article 1 of its
Charter, is " to maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective col-
lective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace... ". The drafters of the UN Charter,
recognising the unfortunate fact that the use of
force was unlikely to be avoided in the mainte-
nance of peace and security, made provision
within Chapter VII for the Security Council to
" take such action by air, sea or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea or land forces of members
of the United Nations " (Article 42 of the
Charter of the United Nations).
62. As a measure authorised by an interna-
tional organisation, it is vitally important that
the use of the * military instrument " in what
might be described as UN-sponsored peace
support operations 
- 
a term which embraces
four main categories of UN activity (namely
peace-making, peace-building, peace-enfor-
cement (as authorised by the Chapter VII provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations) and
peace-keeping) should be perceived as a means
to an end: i.e. the maintenance of international
peace and security.
63. Peace-making does not imply the pro-jection of military force in order to impose a
solution but, rather, is a diplomatic process
perhaps more usefully described as " peace-
broking ".
64. " Peace-building " is defined by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in an " Agenda for Peace " as
" action to identify and support structures which
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict ".
65. In an * Agenda for Peace ", Boutros
Boutros-Ghali defines " peace-keeping " as " the
deployment of a United Nations presence in the
field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties
concerned, normally involving United Nations
military and/or police personnel and frequently
civilians as well ". The suggestion here is that
peace-keeping may be undertaken without the
consent of all parties (i.e. " peace-enforce-
ment ").
66. A variant on the preceding definitions has
been developed in the Pentagon which has
applied itself assiduously of late to an exami-
nation of the " whys and wherefores " of the
United Nations. The definitions read as
follows:
- 
Peace-making: process of arranging an
end to disputes, and resolving issues
that led to conflict, primarily through
diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or
other forms of peaceful settlement,
which may include military peace
support operations;
- 
Peace-support operations: the umbrellaterm encompassing peace-keeping,
humanitarian assistance, peace-enforce-
ment, and any other military, paramil-
itary or non-military action taken in
support of a diplomatic peace-making
process;
-Peace-keeping: non-combat military
operations (exclusive of self defence),
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undertaken by outside forces with the
consent of all major belligerent parties,
designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of an existing truce
agreement in support of diplomatic
efforts to reach a political settlement to
the dispute;
- 
Humanitarian assistance: missions con-
ducted to relieve or reduce the results
of natural or manmade disasters or
other endemic conditions such as
human suffering, disease, hunger, or
privation which might present a serious
threat to life, or result in a great loss of
property;
- 
Peace-enforcement: a form of combat,
armed intervention, or the threat of
armed intervention, that is pursuant to
an international mandate authorising
the coercive use of military power to
compel compliance with international
sanctions or resolutions 
- 
the primary
purpose of which is the maintenance or
restoration of peace under conditions
broadly accepted by the international
community.
67. In an " Agenda for Peace " , Boutros
Boutros-Ghali sketches his personal strategy for
peace, which he also characterises as comprisingfour areas, namely preventive diplomacy
(defined in an " Agenda for Peace " , page 1 l, as
" action to prevent disputes from arising
between parties, to prevent existing disputes
from escalating into conflicts and to limit the
spread of the latter when they occur" ), peace-
making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace
building.
'These four areas for action, taken
together, and carried out with the backing
of all members, offer a coherent contri-
bution towards securing peace in the spirit
of the Charter. The United Nations has
extensive experience not only in these
fields, but in the wider realm of work for
peace in which these four fields are set.
Initiatives on decolonisation, on the envi-
ronment and sustainable development, on
population, on the eradication of disease,
on disarmament and on the growth of
international law 
- 
these and many others
have contributed immeasurably to the
foundations for a peaceful world. The
world has often been rent by conflict and
plagued by massive human suffering and
deprivation. Yet it would have been far
more so without the continuing efforts of
the United Nations. This wide experience
must be taken into account in assessing
the potential of the United Nations in
maintaining international security not
only in its traditional sense, but in the
new dimensions presented by the era
ahead. " (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an
" Agenda for Peace ".)
68. In order to fulfil its primary purpose of
maintaining international peace and security,
the UN must therefore be sufficiently in control
of the military assets operating under its
mandate to ensure that the employment of those
forces is effectively orchestrated with the other
political, social and economic instruments
available to the organisation. It is sometimes
forgotten that the UN's activity also comprises
sub-organisations or'sister-bodies " such as the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees(UNHCR), World Health Organisation (WHO),
United Nations International Children's Emer-
gency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO), etc., and that many non-govern-
mental organisations (e.9. the Red Cross) are
engaged in peace-building moves which are
increasingly conducted alongside (IN peace-
keeping missions. When your Rapporteur
visited the Headquarters of the International
Red Cross in Geneva (which is working tire-
lessly with others to help those suffering in the
former Yugoslavia) it quickly became obvious
that there has to be much more co-operation
between such bodies and the UN, LTNHCR, etc.
It follows that, as a minimum requirement, the
Security Council, acting on behalf of the
General Assembly in accordance with the
Charter, must be able to exercise strategic
direction of all assets operating under UN
mandate such that those assets achieve thepolitical object(s) for which they were
deployed.
69. The relationship between the General
Assembly and the Security Council can, with
some justification, be characterised as a
microcosm of the relationship between the
developing and developed worlds. Whilst the
cold war expedient of classic LIN peace-keeping
avoided the use of troops from the five per-
manent members of the Council, the recent
increase in the level and complexity of opera-
tions 
- 
which demand both increased military
sophistication and, often, scale of involvement 
-
renders it much more likely that the permanent
five will become militarily engaged. There is
therefore a pressing requirement for the Security
Council to evolve a system of accountability to
the UN as a whole. Some degree of accounta-
bility to the General Assembly would go a long
way to countering third world suspicions that
the permanent five, either singly or collectively,
manipulate the Security Council to pursue a
* first world agenda ".
70. In the absence ofaction being delegated to
a competent regional organisation (such as the
CSCE, NATO or WEU), it is entirely probable
that a lead state from amongst the permanent
five will be required to take the initiative in
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future UN operations. Such action brings with it
the reasonable expectation of that state (which,in a democracy at least, relies heavily on
domestic consensus) that all necessary steps will
be taken to minimise casualties. Shortcomings
in C2 undoubtedly increase the likelihood of sus-
taining casualties as a result of both enemy and
friendly fire: a distressingly high proportion of
allied casualties sustained during the Gulf war,
where C2 structures were highly sophisticated,
resulted from " blue on blue " engagements. It is
reasonable therefore to assume that lead states
will, in the absence of an adequate UN
structure, continue to insist on the use of
national C2 structures.
71. It is worth noting that neither NATO nor
WEU have declared themselves as regional
organisations under Articles 52 and 53 since
they believe that this could then impair the pre-
rogative to assert collective self defence under
Article 51. In fact the UN itself obviously per-
ceives both NATO and WEU as regional bodies
and, for example, has been surprised to find that
they shy away even from attending a forth-
coming IIN seminar on the subject.
72. The subject must be thoroughly debated
by the WEU Council in conjunction with the
competent authorities. Likewise the Assembly
should bring such matters into the open. In par-
allel the corollary that WEU action must usually
take place under UN auspices should be
properly examined. Much depends on such a
principle: whether it be that WEU activity per se
could conceivably thus be hostage to individual
veto in the Security Council or whether such a
principle is, for example, absolutely necessary to
allow an individual member such as Germany to
take its place alongside WEU partners * out of
area".
73. As far as logistics go, it is obvious that
very few large-scale operations could take place
without active American involvement given the
USA's virtual monopoly of strategic sea and
air lift, and intelligence-gathering facilities(although WEU's recently-inaugurated satellite
centre at Torrej6n near Madrid gives the Euro-
peans something of a potential capability sadly
lacking hitherto).
74. WEU has been more pragmatic in other
ways, however, and, anticipating involvement in
r6les such as the delivery of humanitarian aid,
disaster relief, peace-keeping and peace-making,
established a military planning cell in October
1992. The cell's initial tasks include: creating
listings of forces that member nations might
make available for ad hoc WEU operations; pre-
paring specific recommendations for the
command and control of such operations; con-
sidering the requirement for WEU rules of
engagement (ROE); planning logistics, transport
and communications; and formulating an
exercise policy.
75. To date, the cumulative experience of the
UN in military enforcement operations under-
lines the place that national command structures
play in their conduct. Operations that have been
mandated under Chapter VII include Southern
Rhodesia, the I 99 I Gulf war and, most recently,
the Somalia incursion 
- 
but, interestingly, not
the Korean war. In command and control terms,
however, the Korean, Rhodesian, Gulf and
Somali models are broadly similar in that,
regardless of mandate or colour of helmet,
national command structures were utilised on
each occasion. However rational this may have
been in purely military terms, its inevitable
result was to isolate, from both the political and
military decision-making loops, the very
organisation under whose authority the oper-
ation had been mandated. Javier Pdrez de
Cu6llar has been quoted as saying:
'The (Gul$ war is not a classic United
Nations war in the sense that there is no
United Nations control of the operations,
no United Nations flag, (blue) beret, or
any engagement of the Military Staff
Committee. What we know about the war,
which I prefer to call hostilities, is what
we hear from the three members of the
Security Council which are involved,
Britain, France and the United States -
which every two or three days report to
the Council after the actions have taken
place. The Council, which has authorised
all this, (is informed) only after the mil-
itary activities have taken place. "
76. The IIN's international credibility is at
stake. Further harm will only be alleviated to the
extent that the UN is enabled to develop, and
exercise, the military competence required to
direct any military assets deployed under its
mandate.
(a) Tho Military Stalf Committea
77. The above points were not, ofcourse, lost
on the framers of the UN Charter. Appreciating
the need for the provision of sound military
advice to the Security Council, the Charter pro-
vided outline terms of reference and mem-
bership for a Military Staff Committee (MSC),
which 'shall be responsible under the Security
Council for the strategic direction any armed
forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council " (Article 47 of the Charter of the
United Nations). However, recognising that mil-
itary command structure would vary according
to the composition of the force - and, pre-
sumably, aware that the subordination of
national forces to international command was
too complex and thorny a question to address
directly 
- 
the Charter then confines itself to
directing that " Questions relating to the
command of such forces shall be worked out
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subsequently. " (Article 47.3 of the Charter of
the United Nations).
78. There are some who argue that the MSC
provides a quite adequate model on which to
base the development of any future UN military
staff. An early victim of the cold war, the MSC
nevertheless made considerable progress in
fleshing out the bones of its Charter mandate
before finally succumbing to the political real-
ities of a bi-polar world. In a report (dated 30thApril 1947) to the Secretary-General, the
Chairman of the MSC forwarded details of the
Committee's recommendations on the * General
principles governing the organisation of the
armed forces made available to the Security
Council by member nations of the United
Nations ". The principles examined included
consideration of the purpose of armed forces,
their composition, overall strength, contribu-
tions by member nations, employment, degree
of readiness, provision of assistance and facil-
ities, logistical support, general location, and 
-last but not least 
- 
strategic direction and
command. In view of their relevance to the
subject of C2, the general principles recom-
mended in this last domain are reproduced in
full at the end of this chapter.
79. Frustrated perhaps by the fact that in
" the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the(Security) Council chose to authorise member
states to take measures on its behalf " (an
'Agenda for Peace " , patagraph 42\, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali clearly supports the resurrection
of the MSC:
* I recommend that the Security Council
initiate negotiations in accordance with
Article 43, supported by the Military Staff
Committee, which may be augmented if
necessary by others in accordance with
Article 47, parugraph 2, of the Charter. It
is my view that the rOle of the Military
Staff Committee should be seen in the
context of Chapter VII, and not that of
the planning or conduct ofpeace-keeping
operations " (an " Agenda for Peace ",
para$aph 43).
80. It is equally clear, however, that this call
for a return to the letter of the Charter does not
excite universal enthusiasm, and particularly
amongst those member states who would likely
be required to provide the bulk of the forces
needed to conduct any action contemplated
under Chapter VII.
81. A number of modern supporters of the
MSC also subscribe to the notion of stand-by
UN forces ( " on call " rather than * standing " ).
Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues that:
" the option of taking (military action to
maintain or restore international peace
and security) is essential to the credibility
of the United Nations as a guarantor of
international security. This will require
bringing into being, through negotiations,
the special agreements foreseen in Article
43 of the Charter, whereby member states
undertake to make armed forces,
assistance and facilities available to the
Security Council for the purposes states in
Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but
on a pennanent basis " (an * Agenda for
Peace ", paragraph 43).
82. An alternative approach, and one that is
currently receiving much attention, not least in
WEU, is that of * earmarked " capabilities. The
earmarking of national forces is seen as the only
realistic way flexibly to generate the forces
required for the wide range of UN military oper-
ations now envisaged. A * standard building
block " concept, with each block providing an
operational capability, would enable a multina-
tional force to be tailored to suit the
requirement.
83. The UN Oflice of Peace-Keeping has
mandated a Stand-by Force Planning Group
consisting of a team of officers from France(Chairman), the Argentine, Canada, Denmark,
Ghana, Pakistan and Poland, to study past and
present peace-keeping operations to determine
the * building blocks " from which future peace-
keeping operations might be constructed. The
countries concerned have been chosen on the
basis of an equitable geographic representation
and in the light of peace-keeping experience.
The terms of reference require the group " to
develop a system of stand-by forces able to be
deployed as a whole or in parts by the beginning
of 1994 anywhere in the world at the Secretary-
General's request within an agreed response
time for United Nations duties as mandated by
the Security Council ".
84. The first phase ofthe exercise, scheduled
for completion in May 1993, is to examine the
way in which a UN Stand-by Force should be
created and to prepare a doctrine for its
employment, together with appropriate proce-
dures.
85. The second phase of the initiative will
involve the same team approaching each of the
65 governments currently supplying troops,
facilities, capabilities or finance for current
peace-keeping missions with a request that they
stipulate the full range of capabilities they would
be willing to supply to the UN, under what lim-
iting conditions, with what stated lead times,
etc.
86. The study should prepare the ground for
establishing a flexible range of forces which
while in no way representing a UN standing
army would be available for use with minimum
delay. Nations would be asked to stipulate the
lead times for putting stand-by forces at the
IIN's disposition and these would be written
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into the required memorandum of under-
standing.
8'1. Such an exercise will, of course, also elicit
information on the capacity of states to partic-
ipate in the full range ofcontingencies envisaged
by Chapter VII. The advantage from the view-
point of governments is that this would allow
ihem a commitment that is limited and condi-
tional - thus avoiding possible political diffi-
culties with the use of forces more formally
" earmarked ",
88. The countries which have been in the
forefront of providing such forces over a
number of years are those from the Nordic
region: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
A 
- 
study on their provisions is included at
Chapter VI.
(b) Finance
89. Whilst there are undoubted advantages -
notably the deterrent value of readily available
forces,- the physical demonstration of collective
will, and the opportunity to develop and
exercise tactical doctrine - stand-by forces also
suffer from a lack of operational flexibility and,
more importantly when considering an interna-
tional force that must be supported by national
contributions, demand sustained financial
support. It is significant that, in the covering
letler to his 1947 report, the Chairman of the
MSC drew " the attention of the Security
Council to the fact that the question of financial
expenditures which might arise in connection
with the fulfilment by countries, members of the
United Nations, of measures envisaged in
Article 42 of the Charter, has not been reflected
in the recommendations prepared ". Such con-
cerns are directly addressed in Chapter IX ofan
" Agenda for Peace " , which makes various pro-
posals to deal with the current high levels of
unpaid contributions, and seeks to establish a
peice-keeping reserve fund (at a level of $50
million), to authorise commercial borrowing,
and to establish a UN peace endowment fund in
order to finance the initial costs of'authorised
peace-keeping operations, other conflict reso'
lution measures and related activities " (an
* Agenda for Peace " , paragraPh 70).
90. To put typical current costs into per-
spective it is worth noting that the cost of one
day of the Desert Storm operation reputedly
equated to the whole of the UN's 1991 peace-
keeping budget.
91. One hopeful sign on the financial side is
that the reserve fund for peace-keeping opera-
tions, ag"reed last December by the UN General
Assembly, is now a reality. The first benefici-
aries are the operations in Angola, on the
frontier between Kuwait and lraq and in El Sal-
vador. The fund has already lent a total of some
170 million French francs to " allow certain
operations to face up to a temporary lack of
liquidity ".
(c) Functions of a W military phnning cell
92. The obvious conclusion is that, regardless
as to whether the Charter provisions for an MSC
can or indeed should be revived, the UN must,
as a matter of urgency, develop an effective
in-house military competence - which in turn
must involve the development of a permanent
UN military staff, based in New York. This is
not a new idea, but it is one that merits urgent
and detailed consideration by both the UN sec-
retariat and individual member states.
93. Your Rapporteur believes that WEU's
own experience in conceiving (notably with
support from its Assembly in general and its
Defbnce Committee in particular) and creating
such a planning cell should be of inestimable
value in the UN context. Hence one of the spe-
cific draft recommendations included with the
present report. It was obvious during your
Rapporteur's fact-finding mission to the UN in
New York that the authorities there would much
appreciate any advice which would be forth-
coming from the WEU planning cell and are
particularly interested in the pragmatic
approach WEU has brought to setting up our
new structure.
94. The tasks to be delegated to a military
staff will depend on the extent to which the UN
expects to exercise political and/or military
control over armed forces operating under its
mandate. At the very least such a staff, given the
political aims of an operation by the Security
Council, should undertake the following tasks:
(a) determirc the military objectives
required to achieve the Political
aims;
(b) decide the force structure required to
achieve the military objectives, within
the required time-scale;
(c/ develop appropriate command struc-
tures;
(d) develop. and advise on changes to,
rules of engagement.
95. Other tasks that a UN military staff
should undertake include:
(a) the monitoring and recording of the
status of national forces available for
assignment to UN operations;
(b) the co-ordination, processing and dis-
semination of intelligence;
(c) the preparation and maintenance of
contingency plans for UN military
deployments;
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(d) the development of standard oper-
ating procedures for use in UN mil-
itary operations;
(e) the co-ordination of logistic, financial
and administrative functions in
support of UN military operations;
(fl the analysis of collective UN milita^ry
experience, and the development of a
core training curriculum to assist
member states to train national mil-
itary and civil personnel in the
specialised techniques unique to UN
multinational military operations.
96. As far as (e) above is concerned, it is sur-
prising to note that, for traditional peace-
keeping operations, the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General in charge of a peace-
keeping mission reports to the Secretary-
General through the Under Secretary-General
for Peace-Keeping 
- 
whilst all logistic and
administrative functions associated with the
same mission are staffed through the Head of
Field Operations Division (FOD), who reportsto the Under Secretary-General for Man-
agement. This functional split in current LIN
procedures and lack of co-ordination, while
hardly ideal for peace-keeping, is clearly unfit
for the conduct of higher-level operations, where
any lack of co-ordination between " teeth " and
" tail " will invite disaster. It is obvious that the
situation must be improved and that UN Head-
quarters should be equipped with a fully-fledged
situation centre manned on a proper 24-hour
watch-keeping basis and properly co-ordinated.
9'1. Regarding fi above, a Swedish colonel in
New York is in the process of developing such a
core curriculum for the United Nations. As with
stand-by forces it is the Nordic countries that
ate the most advanced in organising and
running UN training courses, initially for them-
selves but now for a whole range of countries
(see Chapter VI). The Norwegian Minister of
Defence has recently suggested setting up a UN
peace-keeping academy for the education and
training of high-ranking officers and officials.
98. The " unfreezing of history " triggered by
the end of the cold war has not only created the
opportunity to reappraise and re-order the
" peace support " machinery of the United
Nations but also, by removing many of the cer-
tainties of the " old world order " , has created
the particular circumstances which imply a
greater need for its use. At the same time, a
growing emphasis on basic human rights is
calling traditional views of sovereignty into
question. Thus, whilst there will surely be a
continuing requirement for classic UN peace-
keeping, it is clear that the UN, through the
Security Council, will increasingly be drawn into
situations which can only be addressed under
Chapter VII of its Chaner.
99. The use of the " military instrument " by
the UN is unambiguously mandated in Article
42 of the Charter. Regrettably, however, the
Charter provision to establish a Military Staff
Committee (MSC) " to advise...on all questions
relating to the Security Council's military
requirements (Article 47 of the Charter of the
United Nations) was an early victim of the cold
war (although the MSC has valiantly continued
to meet, almost on a weekly basis, since the
beginning).
100. The IIN, therefore, lacking in-house mil-
itary competence, is currently ill-equipped to
retain either political or military control of any
Chapter " YI ll2 " or VII operations it may
authorise.
101. It is axiomatic that authority and account-
ability go hand-in-hand, and it is for precisely
this reason that, aware of the UN's structural
deficiencies, those nations or groups of nations
to whom the UN delegates the conduct of
operations currently insist on using their own
command structures 
- 
and by so doing, are
marginalising the UN's legitimacy, credibility
and, ultimately, utility.
102. If the UN is to wield the " military
instrument'on behalf of the world community,
it must, at the very least, exercise control of that
instrument. To accomplish this the organisation
must develop the necessary military compe-
tence. Resurrection of the existing MSC is not a
realistic option. The creation of a " military
planning cell ", authorised as a " provisional
measure " under the terms of Article 40 of the
Charter and tasked along the lines proposed
above, would provide the UN with the
minimum competence needed to exercise
effective control of military operations under-
taken under its auspices.
103. As promised there follows the extractfrom " General principles governing the
organisation of the armed forces made available
to the National Security Council by member
nations of the United Nations: report of the Mil-
itary Staff Committee ".
Extract from " Generul prtnciples govening the organisatioa
of the armed, lorces mode awilable to the Natiorul Security
Council by member nations of the Uaited Nations:
report of the Military StaIJbmmittee"(3hh April 1947) (Sec pamsmph 78)
Chapter X 
- 
strategic direction and command of armcd forces
Article 36
The armed forces which member nations
of the United Nations agree to make available to
the Security Council shall be under the exclusive
command of the respective contributing nations,
except when operating under the Security
Council.
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Article 37
When these forces are called upon for the
fulfilment of measures envisaged in Article 42 of
the Charter, they shall come under the control of
the Security Council.
Article 38
During the period these armed forces are
employed by the Security Council, the Military
Staff Committee shall be responsible, under the
Security Council, for their strategic direction.
The time and place at which the Military Staff
Committee will assume or relinquish strategic
direction will be designated by the Security
Council.
Article 39
The command of national contingents
will be exercised by commanders appointed by
the respective member nations. These contin-
gents will retain their national character and will
be subject at all times to the discipline and r-egula-
tions ih force in their own national armed forces.
Article 40
The commanders of national contingents
will be entitled to communicate directly with the
authorities of their own country on all
matters.
Article 4l
Text accepted by the delegations of China,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America:
An overall commander or overall com-
manders of armed forces made available to the
Security Council may be appointed by the latter,
on the advice of the Military Staff Committee,
for the period of employment of these forces by
the Security Council.
Text accepted by the delegations of France
and the United Kingdom:
A supreme commander or supreme com-
manders of armed forces made available to the
Security Council may be appointed by the latter,
on the advice of the Military Staff Committee,
for the period of employment of these forces by
the Security Council.
Commanders-in-chief of land, sea and air
forces acting under the supreme commander or
commanders mentioned above may be
appointed by the Security Council on the advice
of the Military Staff Committee.
YI. Nordic UN stand-by forces
and Nordic UN co-operation
(a) Bockgruund aad bosic structane
104. At the sixth General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1952 it was proposed that
national stand-by forces should be formed and
that the services of these forces could be called
upon in the event ofan international crisis. Sub-
sequent to this proposal no action was taken by
the Nordic countries until the Secretary-
General, Dag Hammarskjtild, in his report to
the thirteenth General Assembly referred to this
recommendation. In a letter dated l2th June
1959, the Secretary-General approached the
nations which were participating or had partici-
pated in the United Nations Peace-Keeping
Force in the Middle East (UNEF I) with a
petition that these member states in their
national military planning should allow for pos-
sible future UN requests for peace-keeping
forces. After discussions in the early sixties, the
Governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden agreed in 1964 to a basic compo-
sition of Nordic stand-by forces at UN disposal.
The formation of units was mainly based on
appreciation's made in the 1950s and to some
extent on experience gained from UNEF I.
105. In the spring of I 968 the organisation and
other relevant data of the Nordic stand-by units
at UN disposal were sent to the Secretary-
General, at the request of the UN's Special
Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations.
106. Lessons learnt in the seventies in con-
nection with the UNFICYP (Cyprus) and UNEF
II missions as well as the employment of units
from the Nordic stand-by forces at UN disposal
in peace-keeping operations have led to certain
structural changes in the composition of the
units within the framework of the Nordic coun-
tries' national obligations as compared to the
original organisation.
107. National law and regulations specified the
maximum number of units and personnel that
could be at UN disposal. In addition to units
accounted for within the framework of UN com-
mitments the Nordic countries have organised
temporary and smaller units for a limited contri-
bution following a request from the UN secre-
tariat.
(b) The Nordic UN stad-bY lorczs
108. The UN stand-by units are organised,
equipped, trained, and mobilised by the national
military authorities concerned according to reg-
ulations issued by the governments (ministries
of defence) of the respective countries.
109. UN contingents, battalions or smaller
units drawn from the Nordic stand-by forces
should be able at short notice to be placed at the
disposal of the UN for peace-keeping mis-
sions.
I10. Most of the units within the Nordic UN
stand-by forces are set up in such a way that
their numerical strength can be increased or
reduced according to UN requests. Adjustments
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in the organisation can also be made from time
to time as required during the course of the
operation. This flexibility also allows for the
organisation to be augmented by limited addi-
tional elements, should the need for this become
apparent during the course of the operation.
l1l. The organisation, equipment and training
of the various units are continuously being mod-
ified as mentioned above. Continued studies of
the use of a UN force from previous and current
UN missions form the basis data for revi-
sions.
ll2. When organising national units of similar
character, the Nordic countries have been
co-operating in certain matters. In order to meet
possible future requirements within the frame-
work of peace-keeping and possibly relief-giving
operations continuous liaison is kept up to deal
with:
- 
r-rew experiences;
- 
improvements in equipment;
- 
revision of existing organisation;
- 
procurement of estimated new require-
ments;
- 
new unit establishments;
- 
training;
- 
states of alert;
- 
mobilisation situation.
ll3. Apart from certain regular officers and
NCOs, the personnel of the units are mainly
selected on a voluntary basis partly from per-
sonnel who have done their national service as
conscripts and partly from enlisted men. As
most applicants are already trained for some
civil trade or profession it follows that the
Nordic countries' yearly selection boards have
an unusually high percentage of craftsmen and
qualified technical personnel to choose from. As
a result of this an added capability of * self-
help " has been absorbed within the units.
Il4. The Nordic UN stand-by forces are com-
posed so that they can fulfil any demand and
specific suggestion on organisation and equip-
ment that will be found in the guidelines issued
by the UN HQ New York for governments con-
tributing troops to a certain mission.
115. The Nordic UN battalion is approxi-
mately 500 to 800 all ranks, normally consisting
of the HQ and headquarters unit plus two to five
rifle companies.
116. Within the framework of the stand-by
forces of all the Nordic countries there are staff
oflicers who are meant to form part of a UN HQ
staff within a UN mission. Staff personnel
should be able to serve in various positions and
levels on the UN HQ staff.
ll7. Positions that should be filled are those
within, for example, operations, logistics, infor-
mation, personnel, liaison, engineering and
humanitarian branches. Staff personnel within
the national stand-by forces can be on imme-
diate call and can be posted within 24 hours.
118. Military police teams operate either inde-
pendently or together with other units from
national contingents within the UN force and
are trained to carry out:
- 
traflic control;
- 
maintenance of law and order;
- 
accident and crime investigation;
- 
guarding, registration and possible eva-
cuation of refugees;
- 
assistance to local police.
I19. Movement control personnel consist of a
number of movement control officers and NCOs
who plan road, rail, air and sea transports and
supervise these movements within a UN area of
operation. The personnel will require appro-
priate equipment as well as local labour in order
to maintain proper terminal services.
120. Military observers are used for various
supervisory duties within the framework of a
UN mission. The observers have usually had
previous service with the UN or have had
special training in UN observer duties.
(c) Recruiting and tmiaing
l2l. Recruiting and selection of personnel for
Nordic UN stand-by forces is carried out
according to national procedures. As most of the
personnel are selected on a voluntary basis, cam-
paigns are organised through the armed forces,
public information services and in liaison with
labour exchanges. Among the WEU nations, the
Netherlands is considering a scheme for
recruiting volunteers for the United Nations,
proposing two-year contracts after national
servrce.
122. The Swedish Parliament at the end of
1992 approved a new act concerning armed
forces for service abroad. The act is a model of
simplicity and may well serve as an example. It
reads as follows and entered into force on lst
January 1993:
The act concerning armedforcesfor sentice
abroad
The following is hereby prescribed.
Section I
At the request of the United Nations or in
accordance with a decision taken by the
Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, the government has the right to
make available armed forces for peace-
keeping operations abroad.
Section 2
Armed forces for peace-keeping opera-
tions abroad shall consist of personnel
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recruited for the purpose. This personnel
shall be recruited to a force for service
abroad organised under the military
authorities.
Section 3
A maximum of three thousand persons
from the said force may serve abroad at
any one time.
123. Training for service with the UN is a sup
plementary form of training beyond the normal
conscript, NCO and oflicer training. The scope
and the time available vary somewhat between
the Nordic countries. The aim of the training is
to give the volunteer some idea of the conditions
under which he will carry out his tasks.
124. The training consists of:
- 
general information concerning the UN
organisation and peace-keeping opera-
tions;
- 
knowledge about the climatic and topo-
graphical conditions in the area as well
as the cultural and religious situation in
the area;
- 
basic knowledge concerning how a
soldier carries out his tasks as a peace-
keeper;
- 
information about the conditions under
which UN service is performed;
- 
training in the function to which he is
allocated in the organisation of a
stand-by unit.
125. For a limited number of oflicers and
NCOs certain basic UN training has been
organised yearly in the Nordic countries in order
to facilitate international teamwork within a
UN mission.
126. The courses are for staff oflicers, military
police personnel, logistics and movement
control oflicers and military observers.
127. The UN courses are organised and run by
the host nation. The appropriate military
authorities of the respective Nordic countries
consult with each other before the course plans
are confirmed and the military instructors to all
IIN courses are appointed. The course staffand
the instructors are drawn from all Nordic coun-
tries.
(d) Nordic military UN peoce-kcepiag co-operatioa
128. The peace-keeping activities of the Nordic
countries are characterised by extensive mutual
co-operation. At the beginning, in the 1950s, the
co-operation consisted only of the organisation,
equipment and dispatch of troops but nowadays
it also includes Nordic officers IIN training and
other activities.
129. The working body for the Nordic military
UN co-operation is the Joint Nordic Committeefor Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN)
which is composed of the respective military
UN authorities of each Nordic country.
130. An essential feature of the NORDSAMFN
activities is the endeavour to benefit from the
experience gained in peace-keeping operations
and the current problems in such way that the
Nordic UN units and their preparedness corre-
spond to the needs of the United Nations at all
times.
Nordic military UN peace-keePing
co- operation activ i ti e s
Twice a year Conference of the Ministers of
Defence
- 
General outlines
Several times Conference of NORDSAMFN
a year - Agenda for the conference of
the Ministers of Defence
- 
Courses for officers and
NCOs
- 
ElPeriences from Present UN
mrsslons
- 
Preparedness
Annually Conference of Nordic Economic
Working Committee
Conference of Ad Hoc com-
mittees
Transport Planning Committee
l3l. The supreme body for Nordic UN
co-operation is the meeting of the Ministers of
Defence which is held twice a year.
132. The Nordic Ministers of Defence have
appointed a special Nordic Economic Working
Committee for dealing with matters affecting
the financing of UN peace-keeping activities. In
addition to matters of general economic interest
the committee is investigating the possibility of
the reciprocal adjustment of economic benefitsin connection with Nordic participation.
Another problem which has been a subject of
study is the guiding principles for regulating
reimbursements in connection with a UN
mission.
133. When units from more than one Nordic
nation take part in a new UN peace-keeping
mission NORDSAMFN can, when necessary,
act as the co-ordinating authority for the Nordic
countries concerning the preparation of the
effort, the co-ordination of transport, and
general management of matters of a common
nature. In this connection there will be close
liaison with the Nordic economic working com-
mittee in order to lay down the general basis for
calculating claims for compensation and the
procedure for presenting these claims to the UN.
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134. NORDSAMFN also co-ordinates the pre-
liminary UN peace-keeping training programme
for Nordic officers and NCOs, which is shared
as follows:
Course Country responsible
UN Military Police
Course:UNMILPOC Denmark
(once a year)
UN Military Observer
Course: UNMOC Finland(twice a year)
UN Logistics Oflicers
Course: UNLOC Norway
(every second year)
UN Movement Control
Course: UNMOVCC Norway
(every second year)
UN Staff Officers
Course - UNSOC(once a year)
Nordic UN Seminar
(every third year)
Sweden
Alternates between
the Nordic coun-
tries
135. Such is the current interest in these
courses that many of them are now being run
much more frequently. In addition the range of
countries participating has increased consid-
erably. For example, in addition to the four
Nordic countries, the last UN staff officers
course held at Almn[s near Stockholm com-
prised officers of some fourteen nationalities.
136. A number of countries (e.9., Austria,
France, Poland and Switzerland) are interested
in running similar schemes themselves. Ideally
of course the UN itself should be organising
such training, perhaps on a regional basis...
137. NORDSAMFN plans and conducts the
Nordic UN seminar, in which persons at
command level within ministries for foreign
affairs, ministries of defence and defence staffs
participate. The purpose of the seminar is to
deal with questions connected with UN peace-
keeping operations. During the seminar there is
a follow-up and analysis of the experience
acquired from past and current operations in
which the Nordic countries have participated or
are participating. The intention is that this will
lead to improved and more effective contribu-
tions to future UN undertakings.
(e) Considerations and faclorc ia annection
with a uN peace-keepiag mission - the Nordic etperience
The decision-making process in UN Head-
quarters in New York
138. The time taken to assemble a force of the
kind envisaged will then depend on when the
countries approached submit their replies. In
this connection their representatives in New
York play an important r6le as intermediaries. If
the countries approached privately have replied
affirmatively they will receive an offrcial request
from the Secretary-General in the form of a
note.
139. The question of the financing of a peace-
keeping operation may be brought up already in
the resolution of the Security Council. As the
budget for the operation can only be determined
as time goes on the Secretary-General must in
the initial stages of the operation make use of
the special authorisation he has for obtaining the
necessary funds.
140. These funds are designed to defray the
costs incurred by the troop-contributing coun-
tries on transportation to the mission area, on
providing their units with equipment and
material and also that portion of the pay and
allowances paid to personnel which the UN has
undertaken to refund.
l4l. Over and above these costs funds are
needed for salaries ofthe civilian personnel, for
administrative costs in connection with the con-
tributions as well as for materials supplied by
the UN and their maintenance.
142. Preparations for the operation are now
entering the practical stage in that questions of
transportation and maintenance take priority,
usually against a deadline. The contacts between
the UN Secretariat and the troopcontributing
countries now take place also through the per-
manent delegations to UN and here it is of great
importance as regards the professional handling
of the issues involved if these delegations have
military experts as regular members of their
staffs. This is the case in respect of compara-
tively few countries, although all the Nordic
countries.
143. Even though this is not specifically stated
in the resolution that has initiated the operation
the Secretary-General submits a situation report
as the end of each mandate period approaches.
Where appropriate the report includes a recom-
mendation that the mandate for the UN force be
extended, though as a rule this has been pre-
ceded by consultations with the host country or
the parties to the conflict. Before the question of
a possible extension of the mandate is taken up
in the Security Council the Secretary-General
must also ascertain that the troop-contributing
countries are willing to continue to take part in
the operation.
144. If the question of a UN peace-keeping
operation is blocked in the Security Council the
matter can be referred to the General Assemblyin accordance with what is known as the
* Uniting for Peace " resolution. This was
approved by the General Assembly on 3rd
November 1950 in connection with the UN ini-
tiative in Korea and was implemented on the
137
DOCUMENT I366
creation of UNEF I (General Assembly Reso-
lution 99711956). However, for a decision of the
General Assembly to be valid it must be sup-
ported by a majority of at least two-thirds (UN
Charter, Article 18.2).
145. Critics of the present system argue that
more adequate pre-planning for peace-keeping
should be undertaken so as to enable the
organisation to respond rapidly when the situ-
ation demands it. Such critics have always
minimised the enormous political difficulties
that have thus far prevented any public pre-
planning for peace-keeping in the United
Nations Secretariat. They have also not taken
sufliciently into account the reluctance of gov-
ernments to make the necessary financial
outlays that may be necessary, in the absence of
any specific crisis, to organise an effective mil-
itary staffto prepare contingency plans.
YII. Tlre woy aheod: a file for WEA?
146. It will be obvious from the preceding
chapters that much remains to be done to give
the UN a specific and an efficient command
structure. First of all, however, the member
nations of the organisation, and especially of the
Security Council, must come to the political
agreement that action should be taken; they
must therefore re-express their faith in the UN.
The first stage in the process is the report by the
UN Special Committee on Peace-keeping Oper-
ations examining the Secretary-General's sug-
gestions advanced in his " Agenda for Peace "
which is expected imminently and which should
bring matters to a head. As we reach the 50th
anniversary of the founding of the United
Nations what could be more appropriate than to
invest the UN with the means to fulfrl the new
vocation outlined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
147. Opinions may still be divided on exactly
how much of the " Agenda for Peace " could be
applied and in what time scale but it points in
the right general direction. The greatest service
the WEU countries might perform would be to
convince our NATO partner, the United States,
to give the ideas a chance to succeed. Your
Rapporteur was assured by the US Delegation in
New York that the new Washington adminis-
tration had an open mind on the subject: there is
therefore an ideal " window of opportunity " 
- 
a
chance to be seized now before it is too late. The
US gesture in putting their troops taking part in
the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia under
non-US command for the first time is perhaps
an indicator and should serve as a precedent.
148. The sine qua non on the European side of
the Atlantic, at least amongst the WEU nations,
is that some of us need to modify our somewhat
cynical attitude to the United Nations (howeverjustified such cynicism may have been in the
past with regard, for example, to the machina-
tions of UNESCO). The argument that the UN
is not properly equipped will no longer hold
water if we will not agree to provide what is
needed.
149. The thorny problem of whether or not
WEU should be declared a regional organisation
under the terms of the UN Charter is discussed
in Chapter V and is the subject of a specific
draft recommendation. Your Rapporteur raised
the subject with the Secretary-General and in
addition a written question has been posed to
the Council concerning the necessity for WEU
to be mandated by the UN for particular action.
The WEU Secretary-General appears to think
not, but much is riding on such considerations
and the debate should now be brought into open
forum.
150. Meanwhile on the practical side attitudes
are changing. Many of our delegations in New
York now include a military representative to
provide appropriate advice. Some 20 countries(including a number of WEU nations) are in the
process ofseconding offrcers at national expense
to the United Nations to augment the present
tiny military staff.
l5l. With regard to'stand-by forces", while
WEU countries do not generally have formal
arrangements for forces earmarked especially for
UN operations, most have contingency arrange-
ments for fairly rapid deployment of some
measure of force. Tied in with this is the obvious
need both for adequate air and sealift to * reach
the right place at the right time ". Such matters
are under particular consideration in WEU at
present: the UN parameter should now be added
as a subject for reflection and recommen-
dation.
152. On the ground (and at sea and in the air)
many of our countries are making available large
numbers of the well-trained for UN operations,
with France and Britain leading in sheer
numbers; Italy, Spain and the Netherlands
making large contributions also and other
members sending contingents * beyond the call
of duty ". (For example, Luxembourg has vir-
tually l09o of its armed forces in former Yugo
slavia.) Most of our countries have also con-
tributed ships and/or aircraft to help enforce
embargo action in the Adriatic. A number are
presently offering personnel and equipment for
the WEU operation to stiffen controls on the
Danube (see the parallel report of the Defence
Committee: * WEU initiatives on the Danube ",
Joint Rapporteurs: Mr. Marten and Sir Keith
Speed).
153. Training also. Some would have us
believe that because an army is superbly profes-
sional and equipped for every eventuality it is
necessarily apt for all the gradations of peace-
keeping outlined in previous chapters. Not so,
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your Rapporteur argues. Peace-keeping is an
acquired science, as the Nordic countries have
long since realised. The United Kingdom has
devised a card system for briefing the individual
soldier on his own rules of engagement - what
he may and may not do in a given situation.
This scheme has been used to effect by British
forces in Bosnia and should be extended on a
UN-wide basis.
154. What is required however is a UN centre
for the exchange of ideas, plus a " data bank "
where details of individual operations could be
held in a sort of collective memory. Such a
centre might save valuable time.
155. At present it is the four Nordic nations
who together provide a " collective memory'
for the UN and a common training system.
Ideally the UN itself should sponsor and run a
" UN staffcollege " as well as specialised schoolsfor logistics, communications, etc. Given
financial as well as political problems it will be
some time before the creation of a centre is pos-
sible or even probable. Meanwhile WEU, which
has already mandated the Defence Representa-
tives Group to examine ways of co-ordinating
training, internally should actively seek to
co-operate on training for the UN with the
Nordic countries. Training co-operation on such
a regional basis may well be the best solution for
the foreseeable future and this European model
could serve as an example for other parts of the
world.
156. * Logistics " is another area which
requires particular attention. Not so much in
traditional NATO terms such as * standard-
isation' and * interoperability ", although these
are obviously important, but more simply in
levels of equipment and in availability. The UN
is sadly lacking in any procurement capability
and stories are legion of " solar topees being
issued in freezing weather and arctic footwear in
the desert ". Even allowing for exaggeration a
problem does exist. Questions such as stocking
of equipment, prepositioning, transport, etc.,
must be tackled and maybe the embryonic WEU
European Armaments Agency should be tasked
with examining such considerations.
157. Of course as in so many other realms the
bottom line for all these considerations is the
finance. The UN's problem in financing opera-
tions has already been mentioned. Certain coun-
tries have been very tardy in making their due
contributions, although apparently the situationis now less dramatic than hitherto. The
* receiving end " is also not without its
problems. The UN pays troops on a flat rate
system, regardless of nationality or background.
Some countries are therefore very much in
profit, others the reverse. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
in " An Agenda for Peace " draws attention to
various aspects of the financial structure of the
UN and makes proposals which appear rea-
sonable.
158. Where WEU nations are concerned we
might examine another aspect of the problem,
from a budgetary angle. We are all in the process
of reducing our defence budgets but your
Rapporteur would recommend that rather than
aim for straight reductions we should diversify
and direct our defence efforts towards support
for the UN. The UN as an idea receives a grcat
deal of goodwill from the electorate which
should be reflected and encouraged by parlia-
mentarians. The UN Secretary-General has also
suggested that defence budgets should be used
increasingly to fund the UN, but why not seek
finance from national overseas development
budgets too? The LIN's humanitarian effort is
now often inextricably linked with peace-
keeping operations and the link could therefore
be emphasised nationally.
159. Thus in practical terms rather than for
semantic reasons WEU should be prepared
increasingly to interact with the UN. While
NATO seems at times to be seeking a r6le tojustify a continued existence in the post-cold
war world WEU has a more pragmatic
approach, realising its current limitations and
that it is only " the sum of its parts ', in political
terms. The UN is likely to appreciate practical
advice to create its own organisation more from
the body which has recent experience in struc-
turing itself than from those who would merely
substitute themselves for the body they were
supposedly helping! Your Rapporteur's draft
recommendations are therefore designed both to
be not only feasible but also to appeal to our
governments as being worth doing if we are to
try to make sure that the UN fulfils its new
vocation.
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Draft Recommendation
on WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Ad,riatic -
reply to the thirty-eighth annual repon of the Council
The Assembly,
O Recalling Recommendations 506,512,519,525,530 and 531 and in particular the Recommen-
dations to:
(a) Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council
to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in l990l9l
and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complica-
tions of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant
breach of the embargo;
(b) Fulfrl its pledge for WEU member states to " offer expertise, technical assistance and' 
equipmeni to ihe governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river
Oanube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 7 57 " and in particular respond to Romania's
request for assistance;
(c/ In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in
the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
(ii) Pleased that WEU has signed memoranda of understanding with Bulgaria,. Hunglry and
Romania on helping police the Danube and that such operations are already producing a deterrent
effect on possible sanction breakers;(iii) Pleased that WEU and NATO have agreed a composite force for Adriatic operations (" Oper-
ation Sharp Guard ") with a joint command in Naples;(iv) Pleased that all member countries are in one way or another fully supporting UN-mandated
operations in the Adriatic, on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Slovenia and consid-
eiing such action already a symbol of European willingness to co-operate in the field of security;
(v) Pleased that the Greek Government has more actively encouraged the application of
UN-mandated sanctions;(vi) Considering that the memoranda of understanding signed with Bulgariq,Ilgn€ary and 
-Romania
are a tangible sign of the good and practical relations prevailing in the WEU Forum of Consul-
tation;
(vii) Welcoming the recent contacts between WEU and both Russia and the Ukraine over the appli-
cation of the UN embargo;
(viii) Convinced that the Council should initiate a specif,rc exercise programme so that forces now
answerable to WEU may train together on a regular basis at all levels and further suggesting that the
ideal starting point for such a programme would be the forthcoming Ardente 93 exercise in Italy;(ix) Congratulating the Council and the presidency on their initiatives,
RpcoprurNos rHAT rue CouNctI-
1. Inform the Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of understanding signed with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania and in particular make explicit any security guarantees given to any or all of
these countries;
2. Ensure that the longer-term political implications of WEU's involvement in operations on the
Danube and in the Adriatic are fully studied and appreciated;
3. Explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible compliance
with all UN sanctions even to the extent of asking member states to second customs and/or police
officers to help with the task;
4. Encourage the Russian authorities to give practical expression to their offer to help ensure that
all embargos aie fully respected on the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
t4l
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5. Develop the liaison established with the Ukrainian authorities with a view to signing a possible
memorandum of understanding for WEU to provide technical assistance to the Ukraine io that UN
sanctions may be seen to be fully respected;
6. Urge the UN to implement a compensation scheme to reimburse at least in part those countries
such as Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which have suffered considerable financial loss as a
result of embargo enforcement.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, joint Rapporteurg
I. Introduction
l. Originally your joint Rapporteurs were to
have presented a report on " An operational
organisation for WEU 
- 
naval co-operation " at
next week's plenary session of the Assembly, but
with recent developments concerning one par-
ticular facet of such operations it was decided to
concentrate for the present on " WEU initiatives
on the Danube and in the Adriatic " which
builds on the report presented last December,
entitled " WEIJ'S operational organisation and
the Yugoslav crisis " (Rapporteur: Mr. Marten).
The aim is to bring colleagues up to date
regarding current operations to enforce
UN-mandated sanctions and to make recom-
mendations.
2. Following the adoption by the United
Nations Security Council of Resolution '157
(1992) instituting an economic embargo against
the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, gov-
ernments adopted a whole range of adminis-
trative 
- 
and sometimes even legislative 
- 
mea-
sures to implement the resolution (economic
and financial sanctions, suspension of scientific
and cultural co-operation, reduction of the
number of diplomatic oflicials, cutting of air
links). In addition, European Community
member states are applying Council Regulation
No. 1432192, of lst June 1992, prohibiting trade
between the European Economic Community
and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
3. In September 1992, at the instigation of
the Defence Committee, the Assembly's
Standing Committee adopted the following spe-
cific recommendation concerning the embargo:
" Recommendation 525
The Assembly,(i) Acting through an urgent meeting
of its Standing Committee;(ii) Recalling Recommendations 506,
5 I l, 5 12 and 519 which have all sought to
prompt specific WEU action to help
resolve the Yugoslav crisis;(iii) Fully endorsing United Nations
Resolutions 713, 7 57 , 770 and 77l;(iv) Welcoming the progress made as a
result of the London Conference but sad-
dened that in spite of many attempts, in
varying bodies, to find a political solution
to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples
concerned is intensifying to a devastating
degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina
but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is
still being shelled nightly;(v) Regretting that the United Nations
embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not
being applied effectively, except at sea;(vi) Congratulating the Italian presi-
dency of WEU for its initiatives in con-
vening an extraordinary Council of Min-
isters meeting in London on 28th August,
as requested on behalf of the Assemblyby its President, and approving the
communiqu6 issued which offers the
United Nations assistance in delivering
humanitarian aid, in the supervision of
heavy weapons and in strengthening the
embargo;
(vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU
countries are contributing forces for Oper-
ation Sharp Vigilance and are prepared to
make forces available to support United
Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but also hoping for a more equitable cost-
sharing agreement between member coun-
tries;
(viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic
Council's decision to make NATO's logis-
tical infrastructure available to co-operatein WEU action in the framework of
United Nations Security Council direc-
tives and also welcoming offers by the
United States;
UncBNu-v RECoMMENDS THAT rHe CouNcrr-
l. Seek immediate United Nations
approval to impose a complete and total
land, air and sea blockade of Serbia and
Montenegro, the cessation of all financial,
economic and other international
assistance and the exclusion ofSerbia and
Montenegro from all international
organisations until such time as they
comply completely with all United
Nations resolutions and the decisions of
the London Conference;
2. Respond favourably to Romanian
requests for help in policing the border
with Serbia and help to establish similar
arrangements with other neighbouring
countries in the region;
3. Insist that Greece give the nec-
essary assurances of total compliance with
the United Nations embargo before con-
tinuing the present negotiations for WEU
membership;
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4. Offer to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to keep WEU forces
available to the United Nations under
European command and operational
' control in order to maintain cohesion and
to carry out Resolution 770 effectively,
and in close co-ordination with the
United Nations;
5. Ensure that the WEU military
planning cell is fully operational when
established on lst October 1992 in order
to play a specific r6le in the present crisis;
6. Institute a formal liaison mech-
anism with NATO headquarters and
appropriate commands and also with the
relevant United States authorities to help
promote efficient and cost-effective
co-operation and to avoid duplication of
effort;
7. Prepare, in conjunction with other
bodies, the future military requirements
which may become necessary should
Serbia not respect the London engage-
ments and, in particular, study the need
to:
(a) develop the alternative options
for action considered on 28th
August;
(b) plan. approqriate anti-sub-
marine and mine-hunting oper-
ations in the Adriatic;
(c/ ensure air superiority in the
area of operations and if nec-
essary an air exclusion zone;
(d) take steps to ensure sufficient
air protection for WEU forces
made available to the United
Nations;
(e) confrne all naval assets based in
Kotor and Bar;
(fl devalop electronic counter-
measures (ECM) to best effect
and, more specifically, jam and
neutralise military communica-
tions as well as fire control
systems;
(g/ provide military hospital facil-
ities in the region for the
treatment of the wounded, both
service and civilian, and
organise facilities for refugees;
8. Invite non-member nations to
co-operate in furnishing military forces to
complement WEU assets;
9. Examine action to be taken,
including military action, not only to stop
present fighting but also to prevent
present conflicts spreading to Kosovo,
Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and,
in conjunction with the CSCE, consider
the timely deployment of protective
forces. "
II. Sanction enforcement on the Danube
4. In October 1992 the Chairman of the
Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, accom-
panied by one of the committee's joint
Rapporteurs, Mr. Giinter Marten, visited
Romania at the invitation of the Romanian
authorities. The world press had been making
considerable comment about the ease with
which the UN embargo on Serbia and Monte-
negro was being flaunted both at border
crossings and by river traffic on the Danube.
5. The WEU delegation was able to see for
itself that every effort was being made to try and
ensure compliance with the terms of the UN
embargo but it was immediately obvious that
Romania at least lacked many of the technical
means required for fully-effective implemen-
tation.
6. In addition, during discussions in the
Foreign Ministry in Bucharest the then Foreign
Minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, made the very
valid point that the embargo was being applied
at considerable cost to his country.
7. In fact the application of the embargo
against Serbia and Montenegro has presented
neighbouring countries with a range of practical
problems. For this reason, at the initiative of the
United Kinldom, the European Community
and the United States organised fact-f-rnding
missions to these countries in order to assess the
difliculties faced by the authorities and help
them to adopt measures to strengthen the
embargo.
8. On the basis of the reports produced by
the fact-finding missions, a liaison group set up
under CSCE auspices proposed, at the end of
September L992, the adoption of a number of
technical co-operation measures. These con-
sisted of the stationing of Sanctions Assistance
Missions (SAMs) in the neighbouring countries
and the establishment of a communications
centre (SAMCOMM) responsible for facilitating
communications and co-ordination between the
SAMs and the authorities of the countries con-
cerned. The SAMCOMM was subsequently set
up in Brussels at the headquarters of the Com-
mission of the European Communities. It is
working in close co-operation with the Secre-
tariat of the United Nations Sanctions Com-
mittee and with the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR). The SAMCOMM
informs the CSCE liaison group of its activ-
ities.
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9. On 4th February 1993, Ambassador
Antonio Napolitano was appointed co-ordinator
for the application of sanctions by the European
Community and the CSCE. By the end of March
1993, Sanctions Assistance Missions had been
established in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Romania, Ukraine and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The staff of
the SAMs and the SAMCOMM, comprising
mainly customs officers, were provided by 13
Council of Europe member states, Canada, the
United States and the Commission of the
European Communities. Periodical reports on
the SAMs' activities are published.
10. These documents show that the author-
ities in the countries where SAMs are stationed
have a clear desire to ensure compliance with
the embargo and to co-operate closely with the
SAMs. The main problems encountered by the
assistance missions concern the inspection and
monitoring of traflic, especially on the Danube,
exports by Serbia of goods from
Bosnia-Herzegovina not covered by UN
Security Council Resolution 787 and the
diversion to Serbia of vessels carrying mainly oil
products and stating their destination to be
other republics of former Yugoslavia not
affected by the embargo. It would also appear
that false documents are widely used by carriersin order to circumvent the administrative
checks at Serbia's frontiers. The SAM reports
also acknowledge that it is very often diflicult to
prove that a violation has occurred solely on the
basis of an examination of documents and that
lack of resources prevents the inspection of all
goods consignments.
I l. Our colleague, Mr. Fabra, Rapporteur for
the Political Committee of the Council of
Europe, quizzed member states of our sister
organisation and its special guest delegations on:
- 
measures adopted by the authorities to
ensure compliance with the embargo;
- 
violations of the embargo which had
been notified to parliaments; and
- 
any other action concerning the
embargo taken by the authorities.
12. Most authorities consulted stated that
they are scrupulously observing the guidelines
adopted by the United Nations Sanctions Com-
mittee for the application of Resolutions 757
ard 787:' the latter, adopted on l6th November
1992, appreciably tightened the embargo.
13. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Malta and Turkey also said that they
have carefully examined every alleged violation
of the embargo and have passed on their
findings to the United Nations Sanctions Com-
mittee.
14. Your Rapporteurs would wish to draw
attention to a particular aspect arising from the
above, which has been emphasised in previous
reports of the Assembly, namely the attitude of
Greece (whose membership of WEU is currently
subject to ratification). For a number of
European Community states it would appear
that it is Greece which provides the main stum-
bling block to pacifying the Balkans, by
" breaking the UN sanctions on Serbia and by
denying Macedonia's recognition ". As under-
lined in previous reports of the Assembly,
Greece has been reproached over the months
with a somewhat dilatory behaviour with regard
to the present UN embargo. Such an argument is
misconceived as your Rapporteurs have been
quick to realise. While, as emphasised in pre-
vious reports, there has been no doubt that
Greek-flagged vessels have run the blockade
with supplies of oil for the Belgrade r6gime,
there is no public evidence of Greek Gov-
ernment connivance in such activities.
15. Quite the contrary in fact: the Greek port
of Thessalonika is clogged (according to the
RUSI in London) with nearly 50 000 tons of
goods prohibited for export. Many of Greece's
trading routes pass through Yugoslavia but very
few nations have suggested any specif,rc recom-
mendation to compensate Greece for complying
with the embargo (or any of the other nations
involved). The RUSI draws attention to a par-
ticular paradox. Violations of sanctions have
been recorded throughout the European Com-
munity and Denmark, the current holder of the
EC Presidency and one of Greece's main critics,
has allegedly actually recorded a rise in its trade
with Serbia over the past year!
16. At the December 1992 plenary session,
again at the instigation of the Defence Com-
mittee, the Assembly adopted the following
explicit recommendations:
" Recommendation 530
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendations 506,
512, 519 and 525 which have all sought to
prompt precise action by WEU to help
solve the crisis in former Yugoslavia;(ii) Fully endorsing United Nations
Resolutions 713, 757, 770, 771 and 781
and the efforts being made by Lord Owen
and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis;(iii) Dismayed that so little apparent
progress has been made in finding a
political solution to the crisis and that the
suffering of the peoples concerned is likely
to be intensified still further with the
onset of winter;(iv) Urging the Council to multiply
efforts within the United Nations, the
CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum
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for Consultation with the Central
European states, to seek greater
co-operation at all levels in a further
attempt to convince the various bellig-
erents to stop f,rghting;(v) Disappointed that the United
Nations Security Council has not heeded
WEU's call for reinforcement of the
embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and
that consequently the fighting is being
prolonged;
(vi) Congratulating the Council for
promptly following up a number of the
Assembly's recommendations and
applauding the Italian presidency for its
pragmatic and positive initiatives over
WEU co-ordination and liaison with the
United Nations, CSCE and NATO;
(vii) Pleased that all WEU countries
have offered to contribute either forces,
logistic support or facilities, or a combi-
nation of such assets, but insisting on the
need for an equitable sharing of costs;
(viii) Convinced that an air defence capa-bility plus associated intelligence-
gathering measures to help protect United
Nations forces are essential;(ix) Considering that similar WEU and
NATO naval and maritime air assets
might well be combined to form com-
posite forces to stress complementarity
and in a demonstration of cost-
effectiveness rather than duplication;(x) Believing that when WEU forces
are operating as such they should be
readily identifiable,
RecouuBNos rHAT rHB CouNcl-
1. Intensify efforts within the United
Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new
WEU Forum for Consultation to support
Lord Owen and Mr.Vance's endeavours
in Geneva and to sponsor a possible fresh
initiative to convince the belligerents in
all parts of former Yugoslavia to stop
fighting and seek a political solution to
their grievances;
2. Prepare a resolution to be tabled by
WEU members of the United Nations
Security Council to reinforce the present
embargo at least to the level of that
enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in
particular to take account of the problem
of cargo in transit and also of the compli-
cations of the Danube Convention and to
publish evidence at an early stage of any
significant breach of the embargo;
3. Fulfil its pledge for WEU member
states to " offer expertise, technical
assistance and equipment to the govern-
ments of Danube riparian states to
prevent the use of the river Danube for
the purpose of circumventing or breaking
the sanctions imposed by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 713 and
757 " and in particular respond to
Romania's request for assistance;
4. Ensure that all WEU nations which
have offered forces, logistic support or
facilities are permitted to participate in
operations, although not necessarily those
organised exclusively under the direct
aegis of the United Nations. Both the
CSCE and the EC, for example, require
considerable support for observer mis-
srons;
5. Prepare a special supplementary
budget for 1992 to take account ofopera-
tions concerning the former Yugoslavia
and also to enable the WEU planning cell
to function correctly;
6. Make contingency arrangements to
provide an adequate air defence capa-
bility to help protect United Nations
forces engaged in former Yugoslavia;
7. In conjunction with the NATO
authorities, rationalise naval and mar-
itime air operations in the Adriatic areato form composite and cost-effective
forces;
8. Design a symbol of specific
European identity to represent WEU and
urge member countries to use it to distin-
guish their military forces 
- 
ships, air-
craft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part
in WEU operations. Personnel serving in
the planning cell should be among the first
recipients of such a badge.
Recommendation 531
The Assembly,(i) Welcoming United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an
air exclusion zone) and 787 (reinforcing
the present embargo to the level of a
blockade) which respond directly to the
Assembly's recommendations;(ii) Welcoming the United Nations
Security Council's decision to set up a
peace-keeping force for the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
wishing to see the initiative extended to
Kosovo and elsewhere;(iii) Welcoming the WEU Council's
prompt responses to the Assembly's Rec-
ommendation 525 adopted on 3rd Sep-
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tember 1992 and also the Council's " Dec-
laration on former Yugoslavia " issued on
20th November 1992,
RrcoiraurNos rHAT rHr CouNclr-
l. Urge all member nations to review
and improve their participation in at least
the humanitarian aspects of operations
concerning the " Yugoslav crisis ";
2. Actively promote the idea of estab-
lishing " safe areas " for refugees and dis-
placed persons throughout the territory of
the former Yugoslavia;
3. Transform the Ad Hoc Group into
a standing advisory group to manage
WEU's response to the " Yugoslav crisis "
for as long as the crisis lasts;
4. Publish the evidence of any known
breach of sanctions and particularly of
cases where arns or other military
equipment were exported to the Serbs and
other warring factions in former Yugo-
slavia;
5. Take measures for and announce
sanctions to be taken by member states
against all sea or air transport operators
guilty of violating the embargo decreed by
the United Nations;
6. Study plans for a European military
operation to relieve the region of
Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and
put an end to the policy ofoccupation and
ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. "
17. The Romanian authorities followed up
with the following declaration on 27th January
t993:
* In regard to the flagrant violation on the
Danube in recent days, by ships flying the
Yugoslav flag, of the embargo imposed by
the United Nations Security Council, the
Romanian Government gives the fol-
lowing details:
l. Security Council Resolutions
75711992 and 78711992 introduced the
embargo against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), con-
sisting of a ban on the import and export
of goods and all transport activities in
respect of those countries.
A ban was also imposed on the transit
through the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of crude
oil and oil products, coal, energy
equipment, steel and other metals,
chemical products, rubber, containers,
vehicles, aircraft and engines of all
kinds.
With a view to the strict application of
these measures, the Romanian Gov-
ernment adopted Decision 7'llll992 and
issued detailed instructions to the appro-
priate Romanian authorities.
2. Since the embargo measures cameinto force, attempted violations by
Yugoslav ships have been recorded,
involving the use of documents con-
taining false information about the cargo
and the destination of goods, refusal to
submit to controls by the Romanian
authorities, the use of flags of other states
and refusal to stop the ships and present
the documents and cargo for control.
All these attempted violations of the
embargo were solved promptly and firmly
by Romania, as was recognised and appre-
ciated by the international experts moni-
toring application of the measures
decided by the Security Council.
3. However, in recent days, cases of
serious violation of the embargo measures
decided by the Security Council have
been recorded.
For instance, on l8th January 1993 the
push boat Bihac, flying the Yugoslav flag,
on the pretext that it intended to return to
the port of origin of the cargo (Reni),
turned round and set off in the opposite
direction to its declared destination and
linked up with the tug Kumanovo and six
barges loaded with oil products.
In the Braila port zone, the tug
Kumanovo left the convoy, which con-
tinued on its way to Yugoslav national
waters.
On 23rd January 1993, three convoys
flying the Yugoslav flag, loaded with oil
products, pushed by the Yugoslav boats
Orasac, Velebit and Kaimakalan, left the
port of Reni in Ukraine. In response to
orders from the Romanian authorities,
the convoys refused to stop and be ver-
ified and continued to advance towards
Yugoslav territory.
Similarly, on 25th January 1993, the tug
boat Kumanovo, with twelve loaded
barges, left the Macin arm of the Danube
without transport documents and went
towards Yugoslav territory.
To ensure respect for the embargo mea-
sures, the Romanian authorities, acting in
accordance with Security Council resolu-
tions, took steps to stop the boats. These
consisted of orders from and encirclement
by frontier patrol boats. The commanders
of the Yugoslav ships ignored the many
calls from by the port authorities over the
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radio and by loud-speaker and continued
on their way.
The relevent authorities tried to approach
the guilty ships and block their way,
paying due attention to the safeguarding
of human lives and at the same time
avoiding causing excessive, irreparable
damage. The commanders of the ships
concerned refused to submit to such
action. Worse still, the commander of the
push boat Bihac threatened to set fire to
the entire cargo and dump it in the
Danube, which would have had very
serious ecological consequences.
4. Romanian legislation has therefore
been seriously violated, as has the Bel-
grade Convention on navigation on the
Danube. Ships have navigated without
documents and have flown the flags of
other states, injunctions and orders to
stop have been ignored, radio links have
been cut and the presentation of docu-
ments and cargoes for customs controls
has been refused.
5. To put an end to these serious vio-
lations of the embargo, the Romanian
authorities have placed the matter before
the Security Council, the United Nations
Sanctions Committee and the authorities
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
have contacted the appropriate author-
ities in Ukraine and Bulgaria. They have
also approached the Romanian courts in
order to instigate legal proceedings against
Yugoslav citizens who have not respected
the legal provisions relating to navigation
on the Danube.
In these circumstances, the Romanian
Government has taken steps to ensure
that all bodies concerned continue to
apply the measures laid down in United
Nations Security Council resolutions con-
cerning strict respect of the embargo
imposed on Yugoslavia, including con-
straining measures, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of those resolu-
tions.
The Romanian Government will remain
in close contact with the Danube riparian
states so that agreements may be reached
to prevent the loading and transport of
goods subject to embargo or carried on
ships belonging to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia so as to ensure strict respect
for Security Council provisions.
The government will again ask for the
support of countries participating in the
CSCE and the United Nations Security
Council in order to receive the technical
means necessary for the strict application
of the embargo measures relating to the
transport of goods on the Danube. "
18. In addition on l8th February consulta-
tions were held between the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Romania and the
Ukraine, resulting in the following memo-
randum:
" On l8th February 1993 consultations
were held in Bucharest between the Min-
istries of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Bul-
garia and Ukraine, as riparian states to
the Danube river, in connection with the
implementation of sanctions established
by the Security Council.
The consultations were attended by
customs, transport, border guard experts
from the three countries and by represen-
tatives of EC/CSCE Sanctions Assistance
Missions (SAMs).
During the meeting a comprehensive
exchange of views on the application of
sanctions on the Danube was made. The
parties considered that sanctions are an
integral part of the international efforts
for the peaceful settlement of the crisis in
the former Yugoslavia and their strict
implementation by all countries will con-
tribute to the speedy solution ofthe crisis.
In this respect, the participants reiterated
the determination of their countries to actin accordance with the provisions of
UNSC Resolutions 757 (1992) and 787(1992) as well as with the consolidated
guidelines for their implementation,
adopted by the committee established
pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991).
The determination expressed in the
statement of the Government of Romania
of 27th January 1993, the statement of the
Government of Bulgaria of lst February
1993 and in the Statement of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of Ukraine of 29th January 1993
was reaffirmed to further strictly comply
with UNSC Resolutions 713 (1991),757(1992) and 787 (1992). The parties
stressed that the competent authorities in
their countries will continue the com-
pliance with UNSC Resolutions 757 and
787 (1992). The participants considered
to undertake some practical steps to this
effect.
The representatives of the three Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs expressed the
readiness of their countries to continue
consultations and co-operation between
their competent institutions in the imple-
mentation of sanctions on the Danube
river.
The three parties agreed to make public
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and to submit the present memorandumto the United Nations Security
Council. "
19. Also on 18th February, the President of
the WEU Assembly, Dr. Hartmut Soell, wrote to
Mr. Teodor Melescanu, the Romanian Foreign
Minister (who had addressed the December
L992 plenary session of the Assembly), in the
following terms:
" ..,...
I have received the text ofthe declaration
adopted by the Romanian Government at
its sitting on 27th January 1993 con-
cerning violations, by ships flying the
Yugoslav flag, of the embargo imposed by
the Security Council. The Romanian
Government announces that it will ask for
the necessary technical means to ensure
strict application of the embargo mea-
sures relating to the transport ofgoods on
the Danube.
Having heard your address on lst
December 1992 and having been briefed
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the
Assembly's Defence Committee, who, as
you know, visited the Iron Gates area in
October 1992, the WEU Assembly is con-
vinced of the Romanian Government's
determination to ensure a satisfactory
application of the embargo. It will cer-
tainly wish to assure the WEU Council of
its support for the request expressed by
the Romanian Government in its decla-
ration of 27th January.
However, in order to do this in an
accurate and, I hope, effective manner, it
would be useful to know what technical
means Romania wishes to be made
available to it.
...... 
t'
20. Mr. Melescanu was very explicit in his
reply of 24th February 1993 (as he had been
when speaking at the plenary session of the
Assembly) :
tt 
......
I would like to convey to you the satis-
faction of my government with reference
to your kind offer to support Romania's
endeavours to ensure the effectiveness of
the UN sanctions against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro). Your offer provides us with an
appropriate framework for co-operation
at a time of critical developments.
As you might well know, the violation of
the embargo by vessels under Yugoslav
flag has raised serious problems to the
Romanian authorities in their actions to
comply fully with the UN sanctions. Par-
ticularly, the shortage of special technical
equipment has become obvious. The doc-
ument herewith attached will bring to
your attention our most urgent needs and
requirements to have such challenges
met.
Aide-mdmoire
In order to strictly apply the Resolutions
713, 757 and 787 (1992) of the UN
Security Council regarding the economic
and military embargo against Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Romanian
side has already expressed the
disponibility to receive observers and
assistance with a view to monitoring the
application ofthe provisions ofthe above-
mentioned resolutions.
For this purpose, the Romanian side
urgently needs the following equipments:
l. Complete navigation radio stations for
small river ships: 18 pcs;
2. Naval radio-telephones to ensure the
adequate communication: 38 pcs;
3. Electro-megaphones: 38 pcs;
4. Speed patrol boats, supplied with spe-
cific equipment for monitoring the
implementation of the provisions of
the Security Council resolutions: 15
pcs;
This equipment is to be deployed in
the following harbours: Drobeta-Turnu
Severin, Calafat, Cernavoda and
Galati.
5. One central radio station for communi-
cations among the customs authorities
on the territorial basis;
6. Computers (in order to control the
ships movement): 12 pcs;
7. Means for preventing oil pollution:
- 
floating fireproof dams for limiting
oil spread (height 
- 
approx. 300 mm
above water level and length 
- 
I 000
m, each): 6 pcs;
- 
oil recovering equipment to be used
on ships with special endowment,
also including absorbent substances
- 
ratio l/l to the amount of spilt oil:
l8 pcs;
- 
dispersion solutions for preventing
oil pollution on beaches and for scat-
tering thin oil films;
- 
pumping installations fit for water
temporary supplying in the range 1.6
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Us 
- 
3 cbm/s: 70 pcs according to the
capacity of the present water
intakes;
- 
fast intervention means, afloat and
on the land (quick laboratory
ships). "
21. The WEU Permanent Council agreed in
principle on l6th March 1993 to send police
forces and equipment to help Romania and Bul-
garia enforce the embargo along the Danube and
in parallel the United States decided to make
three fast 27-foot patrol boats available to the
Romanians together with a United States coast
guard team for training.
22. WEU made a formal offer at the extraor-
dinary ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on
5th April 1993 to assist Hungary as well as Bul-gaia and Romania in implementing the
embargo on the Danube and discussion began in
earnest.
23. The 5th April WEU " Declaration on
implementation of United Nations sanctions on
the former Yugoslavia " reads as follows:
" l. The WEU Council of Ministers
held an extraordinary meeting, following
on their discussions in Rome in
November 1992, to discuss this crucial
phase of the situation in former Yugo-
slavia and in particular the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives of
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the
CSCE Presidency, the CSCE sanctions
co-ordinator and the EC Commission
attended, as observers, this meeting which
was devoted to sanctions implementation
on the Danube. Representatives of the EC
Presidency and Secretary-General of
NATO also attended as observers.
2. With a view to supporting the
efforts of the European Community, the
United Nations and the international con-
ference on former Yugoslavia at this
decisive stage of the negotiations aiming
at the acceptance of the Vance-Owen
peace plan by all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ministers reaffirmed their
determination to contribute signifrcantly
to the implementation of the provisions of
the United Nations Security Council Res-
olutions 787,757 and 713 and of the mea-
sures contained in those resolutions.
3. Ministers welcomed the efforts of
the riparian states to meet their obliga-
tions under the abovementioned United
Nations Security Council resolutions but
noted with concern that, despite these
efforts, sanctions enforcement on the
Danube still required strengthening.
4. WEU ministers therefore offered
their concrete support to the riparian
states by means of the organisation of a
police and customs operation on the
Danube to which WEU countries would
contribute appropriate resources. This
offer is based on three guiding principles
- 
that the operation will be:
- 
based on relevant United
Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, in particular Resolution
787 of l6th November 1992, in
connection with Resolutions 713
and 757;
- 
an extension of efforts already
being deployed by the CSCE and
the European Community and its
member states;
- 
in support of the riparian states
responsible for adopting the req-
uisite measures to ensure com-
pliance with the embargo on the
Danube.
5. WEU ministers welcomed the
support given by the CSCE to the WEU
plan and looked forward to the effective
co-ordination of the EC, CSCE and WEU
efforts to enforce United Nations Security
Council resolutions.
6. The organisation of the police and
customs operation offered by WEU would
be based on a system of co-ordinated
control areas upstream and downstream
of the Serbian border with the aim of
ensuring the effective implementation of
the embargo on the Danube. This would
involve joint teams of police and customs
ollicers from WEU countries and the
riparian states operating from fast patrol
boats to carry out additional controls in
support of those of the riparian states.
7. The WEU Council of Ministers
welcomed the support given by the
riparian states and looked forward to
further consultations on this issue. They
hoped that the police and customs oper-
ation could start as soon as possible in
order to ensure the full implementation of
the relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions and thus to make a
positive contribution to reaching a
solution to the crisis in former Yugo-
slavia, in full complementarity with the
peace process which is being pursued in
other fora. "
24. In essence the " terms of reference "
envisaged an operation to ensure checks on and
surveillance of the traffic on the Danube, much
as the WEU flotilla had done from the beginningin the Adriatic. Some 250-300 * police and
customs officers " were to be deployed with l0
or so fast patrol boats. The then Italian Defence
ls0
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Minister, Mr. Salvo Andd, added that some
measure of force would be authorised but not
necessarily the use of arms.
25. France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Spain envisaged sending con-
tingents. Germany earmarked four patrol craft
and some 50 members of the Frontier Force;
France would contribute 20 or so Gendarmes,
Italy 80 from the Customs Police.
26. The three Danube states involved
expressed a number of understandable reti-
cences, especially conerning Serb reported
threats to blow up a petrol tanker barge on the
Danube. Such an ecological disaster would obvi-
ously affect Hungarian and Romanian water
supplies as well as the Bulgarian nuclear power
station at Kozlodui which draws its cooling
water from the Danube.
27. Meanwhile according to the Romanian
authorities traflic on the Danube was falling.
For example in March only 60 vessels had
passed through the Iron Gate 2lock, compared
with some 60 a week prior to the embargo.
28. Visiting the Danube on 3rd June the
British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd,
was cited in the following terms:
" Gazing at the Danube, Douglas Hurd,
the Foreign Secretary, said: 'Now we have
an empty river; before it would have been
crowded. The operation seems to be
working.'
With those words Mr. Hurd gave his
endorsement to the success of the trade
embargo along the river by Bulgaria,
Romania and Ukraine. He was told,
however, that sanctions against Serbia
were still being breached by land
crossings, especially through Macedonia.
A spokesman for Mr. Hurd said that 62
sanctions assistance personnel were
already deployed and the figure would be
doubled within a month. Of those, 20 will
be British, with three boats. Western
European Union is to deploy equipment
and personnel to strategic ports such as
Calafat, Vidin and at the Iron Gates on
the river. "
29. Various localities were discussed with a
view to establishing WEU bases to help rein-
force the embargo and from 26thto 29th April a
WEU fact-finding mission visited a number of
places on the Danube: Giurgiu and Calafat in
Romania, Ruse and Vidin in Bulgaria, Mohacs
and Baja in Hungary.
30. The aim of the mission was to examine
firstly the common aspects of possible WEU
operations, the general characteristics of the
river, shipping control and communications,
language requirements, fuel availability, elec-
tricity and water supplies, etc., etc. Secondly the
individual merits of each locality were assessed
and recommendations made. Exemplary
co-operation was evident throughout (as it had
been for the Assembly's fact-finding visit in
October 1992).
31. On 29th April the WEU troika (Germany,
Italy and Luxembourg) met representatives of
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to discuss a
series of concerns which had been raised over
the previous weeks.
32. Hungary for example, as expressed by the
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Janos
Martonyi, did not wish WEU contingents to be
armed or to use force, but to serve under Hun-
garian command and even under the Hungarian
flag. At the same time it was reported that
Hungary was seeking security guarantees from
WEU (in case of riposte from the Serbs), similar
to those sought from NATO with reference to
AWACS aircraft operating in Hungarian air-
space.
33. The political implications of this last
point are legion and could technically impinge
on the obligations of modified Brussels Treaty
signatories under Article V of the treaty 
- 
if
taken as a precedent. Your Rapporteurs believe
that the Council is aware of such considerations,
hence the careful wording of the communiqud
issued on the signing of memoranda of under-
standing between WEU and, respectively Bul-
garia, Hungary and Romania.
34. At the WEU ministerial meeting in Rome
on l9th May 1993, ministers agreed that the
strengthening of the UN sanctions through strict
implementation of the relevant Security Council
Resolutions and in particular Resolution 820
should continue to be one ofthe responses ofthe
international community to Bosnian Serb
intransigence. Ministers highlighted the two
contributions which WEU was making in this
respect:
- since July 1992, WEU ships and air-
craft have been conducting, embargo
enforcement operations in the Adriaticin close co-ordination with NATO.
With the adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 820, WEU and
NATO discussed ways of increasing
the effectiveness of these embargo
enforcement operations;
- 
the offer made at their meeting in Lux-
embourg on 5th April to assist in the
efforts of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania in implementing the embargo
on the Danube in accordance with the
provisions of the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions was now being put
into effect. Ministers expressed their
appreciation for the co-operation
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shown by the governments of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania in establishing
this joint initiative, of a civilian char-
acter, which would be conducted in
close co-ordination with the efforts of
other organisations notably the EC and
CSCE and in liaison with the Sanctions
Assistance Missions in the area. They
welcomed the agreement of the riparian
states to the deployment of advance
teams, now in place, in order to prepare
the rapid implementation of the initi-
ative. Ministers expressed their appre-
ciation for the efforts undertaken by the
Presidency and agreed that ltaly would
assure co-ordination on the ground.
35. On 20th May in Rome at the meeting of
the WEU Forum of Consultation at ministerial
level ministers informed their consultation
partners of the WEU operation to enforce the
embargo in the Adriatic undertaken in close
co-ordination with NATO.
" Ministers welcomed the WEU initiative
on the Danube to assist and co-operate
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, in
the strict implementation of the sanctions
provided for in UN Security Council
Resolutions 820, 787, 757 and 713. They
welcomed the signature of three memo-
randa of understanding in Rome to this
effect.
Ministers stressed that the Danube
mission, which was of a civilian character,
represented a concrete example of
co-operation between WEU and certain of
its consultation partners. They reaffirmed
the importance of that co-operation and
their resolve to continue their joint efforts
thus contributing to the search for a
peaceful solution to the crisis. Moreover,
Ministers underlined the importance of
containing the current conflict and agreed
that, were any country to suffer from
aggressive action as a consequence oftheir
support for UN-mandated operations,
this would be a matter of direct concern to
the international community. "
36. At the time of writing the respective mem-
orandum of understanding, terms had not been
made public although your Rapporteurs believe
that it is in the best interests of all concerned,
even Serbia, that as much information as pos-
sible should be published.
37. It is to the credit of all concerned, not
least to the Italian Chairmen-in-Oflice of the
WEU Council, that our organisation should set
itself comparatively modest and pragmatic aims
to begin with and that relations with our Central
European neighbours should be taken forward
in such a tangible and practical fashion.
38. On 9th June, WEU published the fol-
lowing communiqu6 on the subject:
" The offer made at the WEU ministerial
meeting in Luxembourg on 5th April 1993
to assist the efforts of Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania in implementing the
embargo on the Danube in accordance
with the provisions of the relevant UNSC
resolutions is now being put into effect as
memoranda of understanding between
WEU and the individual riparian states
have been signed.
The WEU Danube Mission, which is of a
civilian character, is thus a concrete
example of co-operation between WEU
and its consultation partners.
The mission will provide concrete support
to the riparian states in order to take nec-
essary measures to ensure that shipping
within the control areas on the Danube is
in accordance with UNSC resolutions.
These measures may include the halting
and/or diversion of shipping in order to
inspect and verify their cargoes and desti-
nations.
About three hundred civilian officials(customs and police officers) from
member states will participate in the
mission with up to eleven patrol boats.
The mission will be based at a
co-ordination and support centre estab-
lished at Calafat in Romania; there will be
three control areas: one at Calafat, one at
Mohacs in Hungary and another at Ruse
in Bulgaria.
As most personnel and equipment are in
place, the operation can now begin. "
39. The above arrangements constitute a
steep change in WEU's own operational capabil-
ities and a concrete example of wider practical
co-operation in Europe, as already mentioned.
What more may be done in this respect?
40. A pointer to a possible next step lies in the
meeting held in the margins of the last WEU
ministerial meeting when a number of our
defence ministers met and discussed future
moves on the embargo with the Russian Foreign
Minister, Mr. Kozyrev. As well as discussing a
" phased implementation " of the Vance-Owen
plan the possible deployment of Russian troops
to help seal the Bosnia-Serbia border (as sug-
gested by Belgrade) was evoked. This would
require at least 500 observers, according to UN
sources to check traffic moving across 48
frontier posts to hold the Serbian President to
his promise to deny Bosnian Serbs fuel and
weapons.
41. WEU should intensify discussions with
the Russians to try to find a mutually-
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satisfactory arrangement to ensure even stricter
application of the embargo which apparently is
at last beginning to bite.
42. Links should also be developed with
Ukraine to try to halt some of the alleged
embargo infringements at source. In addition
discussions should begin immediately with our
new member, Greece, to ensure that all suspi-
cions about night-time movement of lorries via
the FYR of Macedonia are countered. The sim-
plest solution would be the stationing of WEU(or CSCE, or EC) monitors at border crossings
to report " untoward happenings ".
43. Finally for the moment on the subject of
the embargo on the Danube, your Rapporteurs
must take issue with the Council on its reply to
Assembly Recommendation 531 which asked
inter alia that the Council " publish the evidence
of any known breach of sanctions and particu-
larly of cases where arms or other military
equipment were exported to the Serbs and other
warring factions in former Yugoslavia ". The
formal reply affirmed that " the relevant data
remains classif-red ". The Assembly believes that
such classification is the Council's own, unilat-
erally decided. This opinion was reinforced
when in the House of Commons in London on
4th May 1993, Mr. Home Robertson, MP, posed
the following question:
" To ask the Secretary of State for
Defence if he will set out the information
available to him on the actions taken by
NATO or WEU monitoring forces in the
Adriatic in relation to the passage to Mon-
tenegrin ports of each of the motor
vessels, Dimitrakis, Novotsak II and East
River, showing the dates on which each
was identified, challenged or boarded, and
the purported port of destination. "
The reply was most revealing:
'MV Dimitrakis was boarded by a
NATO monitoring vessel on 18th January
1993. It gave its port of destination as
Koper 
- 
Slovenia 
- 
and was allowed to
proceed. It then diverted to the Monte-
negrin port of Bar; on emerging, it was
intercepted and towed to Brindisi for
inspection.
MV Novotsak II was boarded by a
Western European Union vessel on 23rd
January 1993. Having declared Venice as
its port of destination, it was allowed to
proceed. It then diverted to Bar, where it
remains. We have asked the Russian
authorities to take up the matter with the
vessel's owners.
MV East River was intercepted, while sta-
tionary in international waters, by a
NATO vessel on l lth March. It declared
its port of destination as Venice. It
claimed to have engine, gyro and radar
problems; an offer of assistance was
declined. Some hours later it was seen
heading for Bar. NATO vessels were
unable to prevent it reaching Montenegrin
territorial waters. The Liberian author-
ities have suspended the ship's licences.
We have asked the Greek authorities to
pursue the matter with the ship's
owners. "
44. This is not the first example of the " left
hand/right hand " syndrome and probably not
the last. What is certain is that the Council must
be consistent in its statements and preferably
give more rather than less information to the
Assembly on a regular basis.
III. Sanction enforcement in the Adriatic
45. The bulk of the foregoing discussion refers
to developments on the Danube. However the
embargo was first applied reasonably effectively
in the Adriatic area and here a quite consid-
erable amount of progress has been made now in
creating composite arrangements between WEU
and NATO in the area. The two distinct naval
operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence
have been combined into operation Sharp
Guard and a combined concept of operations
formulated to ensure unity of command, appro-
priate rules of engagement and adequate force
levels.
46. In practice, this means that WEU vessels
(apart from Spain) will come under SACEUR's
operational command (Spain under " opera-
tional control " only) but a unified NATO/WEU
HQ is currently being established at the
COMNAVSOUTH HQ in Naples where three
WEU staff ofhcers are reinforcing those wearing
the NATO emblem. The mission remains largely
the same but arrangements are hereby consid-
erably rationalised as is obvious from the
communiqud dated 8th June issued jointly by
WEU and NATO:
" Joint session of the North Atlantic
Council and the Council of Western
European Union held in Brussels on 8th
June 1993
l. A joint session of the North
Atlantic Council and the Council of
Western European Union was held today,
8th June 1993. This session completed the
thorough review, undertaken in the light
of recent developments, of the embargo
operations in the Adriatic which NATO
and WEU have been conducting in strict
co-ordination since July 1992. The
Councils approved the combined
NATO/WEU concept of operations for
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the implementation of UNSCR 820 in the
Adriatic. This includes a single command
and control arrangement for combined
NATO/WEU operations (Sharp Guard)
under the authority of the Councils of
both organisations.
2. Operational control of the com-
bined NATO/WEU Task Force (CTF) for
embargo operations in the Adriatic has
been delegated through SACEUR to Com-
mander Allied Naval Forces Southern
Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Acting on
behalf of the North Atlantic Alliance and
Western European Union, he will exercise
operational control over a combined Task
Force to conduct operations to monitor
and enforce compliance with UN sanc-
tions in accordance with UNSCRs 713,
757, 787 and 820. The combined Task
Force will, in particular, aim at pre-
venting all unauthorised shipping from
entering the territorial waters of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro).
3. Arrangements to ensure the effi-
cient conduct of unified operations have
been put in place. Implementation of thejoint NATO/WEU operations will start
immediately. Practical measures to ensurejoint co-operation among the relevant
NATO and WEU bodies have been put
into effect and further joint sessions of the
North Atlantic Council and the Council of
the Western European Union will be con-
vened if necessary to issue additional
political guidance for the operations in
the Adriatic.
4. The combined operation will give
concrete expression to the determination
of NATO and WEU to continue to act
together in co-operation for the effective
implementation of the sanctions decided
upon by the UN Security Council and to
contribute to a settlement of the crisis in
former Yugoslavia. This reflects our com-
mitment to the principles of transparency
and complementarity in pursuit of our
mutual goal of enhanced security through
NATO and WEU. "
IY. The thirty-eighth annual repor"t
of the Council
47. Your Rapporteurs strongly believe thatthe pragmatic and practical arrangements
developed of late within WEU and reported to
the Assembly by the Council in the thirty-eighth
annual report augur well for the future. Never
before has WEU in general nor the Council in
particular been so active, with all its subsidiary
organs starting to " frre on all cylinders ".
48. Detailed comment is being reserved for
your joint Rapporteurs' forthcoming report on
an operational organisation for WEU 
- 
naval
co-operation.
49. Meanwhile a number of colleagues in the
Defence Committee have asked that there
should be renewed efforts to establish a better
dialogue with the Council regarding the
Assembly's recommendations and the formal
replies made available.
50. What follows therefore sums up com-
ments on the Council's replies to recommenda-
tions formulated in the Defence Committee and
adopted at the December 1992 plenary
sesslon.
51. While the Defence Committee was
pleased with the generally constructive replies to
Recommendation 528 (on defence: Central
Europe in evolution), it was somewhat disap-
pointed with the replies to Recommendations530 and 531 (on WEU's operational
organisation and the Yugoslav crisis), and 534
and 535 (on European security 
- 
reserve forces
and national service) and hopes that, rather than
accepting the replies at face value, a fuller
exchange of views may be possible. The Council
is therefore invited to comment further on the
following recommendations:
Recommendation 528
" 2. Follow closely possible moves in
the European Community to create the
new status of " affiliate member " which
could have implications for the formal
relationship between the Central
European states and WEU; "
- 
Pour mimoire, it was reportedly the
former European Commissioner for
External Affairs who conceived the pos-
sible status of " affiliate member ". The
idea would certainly be worth pursuing
with respect to security matters.
" 10. Establish information points in the
capitals of the Central European states, by
using the good offices of the embassies of
WEU members. "
- 
The whole point of this recommendation
wcts to produce a particularly cost-
effective solution for the perennialproblem of disseminating information.It k therefore especially disappointing
that the Council in its reply states that it
" has no plans at present for imple-
menting such a suggestion ".
" ll. Ensure that both WEU member
states and Central European states
develop effective arrangements to prevent
the export of military equipment to those
countries and groups which pursue pol-
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icies of militant nationalism or of
aggressive intention. "
- 
The Council may well have " repeatedly
stated that such arrangements to prevent
the export of military equipment to such
countries and groups have not yet
appeared on the agenda of the Forum of
Consultation ". The Assembly is recom-
mending that the subject should be
included on the agenda of the Forum of
Consultation and believes that such dis-
cussion would be eminently worthwhile
and responsible.
Recommendation 530
* 8. Design a symbol of specific
European identity to represent WEU and
urge member countries to use it to distin-
guish their military forces 
- 
ships, air-
craft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part
in WEU operations. Personnel serving in
the planning cell should be among the first
recipients of such a badge. "
- 
What " preliminary discussions have
already taken place in the Council " ?
Would the Council be prepared to con-
sider a suggestion from the Assembly?(c.f. current recommendations from the
Committee fo, Parliamentary and
Public Relations)
Recommendation 531
" 3. Tranform the Ad Hoc Group into a
standing advisory group to manage
WEU's response to the Yugoslav crisis for
as long as the crisis lasts; "
- 
The Council's reply states that it will
" keep in mind the Assembly's sug-
gestion ". Does the Council not agree
that such a Standing Advisory Group is
required immediately?
" 4. Publish the evidence of any known
breach of sanctions and particularly of
cases where arrns or other military
equipment were exported to the Serbs and
other warring factions in the former
Yugoslavia, "
- 
The Council's reply affirms that " the
relevant data remains classiJied ". Is il
not correct that such classiJication is the
Council's own, unilaterally imposed?
Should the UN not be encouraged to
publish such evidence?
* 5. Take measures for and announce
sanctions to be taken by member states
against all sea or air transport operators
guilty of violating the embargo decreed by
the United Nations; "
- 
The Council's reply states that WEU
member states are " fully aware " of
such a need. What practical measures
are being taken?
Recommendation 534
" l. Take every opportunity to ensure
that the debate on reserve forces and
national service in any member country
benefits from a common fund of expe-
rience and requirements and include dis-
cussion on the subject on the agenda of
the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff
meeting;"
- 
The Council replies that " Questions per-
taining to the " debate on reserve forces
and national service in any member
country " are not, at present, on the
agenda of the Council and its Working
Groups. ", thus sidestepping the
Assembly's recommendation, although
allowing that " Discussion of the subject
of reserve forces and national service in
any member country could possibly be
included on the agenda of a future
meeting of the WEU Chiefs of Defence
Staff. ". Will the Council now agree to
include this important subject on the
agenda of the next meeting of the Chiefs
of Defence StafJ?
" 3. Provide a forum for discussion of
such matters among member states and
also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland and interested Central
European states; "
- 
The Council merely replies that as such
matters are not at present on the agenda
of the Council such a forum would be
premature. In the Defence Committee's
contacts with the countries concerned all
authorities have stressed their interest in
such a discussion. Would the Council
therefore reconsider its reply?
* 5. Explore the idea of creating a
European " national guard " for territorial
defence, using the reserve forces of WEU
member states; "
- 
Again, the Council merely states that the
subject is not at present on its agenda:
the Assembly is recommending that the
idea be explored forthwith.
" 10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security
Studies to make a thorough examination
of national service and the structure of
reserve forces in member states and of the
possibilities for co-operation; "
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- 
The Assembly is pleased with the Coun-
cil's reply that the subject " could pos-
sibly be the subject of a future study " .Which timescale does the Council
envisage?
52. At the time of writing NATO Foreign
Ministers were about to meet in Athens(lOth/llth June) to discuss continuing opera-
tions in former Yugoslavia. Your Rapporteurs
intend to bring the results of this meeting to the
attention of colleagues in time for the debates
scheduled for l6th June.
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APPENDIX
The crisis in former Yugoslavia
WEU operations
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Document 1368 19th May 1993
Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Pmcedure
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf ol the Committee on Rulcs of Prucedure and Privilegu2
by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapprteur
I. REVISION OF PROYISIONS RELATING TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE
- 
RULE 15 OF THE RI.'LES OF PROCEDURE
Draft Decision
oa ancndiag Rulc 15 on the Standiag Committee
The Assembly,
Drclors
To replace paragraphs 4,5,6,7 and 8 of Rule 15 by the following text:
u 4. It shall be convened by the President of the Assembly at the request of the Presidential Com-
mittee, which shall fix the date and duration of its meetings.
5. The Standing Committee shall examine committee reports included in its agenda by the Presi-
dential Committee.
6. An urgent matter may be placed before it by the President, either on his own initiative or fol-
lowing a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives or substitutes. In
this case, the President of the Assembly shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Standing Com-
mittee has a draft text before it and receives appropriate information allowing it to discuss the text in
full knowledge of the facts.
7. The Standing Committee shall act on behalf of the Assembly.
8. Unless otherwise specified in the present rule, procedure in the Standing Committee shall be the
same as in plenary sittings of the Assembly.
9. The provisions of Rule 24 on reports of debates and Rule 25 on the timetable of sittings and
orders of the day shall not be applicable to the Standing Committee.
10. The Chairman of the Standing Committee shall take part in discussions and votes without a
casting vote.
I l. The provisions of Rule 2l (b)on speeches in committee shall be applicable to the Standing Com-
mittee. "
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); MM. Amaral, N... (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs, Aguiar, MM. Andr€,
Battistuzzi (Alternate: Mr. Fenarinl), Bolinaga, Chevalier, Cuco, Diaz de Mera, Dicks, Dumont, Lord Finsberg, MM. Hughes,
Junghanns, Konen, Leccese (Alternate: De Carolis), Lr Jeune, Ottenbourgh, Scheer, von Schmude, Mrs. Soutendijk van
Appeldoorn, Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg, MM. Trabacchini, Visibelli, N... .
N.B. Ihe names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submittel by Mr. Thompsoa, Chainnan and Rapporteur)
l. In the draft decision above, a complete
redrafting of provisions relating to the Standing
Committee is proposed.
2. In the light of the conditions in which the
first two meetings of the committee were con-
vened and held, a number of remarks may be
made:
3.(t) Procedure for discussions in the Standing
Committee, as set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of
Procedure, more closely resembles procedure
governing plenary sittings than that for com-
mittee meetings. It therefore seems simpler to
refer to Assembly procedure and indicate the
exceptions. These exceptions relate mainly to
linguistic arrangements and the participation of
the President of the Assembly, at the same time
Chairman of the Committee, in discussions and
votes.
Reference to procedure applicable to the
Assembly means that there is no longer any need
for the details given in the present text of Rule
15 relating to the rights of rapporteurs and the
timeJimit for submitting reports.
a.(ii) The committee acts on behalf of the
Assembly and the texts it adopts are not subject
to ratification by the latter. Hence, the words " if
necessary " should be deleted so that the rel-
evant phrase reads " the Standing Committee
[acts] on behalf of the Assembly ".
S.(iii) There appeared to be a juridical vacuum
in respect of the convocation of urgent meetings
of the Standing Committee in the absence of
specific provisions in the Rules of Procedure
relating to the event of the Standing Committee
considering a matter which had not been the
subject of a committee report.
6. Two methods of convocation should
therefore be distinguished in the Rules of Pro.
cedure:
(a) convocation by the President of the
Assembly to examine committee
reports included in the agenda of the
Standing Committee by the Presi-
dential Committee;
(b) convocation of urgent meetings which
might be requested in conditions
similar to those for an extraordinary
session (Rule 3). In this case, it would
be for the President of the Assembly
to take the necessary steps to ensure
that the Standing Committee may
express its opinion on a text prepared
by a rapporteur and have appropriate
information.
7. Since, unlike the Standing Committee of
the Council of Europe, the Standing Committee
of the WEU Assembly may not have a matter
placed before it by a committee, there is no need
to make special provision for referring to the
Assembly a report examined by the Standing
Committee.
8. Such referral could result only from a
decision by the Standing Committee, which it is
hard to imagine if it has had a matter placed
before it by the Presidential Committee.
9. In respect ofurgent procedure, it is for the
President of the Assembly to hold consultations
in order to be prepared for such procedure to be
refused. To this end, the President of the
Assembly should, as far as possible, consult the
chairmen of political groups, without being
obliged to do so and a fortiori without their
unanimous approval being required.
10. By assimilation with the convocation of
an extraordinary session in accordance with
Rule 3, it is proposed that urgent meetings may
be convened at the request of not less than a
quarter of members of the Assembly. In
practice, this would be done at the request of
one or more chairmen of political groups or del-
egations. It would be allowable if the number of
members of political groups or delegations
requesting urgent procedure were equal to not
less than a quarter of representatives and substi-
tutes.
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II'INTERP*"nTRUr?'oIt"#ilgNrYrffi'Tf; 
J.'rHtf; BNTPR,.EDURE
Time-limit for tabling requests
for uryent procedure
l. During the last session, two motions for a
resolution with a request for urgent procedure
were tabled during the penultimate sitting, one
on the situation in East Timor and the other on
crimes committed in former Yugoslavia.
2. Finally, at the last sitting a motion for a
recommendation on emergency assistance to
Somalia was tabled without a request for urgent
procedure. To be significant, this action had to be
brought to the attention of the Council very
swiftly without waiting for its possible adoption by
the Standing Committee at the end of March.
3. The problems raised by the situation in
former Yugoslavia, East Timor and Somalia
were known well before the opening of the
session.
4. The appropriate rule should be inter-
preted as follows:
(i) a motion with a request for urgent
procedure should be tabled at the
beginning of the session;
(ii) the tabling of a motion with a request
for urgentprocedure at the end ofthe
session is justified only if the motion
concerns events that have occurred
during the session.
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Draft Recommendation
on the interpretation of Aaicle XII of tlu nodifun Brussels Treoty
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the Council has so far given no juridically-based justification for its decision to
consider that the high contracting parties to the Paris Protocols of 23rd October 1954 would be
authorised to release themselves from their commitments in 1998;(it) Recalling that, in its answer to Written Questions 306, 309, 314 and 315, the Council at last
agreed to examine the Assembly's views on this matter;(iit) Considering that the Assembly's competence to interpret, on the same basis as the Council, the
Protocols of 23rd October 1954 is established by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;(iv) Recalling that, in its answer to Recommendation 372, the Council assured the Assembly that
" no substantial reforms of WEU will be undertaken withour prior consultation with the
Assembly ";
(v) Considering that the Paris Protocols are not simply a revision of the 1948 Brussels Treaty but
establish a new treaty because:
(a) they are directed towards new goals;
(b) they are the basis of a European union whose vocation is to be enlarged and entirely new
means are implemented;
(c) the Paris Agreements are not limited to Protocol No. I which modifies the Brussels Treaty
but include three other protocols whose aim is different;
(d) they create a new organisation;
(e) for the first time they associate the parliaments of the high contracting parties with the appli-
cation of an alliance;(vil Considering it quite clear that the high contracting parties, when signing and ratifying the Paris
Agreements, considered that the essential provisions of those agreements should remain in force for
half a century because of Article XII of the new treaty,
RrcoulrlrNos rHAT rne Coutcu-
Concur with its juridically-based interpretation of Article XII of the modilied Brussels Treaty,
according to which the 1954 Paris Agreements establish a new treaty, and conform to it.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submiued by Mn Goercas, Rapporteur)
1. On 15th April 1993, the Council commu-
nicated its answer to four written questions
(306, 309, 314 and 315) relating to the decision
taken by the governments and expressed by the
WEU Council, as in the text of the Maastricht
Treaty, to consider that the denunciation clause
provided for in Article XII of the modified
Brussels Treaty could be invoked at the end of a
period of fifty years starting with the entry into
force of the Brussels Treaty, i.e. 25th August
1948.
2. The Council thereby rejected the request
made by the Assembly, the principle of which
had been accepted by Mr. Colombo, then
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council, at the joint
meeting between the Presidential Committee
and the Council in Rome on lSth November
1992, that independent juridical experts be con-
sulted. On 21st April 1993, Mr. Colombo told
the Standing Committee that this proposal had
effectively been put to the Council by the
Chairmanship-in-Oflice but the Council had
rejected it. The Assembly has no knowledge of a
meeting of juridical experts from member coun-
tries on this matter which means that, at best,
the government representatives consulted their
ministries' legal experts in a purely national
framework on the basis of a question of whose
wording we have no knowledge in order to
obtain answers whose terms were not notified to
us. In other words, they did not give the
Assembly's request serious consideration.
3. The answer to the four written questions
confirms this impression, on the one hand
because it does not reply, any more than the
Council's earlier statements, to the Assembly's
arguments set out in paragraphs 75 to 83 of Doc-
ument 1261. Nor do the arguments in paragraph
B seem really appropriate:
* A legal obligation to submit diverging
interpretations or disputes to independent
arbitration cannot be found in the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, nor in any other
binding act applicable within WEU.
There is no evidence of a constitutional
practice within WEU envisaging inde-
pendent arbitration upon request by one
of its bodies. Furthermore, there exists no
general legal obligation upon the bodies
and organs of an international organ-
isation to submit diverging interpreta-
tions or disputes to independent arbi-
tration. However the Council does not
foreclose the possibility for further evalu-
ation of additional considerations that the
Assembly might wish to present. "
4. Encouraged by Mr. Colombo, the Assem-
bly paid heed to the last sentence of this para-
graph of the Council's answer and instructed
your Rapporteur to set out the arguments that it
had taken as a basis for challenging the view
expressed by the Council.
5. Paragraph B of the Council's answer
seems highly questionable in three respects.
First, it takes no account of Article IX of the
treaty, which gives the Assembly the right to
scrutinise the Council's application of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. It is evident that this right
covers whatever may be the Council's interpre-
tation of the treaty, and hence of its Article XII,
and that rejecting the Assembly's views out of
hand conforms neither to the spirit nor to the
letter of the treaty. Admittedly, the Council's
point of view would be reasonable if it were
accompanied by proper arguments, but the
authoritative way in which it has acted in such a
matter is not acceptable when the Assembly had
put forward detailed arguments that have not
really been refuted.
6. The Council's answer to the four ques-
tions should probably be compared to the
attitude it has constantly adopted towards the
Assembly in recent years, and particularly in
recent months. It is constantly trying to play
down the Assembly's r6le or even silence it,
although it has played an essential part in the
reactivation of WEU, especially through its
communications to the press. This was again
plain when the Torrej6n satellite centre was
inaugurated on 28th April, although the
Assembly had played a leading r6le in preparing
the decisions that led to the centre being set up,
and in the priority the Council gave to
informing the European Parliament after its
ministerial meetings. There seem to be
increasing indications that the Council is pre-
paring to seize the first suitable opportunity, for
instance the so-called * 1998 deadline", to free
itself as discreetly as possible from an Assembly
that bothers it.
7. Secondly, the Assembly has never
requested arbitration although, in three places,
the Council's answer says that it has, but it has
constantly, and in vain, insisted that the Council
obey the law founded in the modified Brussels
Treaty and turn to an impartial, competent
authority to formulate this law.
8. Finally, in referring to possible " arbi-
tration " and the absence of * a constitutional
practice ", the Council takes no account of the
realities of the modified Brussels Treaty and the
Europe of today. The modified Brussels Treaty
163
DOCUMENT I369
is the first treaty of alliance that makes action by
the governments in a specific area subject to
scrutiny by a parliamentary assembly. Hence,
there cannot be a precedent outside WEU. Nor
is one to be found in the framework of WEU
because, although there have sometimes been
differences between the Council and the
Assembly over the application of the treaty, this
is the first time there has been a difference over
the treaty itself. Consequently there is no prec-
edent that can be invoked or rejected. The
Council was free to consult independent experts.
It did not wish to do so because it wants an
interpretation of Article IX of the treaty that is
as restrictive as possible about the rights and
duties of the Assembly.
9. If we now examine the arguments put
forward by the Council on the substance of the
problem, it should be noted that, on two points,
it admits that the Assembly is right:
(i) lt rccognises that Article XII of the
modified Brussels Treaty is * a denun-
ciation clause, not a termination
clause ", which allows a satisfactory
interpretation of the French text of
Article J.4, paragraph 6, of the
Maastricht Treaty, referring to the
" 6ch6ance " of 1998 in the context of
Article XII of the Brussels Treaty: this
should be the " date " of 1998, as the
English text says, and not the end of
the treaty.
(i/ It says that Article XII specifies 25th
August 1998 as the date of application
of the denunciation clause. However,
as this article lays down that a period
of one year must elapse between the
denunciation of the treaty by a
member country and it taking effect,
it accepts implicitly that termination
ofthe treaty through the denunciation
of all the high contracting parties
would be possible only in 1999.
10. However, there are still serious differ-
ences between the views of the Council and
those of the Assembly and, in the answer to the
four written questions and in all its earlier state-
ments, the Council attributes to the Assembly
arguments that it has never used and does not
answer those that it has actually used.
11. The Council persists in deriding the
serious arguments put forward by the Assembly
by pretending to believe that the latter considers
the change in the numbers of the articles of the
modified Brussels Treaty that are maintained in
the modified treaty, in particular Article XII, to
be an argument in favour of its views. This it has
never done. [t has advanced infinitely more rel-
evant reasons of another kind.
12. The Assembly can but approve the
Council's declaration that " a multilateral treaty
establishes a community of interests, rights and
obligations, the duration of which must be
explicitly defined and accepted by all the
parties. [n no case can an extension ofduration
be imposed to parties by other parties subse-
quently acceding ". What the Assembly has
maintained is that the 1954 Paris Agreements
established a new treaty and not an amended
version of the 1948 Brussels Treaty.
13. In order to $asp this fact properly, the
background in 1954 should be recalled. On 3fth
August, theFrench National Assembly, in a vote
on a previous question, rejected the treaty
setting up a European Defence Community.
This treaty, which had been signed in 1952 by
the six countries of the European Coal and Steel
Community, was to allow the Federal Republic
of Germany to accede to the North Atlantic
Treaty, which the United States insisted on as a
condition for deploying its forces on the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic in the framework
of NATO. The United Kingdom was not a sig-
natory. The NATO countries therefore had to
find a means of allowing the Federal Republic to
participate in NATO while satisfying the French
Parliament on a number of points, inter alia by
ensuring:
(i) a link between Community Europe
and defence Europe as the Council
had done for handling economic
matters with the United Kingdom,
which, in 1954, did not belong to the
ECSC nor, subsquently, to the EEC
or Euratom;
(ii) the participation of the United
Kingdom in the organisation of
Europe's defence;
(iii) controlled limitation of the levels of
forces and armaments of the Federal
Republic of Germany which, at the
same time, placed the latter on an
equal footing with its allies;
(iv) compatibility between these obliga-
tions and the participation of member
countries in NATO.
14. In view ofthe urgency ofthe decisions to
be taken, the nine countries concerned, i.e. the
seven countries which were to accede to WEU,
the United States and Canada, decided to use
the text of the 1948 Brussels Treaty as a basis for
negotiating a satisfactory treaty at the con-
ference they held in London from 28th Sep
tember to 3rd October 1954. The 1948 treaty
was obviously still in force at that time, but it
had lost all practical impact since, in 1950, the
exercise of Western Union's responsibilities had
been transferred to NATO and the draft treaty
on the EDC was intended to replace it com-
pletely. This was also the purpose of the four
protocols comprising the Paris Agreements of
23rd October 1954 which came into force on
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6th May 1955, of which only Protocol No. I
modified the Brussels Treaty, whereas the other
protocols did not refer to it but to the text of the
draft treaty setting up the EDC. This proves that
these protocols could take up sections ofa treaty
that never came into force just as well as sec-
tions of a treaty which, after having been rat-
ified, had fallen into abeyance.
15. The reasons that led the Assembly to con-
sider that the Paris Agreements were not a
revision of the Brussels Treaty but a new treaty
may be summed up as follows:
(i) The aim of the treaty is new. The 1948
treaty was a complement to the action taken by
the nations that united during the second world
war to put an end to the grip of National
Socialism in Europe. At the time the United
States was completing the evacuation of its
expeditionary force from Europe, the European
countries that had participated in the anti-Nazi
coalition signed a treaty designed to maintain an
alliance against any re-emergence of Nazism in
Germany and, on this point, the 1948 treaty was
explicit since it specified that the high con-
tracting parties were resolved " to take such
steps as may be held necessary in the event
of renewal by Germany of a policy of
aggression ".
On the contrary, the Paris Agreements
take into account the birth of a new organisation
aiming at " the progressive integration of
Europe ", which makes it one of the main foun-
dations of the wider European Union most
recently defined in the Maastricht Treaty in
which reunified Germany has, from the outset,
been an essential part. Thus, while the 1948
Brussels Treaty was the last stage in the history
of a divided Europe, the 1954 Paris Protocols
marked one of the first stages in the building of a
new Europe, more widespread and determined
to unite its members by a process of inte-
gration.
(ii) The 1954 Agreements concern a new
entity. The accession of Germany and ltaly to
the Paris Agreements was not, as the Council
claims, a simple enlargement of the Brussels
Treaty to include two new members; in view of
the importance of those countries, it completely
transformed the nature of the coalition by giving
it a European dimension. From this point of
view, the accession of Germany and ltaly to the
Paris Protocols is in no way comparable with the
accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified
Brussels Treaty because the latter was simply an
enlargement of the part of Europe that had
acceded to the modified treaty. On the contrary,
the accession of Germany to a treaty specifically
directed against it would have been nonsensical.
(iii) The Paris Agreements established a
new organisation, as indicated by the new title.
The Western Union of 1948 was the prolon-
gation, for the countries concerned, ofthe 1945
alliance. The Western European Union of 1954
was no longer just an alliance but the military
aspect of the building of a new Europe whose
defence was organised in the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance, as underlined in Article IV of
the new treaty. The object of WEU was no
longer military deployment since, in 1950,
Western Union had practically disappeared in
favour of NATO, but to allow all European
countries to participate in NATO through the
restoration of mutual conflrdence, based on the
controlled limitation of armaments.
(iv) The Paris Agreements are not limited
to Protocol No. / modifying the Brussels Treaty
but also include Protocols Nos. II, III and IV
which are completely new compared with the
1948 treaty, although an integral part ofwhat is
called the " modified Brussels Treaty ", as spec-
ified in Article I of Protocol No. I. This means
that the convenient name of modified Brussels
Treaty is merely a semantic facility and that it is
the protocols adopted on 23rd October 1954 as a
whole that form a treaty which has in common
with the 1948 treaty only the fact that certain
paragraphs were drawn from it, whereas its sub-
stance is totally different. The title of modified
Brussels Treaty might well have been abandoned
and replaced by the more accurate title of Paris
Agreements. [t is obviously the new entity set up
by the Paris Agreements that is concerned by
Article XII of the 1954 treaty, even if its text is
identical with that of Article X of the 1948
treaty. It should also be noted that Article VI of
Protocol No. I specifies that * the present pro-
tocol and the other protocols listed in Article I
above ", i.e. Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, * shall
enter into force when... the instrument of
accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to
the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited
with the Government of the United States of
America", which was done on 6th May 1955.
This means that the Paris Agreements do not
have as their sole origin the 1948 treaty but also
the 1949 Washington Treaty which is one of the
bases for their validity, as is also the draft treaty
setting up the European Defence Community, as
we have seen. This applies to all the protocols,
i.e. also to Protocol No. I modifying the 1948
treaty. How can it be claimed, therefore, that the
Brussels Treaty was anything other than a text
used by those who drafted Protocol No. I
because it was convenient and that there is dejure continuity between the two treaties?
Let us suppose that Protocol No. I should
be considered as a simple revision of the
Brussels Treaty. Should it then be concluded
that Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, which have
nothing to do with the 1948 treaty, would
remain valid while Protocol No. I might be
denounced as from 1998? Article I of Protocol
No. I rules out such reasoning, which would
moreover be absurd. The four protocols as a
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whole form a single, new treaty that came into
force on 6th May 1955.
(v) These agreements have new basic prin-
ciples. Instead of bringing states together in a
coalition, it invokes the representation of the
people, in Article IX, which gives WEU a parlia-
mentary dimension that the 1948 Western
Union did not have.
(vi) lt is clear that,for the signatories, the
controlled limitation of forces and armaments,
the foundation of the reconciliation of the nations
of Europe, was intended to last at least half a
century, because no one could foresee in 1954
that this reconciliation would come about so
swiftly and completely as has been the case. It is
in this perspective that the Paris Protocols were
ratified by the parliaments of the signatory
countries.
16. The entire subsequent evolution of WEU,
its enlargement and the r6le attributed to it by
the Maastricht Treaty confirm that all that the
treaty establishing it has in common with the
1948 treaty is merely a number of expressions
that the authors of the treaty had drafted well
enough for them to be applied, in an entirely
new situation, to different states for the pursuit
of aims that were not those of the signatories of
the 1948 treaty. It is regrettable that the Council
is resorting to verbal skirmishes to hasten
unduly the time when member countries will be
able to break away from the treaty.
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Draft Recommendation
on Eurupeat secarity plicy 
- 
,eply to the thirty-eighth aaaual report
of thc huncil
The Assembly,
(i) Aware that the replacement of the former threat of a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact by the
risk of smaller-scale conflicts has not improved stability in Europe;
(iil Considering that in these circumstances all existing security organisations have a r6le to play in
ensuring and preserving peace and security;
(iii) Considering that Western European countries will have to assume their responsibilities in a
number of security issues which are apparently less vital for their North American allies;
(iv) Noting that, apart from the criteria for recognition of new states adopted by the European
Council, there is an urgent need for a more detailed definition of the rights of peoples to self-
determination;
(v) Noting that, without close co-operation between member states of the EC in intelligence-
gathering and analysis, a common European foreign and security policy cannot be alert and effective;
(vi) Aware that the deep changes in Europe since the end of the cold war are influencing the
respective responsibilities of both the United States and Western Europe to such a degree that the
transformation of the old transatlantic bargain into a new partnership should be considered, as this
could reinforce the existing close relationship and safeguard it for the future;
(viil Aware that geostrategic changes have also influenced the r6le of nuclear weapons in European
security;
(uiifl Noting that the work of the WEU military planning cell is of the greatest importance in pre-
paring any operational activity by WEU;
(ix) Considering that, for the implementation of an effective European foreign and security policy, it
is also vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to start making contingency plans for crisis man-
agement and conflict solution;
(x) Recalling the recommendations already passed on the issues of conllict prevention and peace-
making in the former Yugoslavia;
(xi) Considering that a European security policy implies:
- 
assistance to Central and European states, often with no experience of democracy, to find
their way to pluralist societies;
- 
financial and economic support for states to help them move away from command economies
towards market economies;
- 
cultural, educational and financial support to help states, peoples and minorities deal with the
strife unbridled by the unfreezing of historic rivalries which, until recently, have been sup
pressed by imposed collectivism;
(xiil Considering that this policy must give priority to the following goals:
- 
to prevent any cross-border attack by one European state on another and to work towards
ensuring that this principle is accepted by all European states;
- 
to ensure that, within states, different ethnic or religious goups tolerate each other, minority
rights are respected and to ensure that, ifconflict does arise in one state, neighbouring states
' are not drawn into the conflict;
- to ensure that Europe is able to resist any covert or overt threat to its security from outside
Europe and is in a position to respond to crises, aggression and arms proliferation outside
Europe;
- 
to provide a collaborative structure for western security ties with the former Soviet Union;
- 
to encourage democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the
former Soviet republics and encourage the development of shared liberal democratic values;
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to seek to ensure stability in Central and Eastern Europe through extensive economic
co-operation and a fully-developed system of conflict resolution, peace-keeping and possibly
peace-making;
to avoid the re-emergence of nationalism amongst European armies; and
to maintain a close relationship with the United States, based on a new partnership in order to
pursue common economic, political and security interests,
RrcourrmNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr.
1. Start to examine the aspects concerning European security which should be part of a new
Atlantic partnership;
2. Re-examine the r6le of both United States and European nuclear weapons in European security
in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Give priority to the establishment of contingency plans for crisis management, conflict solution
and the employment of forces under WEU auspices, including decisions regarding the necessary
command, control and communication arrangements;
4. Establish as a matter of exceptional urgency ways of ensuring that CSCE and WEU are in a
position to prevent the conflict in the Balkans from spreading, especially to Kosovo and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
5. Always inform the Assembly of issues arising from ministerial and other meetings and to do so
before communicating with the European Parliament.
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I. Introduction
1. Why yet another report on European
security policy? Most of the readers of this
report are only too familiar with the
organisations, passwords, secret competitions
and failures connected with this issue. Why then
discuss it again?
2. The reason may be that there are still too
many changes on the European scene which
could influence thoughts on security, but it also
may be because passwords can be put in a dif-
ferent order, which ultimately may provide the
key for a solution to Europe's security problems.
The present report neither claims to be
exhaustive, nor boasts of providing the final
solution. It will not dwell extensively on all the
aspects involved, but rather focus on some of
them. It may offer some ideas which could help
in finding the elements for a solution.
II. Competition and co-operution
3. Ironically, the end of the cold war has
brought instability rather than greater stability:
the cold war may have been unfriendly but it
had the virtue, in international affairs, of sta-
bility and simplicity.
4. From the perspective of the western allies,
the task was a simple, albeit expensive one, of
deterring a single massive military threat from
the East. American leadership of and com-
mitment to NATO was unquestioned. NATO's
overriding imperative was military. Whilst
NATO, as an organisation, had a political
structure and character, the political aspect of
the organisation was very much secondary to the
military. Consequently security was naturally
perceived in narrow military terms and the non-
military aspects of security policy, e.g. political,
economic and social measures and contacts,
respect for human rights, were barely taken into
account. Within the alliance this had an
extremely important consequence: the
organisation was greater than the sum of its
parts since an individual country's concern over
a specific issue could be overcome in the light of
the over-riding military imperatives.
5. The collapse of the Soviet Union swept
away this familiar landscape and introduced
greater uncertainty and insecurity. Compared
with the former monolithic threat posed by the
Warsaw Pact, the multifaceted problems of
intrastate interethnic conflict, mass migration
Explanatory Memomndum
(submitted by Mr. Manwl, Ropprteur)
and instability in the Middle East and in the
southern Mediterranean are far more intrac-
table. The response to the security vacuum in
eastern Europe has been to improvise. The last
three years have seen the hectic, not always
co-ordinated, creation of new security instru-
ments and adaptation of existing institutions.
Thus NATO and WEU have been reformed, the
CSCE has been transformed and extended and
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council has
been created. Partly in response to internal
developments and geostrategic changes, the EC
has become an additional factor in European
security. Post-Maastricht, WEU has been given
a dual identity. It will become the EC defence
identity and reinforce the Atlantic Alliance by
acting as the European pillar of NATO.
6. Ideally, Europe's security institutions
should have reacted to the continent's problems
in concert and in doing so achieved an eco-
nomical division of labour between them. In
reality, it could be argued that Europe's security
institutions have, at times, overlapped and com-
peted. Although CSCE, NATO and WEU
communiqu6s constantly refer to the need for
complementarity and transparency, until quite
recently duplication and sometimes even secrecy
have been common. For example, NATO has
sought to prevent obsolescence by transferring
its rationale away from the essentially military
need to counter a specific military threat into
the more political aspects of security. Among
other things, it set up the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council (NACC) in December
l99l to act as a forum for security discussion
and liaison between all the members of NATO
and the former Warsaw Pact. Yet this new " son
of NATO' , although possessing a smaller mem-
bership, shares common interests with the
CSCE. Similarly, in its traditional defence r6le
NATO has faced implicit competition from
WEU. It may appear peculiar that there are two
western naval task forces in the Adriatic moni-
toring the imposition of United Nations sanc-
tions against Serbia and Montenegro, one under
NATO and the other under WEU command. It
may be due only to the fact that the local NATO
Commander is an Italian and that, since Italy
holds the chairmanship of the WEU Council,
the commander of the WEU squadron is also
Italian, that co-ordination between the two
forces has proved successful. Since June 1992,
various attempts have been made to avoid such
parallelism and to improve co-ordination
between Europe's security institutions. There is
a well-founded hope that these improvements
will be effective.
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7. A great deal ofthe discussion ofEuropean
security has concentrated on the relative status
of the various security organisations concerned
with Europe 
- 
NATO, and the NACC, WEU
and its link with the EC; the CSCE; and the
United Nations Security Council.
8. There has been extensive use of architec-
tural metaphors - WEU as the European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance - and of the need for
these various structures to be complementary,
interlocking and multilayered. Additionally, the
question has been raised over which institution
should have the primary r6le in European
security.
9. Such reactions are all quite natural, as is
the fact that in this time of great flux, every indi-
vidual organisation is defending its own
position, trying to extend its area of interest or
to prove its indispensability.
10. So much has been said and written about
these issues that the need for another report may
be questioned. Still, it seems useful to review the
present state of affairs, since changes are taking
place at such a rapid pace that the existing inter-
national organisations, unwielding by nature,
cannot always react appropriately.
11. The much-debated new strategic concept,
for instance, adopted at NATO's Rome summit
in November 1991, has already been overtakenin many respects, if only because of the
implosion of the Soviet Union and its conse-
quences. Moreover, it takes little account of
security in the Mediterranean, which is increas-
ingly important for Europe.
12. Therefore it seems useful to review the
security environment once again, to look at the
potential threats or risks to peace both from
within and without Europe and then decide how
these should be met, preferably by existing
security organisations.
III. Sources of European insecurity
(a) Russia
13. Perhaps more because of a long standing
habit than based upon objective reasoning,
many Europeans are still continuing to see
Russia, the largest successor state to the former
Soviet Union, as the greatest threat to their
security. It should be noted, however, that since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December
1991, the former monolithic politico-military
machine no longer exists and that the potentially
dangerous combination of capabilities and
intentions has come to an end.
The prospect that a weakened Russia
still threaten Western Europe is remote.
if a government were to come to power
wished to re-establish Russia as a major
military power, the weakness of the economy
would make it very diffrcult to reconstruct its
former awe-inspiring military capability.
Nuclear weapons may be the one major
exception to this.
I 5. In the actual state of affairs, there can be
very little hope that Russia will be a prosperous
country in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the
group ofseven leading industrialised nations has
provided support for President Yeltsin with a
$43 billion financial aid package, explicity tied
to continued economic and political reform in
Russia and tacitly linked to continued Russian
co-operation or foreign policy issues. However,
even with this substantial aid package and,
hopefully, follow-up aid programmes, it will be a
long time before the country and its population
will be prosperous enough to constitute a politi-
cally stable state.
(b) Other successor states of the former Soviet
Union
16. There is no guarantee that the other suc-
cessor states of the former Soviet Union will
become liberal non-militaristic democratic
r6gimes. None can be regarded as posing a con-
ventional military threat to the West. Three of
these states, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan,
still have nuclear weapons on their territory.
Whilst there is some opposition in Ukraine to
the idea that Russia should be the sole successor
state with nuclear weapons, all three have made
declarations that they intend to get rid of them
and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-
nuclear states. It is essential that there be strong
international pressure on all three states to keep
to the undertakings which they have given.
17. At the moment, negotiations between
Russia and Ukraine on the application of the
Start I Treaty are still in deadlock. As a conse-
quence, unlike Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,
Ukraine has not yet ratified this treaty.
18. It is therefore not just obstructing the full
implementation of Start [, but also the entry into
force of Start II. Ukraine has stated that it will
ratify Start I only if the nuclear powers provide
adequate guarantees for Ukraine's security, if it
obtains suffrcient financial aid to dismantle its
nuclear weapons and if it is allowed to trade
directly with buyers of the fissionable material
contained in its nuclear warheads. During a
recent visit to the United States, the Ukrainian
Foreign Minister, Anatoly Zlenko, estimated the
cost of dismantling his country's nuclear arsenal
at $2.8 billion, which would also take account of
all economic and ecological factors. The main
drive behind Ukraine's attitude is most
probably a tactic to obtain maximum assistance
in the republic's conversion to a non-nuclear
status. However, there is also a movement in the
republic which considers the maintenance of
a nuclear status as a way of keeping the
14.
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West's attention and of protecting itself against
Russia.
19. Western Europe has not yet come to terms
with the geopolitical position of Ukraine, which
has a 700 000 strong armed force and shares
borders with Romania, Hungary, the Slovak
Republic and Poland. Earlier fears of an overt
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in par-
ticular over the Black Sea fleet and the Crimean
Peninsula, have not materialised but Ukraine's
relations with Russia, its most important trading
partner and principal source of oil, remain
tense. Apparently, Russia takes the view that
both republics are far too interdependent to be
able to live without very close relations. It hopes
that, in the future, such relations could be
institutionalised one way or anotherr.
20. Recently, Ukraine's Defence Minister,
General Konstantyn Morozov, accused Russia
of violating an agfeement among former Soviet
republics on the control of nuclear weapons by
keeping them under the direct control of Rus-
sia's defence ministry rather than under thejoint command of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, as was agreed in December
1991. He also said that Russia was using the
Black Sea Fleet, stationed in the Crimea, to
subvert Ukrainian independence r.
21. Since the western nations are extremely
hesitant about forging closer links with this
republic, it has turned its attention to the
Middle East and Asia. Indeed, there may be
some doubt over Ukraine's capacity to develop
its economy and to stabilise the country's
political and democratic structures if it does not
succeed in establishing good relations with
Russia, but Western Europe should not neglect
its relations with this republic. Such neglect
could easily create an uncomfortable source of
instability in Eastern Europe. Together with the
United States, Western Europe should continue
to exert pressure on Ukraine to ratify START I
and give up nuclear weapons. At the same time,
however, the same pressure should be exerted on
Russia to sign a treaty with Ukraine securing its
borders and sovereignty. If Ukraine really has
chosen the path of economic and political
reform, the West should help it as generously as
it is helping Russia.
(c) Migration and refugees
22. Economic collapse and ethnic conflicts
resulting in civil war, massacres and repression
in Central Europe, the republics of the former
Soviet Union and the Balkans have already
resulted in large numbers of migrants and ref-
ugees, who, understandably, have all moved
westward.
23. At the moment, the conflict in
ex-Yugoslavia has already caused the dis-
placement of more than two million people
within its borders, while more than half a
million took refuge in other European coun-
tries.
24. In each ofthe years 1990, l99l and 1992,
more than a million people left Eastern Europe
and the territory of the Soviet Union for the
West.
25. In the years to come, Central European
countries will remain net exporters of labour
and also transit countries through which citizens
of the republics of the former Soviet Union will
try to move to Western Europe.
26. Another important source of migration
towards. Europe, almgs] 
.exclusively. in-spire_d by
economic reasons is Africa, in particular North
Africa. At the moment, approximately 6 million
people of North African origin are living in the
member states of the EC, half of them having
settled in France.
27. In particular, France, Italy, Portugal and
Spain are worried about the prospect offurther
waves of immigration from Africa, where eco-
nomic growth is too low by far to absorb the
growth rate of the population. Moreover, the
rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the
southern Mediterranean region could lead to
political upheaval and give rise to massive
migration to southern Europe.
28. Many of the migrants from the East and
from the South have not, or do not want to
assimilate into Western European society. For
different reasons, many of them prefer to keep
and cultivate their cultural identity. For many,
accustomed to newcomers seeking to assimilate
and integrate, this multiculturalism is seen as a
threat; however, because individuals or groups
do not conform to the accepted nonns of the
host country does not place their loyalty in
question. In fact, multiculturalism may in the
longer term enrich the lives of all in the host
country.
29. In the present economic situation, many
indigenous Europeans consider the immigrants
as a threat to theirjobs and a further burden on
the well-developed social security system in
Western Europe. Extremist political parties are
exploiting these issues leading to heightened ten-
srons.
30. Central and Western European govern-
ments are well aware of all the problems
involved, and they have recently started to
adopt various measures aimed at countering
both the real and the perceived threat of
migration and refugees. Among these measures
are legal precautions in the form of visa legis-
lation and more restrictive asylum laws, rein-
forced border controls, practical measures to
cope with refugees and diplomatic efforts. Mostl. Financial Times, 5th May 1993.
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of this, however, is still being done at a bilateral
level.
31. On 7th May 1993, Germany signed a
treaty with Poland to control the flood of
migrants seeking asylum in Germany. The treaty
includes German financial support to provide
shelter for immigrants in Poland and to improve
surveillance of Poland's borders. Germany is
trying to negotiate a similar treaty with the
Czech Republic. Separate agreements have been
signed with Bulgaria and Romania allowing ref-
ugees who agree to return to those countries to
be sent back. Germany alone received 438 191
applications for asylum in 1992, compared with
256 ll2 in l99l and 160 000 in the first four
months of 1993. Most applicants come from
ex-Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
An estimated 100 000 applicants came in
through Poland in 1992. Poland hopes to reach
agreements with Hungary, Ukraine and other
neighbours in order to control illegal immi-
grants.
32. At multilateral level, two conferences
have been held on illegal immigration: the first
in Berlin in October 1991 and the second in
Budapest in February 1993, but neither ofthem
was very successful. In Budapest, several non-
obligatory recommendations were adopted but
they had only reference value.
33. The European states most concerned,
Germany and Austria, proposed to establish a
special aid fund in order to support the Central
European " front-line states ". This proposal was
not adopted because of opposition from
southern European countries, France and the
United Kingdom, which argued that they were
the countries which first had to confront migra-
tions from the Maghreb, Black Africa and the
Commonwealth countries.
34. While it is quite clear that the apparent
and growing migration and refugee problems
cannot be solved on a national or bilateral scale,
there still is an astonishing lack of European sol-
idarity to find a common solution.
(d) Ethnic and nationalist conflicts
35. Since in recent years, the risks arising
from nationalist or ethnic conflicts have become
only too familiar, they are increasingly domi-
nating the European security discussion.
36. The reasons for such conflicts are only too
well known to warrant repetition.
37. These conflicts do not immediately
threaten other European states directly and the
ensuing security problem is not one of con-
structing defences against a potential attack. The
problem is the very different one of conflict res-
olution, or preferably, conflict prevention.
38. Indeed, conflict resolution often means
that a conflict has reached a stage of violence,
where people have been stirred up to such a
degree that reason does no longer apply.
Moreover, history has shown that the inter-
vention of external powers in armed local or
regional conflicts has been the mechanism by
which such conflicts have spread, and also
because it appears to be very diflicult not to take
sides.
39. In the new pattern of international rela-
tions which is actively taking shape, the major
actors on the international scene were, and are,
not prepared for conflict resolution 
- 
which is
not surprising. During the cold war, conflict res-
olution was hardly on their agenda. When con-
flicts did arise, they were usually, though not
always, seen as part of an East-West confron-
tation. The question was whether, by supporting
one side in the conflict, the world position of the
USSR 
- 
or the United States, as the case might
be 
- 
could be weakened. The Security Council
had little power in this period, and there was no
other international organisation with any
interest in trying to resolve conflicts. Conse-
quently, the process of conflict resolution is at
present very much a matter of trial and error.
40. International institutions are needed
which try to defuse disputes before they become
armed conflicts. Conflicts which spring from
local nationalist rivalries, once started, are very
difficult to stop. Atrocities are committed;
reports are exaggerated. These conflicts are often
driven by deep hatred and perpetuated by the
desire for revenge. Once large numbers of
irregular forces have acquired weapons, it is
very difficult to negotiate a cease-fire agreement
which is effective. The new institution, under
the CSCE, of a High Commissioner for Minor-
ities is, for this reason, a valuable idea, because
action can be taken before a conflict breaks out.
There is a need for early warning and early
action.
41. Early warning requires more extensive
intelligence-gathering and analysis of facts. It
should be the duty of some international insti-
tution to prepare dossiers on possible sources of
conflict of this kind. Fact-finding cannot be
done properly by ten-day visits from delegations
whose members often have no previous famili-
arity with the region. When the Carter Centre
decided to try to mediate between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, the first year was spent in fact-finding.
Non-governmental organisations can also help
to provide early warning; they also can, and do,
work in the field of conflict prevention.
42. For states other than those directly
engaged, there is one overriding requirement. It
is at all costs to avoid the situation so prevalent
during the cold war, with one group of states
supporting one side in the dispute or conflict,
and another group supporting the other side.
Both sides in the conflict will look for support
from other states. Ifthey obtain it, then the con-
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flict will be prolonged; the states backing dif-
ferent sides will themselves get embroiled, and
may supply weapons and volunteers; and there
is a much greater risk that the conflict will
spread. It follows that there must be an attempt
to get a common approach which is agreed by all
the states which consider themselves in any way
involved. This may include some states which
are not in Europe. For instance, Islamic states
outside Europe have a clear concern with con-
flicts affecting Muslim goups in Europe.
43. In conflict resolution, the r6le of the mil-
itary is very different from its r6le in deterring
and defence against, a major act of aggression.
Military action will tend to come fairly late in
the process, after attempts at resolving the
dispute, mediation, and negotiating a cease-fire
have failed. It is important to distinguish
between military peace-keeping and military
intervention. Peace-keeping traditionally has to
have the agtreement of both sides, and peace-
keeping forces are not heavily armed. Military
interventiorf is a last resort and many conditions
would have to be fulfilled before it could be con-
sidered right.
44. Proportionality dictates that any inter-
vention must do more good or avert more harm
than the evil done in the process. In ethnic con-
flicts within states, it may often be diffrcult to
meet these conditions. To try to impose peace
on two antagonists who do not want to stop
fighting might require external forces stronger
than the sum of the two antagonists, since
outside intervention forces are quite likely to be
shot at by both sides to the conflict. It is difficult
to think of any historical example where outside
intervention in such circumstances has been suc-
cessful.
45. An agreed system of conflict resolution
may require states to take action, and possibly
send military forces, into areas where they have
no direct interest. Those with a narrow interpre-
tation of the national interest may question this:
even peace-keeping forces suffer casualties. A
broad definition of the national interest is
needed, which accepts, as part of the national
interest, work towards a more peaceful world.
The present position in Yugoslavia indicates
that many governments already accept this.
46. In a European framework, this should
lead to a * common European interest ", at a
first stage defined on a case-by-case basis, but
gradually to be based on a coherent and lasting
set of principles. Both the EC and WEU should,in close co-operation, start to define this
'common European interest " which could be a
useful tool by helping to take early policy deci-
sions in future conflicts which threaten Europe's
security.
47. Finally, it should be noted here again that
substantial European support for the estab-
lishment of market economies, economic devel-
opment and the establishment of democratic
government structures are essential in stabilising
Central and Eastern European states and soci-
eties, a vital element of conflict prevention.
(e) Risl<s originating from outside Europe
48. Risks may emerge from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery in the Middle East and the Maghreb.
However, these risks are hardly of the order of
magnilu6s that Europe used to have to face in
military terms and it must guard against the
impetus to find an enemy substitute. Realisti-
cally, it is difficult to imagine how the states on
the southern shore of the Mediterranean could
pose any serious military challenge to European
states whilst a challenge from a state in the
Middle East would be a matter of global rather
than exclusively European concern, because of
its effect on oil supplies.
49. The most appropriate way to deal with
these risks is by action on the part ofthe interna-
tional community to introduce serious pre-
ventive measures which make this type of risk
increasingly improbable. An example is the rein-
forcement of the nuclear non-proliferation
r6gime as the result of lraq's breaches of the
non-proliferation treaty.
50. One of the best ways of dealing with
problems arising from weapons proliferation is
to negotiate a world-wide ban. This has been
done, first for biological weapons, and now for
chemical weapons. To outlaw other weapons
categories in a similar way may be considered,
but the prospects are rather slim. The Treaty on
Chemical Disarmament for instance, signed in
Paris in January 1993 by a large number of
states, was not adhered to by others such as Iraq,
North Korea, Libya and many Arab countries
which stated that they would refuse to do so as
long as Israel is not a party to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. (The members of the Arab
League except for Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait
have not signed for this reason.)
51. Non-military policies can also be used to
reduce threats of this kind. For example, North
African states could be brought into much closer
co-operation with the European Community. As
it is, they send most of their exports to Europe.
It should be possible to develop the kind of eco
nomic co.operation which, as in the European
Community, makes the idea of a military attack
highly implausible. There is a range of proposals(environmental, economic and political) to
encourage co-operative action between the states
which border the Mediterranean 2.
2. See the report on security in the Mediterranean, sub-
mitted by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee(Document l37l).
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52. As part of the arms control agenda, the
transfer of destabilising conventional weapons
must be taken more seriously so as to prevent
any future Saddam Husseins. This must imply a
more critical attitude to the arms trade. No one
would deny that countries are entitled to defend
themselves but it is perverse that at a time when
the European states are engaged in reducing
their military capabilities, under the CFE
Treaty, that they should be acting to increase the
military capability of states elsewhere in the
world.
53. Notwithstanding the many bold state-
ments made by various governments on this
subject during and immediately after the Gulf
crisis, the results of international efforts in this
field have been only very modest. [n fact, not
much more has been done than the estab-
lishment of a United Nations arms export reg-
ister. Even in the EC, the subject of a European
arms export policy seems to have been removed
from the agenda.
54. There is a strong case for trying to develop
a common policy among as many supplying
states as possible, and making that policy suffi-
ciently restrictive, so that the folly of arming
Iraq is not repeated elsewhere.
55. The final category of security risks from
outside Europe is the possibility of attacks, or
the threat of attacks, on the sources or supply
routes of commodities vital to Europe's
economy, as was the case in the Gulf crisis.
Obviously, the best means of protecting Europe
against such events is the promotion of interna-
tional order through competent bodies, in par-
ticular the United Nations. If even this cannot
prevent such aggression, the only possible
answer would be international action based on
the largest possible consensus in the framework
of the United Nations, going throueh the dif-
ferent stages as described in Chapter VII of its
Charter.
IY. Objectives of a European security policy
56. The end of the cold war and the disap-
pearance of the Soviet empire with the
re-emergence of independent states in Central,
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
dedicated to democracy and market economies
has produced a situation where internal
European security no longer depends purely
upon military power and capabilities but also
upon political, economic and cultural considera-
tions.
57. In some respects the * one Europe from
the Atlantic to the LJrals " already exists but it is
a Europe with a clear cleavage.
58. A pattern of increasingly close co-
operation in the western half of the continent is
matched by a process of disintegration in the
other half. While in the western part of the con-
tinent, the idea of settling any kind of dispute by
military force would be considered ridiculous,
this is not the case in the other parts of Europe,
where, from the Balkans to Central Asia, many
have taken up anns to reinforce their arguments
or to reach political objectives. Security in the
West is recognised as the result of a number of
factors: shared liberal democratic values,
extensive economic co-operation, tamed natio-
nalism without the suppression of patriotism
and shared sovereignty without destroying the
nation. Clearly, one objective of European
security policy should be to extend the pattern
of inter-state relations and behaviour within
Western Europe and Scandinavia to Europe as a
whole.
59. As part of this wider concept, an effective
European security policy must include:
- 
assistance to Central and European
states, often with no experience of
democracy, to find their way to plur-
alist societies;
- 
financial and economic support for
states to help them move away from
command economies towards market
economies;
- 
cultural, educational and financial
support to help states, peoples and
minorities deal with the strife unbridled
by the unfreezing of historic rivalries
which, until recently, have been sup-
pressed by imposed collectivism.
60. With these basic conditions in mind, the
objectives of a European security policy will be:
- 
to prevent any cross-border attack by
one European state on another and to
work towards ensuring that this prin-
ciple is accepted by all European
states;
- 
to ensure that within states, different
ethnic or religious goups tolerate each
other, minority rights are respected and
to ensure that, if conflict does arise in
one state, neighbouring states are not
drawn into the conflict;
- 
to ensure that Europe is able to resist
any covert or overt threat to its security
from outside Europe and is in a
position to respond to crises, aggression
and arms proliferation outside
Europe;
- 
to provide a collaborative structure for
western security ties with the former
Soviet Union;
- 
to encourage democratisation throu-
ghout Central and Eastern Europe and
the republics of the former Soviet
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republics and encourage the devel-
opment of shared liberal democratic
values;
- 
to seek to ensure stability in Central
and Eastern Europe through extensive
economic co-operation, conflict reso-
lution, peace-keeping and possibly
peace-making;
- 
to avoid the re-emergence of natio-
nalism amongst European armies; and
- 
to maintain a close relationship with
the United States, based on a new part-
nership. in order to pursue common
economic, political and security
interests.
61. Clearly the institutional instruments
needed to accomplish these tasks are more
complex than the NATO of the cold war.
62. Europe must guard against the risk of a
return to the old style geopolitics which would
see a return to a competition for national power
and influence between European states which
had reverted to essentially national security and
defence policies. This could result from a failure
of European Union as well as from the
breakdown of collective defence institutions.
63. The re-emergence of nationalism in
security and defence policies could occur as a
result of runaway ethnic strife in Central and
Eastern Europe. To give a hypothetical example:
if the German minority in Silesia were to be
victimised by a xenophobic and autocratic
rdgime in Poland, this would quickly become a
bilateral problem in the absence of successful
EC or collective security intercession.
64. Europe has, therefore, a fundamental
interest both in maintaining multilateral
security and defence policies.
Y. The future of trunsatlantic relations
65. It has been rightly pointed out that the
traditional transatlantic bargain on which the
relationship between Western Europe and the
United States was based during the cold war, has
lost most of its rationale 3. This transatlantic
bargain meant that the United States extended
its security guarantee to its West European allies
in return for Western European co-operation in
political, economic and security matters and rec-
ognition of United States leadership.
3. For the many different aspects of United States-European
relations, see Nannette Gantz and John Roper ed: Towards a
new partnership. United States-European relations in the
post-cold war era 
- 
WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
1993.
66. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the com-
munist rdgimes in Central and Eastern Europe,
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact are the main
reasons why the transatlantic bargain lost its
attractiveness. Another important reason is that,
no doubt stimulated by events in Eastern Europe,
the EC took important decisions towards eco
nomical and political integration, including the
development of a common foreign, security and
defence policy, all reflecting a gowing common
feeling to confirm and reinforce Europe's respon-
tifulity and iden
67. The virtual end of the military threat
from Eastern Europe also caused a shift in
interest from transatlantic military to economic
relations, bringing to the surface differences of
view, which until then had more or less been dis-
simulated.
68. The formerly vital importance of the
United States' vast nuclear and conventional
arsenal has diminished. With recent anns
reduction agreements for conventional arms and
for tactical and strategic nuclear arms, there are
prospects for a reasonable conventional balance
in Europe 
- 
for those political and military die-
hards who continue to think in terms of antago-
nistic blocs 
- 
while, in principle, British and
French nuclear forces could play the r6le of a
necessary residual deterrence.
69. In the present turbulent state of world
affairs, it would be unwise to think that Europe
could dispense with transatlantic consultation
and co-operation. Now and in the near future,
United States military assistance appears to be
essential to mount any larger-scale military
operation in Europe, let alone outside it. The
most important reason for this is that WEU
members, individually and collectively, simply
do not have the vast logistical support (air and
sealift), satellite data intelligence and command
and control systems available to the Americans.
The WEU Assembly has been prominent in sug-
gesting how some of these deflrciencies might be
rectified. It has proposed the creation of a WEU
pool of air transport aircraft. The Council
apparently does not consider this to be an urgent
matter, since according to the last annual report,
it is not on the agenda of the Defence Represen-
tatives Group. Another proposal, the creation of
a satellite interpretation centre, was agreed to by
WEU ministers in June 1991. However, these
initiatives must be seen against the background
of declining defence expenditure, and, under
these circumstances, it would seem unlikely that
WEU could develop military resources compa-
rable to the United States in the near future. In
the foreseeable future, therefore, United States
involvement in European security will remain
vital.
70. On the other hand, United States Govern-
ments will come under increasing pressure to
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reduce military expenditure. Clearly, such pol-
icies will have an impact on United States force
levels in Europe and perhaps the availability of
United States military assets such as transport
aircraft.
71. It should be recalled here that the new
United States administration envisages reducing
the number of United States troops in Europe to
100 000 by October 1996, while the Bush
administration had still planned to maintain the
number of troops at 150 000. According to Pen-
tagon documents made available in March 1993,
the Clinton administration plans to reduce the
United States defence budget by $gg billion by
1997. lt is diflicult to predict all the conse-
quences of a reduced United States presence in
Europe, but it is crystal clear that Europe cannot
claim to develop its own foreign and security
policy which, according to the treaty on
European union, " shall include all questions
related to the security of the union, including the
eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common
defence', if it is not prepared to draw the
financial consequences from these basic deci-
sions. The inevitable conclusion is that Europe
will have to pay for a greater share of its
security.
72. The common strategic resources needed
to complement such a policy will not be
available overnight. They can only be the result
of a long planning process.
73. The stage is now reached at which there is
uncertainty over the future commitments of
allies in different kinds of conflicts. This is no
reason to be surprised or even ashamed. After
all, the Atlantic Alliance was created to cope
with a completely different situation in Europe.
After more than forty years of a close political
and military relationship, European and North
American allies should be able to discuss their
long-term relationship without any false shame.
Only in an atmosphere of close consultation,
which includes all possible future developments,
will it be possible to avoid misunderstandings
on both sides of the Atlantic.
74. It would be wrong for Europe to suggest
that NATO is no longer relevant in the years to
come, and Europe should at all costs avoid
arousing feelings of indifference or hostility in
North America towards its historic political and
strategic relations with Europe.
75. It would be wrong for the United States to
pretend that nothing has changed in its political
and military relations with Europe. While there
can be no doubt that the United States is still
fully committed to the obligations of the Wash-
ington Treaty, recent events have made it clear
that beyond the NATO territory, there is a zone
where they may prefer not to intervene but to
leave action to the Europeans.
76. On the other hand, it would be naive to
suggest that the recent changes in Europe do not
require a more thorough adaptation of transat-
lantic relations.
77. This is well illustrated by the crisis in
ex-Yugoslavia. The Europeans originally took
the lead in dealing with this presumably because
the United States took the view that there was
no vital national interest at stake and that it was
purely a European problem. There is no reason
to believe that the United States took this view
because it wishes to see the public failure of the
recently decided European foreign and security
policy.
78. Apparently, in both the United States and
Europe, there is widespread indignation over the
continuation of a civil war on European soil,
where atrocities are being committed and
human rights being trampled at a scale unknown
in Europe since the second world war. At the
same time, both are reluctant to send ground
troops into a savage war, which nobody dare
predict when and how it will end. The United
States and Western Europe are now accusing
each other of not taking the lead, not doing
enough or not proposing the right action. The
same kind of debate may occur again in future
similar conflicts.
79. The positions now adopted by the United
States and Western Europe in European security
affairs are unsustainable in the long run because
they are inherently under tension and trade-offs
will have to be made. The United States wants
to reduce its burdens but at the same time
maintain and influence leadership. Western
Europe wants more equal partnership with the
United States. These tensions will have to be
resolved, and all efforts to cover them up will be
useless because they are too obvious not to come
to the surface again.
80. It is advocated here that Western Europe
and the United States thoroughly revise their old
bargain and replace it by a new partnership,
knowing that they continue to share important
and far-reaching common economic, political
and security interests and that in the new inter-
national relations neither can achieve its
important objectives acting alone.
81. In the framework of this new partnership,
Western Europe and the United States should
negotiate an agreement defining rOles and
responsibilities towards each other and toward
the rest of the world, and leading to changes in
the institutional relationship which reflect these
new definitions and also providing mechanisms
to implement the new policies to achieve
common objectives.
82. The transatlantic partners know each
other too well to continue playing their newly-
favoured game of hide-and-seek with their real
intentions and pulling rabbits out of their hats
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every now and then when the other party seems
to have found a clever move.
83. Without this proposed new partnership,
the existing transatlantic alliance is bound to
deteriorate, neither ally will succeed in attaining
its objective and European security might well
be the victim.
VI. The importance
of arms contol and verification
84. The recently-established framework of
arms control and verification agreements in
Europe has created so much military trans-
parency that it would not be possible, now, for
any European state to build up, in secret, a
major aggressive military capability. Four agree-
ments or treaties have come into force which
between them provide a formidable array of
measures of verification and inspection: the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; the
concluding act of the negotiation on personnel
strength of these armed forces; the Open Skies
Treaty accompanied by the CSCE declaration
on that treaty and the Vienna document of 1992
on confidence- and security-building measures.
85. Together, these documents are ensuring a
continuous and regular process of inspection
and verification and there will be even more in
the future. If any of the participating states were
to consider building or rebuilding a major
aggressive military capability, it could not do so
without triggering a procedure of early warning.
Among other things, it would have to refuse
inspections and withdraw from the relevant
treaties at an early stage of reafinament. This
would appear to rule out any possibility of sur-
prise attack.
86. The next step concerning this particular
threat or risk 
- 
that is, the re-emergence of some
major aggressive expansionist power - is to
maintain the impetus provided by these treaties
or agreements in the new CSCE Forum for
Security Co-operation, established at the July
1992 Helsinki summit. The provisions already
have to be fully implemented. One of the first
functions of the new CSCE security forum will
be to harmonise the relevant provisions of the
CFE Treaty, which concern only NATO and the
former Warsaw Pact states, with the provisions
of the Vienna document which concern all
CSCE members.
87. A good deal more can still be done in
improving military transparency in Europe. The
habit of military secrecy dies hard. The Helsinki
conference set out, for the security forum, a prG
gramme for immediate action. It includes a
number of further proposals for increased trans-
parency. It suggests, for example, the annual dis-
cussion of military budgets with detailed pro-
duction plans for different weapon systems. At
this exchange, states could say whether they
found the forward plans of any other state par-
ticularly threatening. The programme for imme-
diate action does not, however, include any spe-
cific suggestions for further disarmament.
YII. The filc of nuclaar woapons
in European defetce
88. Increasingly, nuclear weapons are seen,
not as solutions to certain security problems, but
as serious problems in themselves. The disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union and the exposure of
lraq's nuclear ambitions have highlighted the
need to give the highest priority to further mea-
sures to prevent the spread of such weapons.
89. The nuclear non-proliferation r6gime
based on the NPT and IAEA should be further
strengthened to stop further proliferation and
the export of nuclear technology. An important
factor will be the actions of the existing nuclear
weapon states themselves. It will be of little use
urging other countries to forego nuclear weapons
if the existing nuclear weapon states are main-
taining or increasing their nuclear firepower.
The United States and Russia have embarked
on massive reductions of the number of nuclear
warheads. This impetus must be maintained and
hopefully adopted by the other nuclear weapons
states. Nuclear weapons are still an important
part of oflicial allied thinking as witnessed by
the final communiqu6 of NATO's Nuclear
Planning Group in autumn l99l in Taormina,
stating that * nuclear weapons will continue for
the foreseeable future to fulfil their essential r6le
in the alliance's overall strategy, since conven-
tional forces alone cannot ensure war pre-
vention'. On the other hand, it decided on a
substantial reduction and restructuring of the
alliance sub-strategic nuclear forces which is in
progress. This cannot be seen as the last possible
adaptation to new circumstances especially since
future threats to Europe are likely to be quite
different from those which had to be faced
during the cold war. Clearly the relevance of
nuclear weapons to the security of Europe has
greatly diminished and the residual purpose of
these weapons may simply and solely be to deter
their use by others 4.
90. Indeed, a critical re-examination of the
r6le of nuclear weapons in Europe is needed.
91. On the one hand, there should be con-
tinuing consultation on the future of transat-
lantic security guarantees, including the various
possible extended transatlantic nuclear deter-
rence options in the Atlantic Alliance and its
4. For a stimulating discussion on this subject see Roberto
Zadra, " European integration and nuclear deterrence after
the cold war ", WEU Institute for Security Studies,
November 1992.
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Nuclear Planning Group. On the other hand, an
intra-European debate is needed over the r0le,
and the future rOle, of European nuclear
weapons. These debates should be initiated in
WEU among both nuclear and non-nuclear
member states. Needless to say, both debates
should take place in parallel and with the
greatest possible degree of transparency.
YIII. The Franco-German relationship
and the defence of Europe
92. Since May 1992, Franco-German military
co-operation has assumed a potentially more
European dimension: France and Germany
decided at their La Rochelle meeting to create a
military corps with a European vocation which
other WEU countries were invited to join. This
Eurocorps was meant to contribute to giving the
European Union its own military capacity and
show the will of the participating countries to
shoulder their responsibilities concerning
security and the preservation of peace in the
framework of the European Union.
93. At the same time, the Eurocorps was
intentioned to contribute to the strengthening of
the Atlantic Alliance. The Eurocorps can be
used for the common defence of the NATO and
WEU allies, for humanitarian, peace-keeping
and peace-enforcing missions. The headquarters
ofthe Eurocorps are being established in Stras-
bourg and the estimated 35 000-40 000 strong
full corps should be operational in October
1995. Belgium and Spain are considering joining
the corps and Belgian liaison officers have been
posted to the Strasbourg headquarters since
March 1993.
94. The Franco-German initiative has been
severely criticised by both the United Kingdom
and the United States. They feared that the
Atlantic Alliance might be weakened if
Germany were to withdraw some of its units
from NATO, which, as some said, was illegir
imate.
95. Finally, on 2lst January 1993, an
agreement was signed between France, Germany
and SACEUR, detailing relations between the
Eurocorps and NATO.
96. While, formerly, French forces could have
been placed under NATO's operational control
in a crisis situation, it was now agreed that
French units of the Eurocorps could be under
NATO's operational command.
97. This means that there would be more
freedom to use these forces, not only for the
Supreme Allied Commander, but also for lower
levels in the integrated command structure.
There is a wider definition of the missions, and
the type and duration of the obligations are
defined in less detail in advance.
98. However, this can be done only under
three preliminary conditions:
- 
there must be a preliminary agreement
with France and Germany;
- 
the corps must be engaged for a prelim-
inary defined mission according to a
plan which has been approved by the
French authorities;
- 
the corps must be engaged as such.
99. As it is, the agreement leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. For instance, what will
happen if the Eurocorps were asked to partic-
ipate in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing opera-
tions of NATO in the framework of the CSCE. It
is also unclear if these rules would apply to other
French units which are not part of the
Eurocorps.
100. Moreover, the relation between the
Eurocorps and WEU is far less clear and, as of
today, no agreement is yet in sight. Certainly,
France is changing its commitments regarding
security in Europe and apparently the doctrine
of the defence of the " sanctuaire national " is
being adapted to a changed security envi-
ronment in Europe. Altogether, France is clearly
working towards a new security concept which
pays tribute to European ambitions while at the
same time taking into account the importance of
maintaining narrow transatlantic relations
which are being revised in a positive sense.
l0l. As the French Defence Minister, Alain
Jupp6, recently said 5:
* Europe as such must be included in the
necessary renovation of the alliance...
even if the link with the United States
is, and remains, more necessary than
ever. "
or otherwise:
* While it is legitimate for France to be
concerned with promoting European
defence, it is nevertheless essential for it
to include its contribution in the transat-
lantic framework. "
102. If France is gradually making progtress in
adapting to a new situation, in Germany, an
acrimonious debate is still continuing over the
question of whether the constitution allows it to
send troops to participate in operations outside
the NATO area. Of the two articles in the consti-
tution now under debate, one, Article 87a, says
that Germany establishes armed forces for
defensive purposes, while the other, Alrticle 24,
expressly permits Germany to join a system of
mutual collective security.
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103. According to the opinion of a large
majority of legal experts, there is no constitu-
tional impediment to German participation in
United Nations or NATO military operations
outside the NATO area, but the position of the
CDU/CSU as the largest partner in the coalition
government has not been strong enough to
overcome the reluctance of both the coalition
Free Democrats and the opposition Social Dem-
ocrats. On the other hand, it became clear that
the consequences of this constitutional debate
had an increasingly negative influence on the
authority of Germany in the international com-
munity, which is faced with growing United
Nations demands for peace-keeping, humani-
tarian and other operations in conflict zones.
104. On the l3th January 1993, the coalition
government reached an agreement which
allowed for future engagement of German
troops outside the NATO area, alongside troops
from other states, even without a mandate from
the UN Security Council. The aggeement thus
covered the sending of * blue helmets " to par-
ticipate in peace-keeping operations under
Security Council decisions or in the framework
of CSCE, and participation in peace-enforcing
measures under the aegis of the United Nations.
It also covered the participation of troops in
operations of collective defence or peace-
enforcement operations, in accordance with
Article 5l of the United Nations Charter, with
other states or in the context of alliances and
other regional agreements, in particular NATO,
WEU and CSCE. Possible German participation
in the abovementioned operations would need
approval in the national parliament: in the first
two cases mentioned by a simple majority, in
the third case by a two-thirds majority. At the
same time, it was agreed that the government
would propose a formal change of the consti-
tution.
105. When, however, Chancellor Kohl pro-
posed that German airmen, who make up one-
third of NATO's AWACS reconnaissance air-
craft crews, should participate in the operations
to enforce a no-fly zone in former Yugoslavia,
the Free Democrats took the question to the
Federal Constitutional Court, which allowed
German airmen to join the operations in former
Yugoslavia, mainly reasoning that Germany's
self-imposed restrictions on its military r6le
would " endanger the trust for Germany within
NATO alliance ".
106. Since the Court's ruling only applies to
this individual case, it does not provide a final
ruling on the still pending constitutional
question, which, if not resolved in accordance
with the coalition's January agreement, would
cause serious problems for the credibility of a
future European security and defence policy. It
is known that in the foreseeable future, WEU or
NATO operations, with military involvement,
to maintain or to restore peace and security in
Europe or to protect its vital interests, will most
likely take place outside the area covered by the
Treaty of Washington. If Germany, Europe's
most powerful economic force with the biggest
population, were to take part in the decision-
making on security and defence policy without
participating in the possibly resulting military
operations, it would create anomalies which
might not be accepted by the other EC member
states and thus lead to serious problems in
European policy making. Moreover, what would
be the use of a Eurocorps, if its German com-
ponent would be condemned to play not more
than a rather ceremonial r6le?
107. In that case, all the French efforts to be
more co-operative within the NATO framework
would not be matched by the expected German
flexibility on out-of-area operations and they
may question if all the extra efforts needed to
build this multinational corps were to any
advantage.
IX. The institutions
108. Fundamental developments within
Europe since 1987 have resulted in gladual
changes in the European security architecture.
These changes already include a gradual and
prudent tendency towards both a Euro-
peanisation and pan-Europeanisation of the
European security structure and an increasing
linkage between the military and non-military
dimension of security policy. This move is,
however, slow and gradual when compared with
the fundamental and far-reaching changes in the
European security situation.
109. Developments within the different
existing organisations will be examined suc-
cinctly in the following paragraphs:
(a) The European Community
110. Especially since 1988, the European Com-
munity has played a considerable part in the
developing European security situation through
its support for economic and political reforms in
Central and Eastern Europe. The European
agreements which were concluded with Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the negotia-
tions on association and other agreements with
the other countries in the region further increase
the influence of the community. The extent to
which the Community agrees to strengthen con-
tacts with these countries depends on their ful-
frlling several stabilising conditions. The associ-
ation agreements and the prospect of possible
membership of the EC also give these states a
wider political incentive and have a stabilising
influence.
1l l. Western Europe, together with North
America and Japan, has a specific responsibility
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to help these countries in this difficult task,
which will take many years to accomplish.
ll2. Much has been done already, but
everyone is aware that it is not nearly enough.
I 13. Important EC programmes for the
transfer of much-needed knowhow to these
countries are " Phare " for Central European
countries and " Tacis " for the former Soviet
Union republics, which together supply about
'l0o/o of the West's technical aid to that region.
There has been criticism of its effrciency, but
that was not only the EC's fault. Moreover, the
criticism was acknowledged and improvements
are now under consideration.
lL4. At the same time, the EC is concluding
different kinds of trade and association agree-
ments with many Central and Eastern European
countries. It is known that Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the
Slovak Republic, which are seeking EC mem-
bership, would like to have a date set for this
objective to be attained.
1 15. They have also complained that the EC,
notwithstanding the existence of agreements,
has been far too hesitant to allow them access to
the EC market. It is also noted that EC member
states are very slow in ratifying the European
agreements, which offer trade liberalisation to
the abovementioned countries. Of the 12
member states, only Denmark, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Spain and the United Kingdom have rat-
iflred.
I 16. In response to this criticism, the European
Commission has now proposed a new package
of measures to accelerate the political and eco-
nomic integration of these six countries into the
EC, which will be discussed in Copenhagen at
the June 1993 EC summit. This package
includes improved, across-the-board market
access for East European products, faster dis-
mantling of EC tariffs, more commission-led
lending to finance infrastructure and a com-
mitment to eventual membership.
11,7. It is especially encouraging to see that
according to the Commission's proposal
" improved market access is the most effective
way of encouraging economic growth and the
transition to market economies ". This opinion
clearly diverges from arguments put fonvard by
EC member states that increased imports from
Eastern Europe would cause lasting damage to
EC members, which are going through a period
of recession. It should be noted that in 1992
Eastern Europe accounted for just over 30/o of
total EC imports, while the EC itself accounted
for more than half the total trade of Eastern
Europe.
I18. The EC has managed to develop substan-
tialty the non-military dimension of security
policy which is bound to play an even more
important r0le. However, the crisis in Yugoslavia
showed that the influence of the European Com-
munity is still too limited as it cannot back its
security policy, confined to non-military aspects,
with military means. Nevertheless, the crisis in
Yugoslavia also indicated a positive development
in the EC's nascent security policy.
I 19. The EC has developed criteria which are
applied for the recognition of new states: the
acceptance of the rule of law and the principles
of democracy, guarantees of the rights of minor-
ities and ethnic groups, respect for each other's
frontiers and observance of existing commit-
ments to disarmament and regional security.
These principles, which are aimed at stabilising
the European security situation, oblige the
republics or people concerned to adapt their
position, if necessary.
120. Apart from that, it established - in par-
allel with the peace conference on ex-Yugoslavia
- 
an Arbitration Committee under the chair-
manship of Robert Badinter which has provided
a number of opinions which can contribute to
the prevention of conflicts. One of these
opinions concerns the right of peoples to self-
determination as is vaguely defined in Article I
of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the
Charter did not provide a definition of the word
" peoples " , nor did it lay down rules as to how
this right is to be exercised.
l2l. The committee appeared to link the rights
of minorities to the rights of peoples. As a conse-
quence, the notion of " people " is no longer
homogeneous and should not be seen as encom-
passing the whole population of any state.
Within one state, various ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic communities may exist. According to the
committee's opinion number 2, each of these
communities would have the right to see its
identity recognised and to benefit " from all the
human rights and fundamental freedoms
recognised in international law, including, where
appropriate, the right to choose their national
identity " . Rights of minorities can therefore be
respected without this having to result in a
break-up of an existing state. This could lead to
a distinction between " nationality " and " citi-
zenship " similar to what is provided in the
Treaty on European Union.
122. Furthermore, the Arbitration Committee
attached great importance to the principle of
respect for frontiers existing at the moment of
independence, and recalled in its opinion
number 2 that, whatever the circumstances,
'the right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers " . On the
other hand, according to the committee, states
may modify their frontiers by mutual
agreement.
123. Even though its member states had onlyjust signed the Treaty on European Union with
l8l
DOCUMENT 1370
its provisions for a common fgreign and security
policy, the EC was the first external power to
become involved in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia,
assuming its new responsibilities.
L24. Furthermore, the Community employed
new instruments in its security policy. The
Twelve mediated in the conflict and initiated a
peace conference in The Hague, they negotiated
to achieve cease-fires, and sent observers to the
disputed area to monitor the cease-fire agree-
ments. Admittedly, all EC efforts have had little
success, but, almost certainly, others would not
have done better. It is hoped, however, that
some lessons will have been learned, one of
them being that taking half measures in no way
helps to solve a crisis. This first experience in
practical common foreign policy also made it
clear that the EC should start making contin-
gency plans for crisis management and solutions
for possible conflict in Europe.
o) NAro
125. Within the Atlantic Alliance, there have
been moves to recognise that the European allies
will have to play an increasingly important r6le
in the security and defence of Europe. First of
all, the important declaration on peace and
co-operation and the new strategic concept
issued at the NATO summit in Rome in
November 1991 emphasised the importance of
strengthening the European pillar and increasing
the rOle of the EC and WEU in defence and
security matters.
126. The Rome declaration asserts that " the
development of a European security identity
and defence r6le, reflected in the further
strengthening of the European pillar within the
alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effec-
tiveness of the Atlantic Alliance....Recognising
that it is for the European allies concerned to
decide what arrangements are needed for the
expression of a common European foreign and
security policy and defence r6le, we further
agree that... we will develop practical arrange-
ments to ensure the necessary transparency and
complementarity between the European security
and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve
and WEU, and the alliance....We welcome the
perspective of a reinforcement of the r6le of
WEU, both as the defence component of the
process of European unification and as a means
of strengthening the European pillar of the
alliance... ".
127. Notwithstanding incidental benevolent
comments, it is, however, not at all clear to what
extent the United States and some European
NATO countries will allow this European pillar
to become more than an appendix to NATO and
to gain some degree of independence.
128. As regards military structures, some
recent developments are indeed providing evi-
dence of a trend towards multinationalisation
and even Europeanisation of the alliance's
armed forces. An allied rapid reaction corps(ARRC) with its headquarters in Bielefeld under
British command is being established. This
ARRC will consist of forces from different
European NATO member states and NATO can
decide to put parts of this corps under WEU
command.
129. There is also the new Franco-German
Eurocorps, for which SACEUR has recently con-
cluded an operational agreement with France
and Germany. According to this agreement, the
Eurocorps will come under NATO operational
command for the implementation of agreed
SACEUR plans. In an alliance framework, the
Eurocorps will be available for humanitarian
peace-keeping and peace-making operations. On
the other hand, it will also be available for WEU
operations, but this has not yet been
formalised.
130. However, this Europeanisation of the
Atlantic Alliance is not yet visible in NATO's
European military command structure. While
Europeans provide 8090 of the alliance's conven-
tional forces, United States officers are still at
the head of the only two major commands and
of one of the three major subordinate com-
mands. The Supreme Allied Commander
Europe is also American.
131. The decision of the North Atlantic
Council in Oslo on 4th June 1992 that it be
" prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with our own procedures, peace-
keeping activities under the responsibility of the
CSCE' should be seen as a positive step
towards pan-Europeanisation of the alliance's
security structure. This implies that the alliance
might also intervene outside the traditional
NATO area. It requires, however, that the CSCE
asks NATO to do so and that no NATO member
state is opposed to such action.
132. The need to establish relations with
Central and Eastern European countries and to
help them to stabilise their security led to the
creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation
Council (NACC) in December 1991, which
includes the 16 NATO countries, the former
Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet
republics plus Albania, making a total of 38.
133. In the first year of its existence, NACC
dealt with such problems as the withdrawal of
former Soviet troops from the Baltic states, the
division of CFE reductions among the newly
independent republics of the former Soviet
Union and the issue of nuclear weapons and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in some of these
republics.
134. At its December 1992 meeting in
Brussels, NACC agreed to prepare for joint
peace-keeping missions in Europe. Co'operation
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in this field would include joint sessions on
planning of peace-keeping missions, joint partic-
ipation in peace-keeping training and consider-
ation of possible joint peace-keeping exercises. [t
was stressed that all peace-keeping operations
would be under the aegis of the United Nations
or CSCE.
135. At the same meeting, a work plan for dia-
logue, partnership and co-operation in 1993 was
agreed to, which would concentrate on such sub-jects as democratic management of defence
budgets, civiUmilitary interface within Minis-
tries of Defence and the conversion of defence
industries.
136. It is clear that NACC with its limited
scope and budget can make only a modest con-
tribution to help solve the many problems being
faced by Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. As regards conversion of the defence
industries for instance, it can organise collo-
quies, studies, exchange or assemble infor-
mation and in general play a r0le as a clearing
house, but there is no money to do more and,
evidently, NACC is not the most appropriate
forum for tackling major industrial and eco-
nomic problems.
137. For Central European countries seeking
EC membership, NACC cannot do enough, but
it provides at least a chance for other republics
furtlier East to learn more about such things as
the organisation and control of armed forces in a
democratic society. It also shows that the West
is seriously interested in stability and peace in
parts of Europe further East. NACC should
therefore continue its activities, concentrating
on the solution of those issues for which it is
best equipped.
138. In recent years, there have also been
efforts to strengthen the political r6le of the
alliance, also by emphasising more than before
the linkage between the military and non-
military dimensions of security. The outcome of
these attempts to date, however, also clearly
shows the limitations of the alliance. In the
present framework, it would not be logical to try
to stretch NATO in a political r0le beyond the
limits of its original vocation as a security
organisation in the classical sense.
139. Finally, NATO should continue to refrain
from enlargement, even if time and again sug-
gestions to extend its membership are made by
Central and Eastern European states. Recently,
NATO confirmed that the subject of
enlargement was not on the agenda. The reason
most frequently put forward is that it does not
want to create a new common border between
the alliance and the territory of the former
Soviet Union, which would imply that Central
Europe would again find itself in a position of
" buffer zone".It also wishes to prevent, at any
price, that Russia and the other former Soviet
republics might become suspicious of a new
alliance being created against them.
140. Another more fundamental argument
might be that such enlargement would be incon-
sistent with its earlier endorsement of the devel-
opment of a European security and defence
identity. The future European Union, if
developed according to the principles laid down
in the Maastrict Treaty, will provide the most
complete security structure imagined, including
all economic, political and defence aspects,
which are vital for the stability, peace and pros-
perity of a state. The greatest ambition of at
least all Central European states is to be
admitted as a member of this union. The
European Community, now being transformed
into a European Union, has from the beginning
been conceived as a dynamic structure with the
development of an integrated peaceful and pros-
perous Europe as its main objective. It would be
erroneous to present accession to the wash-
ington Treaty, which was created with the
limited political-military objective to maintain a
status quo in Europe by preventing the Soviet
Union from extending its influence over
Western Europe as a viable alternative for the
future security of Central and Eastern European
countries. Enlargement of NATO would seem to
run counter to the objective to develop Europe's
responsibility for its own security and defence.
(c) WEU
l4l. As the Europeanisation of the western
security structure was considered essential, both
NATO and the European Community saw WEU
as a useful organisation for achieving this goal
and for asserting their competence in security
and defence. In this context, it seemed as if
WEU was more an object than a subject in the
discussions about the future European security
architecture.
142. After NATO's Rome declaration and the
Maastricht summit, however, important devel-
opments brought WEU to the front of the stage.
Some of these, such as the enlargement of WEU
and relations between the EC and WEU, have
been discussed in earlier Assembly reports.
143. It is recalled here that the declaration of
the countries, which are members of WEU and
the European Union on " The r6le of WEU and
its relations with the European Union and with
the Atlantic Alliance ", which was issued
together with the Treaty on European Union at
the Maastricht summit in December 1991, to
some extent clarified the position of WEU. The
declared objectives were to build up WEU as the
defence component of the European Union and
to develop WEU as a means of strengthening the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It was
also accepted that WEU's operational r6le
would be strengthened.
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144. Indeed, as long as WEU has no military
organisation, and some member states remain
reluctant to use this organisation as an active
and independent actor in Europe, its operational
rOle can be only very limited.
145. Some progress was made when in the
Petersberg declaration of l9th June 1992, it was
stated:
'WEU member states declare that they
are prepared to make available military
units from the whole spectrum of their
conventional armed forces for military
tasks conducted under the authority of
WEU.
Decisions to use military units answerable
to WEU will be taken by the WEU
Council in accordance with the provisions
of the United Nations Charter. Partici-
pation in specific operations will remain a
sovereign decision of member states in
accordance with national constitutions. "
146. It seems, however, that since this bold
statement, relatively little has been done for its
implementation, as in the second part of the
thirty-eighth annual report of the Council to the
Assembly it is dryly stated:
" The (Special Working) Group alsoturned its attention to the
politico-military aspects of designating
and setting up military units answerable
to WEU. At the Council's request, it con-
sidered problems associated with imple-
menting proposals made in the Franco-
German memorandum on the creation of
a European corps. "
147. Apparently, the Council is not so much in
a hurry to implement this part of the Petersberg
declaration as it was regarding enlargement.
While no official arrangement has yet been
made on such units answerable to WEU, the
United Kingdom's Secretary of State for
Defence, Malcolm Rikfind, provided a clear
indication when he said:
" In principle, all the United Kingdom's
conventional armed forces are available
for military operations conducted under
the auspices of Western European Union.
Military units for WEU operations would
be drawn on a case-by-case basis from
forces with national and NATO r6les 
- 
in
the latter case, after consultation with our
NATO allies.... of course, any new com-
mitments for our armed forces must
become publicly known. The new arrange-
ments involving Western European
Union do not imply additional commit-
ments: they simply suggest that in certain
circumstances it may be more appropriate
for WEU, rather than NATO, to sponsor
certain operations. That would largely
depend on whether the United States and
Canada were likely to be involved in a
specific matter, so that is the sort of cir-
cumstance which we envisage as poten-
tially arising. " 5
148. Meanwhile, an agreement has been con-
cluded between France, Germany and
SACEUR, regarding the Eurocorps, which for
the time being, seems to be of greater interest for
NATO than for WEU. As regards these military
units answerable to WEU, the same annual
report mentions that the Defence Representa-
tives Group " examined ways and means by
which units could be assigned to WEU in times
of crisis. It also considered the choice of head-
quarters and the organisation of headquarters
staff. At the same time, the group gave consider-
ation to WEU's structure in times of crisis. "
149. It is hoped that these numerous examina-
tions and considerations will, in the foreseeable
future, lead to conclusions, decisions and imple-
mentations, in order to ensure that a following
crisis in Europe will not again develop into an
armed conflict because of Europe's hesitation
and lack of preparation.
150. On the other hand, it is encouraging to see
that a proposal for co-operation between air and
naval forces of WEU member states, initially
formulated by France, Italy and Spain, with the
aim of developing it with the participation of all
member states, has given birth to a * European
pre-planned airlmaritime force ready to carry
out missions which might be assigned to it by
WEU. "
l5l. According to the Petersberg declaration,
military units of WEU member states, acting
under the authority of WEU could be employed
for:
- 
the common defence in accordance
with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
and Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty, respectively;
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making.
152. The Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf crisis and the
crisis in former Yugoslavia have been occasions
for successful WEU maritime operations for
minesweeping and embargo enforcement,
respectively. Moreover, WEU is providing both
material and personal assistance to the Danube
states of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, in
enforcing the United Nations embargo against
Serbia/ Montenegro.
6. Answer to an oral question by Mr. Marshall, House of
Commons, 20th April 1993.
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153. The Council's decision at Petersberg on
19th June l99l to establish a military planning
cell was an important step fonvard. This
planning cell, which, after a preparatory phase,
started its activities on lst April 1993 under
Major-General Caltabiano as its first director, is
in particular responsible for:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the
employment of forces under WEU aus-
plces;
- 
preparing recommendations for the
necessary command, control and com-
munication arrangements, including
standing operating procedures for head-
quarters which might be selected;
- 
keeping an updated list of units and
combinations of units which might be
allocated to WEU for specific opera-
tions.
154. Rightly, General Caltabiano has said that
the interaction of the planning cell with other
security organisations such as NATO, CSCE and
the United Nations is essential for its military
efliciency and vital to avoid duplication. Again,
transparency and complementarity are key
words in this process.
155. It has been observed time and again that a
European defence organisation without a proper
integrated command structure is not likely to be
effective. The military planning cell should
therefore come fonvard with realistic proposals
which would enable WEU to act if needed. Such
proposals should naturally take into account the
command structures existing in the framework
of the Atlantic Alliance and try to avert any
unnecessary duplication.
156. In future security crises in Europe and
elsewhere, WEU can be a viable alternative if
NATO is not willing or able to act, but not nec-
essarily excluding NATO co-ordination and
even collaboration.
L57. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded
that a future European Union foreign and
security policy towards its eastern and southern
borders will be different from the United States'
policy. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia has provided
a modest example of the divergent views among
western allies which has certainly not con-
tributed to their readiness to act.
158. One important issue to be addressed in
the future is a deflrnition of WEU's geographical
area of interest. Recent operations in the Gulf
and in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia are certainly
providing clues. The self-discipline shown as
regards multiple violent conflicts on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union is also a clear
indication, but there is still an important grey
zone just beyond the atea of the central
European consultation partners where WEU's
interests need to be spelled out in more detail.
(d) Council of Europe
159. Although the Council of Europe is rarely
mentioned in discussions on security in Europe,
the importance of its activities should not be
underestimated.
160. After the accession of Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Poland, and recently of Estonia, Lithuania
and Slovenia, the applications for membershipby Albania, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Russia,
Ukraine, and the Slovak Republic are now being
examined.
16l. In fact, if a country is admitted to the
Council of Europe, it has passed a first
important test as regards the democratic legit-
imacy of its institutions, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, which no country with
ambitions to participate in further European
integration can afford to ignore.
162. The Council of Europe has now estab-
lished activities to help new member states,
applicant states and states on the territory ofthe
former Soviet Union, which do not meet the
geographic requirements for membership, with
projects in the flrelds of legal co-operation,
human rights and media.
163. A recent new development in this
framework was the establishment of a task force
in Tirana, which provides the Albanian author-
ities with legal advice on the reforms of the insti-
tutions and legal systems with the Council of
Europe's standards.
(e) CSCE
164. Since the successful conclusion of the Fol-
low-up Conference of Vienna in January 1989
and especially since the end of the East-West
conflict, the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe has been able to assume
a new r6le where it finally can be used as an
instrument to genuinely strengthen relations
between all European countries.
165. The new start was formalised by the
Charter of Paris for a new Europe which was
accepted by all CSCE countries during the
November 1990 Paris summit. The Charter of
Paris, the Prague Document on Further Devel-
opment of CSCE Institutions and Structures,
Helsinki Summit and other high level CSCE
meetings have gradually provided this body with
an extremely elaborate set of structures, institu-
tions, mechanisms and procedures which leave
very little room for further detailing. There is a
Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, which
has the aim of reducing the risk of conflict by
promoting openness and transparency in mil-
itary matters, the Offrce for Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights in Warsaw, a Secre-
tariat in Prague, while recently a Secretary-
General was nominated.
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166. Furthermore, a High Commissioner on
National Minorities has been appointed, who
provides " early warning " and, as appropriate,
" early action " at the earliest possible stage in
regard to tensions involving national minority
issues with a potential to develop into a conflict
within the CSCE area affecting peace, stability,
or relations between participating states.
167. Finally, at the Stockholm Council
meeting, CSCE ministers adopted the text of a
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration
within the CSCE, providing for general concili-
ation and for arbitration on the basis of agree-
ments, ad-hoc or in advance, based on recip-
rocal declarations, which was signed by 29 of the5l states participating in the Stockholm
meeting. The convention will go into effect
when it has been ratified by 12 states.
168. Altogether, it seems that theoretically
CSCE has a full range of options to take action
in any situation where peace and security in
Europe are threatened. Still, in recent years and
months it has been relatively ineffective, a
reproach which, in all fairness, can be made to
most international organisations in the security
field.
169. In the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, the CSCE
was used as a legitimising factor for action taken
by other organisations, as was the case when the
EC sent observers to Yugoslavia with the
support of the CSCE. This crisis has made it
clear that the CSCE and the Conflict Prevention
Centre are not yet able to intervene efficiently.
The large number of member states, its intergov-
ernmental character and the lack of an executive
branch of its own undermine the possibilities of
the CSCE.
170. There was also an apparent lack of
political will of participating states and of
parties involved in conflicts to recognise CSCE's
authority.
l7l. It is clear that CSCE would be more
effective if it had the full support of other
organisations like NATO and WEU, as they
pledged in July 1992.
172. The most realistic option for CSCE would
be to operate actively in the field of conflict pre-
vention and early warning. There can be no
question that in this respect, monitoring and
fact-finding missions have an important r6le toplay. Unfortunately, such missions often
struggle with shortages in personnel and
funding. These and many other problems in the
practical and organisational field have pre-
vented CSCE from operating effectively.
173. The Committee of Senior Officials is now
examining a restructuring which should enable
CSCE to concentrate on its political and opera-
tional tasks. The first results of this review
should be endorsed by the next Council meeting
in Rome this year, while the operation should be
finalised at the Budapest Review Conference in
late 1994.
174. It should be recognised that the large
number of states involved in the CSCE is at the
same time an advantage and a handicap.
However, through its competences mainly in the
non-military dimension of security, the CSCE
remains a valuable organisation, whose
influence may increase further if the CSCE were
declared a regional arrangement under Chapter
VIII of the United Nations Charter. Partici-
pating states should, therefore, continue and
intensify their efforts to make this, the largest
regional organisation in the area of security, a
success.
(/) The United Nations
175. With a high-profile presence, both poli-
tical and military, in a number of serious con-
flicts in the world, the importance of the United
Nations has grown, not only as the international
organisation which can legitimise and decide on
action, including even the use of violence
against aggress6rs in a conflict, but also as the
organisation which can send peace-keeping
forces of its own.
176. It is too early to tell what will be the con-
sequences ofthese activities for the future ofthe
United Nations. Apparently, there are limits to
its effectiveness and credibility which have
come to the surface in ex-Yugoslavia and Cam-
bodia.
177. It does, however, seem likely that the
bodies mainly concerned with the early stages of
attempts at conflict resolution will be the CSCE
or the UN, or possibly the European Com-
munity or Union; NATO or WEU, or both, will
be concerned at a later stage, with regard to the
provision of military forces.
X, The future
178. Apart from the other problems discussed
earlier in the present report, important ques-
tions regarding the potential improvement to
Europe's possible security policy need to be
addressed here.
179. The first is how Europe should solve the
consequences of a declining US military pres-
ence. The second is how political co-ordination
could be improved in order to accelerate reac-
tions to crises and to make any actions taken
more effective. Finally, how should Europe
provide assistance to the nations of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
(a) Military improvements
180. A way of coping with the US drawdown
from Europe and declining continental military
resources would be to move towards further
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integration between, and r6le specialisation
with, Europe's armed forces. This poses both
practical and political difficulties. Smaller
European states are moving towards the aban-
donment of certain defence capabilities, the
maintenance of which they could justify during
the cold war.
l8l. In contrast, the two most important
European states in military terms, the United
Kingdom and France, both appear determined
to hold on to as many capabilities as possible,
despite reducing the overall size of their armed
forces. ROle specialisation has already occurred
to a certain extent in the NATO Rapid Reaction
Force. Germany for example, has assumed the
major share of the air component, while the
United Kingdom plays the leading r6le on land.
However, arguably, rOle specialisation will have
to be extended well beyond this if overall
European military effectiveness is to be
enhanced or maintained with reduced man-
power and defence expenditure. In terms of inte-
gration, multinationalism has already advanced
in NATO with the formation of multinational
corps and multinational divisions. In practice,
however, multinational integration below divi-
sional level has proved problematic, even in
NATO armies which share common doctrine
and common communication methods.
182. Throughout the cold war, military deploy-
ments were heavily concentrated on the Central
European confrontation. This involved a large
concentration of personnel and weapons, both
tactical and nuclear, to repel an invasion from
the East. Since the end of the cold war, the scale
of deployment is being substantially reduced on
both sides.
183. In future, the forces required will be those
which are adapted to the various requirements
of conflict resolution. These must be able to
respond speedily to a request for action.
Western European countries have been devel-
oping such rapid reaction forces 
- 
national con-
tingents, the Franco-German corps, and
NATO's rapid reaction corps and these
together with NATO's experience of multina-
tional planning, logistics and training should
provide for conflict resolution. The aim of
European states should be to concentrate on the
provision of armed forces suitable for this
function, preferably for use under the auspicies
of the United Nations or CSCE with Security
Council approval.
(b) Polilical improvements
184. The July 1992 decisions by the CSCE,
NATO and WEU to open the possibility of
undertaking peace-keeping operations and, by
NATO and WEU, of providing support for such
operations, marked the beginning of attempts to
improve co-ordination between security institu-
tions.
185. On the other hand, the presence of one
NATO and one WEU naval task force to
monitor the embargo in the Adriatic was seen by
many as an unfortunate consequence of compe-
tition between two security organisations.
Although co-ordination between the two forces
has been successful, it would appear unlikely
that such parallelism will re-occur. In November
1992, NATO and WEU adopted a document on
co-operation which sets out mechanisms for
mutual information and representation of one
body at the meetings of the other, as well as
guidelines for co-operation in planning. The
chances for co.ordination between the two
organisations have been greatly improved by the
transfer of WEU's Secretariat-General to
Brussels at the beginning of 1993.
186. A welcome trend in European security
architecture is its rationalisation. Meeting in
Bonn in December 1992, the defence ministers
of the 13 member states of the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG), estab-
lished h 1976 to harmonise operational require-
ments and standardise defence procurement
practices, formally agreed to incorporate IEPG
into WEU with immediate effect. However, the
practical details of this merger will not be
formalised until the forthcoming June 1993
WEU Council.
187. One of the objectives of this decision was,
as the IEPG National Armaments Directors
have stated in their report to the Ministers, that
WEU, based on an international treaty and
having its own legal personality * could provide
a more solid and visible framework for
European armaments co-operation thus opening
new possibilities for its development, including
the eventual establishment of a European arna-
ments agency, if nations so choose ".
188. In addition, at the November 1992 WEU
Council, it was agreed that WEU would address
the possible transfer of certain Eurogroup activ-
ities in spring 1993. The WEU Defence Repre-
sentatives Group (DRG) is now evaluating the
activities of Eurogroup with a view to preparingjoint WEU positions prior to the establishment
of a joint WEU/Eurogroup working group.
189. The question is if the rationalisation of
European security institutions could be taken
much further at this juncture. Some have made
a case, for example, for a merger between the
NACC and CSCE which do indeed cover some
common ground.
190. It seems, however, far too early io seri-
ously consider this merger, not only because of a
considerable difference in membership, with
NACC covering 38 and CSCE covering 52
states, but also because NACC really has a dif-
ferent orientation and purpose. In the workplan
adopted by NACC on 10th December 1992,
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only the section on political- and security-
related matters has similarities with the field of
activities of CSCE. It would be preferable to
leave both institutions to come to grips with
their main objectives and to reach a stage of
great effectiveness, which may indeed contribute
to peace and security in Europe.
l9l. In a more distant future with the expected
and hoped-for extension of a network of
bilateral and multilateral relations, NACC may
automatically become superfluous since many of
the issues mentioned in the workplan would
then be addressed in specialised organisations
and institutions while other issues would have
lost their topicality.
192. The CSCE could then address all the
political aspects of pan-European security
policy, while possible military action would be
left to NATO and WEU under the aegis of
CSCE as a regional arrangement in the sense of
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
While WEU could provide the military forces
and oversee a particular peace-keeping oper-
ation, NATO could furnish planning, communi-
cations and logistical support. Although such a
division of labour seems unlikely to occur in the
near future, the declining United States military
presence in Europe may reduce the importance
of NATO as a military instrument and conse-
quently enhance the military value of WEU.
193. A further improvement could be to redis-
tribute resources between the various security
institutions. Whereas NATO possesses thou-
sands of central staff, it appears anomalous that
the CSCE and WEU have very limited
resources. For example, the CSCE secretariat
was forced to depend on office furniture
donated by the Swedish Government because it
did not have sufficient funds to pay for its own.
194. It cannot be denied that the funding of a
conflict prevention mechanism now being estab-
lished in CSCE, would be far cheaper than the
cost of peace-keeping, peace-enforcing or mil-
itary intervention.
195. The funding of peace monitors and fact-
finding missions is comparatively cheap com-
pared to the cost of military intervention.
Another possible and relatively cost-effective
initiative would be to ensure that representa-
tives of Central and Eastern European countries
or former Soviet republics can all attend the
meetings of security institutions for which they
have been invited, because of their membership
or for other reasons. At the moment, many of
these states, perhaps those that need the most
assistance, are unable to send their representa-
tives to CSCE or NACC meetings due to a
shortage of funds. Similarly, the citizens of
many Eastern European countries are quite
unaware of the rights that their political masters
have agreed to uphold by signature of the Hel-
sinki Final Act. Greater investment in propa-
ganda on behalf of the CSCE may be a good
investment.
196. All countries of Central Europe and the
republics of the former Soviet Union are
demanding to have access to the West's
expertise as well as capital to manage the eco-
nomic and political reformation from command
economies to pluralistic democracies. This
requires a new international organisation to
assist the reform effort in the East.
197. There are three reasons for this:
(i) the problems in developing demo-
cracy and the market economy in
Eastern Europe and in the former
Soviet Union will take many years,
perhaps decades to accomplish;
(ii) the West's strategic interests are
deeply engaged in the outcome of the
struggles for democracy in these
nations;
(iii) the western technical assistance
which is indispensable in the building
of democratic and market institu-
tions and practices is at present
totally inadequate given the dimen-
sions of the problem.
198. The proposed organisation has already
been given the name the Organisation for
European Democratic Development, the
OEDD, by Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill. Its
essential mission would be to generate and
manage western technical assistance, financed
by western governments, to Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. It would have its home
back in Brussels in order to co-ordinate its activ-
ities with the European Community, although
most of its work would be on eastern territory.
Western nations would pay for experts of this
organisation which would also develop its own
permanent staff. Its divisions could include:
privatisation, banking practices, delivering
municipal services, building democratic legisla-
tures, democratic legal systems including
criminal justice and commercial law, agri-
culture, food distribution, energy, health, edu-
cation, etc. This would involve thousands of
western technical experts living, teaching and
learning in the nations of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union; not three-day visits
but months and years in the territory; not unco-
ordinated efforts by individuals in western
nations but a highly co-ordinated and long-term
intergovernmental effort.
199. The North Americans and the Japanese
should be equal partners with the Europeans in
this effort.
200. The complexity of European security goes
beyond the existing security institutions to a
more profound question of policy direction and
political will. It could be argued that in many
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ways Europe's new security structure is an empty
vessel. Institutions have been revised and mecha-
nisms elaborated but the will to utilise these new
r6gimes often seems lacking. It should be remem-
bered that meetings of the various security insti-
tutions are often attended by the same ministers
and diplomats. However far the co-ordination
and effectiveness of the security structure can be
improved, the system cannot achieve success in
halting, for example, ethnic conflict if the
political will to act is lacking. Of course, this is to
5lgggst that solutions to such conflicts exist. At
worst, all that may be done is to isolate a pa;*
ticular conflict from neighbouring countries and
leave it to be fought out to the point of
exhaustion. On the other hand, a more forthright
attitude to intervention, both military and
political, may prevent the disaster comparable to
the violent implosion of former Yugoslavia.
XI. Conclusions
201. With all the changes still taking place on
the European scene, it is too early for a final, fully
detailed concept ofEuropean security policy, but,
by and large, more elements are coming to the
surface which will have to be taken into consider-
ation when establishing this policy.
202. One early and also inevitable conclusion
of the report is that in the present circum-
stances, the overall political and economic situ-
ation in Central and Eastern Europe and other
neighbouring regions is far too unstable to do
away with any of the long existing or recently
established organisations concerned with
security in Europe. On the other hand, the fact
that these different organisations continue to
exist does not entitle them to enter into compe-
tition, since that would only do harm to the
attainment of their common objective of pre-
serving peace and security.
203. Another conclusion, causing little sur-
prise, is that a continued close relationship
between North America and Europe is indispen-
sable for European security. It should not be
denied, however, that in recent years this rela-
tionship has been subject to mutual criticism
caused by different views and judgrnents. This
concerned not only economic issues, but also
security issues as was, and still is, demonstrated
in the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
204. In general, it is becoming increasingly clear
that the positions adopted by both the United
States and Western Europe in security affairs are
unsustainable in the long run because they are
inherently under tension. Neither party should be
ashamed to admit this, since external factors
have changed completely. There is a need to
revise the old transatlantic bargain and replace it
by a new partnenhip which takes account of con-
tinued important common economic, political
and security interests and objectives, which
neither ally can achieve by acting alone.
205. There are many lessons to be learned from
the Yugoslav conflict. One of them is that in
today's Europe with its numerous existing, and
potential, nationalist and ethnic conflicts, a
common foreign policy cannot be conducted
without stringent procedures for the recognition
ofnew states. Indeed, the European Council has
adopted criteria for this recognition, but this
may not be sufficient if there is not a more
detailed definition of the rights of peoples to
self-determination.
206. The possibility should be considered of
establishing prototype a$eements to be concluded
between a nationality, the state of residence and
the state 
- 
if existing 
- 
with which it has a natio-
nalist or ethnic affrnity. It is vital that minorities
are respected and agreements implemented.
207. For the implementation of an effective
European foreign and security policy, it is also
vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to
start making contingency plans for crisis man-
agement and conflict solution. No foreign and
security policy is possible without intelligence
gathering and analysis offacts. It is far too early
for the EC to develop capabilities in this field,
but there should at least be a mechanism for the
member states to keep each other better
informed through consultation and information.
Such a mechanism could prevent what hap-
pened early in the crisis in former Yugoslavia,
when each member state had a different opinion
on the seriousness of the imminent crisis, based
on different information and analysis.
208. In this framework, the EC and WEU
should also start to establish a lasting set ofprin-
ciples in order to define the " common European
interests " which could lead to common action.
209. Europe cannot pretend that with the revo-
lutionary changes in the geostrategic situation,
the r6le ofnuclear weapons has not been subject
to change.
210. There should be continuing consultation
on the future of transatlantic security guar-
antees. At the same time, an intra-European
debate is needed over the r6le, and the future
r6le, of European nuclear weapons. These
debates should take place in parallel and with
the greatest possible transparency.
2ll. The WEU Council's decision to move the
Secretariat-General to Brussels and to establish
a military planning cell have demonstrated the
Council's determination to create the conditions
for WEU to be developed into an operational
organisation, co-operating with other orga-
nisations, playing its own specific rdle in
Europe's security policy.
212. In the near future, the Council will have
to show the political will necessary to implement
the consequences of its earlier decisons.
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Draft Recommendation
on security ia the Mediteranean
The Assembly,
O Conscious that it is in Western Europe's own interest to have equally good relations with both its
eastern and southern neighbours;
(iil Aware that prosperous socio-economic conditions and democratic institutions are not only the
most important factors for promoting the internal stability of each country and peaceful international
relations, but also contribute to the flourishing of each people's culture and traditions;
(iiil Recognising that the stability of a whole region increases with the homogeneity of the political
institutions and socio-economic systems of the countries in that region;
(iv) Convinced that Western Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote
economic and social development, peace and security in the Mediterranean as confirmed at the EC's
Lisbon summit in 1992;(v) Aware that throughout the southern Mediterranean region there is growing concern over the
increasing threat of Islamic fundamentalist movements, while in some of these countries terrorism may
endanger the stability of society;
(vil Conscious that Egypt, while not a Maghreb country, shares many of the Maghreb member coun-
tries' security concerns;
(viil Convinced that a favourable conclusion to the Middle East peace process, which is vital for
peace and security in the Mediterranean as a whole, will also lead to increased European responsibility
for the promotion of economic and social development, peace and security in that region;
(viiil Recognising that at the moment there is no military threat to Western Europe from any of the
states south of the Mediterranean;(ix) Convinced that the risk of proliferation of weapons systems and technology, whether nuclear,
biological, chemical or conventional, is a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean
reglon;
(x) Convinced that co-operation between universities and institutes for research into and studies of
security matters on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean miglrt lead to better mutual
understanding,
RecouueNos rHAT run CouNcrr-
l. Implement its decisions to establish a gradual and phased security dialogue with the Maghreb
countries, starting with a restricted number of individual southern Mediterranean countries, which at a
later stage could be extended to include all the countries of the region and lead to true co-operation in
security matters;
2. Promote bilateral military training and exchange programmes between its member states and
countries in the southern Mediterranean region on a bilateral basis, as a first step towards a system of
confidence-building measures;
3. Promote efforts by its member states, both in their bilateral trade relations and in international
negotiations, to prevent or at least reduce the proliferation of weapons systems, be they nuclear, bio-
logical, chemical or conventional, which could threaten peace and stability in the Mediterranean
reglon;
4. Encourage the WEU Institute for Security Studies to remain in regular contact with similar insti-
tutes in the area to the south of the Mediterranean.
r9l
DOCUMET{I l37l
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Rosetq Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. To some people, it may seem secondary to
speak of security in the Mediterranean now that
Western Europe is developing its relations with
its eastern neighbours. However, tackling the
security aspects of this region will, in the
medium term, be a guarantee for us that it will
be safeguarded, thereby ensuring, on the other
side of the * peaceful lake ", the high degree of
stability necessary for co-operation between
Europe and the Maghreb in particular. Now that
maps are being redrawn on the international
scene due to the collapse of the former Soviet
Union and the breaking up of bipolar relations,
there is a redeployment of the forces in presence
in the western Mediterranean. What r6le will
Europe have to play in this new context in
which, since the disappearance of the Soviet
camp, divisions have emerged in North-South
relations and at regional level and profound dif-
ferences are apparent at political level and that
of the different economic systems?'
2. Europe is aware of its responsibilities and
has not forgotten the historical links that bind it
to its Mediterranean partners; to abandon the
Maghreb to its fate could but be harmful. We
must therefore find a strong, stable Maghreb
that can become a reliable economic partner
capable of providing Europe with sources of
prosperity and lasting guarantees of peace. It is
no longer a matter of encouraging relations of
good neighbourliness but rather ofgiving active,
mutual encouragement to co-operation in the
Mediterranean in the framework of a new part-
nership.
3. The Mediterranean is seeking a new
balance and trying to adapt itself to changes in
the world and avoid the many threats facing it.
This security arca must not become an area of
confrontation due to insufficient economic,
social and political development and inabilityto lower significantly uncontrolled internal
tension. Our security is at stake in the Mediter-
ranean where the social situation has deterio-
rated; what are the fundamental aspects of
stability and security in the western Mediter-
ranean?
4. Relations between Europe and the
Maghreb are set in a twofold context. On the one
1. It should be noted that the present report makes no
mention ofTurkey, as it was recently the subject ofa report
presented on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr.
Moya, Rapporteur (Document l34l).
hand, internal threats are emerying in the region
stemming from the economic crisis with a high
unemployment rate and an external debt that
prevents a fresh start. This economic crisis is at
the same time one of the causes of a resurgence
of religious fundamentalism, thus undermining
the population's support for the established
authorities. On the other hand, these problems,
which have political repercussions but are struc-
turally economic, cannot fail to give rise to and
accelerate flows of migrants that Europe will be
unable to resist.
5. In the short term, these relations are liable
to result in conflict situations. The Mediter-
ranean is seeking a new balance to avert the
threats facing it. WiU it become a front line for
Europe? Europe's response to the problem of the
Maghreb nevertheless leaves hope that co-oper-
ation between states will be actively revived in
order to eliminate the risks of drift or regional
disorder. This is why the Mediterranean stake
calls for the implementation of new socio-
economic relations between the European Com-
munity and its partners in the Maghreb so as to
ensure a lasting combination of stability and
security since Euro-Maghreb policy extends
beyond economic or political interests and the
search for regional security implies a dialogue of
which WEU might be the driving force. No
splits are insuperable and there is no reason for
the Mediterranean countries to be doomed to
confrontation rather than laying the foundations
for co-operation that would be fruitful for all.
II. Individual countries
(a) Algetia
(i) Economy
6. One of the main problems for Algeria's
economy is its foreign debt of $26 billion,
requiring a debt service of $9 billion or 7570 ofits goods and services exports. Algeria has
rejected the solution of rescheduling this debt,
but has limited its imports. The government
claims that it has now managed to stablise the
foreign debt service.
7. Even if the government has said that it
wishes to start privatisation, it still has trouble in
putting its new policy into practice. One of the
arguments put fonrard by officials is that it has
not been a grcat success in Central and Eastern
Europe. It is no longer considered taboo, but the
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government does not want to precipitate the
national economy into sudden changes. At the
moment, the overall macroeconomic and legal
framework for privatisation has not yet been
created, but as a first step, the government has
started to review this framework. A number of
state-owned companies have been reorganised
under a r6gime of autonomous management and
the government is trying to find foreign partners
for participation in the investment and man-
agement of such companies. Efforts have been
made to reduce state trading monopolies.
8. Recently, however, the Prime Minister
has reinstated government control of imports of
all foreign goods worth more than $100 000 and
refused to allow the dinar to continue depreci-
ating, two decisions which have prevented any
new agreement with the IMF.
9. The government has freed all prices
except those of basis foodstuffs but it has now
put off all other reform measures because it is
unwilling to risk setting off a social explosion at
a time when it is engaged in a confrontation
with radical Islamists and terrorism.
10. Only the agricultural sector is now fully
privatised and while in recent years there has
been an average 490 increase in products, there is
still scope for further development. Sugar and
oil are imported l00Vo, while 500/o to 600/o of the
domestic need in grain (at the cost of nearly a
quarter ofits hydrocarbon export revenues) and
large quantities of milk powder are imported.
In total, Algeria's yearly agricultural imports
amount to approximately $2 billion. All five
commercial bank companies are still state-
owned. The government has given up its funda-
mental objections to privately-owned banks
operating within the country, but it may still
take several years before such banks start to
operate.
11. The 1990 credit and finance law includes
provisions to allow foreigners to have holdings
of up to 1000/o in ventures in an effort to increase
employment and to encourage the transfer of
technology. Recently, the Prime Minister sus-
pended these provisions. A new tax system,
including income tax, corporation tax and value
added tax, was introduced in 1992, but tax col-
lection may still cause problems for the adminis-
tration.
L2. The tourist industry is only in its infancy,
but the government is making an effort to
promote the development of high quality
tourism in the country's southern regions.
13. There continues to be an astonishing lack
of diversification in Algeria's exports, with
hydrocarbon sales still responsible for 96.60/o of
foreign earnings in 1991. Due to the shortage of
foreign currency, only 550/o of the country's
industrial capacity is being used and there is
little prospect of an improvement in the short
term.
14. The government is aware of the existence
of a large parallel economy which has a negative
influence on the state's ability to control
inflation and collect taxes. In 1993, while both
Morocco and Tunisia are trying to reduce the
budget deficit, Algeria's budget deficit will
attain l4Vo of its GNP. The increase of expend-
iture is in particular the consequence of funds
created for the reorganisation of state companies
and for the support given to poorer families. All
of this is liable to increase the inflation rate,
which is now about 30%. The government hopes
that new housing programmes and a programme
for environment planning will enable it to
control migratory movements within the
country.
(iil Polilical situation
15. The government is well aware that Algeria
is in a difficult economical and political tran-
sition process. It also thinks that the change in
the political system from a one-party system to a
multi-party democracy was started without the
necessary careful preparation, leading to sus-
pension of the electoral process.
16. Still the High State Council is convinced
that only the establishment of a true democratic
political system can guarantee the internal sta-
bility and economic and social development of
the country. A complex modern society can be
developed only with the consensus of all social
partners.
17. The High State Council is trying to break
the deadlock resulting from the suspension of
the electoral process in January 1992, through a
dialogue with the country's political partners,
including the moderate Islamic parties, Hamas
and Ennahda. This dialogue started in Sep-
tember 1992 and was resumed on l3th March
1993 after an intemrption. The agenda for the
second round of talks includes the revision of
the constitution, the creation of a " presidential
organ' to manage the two-year transition from
the end of 1993, when the mandate of the High
State Council will come to an end and the next
presidential elections in 1995, the task and
rights of the National Consultative Council(temporarily replacing the National Assembly)
with its sixty members, nominated by the High
State Council; and finally the character of the
transition period before the restoration of a con-
stitutional order with the organisation of legis-
lative and presidential elections. Talks have
already been held with the FLN, Hamas and the
RCD (Rally for Culture and Democracy).
18. It should be noted here that the army,
which does not participate in the official
political dialogue initiated by the government,
plays an important r6le in Algerian politics. One
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of its well-known theoreticians recently made it
clear that the army will not seize power, but that
it will nevertheless act in favour of a modern
and republican Algeria * guaranteeing freedom
and social progress, while respecting the prin-
ciples of Islam " 2.
19. After a meeting with the High State
Council, Hamas recently condemned terrorism
as a 'phenomenon unfamiliar to the values of
Islam ". In the same communiqud, Hamas con-
firmed its attachment to democracy and the
republican system while agreeing with the High
State Council over the r6le of Islam in Algerian
society, this being the * essential cement which
binds all Algerians " 3.
20. Earlier this year, the RCD, which is
against any dialogue with the Islamic fundamen-
talist movement, accused the Algerian Gov-
ernment of aiming at a compromise with the
Islamists at the expense of the democratic
republicans. Later, after a meeting between the
High State Council and the RCD, it was said
that both had converging views as regards their
attachment to national unity, republican values,
democracy and multipartyism a.
21. Meanwhile, the government is engaged in
a persistent combat against terrorism, which is
continuing notwithstanding some earlier severe
blows. The population is clearly growing weary
of the terrorists' mounting activity, but the gov-
ernment's position does not seem to be strong
enough to capitalise on the national outrage.
22. In an address to the nation on 8th May
1993, the head of state, AIi Kafi, announced a
change organising the pluralist political system
and a constitutional referendum as two key ele-
ments of a plan to return to democracy. He
stated that the transition period for a return to
democracy would be kept as short as possible.
(iiil Algeria and the Islamic Salvation Front(rsF)
23. The source of the ideas underlying the
thinking of the various Islamic organisations is
to be found mainly in the Muslim Brotherhood,
founded in Egypt in 1928. Islamists advocate a
return to the Sharia and, of course, to the Koran,
in close correlation with the Islamisation of
society through political and social action.
Leaving the original framework of the mosques,
Islamists are thus setting up systems following
various models. First of all, they are creating
religious associations to promote their values
and propagate awareness among the people
while remaining outside politics as such (e.9. the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). In a second
2. Lr Monde, 12th March 1993.
3. Lr Monde, 3rd April 1993.
4. [,e Monde, 6th April 1993.
stage, they are entering the western-type demo-
cratic system with an electoral framework. The
ISF followed all these models in turn. With this
strategy, it will gradually control more and more
" Islamised areas " and increase its local elec-
toral victories. In 1990, it managed to take over
most of the larger town halls.
24. What concessions did the state then make
to Islamisation? Apart from a clamp-down by
the authorities, there was an attitude of ideo-
togical reconquest. Re-Islamisation, for and on
behalf of the state, was started to defuse this
uncontrollable challenge. To prevent the IFS
from penetrating sectors that might destabilise
power with democratic rules was henceforth the
watchword of the Algerian state, but the almost
inevitable consequence was to be the radi-
calisation of the IFS.
25. With a massive victory in the various
local elections (cancelled by the authorities), the
attitude of President Chadli Benjedid will be
noted since, following these results, he did not
rule out cohabitation with the fundamentalists.
It is possible that he was thereby trying to ensure
that he himself stayed in power until the end of
his mandate in 1993. His resignation on llth
January 1992, under pressure from the People's
National Army, was the sign of the latter's clear
refusal to allow power to fall into the fanatical
hands of the IFS.
26. A High Committee of State, first under
the presidency of Mohamed Budiaf and then,
following his assassination in June 1992, of Ali
Kafi, ensured the interim running of the
country. On 4th March 1992, the IFS was offi-
cially dissolved by the Administrative Chamber
of the Court of Algiers (this being confirmed on
appeal by the Supreme Court). 397 of those
elected in the cantons and I 541 in the munici-
palities were suspended from office. The oflicial
reason given was that the IFS had violated the
July 1989 regulations forbidding the creation of
a party based on religion.
27. The assumption of presidential powers by
the High State Council caused tension and out-
breaks of violence in several towns, which
resulted in a state of emergency being decreed
on 9th February 1992 which was extended
indefinitely in February 1993. The Human
Rights Ministry was dissolved and replaced by a
" national human rights monitoring centre ".
The killing of almost 100 people and the
detention of thousands in special detention
camps in southern Algeria were strongly
criticised by both Algerian and international
human rights organisations. Many detainees
were released later.
28. It is to be feared that this dismantling may
lead the militant base, now less organised but
still impassioned, to join up with other more or
less clandestine movements such as the Armed
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Islamic Algerian Movement or the Loyal to the
Oath movement.
29. With this ex-political party, Algeria chose
the course of severity. Already considerably
weakened in the second half of l99l by the
arrest of most of its leaders and then deprived of
its electoral victory, the IFS, disappointed and
rejected, from then on preferred to play the
forced card of radicalisation which could make
it turn to terrorism rather than play the game of
democracy which had been taken away from it.
Finally, might not this clear, determined ten-
dency on the part of the Algerian authorities to
eradicate Islamism result in the army again
coming under the orders of the state and demo-
cratic progress being placed on hold?
(b) Esypt
(i) Economy
30. In August 1990, when Iraq invaded
Kuwait, Egypt's economic situation was almost
without hope of recovery. Since then, and as a
consequence of its active participation in the
coalition, an important part of its debt has been
acquitted, and financial aid has been provided
by several countries. Egypt has reorganised its
finances, started to restructure its economy in
accordance with an agreement concluded with
the IMF and has initiated a process of
privatisation. The Egyptian pound is convertible
with a stable exchange rate against the US dollar
and interest rates have been reduced. In the last
two years, the budgetary deflrcit has been
reduced by more than half and Egypt now has a
balance of payments surplus.
31. On the other hand, the government's
financial strictness imposed by the IMF has had
negative consequences for the population. The
purchasing power of the public has further
declined through price increases and subsidy
cuts for vital primary products. Salaries in the
public sector have fallen by 290/o in real terms
during the last five years. The low growth rate of
the economy has caused a dramatic increase in
unemployment. The ILO recently suggested the
number of 3 million people unemployed but
many specialists consider this an underesti-
mation and that the real number is difficult to
assess. Each year 400 000 young people join the
labour market.
32. It should also be noted that the social
fund of more than $600 million foreseen in the
IMF programme to compensate the negative
consequences of the strict financial policy has
not yet been established. The number of unem-
ployed will increase further with the restruc-
turing of the public sector as required by the
IMF. There is hope that economic growth will
be generated by the private sector which is now
being liberated from its many legal restric-
tions.
33. For the time being, the industrialisation
policy must be oriented towards exports because
of the weak purchasing power of the population.
At the moment, per capita exports in Egypt are
only $72, of which one third is for oil. The agri-
cultural sector, employing more than one third
of the population, has started to develop in the
last five years. This could contribute to a better
control of wild urbanisation which is now
playing into the hands of Islamic fundamen-
talism. Tourism, with a total revenue of
$3 billion in 1992, is the most important source
of foreign currency.
34. Altogether, it should be said that the gov-
ernment is making an enormous effort to
improve the country's economic situation.
However, the positive results of financial aus-
terity and economic restructuring will probably
only have a real impact on the population as a
whole in ten to {ifteen years from now.
(ii) Political situation
35. A large part of the rapidly growing urban
population is desperate. For many, there is no
hope of finding a job and there is also an
increasing number of well-educated young
people who are discovering that their profes-
sional aspirations cannot be met. Nor is there
much chance of participation in political dia-
logue through democratic structures.
36. There can be no doubt therefore that this
constitutes an ideal breeding ground for Islamic
fundamentalism, which has in recent years
become extremely activist in the entire region.
The proximity of Sudan, a fundamentalist state
which is actively promoting the expansion of its
religious ideology, is certainly an element which
is not alien to the rise of fundamentalism in
Egypt. Recently, some fundamentalist groups
have decided to lend force to their arguments by
terrorist attacks, often against tourists or tourist
attractions.
37. President Mubarak has tried to avoid a
confrontation as long as possible, but the recent
series of violent terrorist attacks which aimed to
hit the country's important tourist industry has
pushed him to react vigorously. On 9th and lOth
March 1993, the Egyptian police launched an
offensive against Islamic extremists, resulting in
23 dead,40 wounded and around 150 arrested.
This was followed later by more anti-terrorist
operations directed mainly against the extremist
organisation Jamaa Islamiya, led by Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman.
38. It should be noted that these and other
operations against terrorists have been well
received by a large part of the population which
believes that the extremists have gone too far.
While it is generally admitted that the lslamic
activists are far from being able to seize control
of the country, they could certainly be a
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destabilising factor. There is no doubt that the
majority of the population rejects terrorism, but
at fhe same time it should be mentioned that it
also seems to have doubts over the administra-
tion's ability to solve the country's problems.
39. Egypt does indeed have a democratic
system, with remarkable freedom of the press
ahd it has a national parliament where different
political parties are represented. On-the other
hand, the overwhelming majority of the gov-
erning National Democratic Party leaves little
room-for a political dialogue in the democratic
institutions, thus contributing to unguided
feelings of dissatisfaction in large groups of the
population. The government has gradually
beiome aware that further democratisation is
the only way to break the deadlock.
40. The most difficult question now is
whether those of the Islamic fundamentalists
who refuse in any way to be involved in ter-
rorism should be allowed to establish a political
party in order to participate in the democratic
process. For the time being, the view is that
Egyptian society is still too vulnerable and eco-
noinically weak to promote their inclusion in
democratic institutions.
41. At the same time, the government has
undertaken a threefold strategy to promote dem-
ocratic political developments and to curb the
fundamentalist movement. First, it is trying to
promote a sense of historic reality, demon-
itrating that the introduction of the Sharia(Islamic law) would mean imposing a legal
system which is not adapted to a modern
society. Second, it is planning to achieve gtreater
social harmony by narrowing social gaps among
the different classes of the population. Third, it
is putting into practice a firm deterrence policy
against terrorists. In this framework, a new law
has been introduced defining terrorism as a
criminal act with severe punishment.
(iiil Foreign policy in the region
42. Egypt has actively supported the Middle
East peace process from the beginning. Recently,
President Hosni Mubarak has emerged as the
key intermediary in efforts to revive the peace
talks which stalled because of Israel's mass
deportation of Palestinians in December 1992.
One of the reasons was that successful medi-
ation would help President Mubarak reinforce
his position against fundamentalist activities
and would also underline Egypt's strategic value
to the United States from which it seeks a con-
tinuous commitment to the annual $2.1 billion
in civil and military aid.
43. Egypt has also expressed its wish that after
a successful conclusion of the Middle East peace
process, Europe should play a prominent rdle in
the economic and social development and the
maintenance of lasting peace and security in the
region.
44. According to Egypt, the socalled 5+5 dia-
logue (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain +
Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya) is
based on a supposed distinction between the
western and eastern Mediterranean which, in the
opinion of Egypt, does not exist. On the other
hand, Egypt is aware that a really useful dialogue
between all the countries around the Mediter-
ranean can be established only after a successful
conclusion of the Middle East peace process.
Egypt is now developing its proposal to establish
a Mediterranean forum in which the common
interests of all nations around the Mediterranean
in vital areas such as economy, security, tech-
nology transfer, environment, culture, etc. should
be diicussed. One of the ideas put fonvard is to
convene a few representative states from the
region to start discussing ways and means' A con-
feience of ministers should then establish a
number of principles. Other states could join,
provided that they are prepared to subscribe to
the initial declaration.
(c) Libya
45. The country's present almost 4.5 million
inhabitants, most of whom are Sunnis, obtained
political independence in l95l and, until 1960,
ihe nationalists and Muslim brothers criticised
the country's political independence. In 1971,
the Arab Socialist Union was created; religious
institutions were then nationalised and the uni-
fying influence of Islam and socialism was
noted. Kadhafi was more of a reformer than a
fundamentalist and, in 1978, he rejected the
Sunna, thereby affirming his r6le as supreme
leader. His view of religion is significant: by
allowing each individual to interpret Islamic law
and not making the piligrimage to Mecca com-
pulsory.
46. Although denounced by legal experts, in
1973 Libya, with the proclamation of the
people's revolution, entered a socialist, pre-
iapitalist r6gime in conjunction with Islamic
traditions. Gradually, the prerogatives of the
religious leaders were restricted and, as from
1975, the Friday evening serrnons, which were
strictly spiritual in order to avoid political dis-
cussion, and the mosques were no longer
managed by religious Imams, hence the Grand
Mufti rallied to the opposition in 1977 (he was
evicted as a religious leader in 1984). In the mid-
eighties, militant Islamists, closely linked with
certain North African countries, were severely
repressed by the authorities and, in 1985, two
well-known religious leaders were imprisoned
without trial; in 1988, the police raided Tripoli
University (bastion of the Islamists). In 1991,
the General Congress of the People passed a law
according to which religion devolves directly
from the creator without any intermediary, thus
forbidding an ecclesiastical monopoly of religion(or any exploitation by other groups).
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47. The terrorist attack in December 1988
that caused the death of 259 persons in a Pan
American Boeing 747, phts I I inhabitants of the
town of Lockerbie in Scotland, followed by the
attack on a UTA flight in Niger in September
1989, forced France, the United Kingdom and
the United States to decide to bring to trial those
responsible for these crimes. They are sup-
porting each other in their diplomatic andjudicial action, but are still waiting for positive
action from Tripoli. When Tripoli refused to
hand over for trial in the West the two suspects
in the Pan Am Lockerbie terrorist attack, the
United Nations imposed sanctions in April
1992. A year later, in April 1993, the United
Nations renewed the sanctions, including a
flight embargo, while the United States
threatened to tighten them and perhaps to
include a ban on oil sales. Arab nations have
made several attempts to broker a solution, but
there are no signs of a breakthrough.
48. The sanctions adopted by the United
Nations forbid sales of arms to and air links
with Libya but affect neither the country's oil
exports nor most of its imports that come in by
sea. Libya is continuing to export oils, which
accounted for 43.5o/o of its GDP in the period
1988-93. The Libyan Government's new eco-
nomic policy was launched in 1987, its main
aims being independence in respect of oil
resources and a fair sharing ofrevenue. The abo-
lition of wage-earners, who are now " asso-
ciates " and the desire to abolish intermediary
powers in favour of the direct power of the
masses is taking tangible shape with the intro-
duction of a new administrative division of
I 500 communes with widespread autonomy in
financial matters and the management of facil-
ities. After the expulsion of more than half the
almost 600 000 foreigners working in Libya in
1983, the government was forced to authorise
small private businesses, whereas now
privatisations are being considered.
49. Gradually, Libya is feeling the conse-
quences of the United Nations sanctions
imposed over a year ago. In a recent interview,
Colonel Moammar Kadhafi stressed his desire
to halt emnity between the United States and
Libya and to establish good relations with the
new Clinton administration. He did not,
however, abandon his refusal to hand over the
two Libyans accused of the Lockerbie bombing
in 1988, which still is the main stumbling-block
in United States-Libyan relations.
50. He also strongly condemned Islamic fun-
damentalists and insisted that he was co-
operating closely with Egypt and the Maghreb
countries to combat the spread of Islamic mili-
tancy. At the same time, he made overtures
towards Israel and the Jewish world, apparently
to demonstrate a positive new Libyan approach
to international relations.
51. At the beginning of May 1993, Colonel
Kadhafi made new proposals to liberalise the
country's state-dominated economy. He sug-
gested the development of mass tourism and the
adoption of a law providing guarantees for
foreign capital investment.
52. All this may be interpreted as the Colo-
nel's desire to put an end to his country's iso-
lation due to the embargo and the ban on inter-
national air travel to Libya, which, according to
the government, has cost the country more than
$2.2 billion in lost exports and other damage.
(d) Mauitania
(i) Economy
53. Mauritania, which was made a member of
the AMU for political reasons, does in fact have
very little in common with the other AMU
member states.
54. Trade with its Maghreb neighbours is
weak and irregular. Traditionally and geographi-
cally, Mauritania has more economic links with
the sub-saharan countries.
55. It should be noted that the average
income, in comparable purchasing power, is one
third the average income in Algeria and Tunisia
and half the average income in Morocco. Mauri-
tania is among the 40 least-developed countries
in the world with a continuous fall in average
income during the last 20 years. The main
causes for this negative development were: a
long period of drought and depopulation of rural
areas, combined with the consequences of the
Sahara conflict, the deterioration ofthe iron ore
market and increasing national debt.
56. An economic restructuring programme
supported by international financial organ-
isations has led to some improvements. A new
programme for the years 1989-91 with more
structural reforms including the restructuring of
public companies has however not been suc-
cessful because of unfavourable climatological
and other external circumstances. Moreover,
Mauritania's attitude in the Gulf crisis deprived
it of Arab financial support and led to a sus-
pension of the programme.
57. Since 1991, the situation has been
improving and there is reason for hope. Not
only was the border with Senegal reopened, but,
as mentioned above, there were positive
political changes, such as a new constitution and
presidential elections.
58. In October 1992, new agreements were
signed with the World Bank and the IMF. An
ambitious 1991-95 economic restructuring pro-5. 4% of world crude oil exports.
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gramme is aiming at an annual growth rate of
3.50/0, a 3.60/o yearly inflation by 1995 and a
reduction in the country's external debt. In
January 1993, the Club of Paris revised the
country's debt situation.
(it) Political situation
59. Since a military coup in 1978, Mauritania
has been ruled by a Military Council of National
Salvation, its Chairman being President of the
Republic. The National Assembly was sus-
pended.
60. In July 1992, however, a new constitution
was approved by national referendum. Political
parties were legalised. The country's first multi-
party presidential elections were held in January
1992, which were won by the incumbent Pres-
ident, Colonel Moaouia Ould Sidi Taya, who
was supported by the army and the Social Dem-
ocratic Republican Party. President Ould Taya
won 62.750/o of the votes cast, with a total
turnout of just under 5@/o of the voters.
61. This democratisation of political life fol-
lowed growing criticism of Mauritania's human
rights record and mounting pressure for reforms.
Amnesty International in particular claimed
that hundreds of people in detention had been
killed and that many others had been
imprisoned without any kind of trial. There
have also been complaints over a lack of
freedom of religion.
62. The first legislative elections based on the
new constitution were held in March 1992 with
President Ould Taya's Social Democratic
Republican Party winning 67 of the total 79
seats with the remaining 12 seats going to two
political parties and ten independent candi-
dates. The polls were boycotted by six oppo-
sition groups who alleged vote rigging. Only
around 350/o of the electorate took part in the
vote.
(e) Morocco
(i) Economy
63. In December 1989, the government
announced that ll2 publicly controlled com-
panies and banks employing 35 000 people and
almost half of the country's companies with
state participation would be privatised by 1995.
A system of value-added tax and company taxes
was introduced. The privatisation of some banks
is intended to channel domestic funds into the
banking system.
64. The proceedings of the sale, estimated at
l0 billion French francs will be used mainly for
education, health and public housing, while a
small part will be allocated for infrastructure
programmes. Altogether, the Moroccan public
sector is relatively modest, with l5ryo of the gross
national product and 5Vo of the workers in
the commercial and industrial sector. Still,
privatisation is a major operation which has
been held up because ofthe lack ofexperience of
those responsible, complicated legislation and a
high degree of red tape.
65. Three years after the publication of the
royal decree on privatisation, only half a dozen
companies have been privatised. Many com-
panies put up for sale at the end oflast year have
not yet found buyers.
66. On the other hand, the government is pos-
itively determined to make the operation suc-
cessful and ultimately does not exclude the pos-
sibility of privatising state monopolies such as
the national electricity company.
67. Deregulation has indeed made consid-
erable progress. More than 9070 of all goods can
now be imported without a licence. A free trade
zone is being established near Casablanca, while
an offshore banking centre is being established
at Tangiers. Since 1989, foreign currency con-
trols have been eased considerably and foreign
investment has been greatly facilitated. It should
be mentioned that the proportion of manufac-
tured goods in Moroccan exports was 65% in
1991. In the same year, the balance of payments
deficit was reduced to under 390.
68. There remains, however, an urgent need
to address the problems regarding land reform
and domestic food production, bearing in mind
that notwithstanding the high level of agricul-
tural production, one third of the total grain
consumption is still being imported.
69. In 1991, industrial investment registered
a reduction of 14.90/o in the first seven months,
affecting all sectors except for textiles. There was
an increase of 40/o in industrial production.
70. A six-year privatisation programme of
state assets to the value of 9.5 billion dirhams
has been launched, while debt rescheduling
agreements have reduced some of the pressure
on the government.
(it Relations with the EC
71. Morocco attaches the greatest possible
importance to its relations with the EC which
have a commercial, economic and financial
dimension, and also include a political dialogue.
The EC has responded positively and the basic
policy contained in the Lisbon declaration is
now being worked out in a new preferential
agreement aiming at a mutual partnership. It is
hoped that this new agreement will enter into
force in 1995. The political dialogue, which will
be an integral part of the agreement, should
include all matters of common interest.
Morocco has indicated that one of the issues to
be addressed is security in the Mediterranean.
Other issues include migration, the fight against
drugs and terrorism and also democracy and
human rights. Stressing that a human rights dia-
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logue with Europeans is useful and indispen-
sable, Morocco has also indicated that Europe
should be well aware that it cannot transfer all
its own models and standards to Morocco over-
night.
72. Morocco signed a treaty of friendship,
good neighbourliness and co-operation with
Spain in 1991. This treaty guarantees the
peaceful settlement of disputes between the two
states, a clause which has particular importance
for the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla,
which were claimed by Morocco.
(iii) Politicalsituation
73. The last legislative elections in Morocco
were held in September 1984, providing a
six-year mandate for the members of the
Chamber of Representatives. In December
1989, King Hassan's decision 
- 
connected with
the situation in the Sahara 
- 
to extend the term
of the Chamber by two years was approved in a
referendum. Meanwhile, the mandate of the
Chamber expired in October 1992 and the
planned date for new elections has been post-
poned twice. The elections planned to be held
on 30th April 1993 have again been postponed
until 25th June next in response to a request by
the political parties, which wanted to be able to
prepare the elections better, in particular, by a
complete overhaul of the electoral lists.
74. A new government composed mainly of
technocrats was appointed on 1 lth August 1992
and is supposed to prepare the planned legis-
lative elections to be held on 25th June 1993.
75. In May 1992,the five main parties of the
legal opposition formed a democratic bloc and
published a unified position on the common
demands for a fundamental constitutional
reform which would lead to a healthy democracy
within the framework of a constitutional mon-
archy. While certain opposition parties had
voiced criticism and disappointment over the
proposed new constitution and some of them
had called for a boycott of the referendum, the
government published a turn out of 97.290/o of
the I I million voters and a 99.960/o approval
rate: figures likely to astonish citizens of the
Western European democracies.
76. Over the years, the Moroccan rdgime has
managed to maintain a balance in the pluralism
of political parties, by encouraging some and
discouraging others.
77. In his speech from the throne on 3rd
March 1992, His Majesty King Hassan II
announced that a draft constitutional reform
was to be submitted to the people for approvalin order first to strengthen the democratic
process, then to affirm the state of law and,
finally to make active preparation for the
medium-term choices that have to be made by
the country by 2000, i.e. a political choice (plur-
alism) and an economic choice (liberalism).
78. Although boycotted by certain political
groups, on 4th September 1992 the Moroccan
people approved the proposed revision by a very
large majority (99.980/o). Although not a total
reform, the new constitution nevertheless makes
a few changes to the previous 1972 consti-
tution.
79. First, in the preamble, Morocco affrrms its
endorsement of human rights as universally
recognised; second, the Chamber of Representa-
tives may set up commissions of enquiry; third, a
Constitutional Council is set up (with an easy
method of seisin); fourth and last, the King
appoints and dismisses ministers on the proposal
of the Prime Minister. Moreover, the head of gov-
ernment presents his programme to the Chamber
of Representatives for debate and vote.
80. The new constitution, therefore, clearly
reinforced the position of both Prime Minister
and parliament. Moreover, it envisages the cre-
ation of an economic and social council. At
present, the government is preparing to improve
the legal status of women.
81. There is much at stake in the new funda-
mental text of the Kingdom of Morocco both at
institutional level (with new creations) and at the
level of the relationship between the executive and
parliament, but this new text will be of effective
value only if it is accompanied by the political
reforms that have been announced. It is to be
hoped that the state and the Moroccan people will
measure up to the scale of the ambition of this
praiseworthy constitutional reform.
82. One could imagine that this referendum
was also a sign of Morocco's determination to
intensify its relations with its western partners,
and particularly the EC member countries.
83. In early 1991, the Moroccan Government
was strongly criticised by different human rights
organisations for the arbitrary detention of
political opponents and for the widespread use
of torture of detainees: allegations which have
been repeatedly denied by the government.
84. In August of the same year, King Hassan
granted an amnesty to an unspecified number of
prisoners who had " recognised the Moroccan
identity ofthe recovered Sahara ". Later, in Sep-
tember and October 1991, military detainees,
who had allegedly participated in plots against
the King in l97l and 1972, were released.
85. In March 1993 the Consultative Council
on Human Rights, which was created in 1989 by
the King and consists of representatives from
three different human rights organisations and
of the administration, recognised the existence
of the problems of political prisoners, the situ-
ation in overpopulated prisons, and the viola-
tions of the right to free movement and indi-
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cated that in order to find remedies they
examine these matters in detail.
(iv) Islam
86. Since independence in 1956, Islam has
been one of the instruments reinforcing the
political legitimacy of Morocco's monarchial
dynasty. In the framework of training and edu-
cation, judges, lawyers and preachers were
encouraged to support the monarch and in 1961
the state-sponsored League of Religious Scholars(Rabitat al-Ulama) was established. The 1962
constitution declared Islam to be the state
religion, while reaflirming the legitimacy of the
hereditary monarchy, forbidding any " ques-
tioning of the monarchial rdgime or the Muslim
religion'. At the same time, a legal system was
introduced with a combination of elements of
the Sharia (Islamic law) and French civil
codes.
87. A Regional Council of Ulama (religious
scholars) and a High Council of Ulama under
the King's presidency were established in 1980
to monitor religious appointments, define reli-
gious orthodoxy and authorise the construction
of mosques.
88. In the 1980s, a number of Islamic
activists, most of them alleging to belong to the
clandestine association of Islamic youth, were
sentenced for * plotting against the monarch and
planning to establish an Islamic state ". The
Movement for Reform and Renewal founded in
1983 as the Islamic Association, although not
oflicially registered, is one of the few militant
Muslim fundamentalist groups to be tolerated
by the Moroccan Government. This movement
supports the monarchy, but at the same time
demands strict adherence to Islamic law,
including the abolition of bank interest. It is
opposed to violence and has opted to join legal
parties.
89. It should be mentioned here that, all in
all, Morocco is less affected by Islamic funda-
mentalism than its neighbouring states. One of
the reasons is beyond doubt the leading position
of the King in religious matters. Among others
are real pluralism and the less monolithic system
of political parties.
(f) Tunisia
(i) Economy
90. With the seventh development plan 1987-
1991, Tunisia started to implement a policy of
economic liberalisation and privatisation with
the objective of opening up its economy to the
international economic system and reinforcing
its ability for self-sustained development.
91. This included a progressive reform of the
monetary and fiscal system. The reform of the
tax system in 1988 broadened its base and dis-
couraged fraud, while value-added tax and
company taxes were introduced. In the banking
sector, competitive measures were brought in,
including the establishment of offshore banks.
Obviously, the banking system is still bearing
some hallmarks of the command economy such
as overstaffrng and accumulated bad loans, but
there is hope that these will gladually dis-
appear.
92. Many import controls were lifted so that
by the end of 1992 the free import ratio was
around 85V0. At the same time, the highest rate
for customs tariffs and duties had decreased to
43%, compared with 1000/o in 1986. In a serious
effort to attract foreign capital and technology
transfer, Tunisia introduced its first industrial
investment code in 1987, stressing its advan-
tages as an offshore manufacturing base for
European companies. Most foreign capital gen-
erally flows into the hydrocarbons sector, the
manufacturing industries and tourism.
93. Foreign currency restrictions have been
lifted, and foreign investors no longer require
prior agreement from the Central Bank to repa-
triate their capital investments or remit proflrts.
Foreign currency allowances for Tunisians have
doubled in the last six years.
94. The budget deficit was brought down
from 6.7V0 of GDP in 1984 to 2.70/o in l99l and
2.3o/o in 1992, while inflation is now at 6Vo. Eco-
nomic gowth has averaged 6.60/o over the past
three years, more than three times the rate of the
population growth.
95. Indeed, all these measures have resulted
in a gteater diversity and volume of exports. The
total of exported goods and services increased
from 2 161.2 million dinars in 1986 to 4764
million dinars in 1991. It should be mentioned
that 75Vo of all exports is destined for the EC,
but demand, most notably for leather and tex-
tiles, has recently weakened.
96. In 1992, the EC also imposed import
restrictions on Tunisia, causing a 33Vo drop in
exports of agricultural and food products. As
mentioned elsewhere in this report, anomalies
would exist to a lesser degree after the con-
clusion of a preferential, non-reciprocal trade
agreement between the EC and Tunisia guaran-
teeing free access to the Common Market of
industrial products and concessions for agricul-
tural products. In recent years, co-operation in
trade with other Maghreb countries has made
some progress. Exports to these countries are
now 80/o of total exports but there is still room
for improvement, with an urgent need to abolish
many existing trade restrictions.
(ir) Political situation
97. Under the guidance of President Zine al
Abidine Ben Ali, the Tunisian Government has
chosen the path of further democratisation
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which it considers to be a guarantee for the bal-
anced development of the country.
98. A new election law has now been adopted
which has introduced a combination of a pro-
portional and a district system. It is hoped that
the next elections in 1994 will generate credible
opposition parties which in the beginning might
be rather small in size, but would have the
dynamics necessary for future growth.
99. However, Islamic fundamentalists have
been excluded from the actual democratisation
process because they are not prepared to submit
themselves to the rules of the game.
100. The government is convinced that the
economy will not flourish without democratic
government structures. It is determined to
create all the necessary conditions for a healthy
opposition movement which would be repre-
sented in parliament after the next elections
which are to be held it 1994.
(iii) Islam and the state
101. Under President Habib Bourguiba, a con-
certed effort was made to dissociate religion from
the state. Among other things, personal statute
laws relating to marriage and divorce were secu-
larised and lslamic law courts were liquidated.
Although both the President and government
leaders sought to present the changes as aspects
of Islamic reform rather than of increasing secu-
larisation, it led to a distinct sense of alienation
among the less affluent and less educated classes
of society and to anti-government demonstra-
tions in 1960 and 1961, which were inspired by
religious scholars. By the end of the 1960s,
growing opposition prompted the government to
adopt a more conciliatory approach where it
encouraged mosques and religious study groups
to become the chief forum of political debate. In
1970 the government backed the creation of the
Quranic Preservation Society (QPS - Associationpour la sauvegarde du Quran), which included
among its early members Rashid al Ghannouchi,
who later founded the Movement of the Islamic
Tendency (Mouvement de la Tendance Isla-
mique 
- 
MTI). Other smaller Islamic movements
were established in the following years.
102. In l98l the MTI applied for legalisation,
stressing that it did not question the validity of
western concepts of liberty and democracy or
favour violence. It failed, however, to win gov-
ernment recognition and was banned in 1981,
increasing its popularity. Food riots in 1984 led
to a new official rapprochement with the Islamic
movement, but this did not prevent new
troubles in 1986 and 1987, while in 1987 the
government established the Islamist Council of
Ulama, which served as a channel for the official
supervision of religious activities.
103. In November 1987, Zine al Abidine BenAli replaced Habib Bourguiba as President,
almost immediately decreeing a presidential
pardon for hundreds of MTI militants. The new
government also showed a willingness to seek
overtures towards Islamist critics. On the other
hand, a firm stand was taken when in 1988 the
parliament adopted legislation which permitted
political parties to seek legalisation with the stip-
ulation that " no party has the right to refer in its
principles... to religion, language, or race ".
104. ln 1992 there were mass trials of Islamic
activists belonging to Al Nahda or its splinter
groups. The trials were criticised by some
human rights organisations under the allegation
that the judical procedures did not conform to
international norns and that confessions had
been extracted through torture.
105. The government is aware that Islamic fun-
damentalists are using western human rights
organisations to promote and to protect their
own activities which have a monopoly of power
and intolerance as their main objectives.
106. The Tunisian Government is worried
about the alleged Islamic terrorists who were
granted political refugee status in various
European countries. It insists that there should
be closer co-operation between the countries on
both sides of the Mediterranean in the fight
against terrorism.
107. In Tunisia, many of the mostly young and
urban-based Islamists of Ennahda are the first-
generation offspring of migrants from coastal or
rural areas. The lack of professional opportun-
ities, as well as the comrpt practices accompa-
nying the distribution of privileges, are seen as
major factors in the turn of this section of the
younger generation to Islamism.
III. The Middle East peace process
108. After the Gulf war, the United States
seized the opportunity to convince the Israelis
and the Arabs that the time was ripe to start
negotiations on peace in the Middle East.
Finally, in Madrid on 30th October 1991,
thanks to the very able diplomatic efforts of,
in particular, the United States Secretary of
State, James Baker, delegations from Israel,
Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation formally started negotia-
tions in a Middle East peace conference, jointly
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet
Union. The conference took place within the
framework of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal
of Israeli troops from occupied territories and
for the recognition of Israel.
109. Almost immediately after the official
opening, bilateral negotiations were started
between the Israeli and other delegations. It was
decided that negotiations with the Jordanian-
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Palestinian delegation would be divided intotwo different tracks for discussion:
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian issues.
I10. Further rounds of talks were held in
Washington (l3th-16th January 1992) and
Moscow (28th-29th January 1992). A conflict
then started over the composition of the Pales-
tinian delegation, which, according to the
* Madrid formula ", should not include PLO
members, Palestinians from East Jerusalem or
Palestinians from the diaspora outside the
occupied territories. A new round then took
place in Washington in February and April and
during May a series of multilateral negotiations
in different capitals were alternatively boycotted
by various delegations.
l1l. The formation of a new LabourJed Israeli
Government under Prime Minister ltzhak
Rabin was considered by many as offering new
chances for progress in the peace process.
ll2. A sixth and seventh round of talks were
held in Washington and elsewhere in September,
October and November, but there was still little
evidence of substantial progress.
I13. However, after Egyptian mediation, Israel
abandoned its boycott of multilateral talks on
refugees and regional economic co-operation
begun in May 1992 in protest against Pales-
tinian plans to appoint exiles as representatives
in their delegations to the two sessions.
ll4. Negotiations were intemrpted on lTth
December 1992, when the Israeli Government
expelled more than 400 Palestinians to
Lebanon. Since then, intensive diplomatic
efforts have been made in which the Egyptian
President Mubarak played an important r6le in
bringing all parties back to the negotiation table.
115. Israel has accepted Faygal al-Husseini as
the acknowledged leader of the Palestinian dele-
gates to the bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions, a price it had to pay after the massive
expulsions of December 1992.
116. Under pressure from both the Americans
and the other Arab participants, the Palestinians
dropped the immediate return of the expelled
refugees as a condition for resuming negotia-
tions. A new round of talks was started in Wash-
ington on 27th April 1993. The United States
Secretary of State, Warren M. Christopher, held
a meeting with all the heads of delegations 
- 
the
first of this kind since October l99l 
- 
to show
his determination to try to bridge gaps and to
broker compromises if necessary.
ll7. Syria has made it clear that Israel should
withdraw from the Golan Heights, an issue
which Israel is willing to discuss if Syria
commits itself to " full peace ", symbolised by a
peace treaty.
118. It should be noted that the Egyptian Gov-
ernment has a direct interest in successful negoti-
ations in the Middle East process with Israel
making important concessions to the Palestinians.
ll9. The Egyptian Government is convinced
that an Israeli-Arab peace agreement could be a
strategic counterweight for lranian-Sudanese
influence through fundamentalism in the region.
120. On the other hand, both Israel and the PLO
have an interest in reaching a peace agreement.
The PLO, the Palestinians' main mouthpiece
during a decad+long struggle for liberation and
independence and now within reach of a com-
promise with its historic opponent, is feeling the
mounting influence of Hamas, the Palestinian
version of Islamic fundamentalism.
l2l. In a few months' time, Hamas has
managed to occupy the foremost position in the
armed resistance against Israel in the occupied
territories. The deportation of some four
hundred of its members to south Lebanon has
only strengthened its position. With the hitherto
slow progress in the peace process, the Israeli
policy of maximum repression and few conces-
sions, Hamas is a serious rival of the PLO and
far less inclined, if not totally opposed to
making compromises with Israel.
122. An agreement between Israel and Pal-
estine is again the most important and urgent
issue in the Middle East peace process.
123. The Israeli Government now seems to be
prepared to discuss self-government for the Pal-
estinians, not only regarding their citizens, but
also regarding their territories. The peace process
has apparently reached a decisive phase where
important decisions will have to be taken.
L24. At this stage, Europe certainly has a r6le to
play. However, it should prepare itself for the
more prominent rOle which it inevitably will
have to play after a peace agreement, not only in
stimulating trade and development in the Medi-
terranean, in accordance with its renovated Med-
iterranean policy, but also in promoting peace
and security co-operation in the region 6.
IY. Arab Maghreb Union
125. After a long history of failed initiatives to
create a regional forum of co-operation in the
southern Mediterranean, Algeria, Libya, Mauri-
tania, Morocco and Tunisia signed a treaty on
19th February 1989 establishing the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU).
6. It should also be noted that the Parliamentary Assembly
ofthe Council ofEurope has always been concerned with the
establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East: a report
published in 1989 on the prospects ofpeace in the Near East(Rapporteur: Mr. Found) and another report expected in
September 1993 on the situation in the Middle East
(Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman) testify to this.
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126. Under the treaty, the five countries agreed
to formulate common policies on: (i) defence(" to safeguard the independence of every
member state "); (ii) economic issues (* to
achieve the industrial, agricultural, commercial
and social development of the member states...
by setting up joint ventures and preparing
general and specialised programmes "); and (iii)
international and cultural issues.
127. The administrative structure includes a
Presidential Council (the supreme body), com-
posed of the heads of member states, convening
every six months. The chairmanship rotates
annually. Other AMU structures include a
council of foreign affairs ministers to prepare
summits;a committee to oversee moves towards
integration; and a Consultative Council com-
posed of ten members from each state.
128. The main objectives of the AMU are eco-
nomic, with its members intending to " follow a
common policy in the various domains " and to
" work gradually towards achieving the free
movement of their people, goods, services and
capital ". At least some of the participants hoped
that closer regional co.operation would also create
attractive prospects for relations with the EC.
129. The AMU treaty also provides a security
dimension, stating in Article 14 that " any
aggression to which a member state is subjected
will be considered as an aggression against the
other member states ".
130. Moreover, in Article 15, member states
" pledge not to permit any activity or
organisation in their territory that could harm
the security, territorial integrity or political
system of any other member state ".
l3l. Since 1989, many meetings of the
member states have been held at different levels,
including summits attended by heads of state.
Vital issues such as food, security, human
resources, regional infrastructure, economy and
finance are the main subjects of discussion. A
schedule has been approved for the implemen-
tation of a complete customs union by 1995. On
the other hand, it should be noted that, up until
now and notwithstanding the existence of a fol-
low-up committee, a council of foreign ministers
and twice-yearly summits, these activities have
not provided many concrete results.
132. The main reason for this is the lack of
foreign investors and foreign currency needed to
implement the ambitious projects. This is why
the Maghreb countries are still interested in
intensifying their relations with the EC, a
partner with which the Maghreb countries
actually exchange 750/o of their trade.
133. On the other hand, one should allow the
Maghreb countries more time to get organised,
knowing that it took the EC member states more
than thirty years before they signed the Treaty
on European Union and with some member
states still seemingly reluctant over its full
implementation.
134. The last AMU summit conference, pre-
ceded by a meeting of foreign ministers, was
held in Nouakchott (Mauritania) on lOth and
l lth November 1992.In the final communiqud,
terrorism was condemned and it was said that
the rise of religious fundamentalism constituted
a threat to society and democracy. The AMU
further called on the United Nations Security
Council to reconsider its decision on an
embargo against Libya.
I 35. Since then, there has been no progress. On
lTth February 1993, it was announced that the
AMU Foreign Ministers had decided to suspend
momentarily the build-up of the AMU in order
to assess what had been done and what should
be done. In this framework, the Moroccan
Foreign Minister mentioned the fifteen agree-
ments signed since January 1989, of which not a
single one had been or even could be imple-
mented because each member country was fol-
lowing a different economic course.
136. Even if economic co-operation is still in
its infancy, also because of the many structural
differences between the various member coun-
tries, it should be noted that the AMU is already
offering a regular opportunity for political con-
sultation on issues such as the Gulf crisis, the
Western Sahara dispute, Islamic fundamen-
talism, the Middle East peace process and eco-
nomic sanctions against Libya.
V. The problem of Western Sahara
137. Following the discovery, in the late
sixties, of an enormous phosphate deposit in
Bou Craa, Spain, which still had authority over
that desert territory, preferred to opt for the cre-
ation of a small independent state, free to decide
its own economic commitments. Morocco,
however, then immediately recalled its pre-
colonial right over this land and, in 1969,
Algeria even supported King Hassan I['s terri-
torial claims. Shortly aftenvards, Algeria, disap-
pointed by a joint agreement with Morocco con-
cerning an iron deposit near Tindoul willingly
started to support the Sahraouis, who soon
became the Polisario Front.
138. The withdrawal of Spain from this region
without the establishment of proper governing
authority to replace it, was followed by several
consultation efforts which produced no clear
consensus.
139. In 1976, a Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) was established by a gov-
ernment in exile, the independence of which the
Polisario Front struggled to assert.
140. Algeria has been the SADR's main
advocate over the years, while Libya has a policy
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of alternately defending and withdrawing
support from the SADR. Mauritania first partic-
ipated with Morocco in the occupation of
Western Sahara, withdrew its troops in the late
1970s declaring neutrality, and recognised the
SADR in 1987. Tunisia has always been neutral
in this dispute.
l4l. Since the beginning of the 1980s,
Morocco has consolidated its position in
Western Sahara by the construction of defensive
positions and other military measures which
have diminished the Polisario's possibilities to
be a serious military threat. On the other hand, a
purely military solution for the problem is
excluded. In 1982, King Hassan agreed to take
part in a summit meeting of the Organisation
of African States. However, the subsequent
admission of the SADR to the OAS, thus
making it both judge and party, impeded efforts
to find a solution in this framework.
142. In August 1988, both the Polisario and
Morocco accepted a United Nations peace plan,
which proposed that the choice between inde-
pendence or integration with Morocco should be
decided through a referendum based on the
1974 Spanish census ofthe Saharan population
that was a basis for establishing electoral lists.
143. Since then, preparations for the refe-
rendum have dragged on and several deadlines
for the referendum have not been met. A United
Nations force (MINURSO) was sent to the
region in l99l to supervise the application of
the cease-fire and troop movements following
the coming into force of the cease-fire between
the two parties concluded under the aegis of the
United Nations.
144. One of the difliculties is to reach an
agreement over the number of potential voters.
The Spanish census mentioned a figure of
74000 inhabitants, but Morocco added lists
totalling some 120000 other potential voters,
which are now being verified by the United
Nations, which has agreed to an enlargement of
the electorate to an extent that still has to be
defined.
145. The building of a strong Maghreb and the
economic stake of a Euro-Maghreb axis depend
on a peaceful settlement of the Saharan conflict
without which there can be no fruitful
co-operation between Algeria and Morocco.
This complex issue, which has remained topical
in the region for almost twenty years, might be
solved in a manner satisfactory to all in the refe-
rendum on self-determination. On 2nd March
1993, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 809 recalling that, in
accordance with the plan to settle the Western
Sahara question, it was for the Secretary-
General to lay down instructions for examining
requests to participate in the referendum. A
report by the United Nations Secretary-
General to the Council on the result of his
efforts is due in May 1993, and it is hoped that
the referendum can take place before the end of
1993.
YI. The pmposal for a Conference
on Security and Co-operation
in the Mediterranean and the Middle Eost(cscM)
146. The Gulf war brought to the fore feelings
and demonstrations of certain common security
concerns shared by Western European and at
least a number of Middle Eastern Arab states. At
the same time, however, differences of view
could be observed between the population of the
northern and southern Mediterranean.
147. This led to a proposal by northern Medi-
terranean countries to establish a CSCM,
involving all Arab countries and Iran, Mediter-
ranean countries on both shores, as well as
European countries, a number of former Soviet
republics, the United States and Canada. It
would be modelled according to the principles
governing the CSCE.
148. Such a proposal can be seen only as a very
long term project. Real progress in the Middle
East peace process and peace, or at least a lasting
and durable cease-fire, in ex-Yugoslavia, must
be minimum conditions before anything useful
can be done in this framework. Moreover, it
may be a long time before all the different coun-
tries with their divergent political practices are
able to agree on principles such as those adopted
in the CSCE.
149. It should be noted here that, at the 1992
CSCE Helsinki summit, some decisions were
made as regards the Mediterranean region.
150. Among other things, it was decided that
the Committee of Senior Officials should * seek
to relate issues regarding co-operation in the
Mediterranean to the goals of the CSCE
process " and should " examine, as appropriate,
practical modalities for possible contributions to
the CSCE by non-participating countries ".
151. The establishment of an effective infor-
mation exchange was encouraged and non-
participating Mediterranean states are to be
invited to future review conferences * to make
contributions concerning security and co-
operation in the Mediterranean ". It is too early
yet for any substantial results to be available,
but these decisions could certainly lead to pos-
itive developments in the future.
152. A far more practical way would be for
WEU to start a gradual dialogue with a
restricted number of individual southern Medi-
terranean countries such as Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia and Egypt, which would later be
formalised, institutionalised, and, if all goes
well, extended to include others.
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VII. NATO and the soathern Mediterranean
153. Traditionally, NATO has given due
attention to its southern flank, which includes
the Mediterranean. During the cold war, its
main interest in this area was to provide a coun-
terbalance to the Soviet maritime presence. In
particular, the presence of the United States
sixth fleet was a guarantee for deterrence and
equilibrium, passwords for survival in those
years.
154. As is well known, the radical changes in
East/West relations called for a thorough
revision of the alliance's strategic concept,
which was agreed by the heads of state and gov-
ernment in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991.
Under the heading of " security challenges and
risks ", this new strategic concept was still
mainly focused on possible events in Central
and Eastern Europe.
155. Among the security risks mentioned were:
" the adverse consequences of instabilities that
may arise from the serious economic, social and
political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries
and territorial disputes, which are faced by
many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe ".
156. Strangely enough, such risks were not
mentioned for the southern Mediterranean and
the Middle East, which were perceived rather as
regions where a purely military threat could
emerge. In the strategic concept, this was stated
as follows:
" The allies also wish to maintain peaceful
and non-adversial relations with the coun-
tries in the southern Mediterranean and
Middle East. The stability and peace of
the countries on the southern periphery of
Europe are important for the security of
the alliance, as the l99l Gulf war has
shown. This is all the more so because of
the build-up of military power and the
proliferation of weapons technologies in
the area, including weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles capable
of reaching the territory of some member
states of the alliance. "
157. Later, the organisational consequences
were decided in meetings of the Defence
Planning Committee of l2th-l3th December
1991 and 26-27thMay 1992.
158. The Commander-in-Chief of Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) is still
an American. Allied Forces Southern Europe(AFSOUTH), in which there are no partici-
pating French or Spanish forces, cover the allied
land forces of southern and south-eastern
Europe, the allied air and naval forces of
southern Europe and the naval intervention
forces of southern Europe (sixth fleet).
159. In the framework of the new strategic
concept with increased flexibility and mobility
to respond to the requirements of deterrence,
crisis management and peace-keeping, the
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean(STANAVFORMED), which is an immediate
reaction force at the disposal of SACEUR, has,
since 30th April 1992, replaced the former allied
naval force (NAVOCFORMED). Participatingin STANAVFORMED are the navies of
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
YIII. WEU and the Meditenanean
160. In the first half of 1992, the Mediter-
ranean sub-group of WEU met twice. According
to the information given by the Secretary-
General:
* The group continued its exchanges of
view on three topical questions, namely,
the situation in former Yugoslavia, efforts
to resolve the problem in Western Sahara
and the Cyprus question. The group con-
cluded its work as regards the annotated
list of principles likely to contribute to a
resolution of security problems in the
Mediterranean. It also took stock of
progress in the " Five plus Five " process.
Lastly, the group approved a draft
mandate for future contacts between
WEU and the Maghreb countries. As to
the analysis of risks likely to affect
security in the Mediterranean and in the
Gulf region, the group is now in Pos-
session of a number of detailed national
contributions on security in the Maghreb,
and of a study prepared by the WEU
Institute for Security Studies on the situ-
ation in Algeria and its consequences for
the Maghreb and Europe. "
161. It would be extremely useful for the
Assembly to have more detailed information on
the " annotated list of principles " which could
help to solve the security problems in the Medi-
terranean.
162. The approved draft mandate for future
contacts between WEU and the Maghreb coun-
tries was most probably referred to in the
Petersberg declaration of l9th June 1992, in
which:
" Ministers reafftrmed the importance of
the Mediterranean sub-group's work on
security in the Mediterranean. They also
adopted terms of reference for the estab-
lishment by WEU of a gradual and phased
dialogue with the Maghreb countries,
taking into account the political develop-
ments both in these countries and in the
region. "
205
DOCUMENT I37I
163. After the Petersberg declaration, the Med-
iterranean sub-group met again on 24th July,2lst September and 30th October 1992.
According to the Secretary-General:
" It continued its discussions on three
topical questions, i.e. the situation in
Algeria, the efforts to resolve the problem
of the Western Sahara and the Cyprus
question. The group was informed of the
preliminary ddmarche already made by
the presidency and the Secretariat-
General pursuant to the decision taken by
the Ministerial Council on l9th June
1992, progressively to establish a dialogue
with the Maghreb countries. "
164. In fact, while the Council is apparently
making the first move towards a security dia-
logue with the Maghreb countries, the Assembly
has no knowledge of an approved mandate or
the adopted terms of reference for such con-
tacts.
165. This, notwithstanding the fact that many
questions arise which are not without interest.
Among these are:
- 
Will the dialogue be conducted with the
Maghreb as a whole, assembled in the
AMU, or will it take place on a quasi-
bilateral level between WEU and each
of the Maghreb countries individ-
ually?
- 
What will be the position of Egypt
which, although it is part of the
southern shore of the Mediterranean
but does not belong to the Maghreb, has
security problems very similar to those
of the Maghreb countries?
- 
Will Libya be included in the dialogue
despite the fact that the consequences
of terrorist actions against the Pan Am
and UTA aircraft are still being unsatis-
factorily handled?
166. These questions, of which this is not an
extensive list, should be the subject ofdebate in
a plenary session, prior to the formal opening of
the dialogue sought by the Council and the
Assembly. In the present context of relations
between Europe and the southern rim of the
Mediterranean, WEU should assume its respon-
sibilities. Henceforth, security and defence are
essential to all these relations. WEU might
become the instrument allowing Europe to
develop a partnership with those countries in
the security area.
IX. The Meditenanean policy of the EC
167. For the European Community, relations
with the southern Mediterranean have the same
level of priority as its relations with the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe. For many
years now, the Mediterranean policy of the
European Community has been based on
financial protocols and trade agreements.
168. In recent years, especially after the fall of
the Berlin wall, it seemed that the EC's attention
was very much focused on Central and Eastern
Europe. Aware of this imbalance, the European
Council has recently underlined the importance
of its overall relations with Mediterranean coun-
tries.
169. Already in December 1990, the European
Council had adopted its renovated Mediter-
ranean policy, transforming its policy of
co-operation into a policy of partnership, which
beyond the economic dimension also takes
account of the political dimension which is of
equal importance in stabilising this region.
170. The idea of the renovated Mediterranean
policy is to have a general and bilateral financial
part which is structured and completed by dif-
ferent bilateral agreements.
l7l. Apart from this, there would be other
agreements for Mediterranean countries not
covered by the renovated Mediterranean
policy.
172. The different agreements with the twelve
Mediterranean countries covered by the reno-
vated Mediterranean policy are as follows:
- 
association agreements, aiming at a
customs union with Turkey, Cyprus
and Malta, which have all applied for
membership;
- 
a free-trade agreement with Israel, to be
deepened in parallel with the Middle
East peace process;
- 
preferential, non-reciprocal agree-
ments, including free access to the
Common Market and concessions for
agricultural products on a product-by-
product basis with Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and
Lebanon.
173. Partnership agreements are now being
worked out with Morocco and Tunisia, with
Algeria to follow later. It is hoped that ulti-
mately such agreements will fit into a Maghreb,
and later a Euro-Maghreb, economic area.
174. The EC's Mediterranean policy was
detailed further when in Lisbon on 26th-27th
June 1992 the European Council adopted a dec-
laration on relations between Europe and the
Maghreb i.
175. One of the reasons for the Lisbon decla-
ration was that European Mediterranean coun-
tries feel responsible for convincing the other
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member states that they have a common respon-
sibility to help the Maghreb countries in devel-
oping their economies and a modern adminis-
tration and society capable of taking up the
challenge of the twenty-first century.
176. On the other hand, it stressed that only a
common effort will provide the desired results.
Moreover, no assistance will be effective if the
Maghreb countries themselves do not embark
upon structural reforms, such as improving the
use of resources and mobilising savings by chan-
nelling them into productive investments.
177. Too many North African businessmen are
still reluctant to invest in long-term projects. If
the citizens of these countries fail to invest in
their own countries, it will be difficult to attract
foreign investments.
178. Integration ofthe different national econ-
omies in the region is also indispensable. Each
of the Maghreb countries must open its markets
to the others and seek new markets for its
products.
179. As compared to the preceeding five-year
programme, the new EC programme for the
Mediterranean has increased its financial means
by 270o/o. Apart from the existing system of
financial protocols, a fund has been established
in order to initiate the social consequences of
structural adjustments, which is to be used as
the restructuring takes place. More money will
also be provided for projects of regional inte-
gration.
180. The most important innovation, however,
in the EC's Mediterranean policy is economic
co-operation which consists of measures to
encourage relations and links between private
companies. This enables European investors to
get financial support for the creation of joint
ventures in southern Mediterranean countries.It has now been decided that tariff barriers
for agricultural products will be dismantled in
1993, instead of 1996 as originally planned.
Remaining quotas for agricultural products will
be increased by 5olo each year.
l8l. The Community has therefore stressed
time and again that the Maghreb countries
should assume their own responsibility in trans-
forming their economic, social and political
structures, encouraging intra-Maghreb trade and
convincing prosperous citizens and companies
to make long term investments in their own
homeland, thus stimulating their own econ-
omies.
X. Fundamentalism, who is responsible?
182. Until the Gulf war, fundamentalist move-
ments received backing, including financial,
from certain countries in the region. Egypt,
Algeria and, to a lesser degree, Tunisia have now
repeatedly accused Iran and also Sudan of sup-
porting Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists in
their respective countries.
183. When Algeria decided to break its diplo-
matic ties with lran on 27th March 1993, it
accused Iran of trying " to destablise not only
Algeria, but the whole of the Muslim region and
to undermine the image of Islam in the
world ".
184. It is indeed widely believed that Iran is
giving financial assistance to the FIS in Algeria
and that Sudan or Iran is backing Islamic ter-
rorists in Egypt. Sudan offers an easy escape
route for extremists who are active in Egypt and
there is no doubt about the political and intel-
lectual support from Iran and Sudan for Islamic
fundamentalist movements elsewhere.
185. Another complaint of the southern Medi-
terranean countries confronted with fundamen-
talism is that many fundamentalist terrorists
and Islamic extremists are former combatants of
the war in Afghanistan, trained and armed by
the West to help the Mujahiddin in their Jihad
against the communist rulers.
186. Indeed, more than 35 000 non-Afghan
volunteers, trained in Peshawar with the
assistance of funds mainly from the United
States and Saudi Arabia, were decisive in
bringing down the communist r6gime in Afghan-
istan and in this way indirectly contributed to
the end of the cold war.
187. It should be noted, however, that from the
very beginning Egypt has played an important
r6le in supporting operations for the
Mujahiddin in Afghanistan. Most other coun-
tries in the Arab world have done their part.
188. As mentioned earlier, however, all this
does not alter the fact that serious economic and
social problems and the discontent of large sec-
tions of the population with government policies
have been and still are a fertile breeding ground
for the rise of these Islamic movements. A
solution of these problems is mainly in the
hands of the governments of these countries.
European economic assistance can help, but the
basic and fundamental steps have to be taken by
the national governments.
XI. The hypothesis of a military threat
and threat perceptions
189. [t should be clearly stated that at the
moment there is no military threat to Western
Europe from any of the states south of the Medi-
terranean. The military capabilities and the
political intentions needed to justify even the
perception of such a threat do not exist in any of
these states.
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190. There are, however, risks and challenges
which should be given due attention. There is a
not negligible risk of proliferation of nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction and possibly
of missile technology. If the proliferation of such
weapons is combined with the seizure of power
by strongly nationalist or Islamic fundamentalist
movements in certain countries, it could lead to
destabilisation of the region even if hostile
intentions are most likely to be directed against
neighbouring countries rather than against
Western Europe. There may also be a risk of
weapons proliferation concerning terrorist
groups.
191. On the other hand, in its dialogue with
these states, Western Europe should make it per-
fectly clear that the establishment of a European
security and defence policy, including the identi-
fication of military forces answerable to WEU,
should not be perceived as a threat.
192. In order to enhance security in the Medi-
terranean region, Western Europe should make
a dedicated effort to prevent uncontrolled prolif-
eration of different kinds of weapons systems in
the southern Mediterranean region.
193. What can the West in general, and
Western Europe in particular, do in order to
avoid uncontrolled proliferation of weapons
systems of all kinds in southern Mediterranean
countries? Arms control policies through negoti-
ation are probably the most important way to
respond to these challenges, and these policies
should include: a strengthening of the NPT
r6gime in 1995, pressure on countries which
have not signed in January 1993 the Chemical
Weapons Convention to do so, reinforcing the
biological and toxic weapons convention by
means of verification, improving control of the
transfer of ballistic missile and missile-
production related technology (e.g. via the
MTCR and Cocom). It should be mentioned
here that Algeria has played a passive r6le in
convincing some of its Arab neighbours to sign
the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the
Arab countries had planned to boycott as long as
Israel would not sign .the non-proliferation
treaty. These are all areas in which a European
common foreign and security policy could play
an important r6le in the future 
- 
after the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty: the idea of pro-
viding economic aid in exchange for arms
control compliance (as is the case with the
United States vis-i-vis Ukraine for the NPT)
could be considered in this context as one possi-
bility for improving the chances of success.
Finally, new anns control r6gimes in regard to
both north-south and south-south relations in
the Mediterranean could be developed in the
future, for example for conventional weapons in
the Mediterranean, confidence-building mea-
sures or naval forces, three areas which have not
been covered by existing arrangements.
194. One way of confidence-building is the
exchange of military oflicers on a bilateral basis,
which creates networks of personal relations.
More of such practical steps could be taken in
the near future.
195. Certainly, negotiations on further arns
control policies are not the only way to create
security in the region. More active protection
systems should also be established. For this
purpose, WEU has established a satellite image
interpretation agency and is examining the pos-
sibility of satellite observation. The WEU
Assembly has organised a symposium on the
possibility of establishing anti-ballistic missile
defences, and rapid intervention forces are being
formed, while several WEU member states have
taken the first steps towards creating a per-
manent maritime patrol unit in the Mediter-
ranean.
196. It should be stressed, however, that all
such activities should be integrated into a
strategy to promote co-operation with southern
Mediterranean countries in all areas, the main
objective being to avoid confrontation and a
return to the old concepts ofpure deterrence and
defence.
XII. Cultural, political,
economic and demographic foctors
influencing security in the Mediterranean
(a) Caltaml lbctors
197. In the southern Mediterranean states, dif-
ferent cultural trends can be distinguished,
which all have an influence, be it negative or
positive, on the attitude of their government
towards Western Europe.
198. Nationalist movements often accuse
Western Europe of preventing the spread of
modernity by imposing trade restrictions or bar-
riers and by limiting technology transfer and sci-
entific exchanges. These movements are not
anti-European; they claim to share the same
essential cultural values and their ultimate aim
is to be on a par with Europe. Islamic funda-
mentalists take the view that modernity may be
reached only within the framework of indig-
enous values. According to fundamentalists,
assimiliation of western cultural values in
general can only lead to subordination. The size
of Islamic fundamentalism has spread and
intensified anti-western sentiments throughout
the southern Mediterranean region. In the
longer term, this may have a negative influence
on the dialogue between Europe and the
southern Mediterranean region.
199. On the other hand, it should be noted that
the large number of emigrants from the southern
Mediterranean to Western Europe is resulting in
a mirror image in Europe. A number of North
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African immigrants prefer to maintain their own
culture within their own ethnic communities
rather than be integrated into the European
culture. This phenomenon, combined with the
consequences of a contracting economy, is one
of the causes of intolerance and racism which,
in many European states, lead to the adoption
of restrictive legislation on immigrants and
refugees.
200. One other cultural phenomenon should be
mentioned. Through modern communication
systems, including satellite television, the popu-
lation in the southern Mediterranean region is
increasingly swamped with the images and mes-
sages of the European mass media. Naturally,
these mass media present a European per-
spective of the world and also a cross-section of
European culture which does not necessarily
respond to the highest standards. Moreover,
these European programmes, while miles apart
from the indigenous Islamic culture, often
present a less flattering image of Islamism, thus
fuelling existing or dormant anti-European
feelings.
(b) Political factors and human rights
201. Understandably, the European attitude
towards the political situation in the southern
Mediterranean states is often perceived as
ambiguous.
202. On the one hand, Europe is providing
financial, economic and other assistance to the
countries in the region, thus helping their gov-
ernments to stay in power, even though Europe
criticises them for being authoritarian and intol-
erant towards opposition movements. At the
same time, opposition movements in those
states are accusing Europe of helping these gov-
ernments to retain control of the country.
203. On the other hand, all southern Mediter-
ranean governments are criticising European
states for being too tolerant towards opposition
movements, fundamentalists and terrorists by
providing them a safe haven.
204. It should be pointed out here that no dem-
ocratic European government is prepared to
support those who consider terrorism and vio-
lence as a legitimate means to attain political
objectives. In fact, Europe is faced with an
almost insoluble quandary. In the European
democratic political context, it is perfectly legit-
imate and even wise for a government to have
contacts with both the government and oppo-
sition parties of other states. After all, demo-
cratic elections can lead to a change of power
from one party to the other which ii considered
legitimate and acceptable to everybody
involved.
205. This, however, is not the case in today's
more authoritarian power structures in the
southern Mediterranean, where opposition to
the government is tolerated in most countries
only if it does not have the strength and support
to take power.
206. Those currently in power do not com-
pletely meet our criteria for democratic gov-
ernment and legitimacy is being challenged by
the population, thus creating a further factor of
instability; the varying degrees of imbalance that
exist in the Maghreb countries, which are also
faced with an almost complete range of socio-
economic and socio-political difliculties, give
rise to risks of political instability of which dem-
onstrations by the population are but one ofthe
various forms of violent expression. This is why
in some countries fundamentalist Islam may
become, to a certain extent, the most widespread
way of challenging society and the economy. It
may be hoped that the southern Mediterranean
basin will turn clearly towards political rdgimes
that are increasingly close to the western system.
Morocco has revised its constitution, thus prom-
ising greater respect for institutions and, above
all, the balance of power. Tunisia is starting to
make significant changes in its political r6gime
as regards respect for human rights. On the other
hand, it is not clear how this new policy will be
implemented in future yeani.
207. Where Algeria is concerned, political plur-
alism will be inevitable, but still diflicult to put
into practice for those in power. It remains to be
seen how and when Libya and Mauritania will
succumb to the call for democracy that comes
from Europe.
208. According to a long-standing tradition
and for reasons which need not be explained in
full here, Europe is trying to promote the estab-
lishment of truly democratic structures in the
southern Mediterranean. In particular, it is
thought here that such democratic structures
would create more balanced and stable societies,
where in principle all citizens have the same
rights and obligations and where nobody is " a
priori " excluded from participation in demo-
cratic power structures. Democracy is also indis-
pensable for the development of a modern
social-economic structure of a country.
209. The sincerity and value of European argu-
ments for democracy cannot be questioned and
the promotion of democracy and respect for
human rights must be an essential part of
Europe's co-operation with all the states in that
regron.
210. All this cannot be put more clearly than as
stated in the European Council's Lisbon decla-
ration:
" The Community and its member states
consider that their relations with the
Maghreb countries must be founded on a
common commitment to:
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- 
respect for international law, the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter
and the resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council;
- 
respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural matters and
democratic values exemplified by free
and regular elections;
- 
the establishment of democratic institu-
tional systems guaranteeing pluralism,
efective participation by citizens in the
lives of their states and respect for the
rights of minorities;
- 
tolerance and coexistence between cul-
tures and religions. "
2ll. On the other hand, it is necessary not to
try to impose democratic systems, now part of
the European cultural heritage, but which are
alien to the indigenous Arab culture and
identity.
212. It should be noted that the remarkable
lack of cohesion and of effective political
co-operation structures, and also the wide dis-
parities between economies and economic,
political and social systems in the southern
Mediterranean constitute an obstacle to
achieving a coherent and successful European
policy of co-operation and partnership with that
region as a whole. It would also be important to
stimulate and start concrete projects of a
common interest for the whole Maghreb
region.
(c) Economic facton
213. The marked disparity of income among
most countries in the area and economic/social
underdevelopment fuel opposition (particularly
Islamic) to Arab r6gimes, thus increasing insta-
bility. International and bilateral co-operation
has recently made more effort to address these
problems, launching major adjustment and
restructuring programmes. The European Com-
munity has established a new programme (the
renewed Mediterranean policy). This pro-
gramme, despite an increase in funding, remains
a modest effort considering EC interests in this
region. It is weakened by the fact that member
states hesitate to assign increased importance
and resources to a common policy of
co-operation as opposed to national ones. The
EC should play a gtreater and more autonomous
r6le in supporting progxammes and projects
aimed at increasing employment in the shott/
medium-term 
- 
an objective which is less
important than the restructuring and adjustment
programmes supported by IMF and the World
Bank.
214. International economic co-operation,
however, is limited by the severe disintegration
and fragmentation of some regional economies
and by the lack of co-operation between states
with extremely unequal demographic and
income distributions. The Arab-Israeli conflict
constitutes a fundamental disruption of rela-
tions between the countries of the region.
215. This state of disintegration is a
destabilising factor and threat to the interests of
Western Europe and other neighbouring coun-
tries. It results in market fluctuations and trade
restrictions, weak infrastructures, threats to oil
and other energy supplies, and the lack of
mobility of goods and people, which contributes
to migrations to Western EuroPe.
216. Progress in the current Arab-Israeli nego-
tiations would have a very positive effect on
international co-operation in the region, and
would stimulate trade, technology transfer and
development.
(d) Demogqhic focton
217 . Inertia due to the size ofthe younger gene-
ration implies that demographic growth will
remain very sustained in the next few years. The
population of the Maghrc!, now numbering 65
million, will, according to World Bank esti-
mates, rise to 84 million in 2000.
218. However, the idea that the Maghreb has
an " explosive " demography is perhaps not so
accurate as it may seem. Arab birth rates now
seem to be declining. When the studies were
started in the sixties, many countries held a kind
of record. For instance, the average number of
children per women was more than 8 in Algeria.
As from 1965, the figure started to fall in
Tunisia and Egypt. Morocco followed suit a few
years later. Where Algeria is concerned, by the
end of the eighties it had almost made up for the
ten years' lag it had built up due to its hostility
to family planning. ln 1992, the fertility index in
the various countries was as follows:
- 
Algeria: 5.4
- 
Tunisia: 4.1
- 
Morocco: 4.8
- 
Egypt: 4.5
- 
Libya: 6.9
219. However, the growth of the active popu-
lation is still hieh. It represents about 670 000
persons a year between l99l and 2000 for
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and
Libya, compared with 364 000 in the period
19'19-89. A total of 6 million jobs will have to be
created between now and 2000.
220. The various development plans have
sought to encourage the creation of jobs. The
Algerian 1985-89 plan had a target to create
180000 jobs a year compared with 130000
between 1980 and 1984. However, there was
instead a steady fall in achievements:122 000 in
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1985,74 000 in 1986, 64 500 in 1987, 60 000 in
1988 and 56 000 in 1989. The Tunisian 1982-86
plan provided for 60 000 new jobs a yeat,
whereas 45 000 have actually been created.
(e) Urbanisation
221. A problem linked with demographic
$owth is that of the distribution of the popu-
lation throughout the territory. A demographic
growth rate of 2o/o per year corresponds to an
urban growth rate of 80/o in the shanty towns.
Several Maghreb towns have become megalopo-
lises with new problems relating to housing,
access to education and medical care, communi-
cations, hygiene and pollution.
(l) Migration
222. Migration towards Europe is largely the
direct consequence of the imbalances described
above and of inadequate economic impetusin the southern Mediterranean countries.
Migration, due to its extent, the size of the emi-
grant population already living in the European
Community and the material and political diffi-
culty of handling it, raises a serious problem of
social and economic stability and, sometimes,
even a cultural problem for some countries of
the European Community.
223. There is a serious problem of social
stabilisation if the host country and the country
of origin both have surplus manpower. Badly
handled migration leads to a transfer of unem-
ployment, which implies an increase in the
social cost of clandestine immigration for the
host countries.
XIII. Conclusions
224. It has been said over and again that
Western Europe, in order to attain its main
political objective ofliving in a peaceful, secure
and prosperous environment, will have to
establish and maintain balanced relations with
both its eastern and southern neighbours.
225. During the cold war, Western Europe was
mesmerised by the military threat from the East.
Since the failure of communism and the dis-
bandment of the Warsaw Pact, it is still concen-
trating most of its efforts eastwards, to help
these countries build new political, economic
and social structures which may, in the future,
facilitate their full integration into a new
Europe.
226. The understandable fixation on problems
in its eastern areas almost made many people
forget the Mediterranean region, and in par-
ticular the southern rim with the Maghreb and
Egypt. This is a partly wrong impression,
probably also caused by the overwhelming
attention of the mass media for events in
Central and Eastern Europe.
227. Indeed, the Mediterranean member states
of the EC have never betrayed their historical
links with the southern Mediterranean and apart
from their continuous bilateral relations and
co-operation programmes, they have always
managed to convince their European partners of
the need for EC co-operation programmes with
this region. In 1990, the European Council,
adopting its renovated Mediterranean policy,
transforming these programmes into a policy of
partnership with both an economic and political
dimension.
228. Meeting in Lisbon in June 1992, the
European Council confirmed its interest in the
Mediterranean region, in terms of both security
and social stability, not only in the conclusions
of the presidency, but also in a specific decla-
ration on relations between Europe and the
Maghreb. Rightly, this declaration insisted on a
political dialogue which should permit a regular
exchange of information and greater mutual
consultation on political security matters.
Moreover, as quoted earlier, the Community
considers that its relations with the Maghreb
countries must also be founded on a common
commitment to respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural matters and for dem-
ocratic values exemplified by free and regular
elections.
229. Some days earlier, the WEU Council had
adopted terms of reference for the establishment
by WEU of a gradual and phased dialogue with
the Maghreb countries.
230. At the moment, there seems to be a lack of
balance between, on the one hand, the economic
and social co-operation and even partnership
now being established and, on the other, the
political dialogue including security issues. Eco-
nomic, social and security issues are inextricably
linked and it would be wrong not to address
both at the same time.
231. It should be admitted that in the southern
Mediterranean region there is still a consid-
erable lack of coherence in the policies of the
various countries, which stands in the way of a
coherent north-south dialogue. It is also true
that the southern Mediterranean countries have
a responsibility of their own to solve regional
bilateral and multilateral problems. Likewise,
each of these countries is naturally responsible
for its own internal stability and security.
232. Western Europe can contribute to the cre-
ation of economic conditions favourable to
global development, which indeed are vitally
important, but it can and will not interfere in
the internal political situation of any of them.
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Furthermore, it is capable of transferring its
administrative experience and techniques,
essential for organising and managing a market
economy, the community, the government and
the administration of a modern state.
233. As regards the north-south Mediterranean
security dialogue, it is advocated that WEU start
a gradual dialogue with a restricted number
of individual southern Mediterranean coun-
tries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and
Egypt, which would later be formalised,
institutionalised and, if all goes well, extended
to include others.
234. Europe must include the southern Medi-
terranean region in its global policy, not only
because it has historic links with that region but
because henceforth it will not be able to view
the various regions around it in isolation from
their surroundings. Partnership is essential and
Europe has no time to lose.
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l. The European Council reaffirms its soli-
darity with the Mahgreb countries and its firm
determination to continue its overall policy of
contributing to the stability and prosperity of
the Mediterranean region on the basis of an
approach favouring partnership.
2. The Community and its member states
consider that their relations with the Maghreb
countries must be founded on a common com-
mitment to:
- 
respect for international law, the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter
and the resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council;
- 
respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural matters and
for democratic values exemplified by
free and regular elections;
- 
the establishment of democratic institu-
tional systems guaranteeing pluralism,
effective participation by citizens in the
lives of their states and respect for the
rights of minorities;
- 
tolerance and coexistence between cul-
tures and religions.
3. The political dialogue between the
European Community and its member states
and the Maghreb countries should permit a
regular exchange of information and greater
mutual consultation on political and security
matters. Similarly, the European Community
and its member states hope that this dialogue
will as soon as possible extend to elected repre-
sentatives and the social partners. The Com-
munity and its member states are also ready, at
the appropriate time, to continue the dialogue
entered into with the AMU.
4. In the economic field, the European
Council reiterates its support for the harmo-
nious development of the Maghreb region with a
view to its economic integration, the intro-
duction of true market economies and the
modernisation of economic systems.
APPENDIX I
Declaration by the European Council
on relations between Europe and the Maghreb
Lisbon, 26th-27th June 1992
In this context, the European Council,
mindful of the possibilities for action already
decided upon in the context of the RMP, to
which the Community remains firmly com-
mitted, considers that a true Europe-Maghreb
partnership should encourage the continuation
of economic reforms and a substantial increase
in private investment, and more particularlyjoint ventures between firms in Europe and the
Maghreb, with a view to promoting job-creating
activities.
The European Council states that the
Community is ready to play a full part in such
an undertaking, in particular through financial
co-operation, especially in the context of the
RMP, investment promotion, increased tech-
nical co-operation in all areas of common
interest and ultimately, by stages, the setting up
ofa free-trade area. The European Council notes
that talks have already made it possible to
explore this approach with Morocco and hopes
that rapid progress can be made along these
lines. It proposes that a similar approach be
adopted towards other countries in the region.
5. In the social field, the European Council
considers that priority consideration must be
given to the problems raised on both sides of the
Mediterranean by:
- 
migration and the living and working
conditions of migrant communities;
- 
demographic imbalances and the atten-
dant economic and social disparities.
6. In the cultural field, the European Council
considers that more exchanges, in particular of
young people, university students and staff, sci-
entists and those in the media, are vital for a
better knowledge and mutual understanding of
peoples and cultures in Europe and the
Maghreb.
7. Through the progressive attainment of the
objectives cited, in particular that of part-
nership, the European Council shows its firm
determination to place relations between Europe
and the Maghreb on a footing which, in scale
and intensity, is commensurate with the links
forged by geography and by history.
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Your Rapporteur wishes to express his sincere gratitude to the many authorities who provided
kind help and assistance in preparing this report. The embassies of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia in Paris, and the embassy of Morocco in Lisbon were helpful in preparing visits to these
respective countries, where your Rapporteur had many interesting discussions on all of the different
subjects dealt with in the report. The programme of this visit was as follows:
Egypt 
- 
15th and 16th March 1993
- 
Discussion with H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Farghal, Director of the Department of Infor-
mation and Research
- 
Discussion with the Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the People's Council, Dr.
Mohamed Abdel Allah
- 
Discussion with the Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Department of the European
Community, Mr. M. Sherif Sadek
- 
Discussion with H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Osman, Director of the Department of Planning
- 
Discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amine Moussa
Algeria 
- 
16th and 17th March 1993
- 
Discussion with the Director General for Multilateral Relations, Mr. Amine Kherbi
- 
Discussion with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Houine Djoudi
- 
Discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Redha Malek
- 
Discussion with the Deputy Minister for the Budget, Mr. Benbitour
Tunisia 
- 
lSth and l9th March 1993
- 
Discussion with the Minister of Justice, Mr. Sadok Chaabane
- 
Discussion with the Minister for International Co-operation and External Investment, Mr.
Mohamed Gannouchi
- 
Discussion with the Minister of Defence, M. Abdelaziz Ben Dhia
- 
Discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Habib ben Yahia
Morocco 
- 
19th and 20th March 1993
- 
Discussion with the Director of the Private Oflice of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
and Co.operation, Mr. Taib El-Fassi
- 
Discussion with H.E. Ambassador Maati Jorio, Director of European and American Affairs at
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Moreover, your Rapporteur was represented at two conferences on this subject. The first, a
seminar on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, was organised by the Spanish Parliament
and the North Atlantic Assembly in Granada, from lst to 3rd February 1993.
The second, a seminar on the southern dimension of European security 
- 
the Mediterranean
area and the European security identity, was organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in
collaboration with the Instituto Affari Internazionali and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
in Rome, on 5th and 6th March 1993 with, among others, particularily stimulating contributions by
Roberto Aliboni and Roberto Zadra.
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Amendments I and 2
l4th June 1993
Security in the Mediterranean
AMENDMENTS I and 2'
tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others
l. After paragruph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as
follows:
" Noting the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
(CSCM) which would seek to emulate the success of the CSCE in arms control and reduction,
enhanced security through confidence-building measures, and the protection of human and
minority rights;"
2. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
" Commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and pursue its establishment with vigour and
perseverence; "
Signed: Atkinson, Reddemann, Lentz-Cornette, Foschi, Colombo, Smith, Fenner, Lopez Henares,
Miiller, van der Linden, Fry, Lummer, Speed, Ward, Rathbone, Vogel, Bowden
l. See 2nd sitting, l5th June 1993 (amendments amended and agreed to).
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Amendment 3
14th June 1993
Security in the Mediterranean
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled by Mr. Parisi and others
3. After the last paragraph of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Hold effective consultations with the Community institutions and European political
co-operation so that action to ensure military security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of
political and economic co-operation in the region. "
Signed: Parisi, Foschi, Colombo
1. See 2nd sitting, l5th June 1993 (amendment amended and agreed to).
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Amendments 4 and 5
l4th June 1993
Security in the Mediterranean
AMENDMENTS 4 and 5'
tabled by Mn Roseta
4. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest in the devel-
opment, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean coun-
tries; "
5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and, insert:
" (ix) Convinced nevertheless that the risk of proliferation of weapons systems and technology,
whether nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to
peace and stability in the Mediterranean region;"
Signed: Roseta
l. See 2nd sitting, l5th June 1993 (amendments agreed to).
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 526 to 536
RECOMMENDATION 526 I
on European security policy -
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Earopean Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht2
I
The Assembly,
l. Is resolutely in favour of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all signatory countries;
2. Considers the modified Brussels Treaty to be the only treaty providing the foundations for truly
European solidarity in defence matters and, as such, the inevitable basis of a European Union in this
area;
3. Recalls its Recommendations 490 and 504 urging the Council to revise the treaty to adapt it to
the new situation in Europe without weakening the commitments it includes;
4. Notes that the Maastricht Treaty recognises this fact and specifies that WEU is part of the
process of European Union;
5. Believes that, for WEU to assume the rOle attributed to it by Article I of the modified Brussels
Treaty and by the Maastricht Treaty, it is essential for the modified Brussels Treaty to continue to be
strictly applied;
6. Notes that the Council is apparently using various means to diminish the importance andjuridical significance of the treaty, to circumvent its provisions and to weaken its political significance,
e.g. by:
(i) feigningto ignore the way the responsibilities of WEU under Articles I, II and III of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, the exercise of which has been entrusted to other organisations, are effectively
carried out, as can be seen from paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 517, while paragraph 3
of the answer to Written Questions 302 and 303 recognises the Assembly's responsibility for " any
matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty ";
(ii) not reaching agreement with NATO to avoid duplication of work, as required by Article IV,
as it emerges from the parallel decisions taken by NATO and WEU on the naval deployment to enforce
the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro decided by the Security Council and on the deployment of
armed forces from member countries to escort humanitarian assistance for Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(iii) introducing in the Petersberg Declaration a reservation that seems to be of general signifi-
cance relating to the application of Article V;
(iv) wrongly taking Article VII as a basis for justifying this reservation, as it does in its answer to
Written Question 301;
(v) making no reference, in the second part of its thirty-seventh annual report, to the Agency for
the Control of Armaments, a subsidiary body of the Council in accordance with Article VIII;
(vi) thereby violating Article IX;
(vii) limiting the significance of this article by:
(a) not communicating to the Assembly important documents on its activities;
(b,) providing for the implementation of the Petersberg Declaration in regard to the
enlargement of WEU and the creation of the status of associate member and of observer
without the Assembly having been able to discuss the matter;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November I 992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (8th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l342,part
One).
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(viii) not applying the provisions of Article XI to states that it is inviting to become associate
members of WEU;
(ixi insisting on an arbitrary interpretation of Article XII and not following up paragraph 2l of
Recommendation 517 which states that the Assembly considers that the period of fifty years ran from
1954 and where the Assembly invites the Council of Ministers to submit this issue to independent
arbitration;
7. Considers that, by acting in this way, the Council, far from preparing the establishment of a
European Union with clearly specified competences and responsibilities, is apparently weakening such
a prospect.
Ir nrcouurNDs rHAT rsr CouNcIt-
l. Report effectively to the Assembly on every aspect of the application of the modified Brussels
Treaty, even in cases where the responsibilities attributed to it by the treaty are exercised in other fora
as it has undertaken to do on several occasions;
2. Seek an understanding with NATO to avoid duplication, while leaving WEU the possibility of
exercising fully the responsibilities assigned to it by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Proceed to no modification in the scope of the modified Brussels Treaty by any process other
than international agreements subject to ratification;
4. Report in its annual report on the application of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV;
5. Provide the Assembly in time with all the information it needs to exercise the mandate assigned
to it by Article IX, inter alia by:
- 
answering without delay Written Question 305 asking the Council to communicate its
organogram to the Assembly;
- 
reversing its refusal to answer Written Question 304 asking for details of the results of the
operations of the naval force co-ordinated by WEU in the Adriatic;
- 
communicating:
- 
the report on practical measures necessary for the development of close working relation-
ships with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
- 
the proposals of the Permanent Council for promoting co-operation between the respective
secretariats of those organisations;
- 
its report on the mandate of the WEU planning cell;
- 
its report on the possible tasks of WEU forces;
- 
its report on co-operation in armaments matters;
- 
its report on current WEU activities in space matters;
- 
its report on current WEU activities in regard to the verification of arms control agreements
and implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
- 
its report on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group;
6. Fotlow up paragraph 2l of Recommendation 517 according to which:
" Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the
modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council
considers the starting date is 1948,
THn AssrN,rsLY STRoNGLY URGES
That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbi-
tration. "
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II
The Assembly,(i) Considers that the European Union has a vocation to associate all Central European countries;(ii) Welcomes the fact that the Council, after the Assembly, has started to examine with those coun-
tries the conditions for a collective security organisation in Europe;(iit) Notes that the information it has received concerning requests from some of those countries
about their approaches to the Council do not correspond io the information it receives from the
Council;
(iv) Considers that the rapprochement between the Central European countries and the European
Union means that they must henceforth base their relations on the principles governing relations
between the member countries of WEU.
[r nrco]ttvlsNDs THAT rnr CouNcrt-
1. 
. 
Develop its exchanges with the CSCE with a view to making a more effective contribution to
maintaining peace in Europe;
2. Offer the Centr-al European countries any technical assistance they may request, in particular to
allow th-em to play a better part in operations to verify all the disarmament or aims iimi[ation agree-
ments they may have signed;
3. 
. 
ResPond favourably to the requests some of those countries have made so as to improve the res-
toration of confidence and maintenance of peace in Central Europe;
4.^ Arrange for requests sent to the Chairmanship-in-Office to reach the Council and be the subject
of real consultations;
5.. Urge the Governments of Hungary and Slovakia to submit the dispute between them to concili-
ation procedure similar to that provided for in Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 526
I.
l. The Council will continue to " report effectively to the Assembly on every aspect of the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty ".
2. The Council is convinced that the development of WEU as the defence component of the
European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance will not
result in " duplication " with NATO but in co-operation in a spirit of complementarity, transparency
and reciprocity where applicable. This co-operation will not affect the probability of WEU exercising
fully the responsibilities it is assigned by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
3. The Council has no intention of proceeding with " modification in the scope of the modified
Brussels Treaty by any process other than international agreements subject to ratification ".
4. The Council will continue to report in its annual report on the application of Protocols No. II, III
and IV as appropriate.
5. The Council regrets that 
- 
for the time being 
- 
it cannot comply with the request made in
Written Question 305 and reiterated in paragraph 5 of the recommendation. Preliminary discussions
on an updated comprehensive organisation chart have taken place in the Council and its working
groups, and the Council hopes to be able to make an updated organisational chart available to the
Assembly after the details have been agreed by the competent bodies and submitted for final approval.
It should be recalled that in the declaration on former Yugoslavia adopted at the Council of Min-
isters in Rome on 20th November 1992, warships and aircraft of WEU member states, under Italian
operational control, have been carrying out operations to monitor at sea compliance with the embargo
established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. So far,3 649 ships have been
monitored. In the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787,the Council takes due note
of the Assembly's request to provide " details of the results of the operations of the naval force
co-ordinated by WEU in the Adriatic'. At present, more specific date remains classified. In the
opinion of the Council, any publication of more specific data could best be handled in the United
Nations framework. The recommendations are classified documents. While the Council is willing, in I
principle, to examine additional ways of increasing the amount of information accessible to the
Assembly, the need for confidentiality constitutes an objective restraint.
6. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request in paragraph 6 of the first part of the rec-
ommendation and previously formulated in paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517.
II.
1. The Council attaches great importance to a further development of exchanges between WEU
and the CSCE with a view to " making a more effective contribution to maintaining peace in Europe ".
The development of the CSCE, and in particular the post-Helsinki forum on security co-operation, are
on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.
2. The Council and its working groups will explore ways of offering Central European countries any
" technical assistance they may request, in particular to allow them to play a better part in operations
to verify all the disarmament of arms limitation agreements they have signed ". It should be recalled
that the Council attaches special importance to co-operation with third parties in the fields of CFE ver-
ification and also Open Skies.
3. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request to " respond favourably to the request
some of those countries have made so as to improve the restoration of confidence and maintenance of
peace in Central Europe.
4. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request made in paragraph 4 of the second part of
the recommendation.
5. The Council advocates the settlement of all differences and conflicts by peaceful means in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of
regional arrangements and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
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RECOMMENDATION 527 
'
on Turkey2
The Assembly,
(t) Welcoming Turkey's associate membership of WEU, while looking forward to close co-operation
in the framework of the association document;
(ii) Recalling Turkey's most loyal membership of NATO and its vital contribution to security in
Europe during the many years of East-West confrontation;(iit) Aware of Turkey's important geostrategic position which has changed to some extent but whose
interest has remained undiminished since the end of the cold war;(iv) Stressing the importance of Turkey's participation in debates on Europe's future security in the
framework of WEU;(v) Concerned about the volatile situation in the newly independent republics of Transcaucasia and
Central Asia where political instability and ethnic strife seem to dominate the agenda;(vi) Noting that Turkey, which has historic, cultural, linguistic and religious affinities with the popu-
lations of many of these new republics, can serve as a model for their gradual development into
modern states based on democratic government and a market economy;
(vii) Aware of the specific contribution which Turkey can make in concerted efforts to bring about
stable inter-ethnic and international relations in the Balkans;
(viii) Recalling the report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the situation of
human rights in Turkey (Document 6553) and Resolution 985 of that Assembly;(ix) Concerned about the mounting violence in south-eastern Anatolia which stands in the way of
a balanced policy towards the Kurdish population in that area as announced by the Turkish
Government;(x) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if it is used as a means of attaining political objectives;
,(xi) Recalling paragraph l0 of the Council of WEU's Venice communiqu6 on 30th April 1986, which
'stated that " They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and
underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries
of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge. " ;(xii) Convinced that Greece and Turkey, which both wish to be well-respected members of the com-
munity of civilised European states and to participate in WEU, cannot afford to continue to harbour
differences over many issues which could be solved if approached in a positive manner,
RrcouurNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Afford active encouragement to Turkey in the establishment of close relations with the newly
independent republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in particular in activities which may help to
prevent or solve conflicts in those regions;
2. Be certain to involve Turkey in all its consultations and initiatives regarding the Balkan crisis;
3. Establish close co-operation with Turkey in containing the threat to security posed by interna-
tional terrorism;
4. Make every effort to promote a solution to existing differences between Greece and Turkey in
order to prevent such differences being a strain on security discussions in WEU, particularly taking
into account Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which refers to the settlement of
mutual differences by peaceful means, among others in accordance with Article X of the modified
Brussels Treaty;
5. Endeavour, as matters now stand, to give Turkey guarantees allowing it to participate at the
highest possible level in the tasks and missions of WEU, account being taken of its status of associate
member as contained in the document on associate membership signed in Rome on 20th November
1992.
I . Adopted by the Assembly on I st December I 992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( l0th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1341,
addendum).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 527
1. The Council is fully aware of the important r6le played by Turkey " in the establishment of close
relations with the newly-independent republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in particular in
activities which may help to prevent or solve conflicts in those regions ". It also shares the Assembly's
assessment in paragraph (VI) of the recommendation that " Turkey, which has historic, cultural, lin-
guistic and religious affinities with the populations of many of these republics, can serve as a model for
their gradual development into modern states ".
2. In accordance with the provisions of the document on associate membership signed in Rome on
20th November 1992 as well as the other related texts, the associate members of WEU will be involved
in the consultations and initiatives of the Council.
3. The Council is fully aware of the need to " contain the threat to security posed by international
terrorism ". At present, no specific questions pertaining to international terrorism feature on the
agenda of the Council and its working groups. In so far as the need for consultation on the subject of
international terrorism could arise in the future, associate members of WEU will be involved in the
consultations and initiatives of the Council in accordance with the provisions of the document on asso-
ciate membership signed in Rome on 20th November 1992, as well as the other related texts.
4. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request made in paragraph 4 of the recommen-
dation.
5. In accordance with the provisions of the document on associate membership signed in Rome on
20th November 1992 as well as the other related texts, the associate members of WEU will be " able to
participate at the highest possible level in the tasks and missions of WEU ".
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
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RECOMMENDATION 528 
'
on defence: Central Europe in evolution2
The Assembly,
(!) Welcoming progress made in establishing a formal relationship between WEU and the states of
Central Europe;
Qi) . Welcoming the_e-xtraordinary_ meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with theForeign and Defence Ministers of Central European states on 19th June 1992;(i.ii) 
.Welcoming_th_e declaratDn agree_d at the same meeting and aiming " to strengthen existing rela-tions between WEU and the Central European states by structuring thi dialoguefconsultation-s and
co-operation ";
Q, Welcoming the Council's largely positive replies on those aspects of relations with the Central
European states stressed in Recommendations 518 and 524;
(v) 
-.Welcoming tlre various initiatives taken under the aegis of the WEU Institute for SecurityStudies to deepen the discussion with the Central European states;(vi) Determined to maintain the momentum of its own relationship with the governments and par-
liaments concerned;
Qii) Recalling Recommendation 510 on " Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary andPoland " and extending the recommendations to include reference also to Bulgaria and Rdminia,
RrcouurNos rHAT rur CouNcrr,
1.. 
. 
Fulfil the expcctations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue and
timely discussion of current issues;
2. Fo-tlow closely possible moves in the European Community to create the new status of " affiliate
member' which could have implications for the formal relationship between the Central European
states and WEU;
3. Include the Ce^ntral European states in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for
debate on subjects of mutual interest, such as national service and consiription;
4. Invite the Central European states to observe the exercises to be co-ordinated by the WEUplanning cell;
q. Encourage member states as appropriate to develop relations with the Central European states in
the realms ofi
- 
higher staff training;
- 
budgetary management;
- 
procurement (especially for air defence);
- 
personnel exchanges;
- 
language training;
- 
military survey and mapping;
- 
command and control (C2) and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems;
6._ Explore ways in which the Central European states might be associated with the development of
a European armaments agency;
7. Seek the opinions of the Central European states on matters scheduled for discussion in the
CSCE and NACC and wherever possible co-ordinate positions;
Adopted by the Assembly on I st December I 992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( l0th sitting).
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1336).
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q. Institute regular meetings of the " Seventeen " in the context of the Vienna Forum for Security
Co-operation;
9. Ensure that accounts of consultations with the Central European states at ministerial and WEU
Permanent CounciUAmbassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by the
Institute for Security Studies are included in the innual report to the Assembly;
10. Establish informatio^n__pgilts in the capitals of the Central European states, by using the good
offices of the embassies of WEU members;
11. Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrange-
m-entsto prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies
of militant nationalism or of aggressive int-ention.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 528
l. The Council is of the opinion that the implementation of the " concrete measures " adopted at
the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe in Bonn on
l9th June 1992 allows for * regular and relevant dialogue and timely discussion of current issues ". It
should be recalled that paragraph 7 of the declaration adopted on this occasion reads:
* The foreign and defence ministers adopted the following concrete measures:
- 
Foreign and deferrce ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level
may be convened if circumstances require.
- 
A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the
ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least
twice a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures
adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of
co-operation.
- 
Consultation at ministerial and WEU Permanent CounciUambassador level on security issues
may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level.
The following initiatives will be ccntinued and encouraged: regular exchanges of documents and
information, growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the cor-
responding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia
will be organised. The programme of scholarship will be continued. "
Following the extraordinary ministerial meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992 between the WEU
foreign and defence ministers and their colleagues from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the first meeting of the forum on consultation at ambassa-
dorial level was held in London on l4th October 1992. On the agenda for discussion between the
members of the Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the eight partner countries of Central
Europe were the expansion of this dialogue, the development of co-operation and also topical ques-
tions, including the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries and the conflicts in former
Yugoslavia.
Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers * welcomed this step in the devel-
opment of relations with the partner countries of Central Europe and looked forward to meeting their
colleagues in the spring of 1993 " (paragraph 12 of the Rome communiqud).
2. The Council takes note of the suggestion made in paragraph 2 of the recommendation, but it is
not aware of any moves within the European Community to create a new status of " affiliate member ".
The Council recalls that paragraph 5 of the declaration adopted at the extraordinary meeting of the
WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June 1992 states: "The
enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, I-atvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these
countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation
could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations ".
3. Paragraph 7 of the declaration adopted at the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers with states of Central Europe on l9th June 1992 states, inter alia, that there will be " growing
co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the
countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised ". National
service and conscription could, in due course, become subjects for future seminars and colloquia.
4. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's suggestion expressed in paragraph 4 of the recom-
mendation.
5. The Council welcomes the fact that individual WEU member states are already developing rela-
tions with Central European states in fields such as those mentioned in paragraptr S bf ttre reiorimen-
dation.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th February 1993.
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6. " Ways in which the Central European states might be associated with the development of a
European armaments agency " can be explored in due course, in line with the progress made with the
development of such an agency and with paragraph 5 of the declaration adopted at the extraordinary
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June 1992,
which states: " The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are devel-
oping between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate
forms of co-operation could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations ".
7. The Assembly will note that, during the first meeting of the forum of consultation on l4th
October 1992, subjects such as the development of the CSCE and in particular the post-Helsinki forum
on security co-operation and also topical questions, including the withdrawal of Russian troops from
the Baltic countries, were discussed.
8. The Council will bear in mind the Assembly's suggestion to " institute regular meetings of the
Seventeen in the context of the Vienna forum for security co-operation ".
9. The Council will study the the Assembly's suggestion to include * accounts of consultations with
the Central European states at ministerial and WEU Permanent CounciUambassador level and
meetings of senior oflicials or seminars organised by the Institute for Security Studies " in its annual
report to the Assembly.
10. The Council will study the Assembly's interesting suggestions for 'establishing information
points in the capitals of Central European states, by using the good offices of the embassies of WEU
members ". For reasons of cost-effectiveness and the coherence of the organisation's public infor-
mation efforts, however, the Council has no plans at present for implementing such a suggestion.
I l. The Council is fully aware of the need to " develop effective arrangements to prevent the export
of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies of militant nationalism or of
aggressive intention ". It has repeatedly stated that such arrangements to prevent the export of military
equipment to such countries and groups have not yet appeared on the agenda ofthe forum ofconsul-
tation.
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'
on Eurupean securtO wficy -
reply to the thiny-seventh annual relnn of the Council:
Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia2
The Assembly,
(t) Recalling its Recommendation 525;(iil Noting with satisfaction that, in a number of respects, this recommendation has been followed up;(iiil Noting, however, that the decisions taken in WEU and NATO to protect humanitarian
assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are being implemented very slowly;(iv) Considering that the approach of winter makes the conditions for the survival of these people a
matter of supreme concern;
(v) Noting that the measures decided by the Security Council to ensure a cease-fire in Bosnia-
Herzegovina still fall short of achieving such a result;
(vil Noting the slowness with which Security Council decisions are applied in the parts of Croatia
that are outside the authority of that republic;
(vii) Insisting that a statute must be created for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by qualified rep-
resentatives of the three principal components of the population of that republic;
(viiil Fearing a spread of hostilities to regions of former Yugoslavia which have remained safe from
them, particularly in the region of Kosovo,
RrcouurNos rHAT rne CouNcrr-
l. Speed up intervention by forces of member countries to protect the transport of humanitarian
relief to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Approach the Security Council to ensure that it makes effective the coercive measures it has
taken to make the parties to the conflict put an end to military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
3. Offer the United Nations a larger contribution to the peace-keeping operations it has under-
taken;
4. Consider the possibility of extending the UNPROFOR mission to Kosovo;
5. Agree to its members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with
a name acceptable to the population of that republic.
I . Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( I I th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l342,Part
Two).
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l. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they " reaffirmed the collective determination of WEU member states to con-
tribute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-
Herzegovina under the responsibility of the United Nations and to offer further support to these opera-
tions. The member states of WEU are also prepared to study the possibility of and the requirements for
the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes ". Accordingly, the Contingency Planning
Group has drafted an initial report on this subject which has been made available to the United
Nations within the framework of the discussions on the Owen-Vance plan.
2. In the same declaration, WEU ministers " expressed dismay at continuing acts of aggression and
violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the unacceptable practice of ethnic cleansing as well as at the
repeated gross violation of humanitarian operations ". They called on all parties to respect the prin-
ciples and decisions agreed at the London conference and to work with the United Nations and EC
special envoys to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the problems of former Yugoslavia. They
reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
and stressed that violation of those resolutions would call for consideration of further measures by the
United Nations Security Council.
3. In their declaration on former Yugoslavia, ministers " also reaffirmed their determination to
reinforce the contribution WEU and its member states were making in support of the efforts of the
whole international community to bring peace to former Yugoslavia and to relieve the suffering of its
people ".
The same declaration also specifies that " WEU member states are contributing in a variety of
ways to the enhanced operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are now beginning
their tasks of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance ". They reaffrrmed the collective deter-
mination of WEU member states to contribute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the responsibility of the United Nations and
to offer further support to these operations.
4. The Council is fully aware of the dangers of the conflict in former Yugoslavia spilling over to
Kosovo and agrees with the Assembly on the need for preventive diplomacy.
5. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request in paragraph 5 of the recommen-
dation.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th February 1993.
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'
on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis2
The Assembly,
(r) Recalling Recommendations 506, 512,519 and 525 which have all sought to prompt precise
action by WEU to help solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
(iil Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713,757,770,771and 781 and the efforts being
made by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis;
(iir) Dismayed that so little apparent progress has been made in finding a political solution to the
crisis and that the suffering of the peoples concerned is likely to be intensified still further with the
onset of winter;
(iv) Urgrng the Council to multiply efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new
WEU Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, to seek g;reater cooperation at all
levels in a further attempt to convince the various belligerents to stop fighting;
(v) Disappointed that the United Nations Security Council has not heeded WEU's call for rein-
forcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and that consequently the fighting is being pro-
longed;
(vt) Congratulating the Council for promptly following up a number of the Assembly's recommenda-
tions and applauding the Italian presidency for its pragmatic and positive initiatives over WEU
co-ordination and liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO;
(vit) Pleased that all WEU countries have offered to contribute either forces, logistic support or facil-
ities, or a combination of such assets, but insisting on the need for an equitable sharing of costs;
(viii) Convinced that an air defence capability plus associated intelligence-gathering measures to help
protect United Nations forces are essential;
(ix) Considering that similar WEU and NATO naval and maritime air assets might well be combined
to form composite forces to stress complementarity and in a demonstration of cost-effectiveness rather
than duplication;
(x) Believing that when WEU forces are operating as such they should be readily identifiable,
Rrcouuruos rHAT rnr Couxcn-
1. Intensify efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for
Consultation to support Lord Owen and Mr. Vance's endeavours in Geneva and to sponsor a possible
fresh initiative to convince the belligerents in all parts of the former Yugoslavia to stop fighting and
seek a political solution to their grievances;
2. Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to
reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in l990l9l and in par-
ticular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube
Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo;
3. Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to ' offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment
to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of
circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713
and 7 57 " and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance;
l. AdoptedbytheAssemblyon2ndDecemberl992duringthesecondpartofthethirty-€ighthordinarysession(llthsitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1337).
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4. Ensure that all WEU nations which have offered forces, logistic support or facilities are per-
mitted to participate in operations, although not necessarily those organised exclusively under the
direct aegis of the United Nations. Both the CSCE and the EC, for example, require considerable
support for observer missions;
t. Prepare a special supplementary budget for 1992 to take account of operations concerning theformer Yugoslavia and also to enable the WEU planning cell to function correctly;
6. Make contingency arrangements to provide an adequate air defence capability to help protect
United Nations forces engaged in the former Yugoslavia;
7. In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the
Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
8. Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in WEU
operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell strould be among the first recipients of such a badge.
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l. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they " expressed dismay at continuing acts of aggression and violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, at the unacceptable practice of 'ethnic cleansing' as well as at the repeated gross viola-
tions of human rights ". They condemned all forms of obstruction of humanitarian operations. They
called on all parties to respect the principles and decisions agreed at the Iondon conference and to
work with the United Nations and EC special envoys to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement to
the problems of former Yugoslavia. They reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions and stressed that violations of those resolutions would
call for consideration of further measures by the United Nations Security Council. They also reaf-
firmed their determination to reinforce the contribution WEU and its member states were making in
support of the efforts of the whole international community to bring peace to former Yugoslavia and to
relieve the sufferings of its people.
It should be recalled that 
- 
following the extraordinary ministerial meeting in Bonn on l9th June
1992 between the WEU foreign and defence ministers and their colleagues from Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania - the first meeting of the forum of
consultation at ambassadorial level was held in London on l3th October 1992. On the agenda for dis-
cussion between the members of the Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the eight partner
countries of Central Europe were topical questions, including the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.
The Council is aware of the need for fresth political initiatives to convince the belligerents in all
parts of former Yugoslavia to stop fighting and seek a political solution to their grievances.
2. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they * welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution
787-. They decided that WEU will contribute to its implementation and that, to this end, warships and
aircraft of WEU member states, on the basis of approved joint planning, will start operations aimed at
ensuring the strict implementation of the embargo at sea. These will include stop and search actions
and other measures ai necessary. The participation of the member states will be subject to the provi-
sions of their national constitutions ". In the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787,
the Council takes due note of the Assembly's request to " publish evidence at an early stage on any sig-
nificant breach of the embargo ". At present, the relevant data remains classified, however. In the
opinion of the Council, publication of evidence relating to " any known breach of sanctions " should
properly be handled in the United Nations framework.
3. The declaration on former Yugoslavia specifies: * WEU member states emphasised the impor-
tance of the sanctions assistance missions to which they contribute as members of the EC. They
appealed to the Danube riparian states to ensure the strict application of the relevant United Nations
S-eiurity Council resolutions and confirmed that they were prepared to offer, if reqgested, expertise,
technic-al assistance and equipment to those states to prevent the use of the Danube for the purpose of
circumventing or breaking sanctions. They also affirmed their willingness to make simular contribu-
tions to the implementation of the control of the land embargo at the frontiers ".
4. In the same declaration, WEU ministers " also reaffirmed their determination to reinforce the
contribution WEU and its member states were making in support of the efforts of the whole interna-
tional community to bring peace to former Yugoslavia and to relieve the suffering of its peoples ". The
Council is well aware that 
- 
in the context of the crisis in former Yugoslavia - not only the United
Nations but also the CSCE and the EC require considerable assets.
5. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers " welcomed the establishment of the
WEU planning cell in Brussels on lst October and looked fonvard to it becoming operational by April
1993. Ministers asked the Council and its working groups to guide and encourage the planning cell in
implementing its tasks and responsibilities, including developing planning options and designating
military units for missions under WEU auspices. Ministers tasked the Defence Representatives Group
to finalise the guidelines for selecting headquarters for these missions " (paragraph 3 of the Rome
communiqu6). Adequate funds have been made available for the planning cell to become operational
by April 1993.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
232
DOCUMENT 1372
6. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they " reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions and stressed that violations of those resolutions would call for consider-
ation of further measures by the United Nations Council ".
7. It should be recalled that the declaration on former Yugoslavia specifies that " WEU operations
in the Adriatic have been undertaken and will continue to be carried out in close co-ordinaiion with
NATO. WEU will continue to ensure that the two organisations work closely together ". In the Coun-
cil's opinion, co-ordination with NATO in the implementation of the naval anbargo operations is
excellent at all levels. In conjunction with NATO authorities, consideration will be given to further
possibilities for rationalising naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area.
8. Preliminary discussions on a possible official symbol to represent WEU have already taken place
in the Council. The Council hopes to make progress with this question in the near future. -
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on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis2
The Assembly,(i) Welcoming United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an air exclusion zone) and 787(reinforcing the present embargo to the level of a blockade) which respond directly to the Assembly's
recommendations;(ii) Welcoming the United Nations Security Council's decision to set up a peace-keeping force for
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and wishing to see the initiative extended to Kosovo and
elsewhere;(iii) Welcoming the WEU Council's prompt responses to the Assembly's Recommendation 525
adopted on 3rd September 1992 and also the Council's " Declaration on former Yugoslavia " issued on
20th November 1992,
RrcouurNos rHAT rue CouNclr-
l. Urge all member nations to review and improve their participation in at least the humanitarian
aspects of operations concerning the Yugoslav crisis;
2. Actively promote the idea of establishing safe areas for refugees and displaced persons
throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
3. Transform the Ad Hoc Group into a standing advisory group to manage WEU's response to the
Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis lasts;
4. Publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of cases where anns or
other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in the former Yugo-
slavia;
5. Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against i
transport operators guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations;
6. Study plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo,
prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December I 992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( I I th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1337 sup
plementary draft recommendation).
all sea or air
liberate the
'the Serbs in
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l. The declaration on former Yugoslavia adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers at its meeting
in Rome on 20th November 1992 states: " WEU member states are contributing in a variety of ways to
the enhanced operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are now beginning their task of
ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They reaffirmed the collective determination of
WEU member states to contribute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the responsibility of the United Nations and to offer further
support to these operations. "
2. The same declaration specifies that " the member states of WEU are also prepared to study the
possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes ". The
Contingency Planning Group considered these in its meetings of lst-2nd December 1992 and
lzth-l3th January 1993.
3. The Council will keep in mind the Assembly's suggestion to transform the ad hoc Group on
Yugoslavia " into a standing advisory group ".
4. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they reaffrrmed their determination to reinforce the contribution WEU and its
member states were making in support of the efforts of the whole international community to bring
peace to former Yugoslavia and to relieve the suffering of its peoples. In this regard, they noted that,
since 16th Jnly 1992, warships and aircraft of WEU member states, under Italian operational control,
had been carrying out operations to monitor at sea compliance with the embargo established by United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. So far,3 649 ships had been monitored by WEU
operations and 7l suspected violations had been reported. Ministers therefore welcomed the adoption
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787. They decided that WEU would contribute to its
implementation and that, to this end, warships and aircraft of WEU member states, on the basis of
approved joint planning, would start operations aimed at ensuring the strict implementation of the
embargo at sea. These would include stop and search actions and other measures as necessary. The par-
ticipation of the member states would be subject to the provisions of their national constitutions.
In the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787,the Council takes due note of
the Assembly's request to " publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of
cases where arms or other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in
former Yugoslavia ". At present, the relevant data remains classified, however. In the opinion of the
Council, publication of evidence relating to " any known breach of sanctions " should properly be
handled in the United Nations framework.
5. WEU member states are fully aware of the need to " take measures for and announce sanctions
to be taken by member states against all sea or air transport operators guilty of violating the embargo
decreed by the United Nations ".
6. Meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia in which they " reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions and observed that violations of those resolutions would call for consider-
ation of further measures by the United Nations Council ".
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
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on Europaan armaments co-operation after Maastricht2
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the new tasks attributed to allied forces in Europe make essential an in-depth
re-examination of defence equipment and technology requirements, taking account inter alia of:
- 
the disappearance of the threat of a mass attack against Europe;
- 
uncertainty about the risk of conflicts and tension that exist or may emerge in several regions
of the world;
- 
reductions in defence budgets in the majority of WEU member countries;
- 
the rapid evolution of advanced technology in the defence area;
(ii) Stressing that the creation of multinational forces in the framework of NATO and WEU shows
how urgent it is to make more effort to enhance the standardisation and interoperability of their
equipment;
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the increased activities of the Independent European Programme
Group (IEPG) in joint research on and development of defence equipment;
(iv) Noting nevertheless with concern the existence of a number of bi- and multilateral equipment
co-operation programmes which are not certain to be either developed or completed;
(v) Welcoming, on the one hand, WEU's Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, in which it is sug-
gested that a deeper study be made of strengthening European armaments co-operation with a view to
setting up a European annaments agency, and, on the other, the Council's proposal to instruct WEU
and IEPG experts to study this problem together so that it may be settled without delay;
(vi) Astonished nevertheless that, more than seven months after the IEPG defrned its positions
relating to the conditions for possible association of the IEPG and WEU, the Council has still done
nothing to implement these proposals;
(vii) Convinced that it is the duty of the public authorities, as defence industries'principal customers,
to try to help them to find means of facilitating their conversion and adapting themselves to the new
conditions;
(viii) Convinced that defence industries should not be excluded from the European market but noting
that the Twelve did not reach agreement in Maastricht on abolishing Article 223 of the Rome Treaty,
Rrcout"rnNos rHAT rse CouNctt
1. Speed up its work in order to work out a concept ofthe r6le and operation ofa European arna-
ments agency;
2. Appoint representatives immediately to contact without delay the team made responsible by the
IEPG for the dialogue with WEU with a view to studying together the conditions for a merger between
the IEPG and WEU;
3. Ensure that the future agency has adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the
process of harmonisation, by member countries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sen-
sible, not too burdensome manner;
4. Ensure that all the IEPG member countries participate fully in the agency;
I . Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( l2th sitting).
2. 
. 
Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee (Document 1332).
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5. Reach agreement on its policy towards exports of military equipment and end-destination con-
trols on exports of jointly-produced equipment and promote the notification of such exports to the
United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers;
6. Draw up an inventory and a financing plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies
launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment, and draw up a list of priorities;
7. Inform the Assembly of the results of its study on Europe's strategic mobility needs;
8. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it drew from the first stage of the feasibility study for the
creation of a European space-based observation system.
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l. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request that it " speed up its work in order to work
out a concept ofthe r6le and operation ofa European annament agency ". It notes, however, that the
transfer of the IEPG functions to WEU is already a flrrst step towards developing WEU's capability in
the field of armaments co-operation.
2. It should be recalled that the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Bonn on 4th
December 1992. They issued a communiqu6 which states: " Recalling their decision at their last
meeting in Oslo to task the National Armaments Directors (NADs) to examine the IEPG's future r0le
in depth, ministers noted with satisfaction the work done. This work has concentrated on the possible
incorporation of the IEPG into WEU, based on six key principles developed for and approved by IEPG
ministers... Ministers also noted the positive results of the WEU Council on 20th November and
agreed that a transfer of IEPG functions to WEU would represent an important step toward enhanced
European armaments co-operation based on the work undertaken by the NADs. IEPG ministers have
therefore decided today that this transfer will take place forthwith. They invited the Belgian Minister
of Defence, in his capacity of Chairman for the IEPG, to inform WEU accordingly. They also
emphasised the need to maintain the momentum of the activities currently being taken fonvard by the
IEPG ".
3. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request that it * ensure that the future agency has
adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the process of harmonisation, by member coun-
tries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sensible, not too burdensome manner ".
4. The Bonn communiqu6 issued by the thirteen IEPG nations on 4th December 1992 specifies: in
reaching this fundamental decision, they confirmed that the thirteen nations will continue to have
equal rights and responsibilities in the field of armaments co-operation and the links with NATO will
be maintained. They also emphasised the need to maintain the momentum of the activities currently
being taken forward by the IEPG.
5. The Council has repeatedly stated its position on exports of military equipment, inter alia in its
reply to Recommendation 520.
6. The Council will bear in mind the Assembly suggestion to " draw up an inventory and a financing
plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment,
and draw up a list of priorities ".
7. Information on progress made with the Franco-German study on the European requirement for
strategic mobility will be made available to the Assembly in due course.
8. Information on the Council's conclusions from the first stage of the feasibility study for the cre-
ation of a European space-based observation system will become available to the Assembly in due
course.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th February 1993.
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on anti-ballistic missile defence2
The Assembly,
O Gratiflred that Europe is no longer threatened by a ballistic missile attack from the territory of
the former Soviet Union;(iil Recalling nevertheless that the danger of proliferation of ballistic technology and nuclear, bie
logical and chernical warheads stockpiled on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States
has not yet been averted;
(iiil Noting that several third world countries, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Near and
Middle East, are making considerable efforts to procure ballistic systems capable of reaching European
countries;(iv) Noting further that a number of countries that have not joined the missile technology control
r6gime (MTCR) are endeavouring to develop ballistic technology and to export it to third world coun-
tries;(v) Disturbed at the growing number of countries endeavouring to develop nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons;(vil Recalling the uncertainty that still remains about the completion of the United States pro-
gramme for establishing a system of global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) and its conse-
quences for Europe;
(viil Considering that such a system of protection will mean renegotiating the anti-ballistic missile
treaty of 26th May 1972;
(viiil Stressing the importance of the evolution of Russian-American co'operation in this matter in the
framework of which the possible creation of an early warning centre to avert the risks of ballistic
attacks is being studied;(ix) Recalling that the technical difficulties encountered during the Gulf war in intercepting with
Patriot systems Iraqi missiles launched against Tel Aviv and Riyadh showed that protection against
this new type of threat was still far from perfect;(x) Convinced, therefore, that it is high time for the Western European countries to adopt a joint
position, on the one hand on the assessment of the possible risks for Europe of the development of bal-
listic technology throughout the world and, on the other, on the corresponding response;
(xil Also convinced of the need to ensure that efforts to afford protection against ballistic missiles do
not lead to an arms race in space,
RrcoulvrgNps THAT rnr couNcrr-
1. Assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from:
(a) the development of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear capability in several
countries of the world;
(b) the proliferation of ballistic technology in countries close to Europe's southern and south-
eastern flanks;
2. Identify without delay Europe's needs and the means available to it to counter the ballistic
missile threat;
3. Adopt without delay a joint European position towards the American programme for global pro-
tection against limited strikes (GPALS) ;
4. Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent interna-
tional and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system;
5. Submit its conclusions to the Assembly.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( l2th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1339).
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1. The Council is fully aware of the need to assess the risks to Europe stemming from " the devel-
opment of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear proliferation of ballistic technology in
countries close to Europe's southern and southeastern flanks ".
2. Questions pertaining to a global protection system (GPS) are on the agenda of the Council's
Special Working Group.
3. An in-depth study of questions pertaining to a global protection system would necessarily have
to precede any * adoption of a joint European position towards the American programme for global
protection against limited strikes (GPALS) ".
4. The Council will bear in mind the Assembly's request to " promote the participation of the
largest possible number of countries and competent international and national institutions to share the
burden of the establishment of a global protection system ".
5. Additional information will become available to the Assembly in due course.
240
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
DOCUMENT 1372
RECOMMENDATION 534 
'
on Earopean secarity - resene forces and national senice2
The Assembly,
(i) Recognising that adequate standing forces must still be maintained to preserve the requirement
for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the more binding mod-
ified Brussels Treaty;
(it) Conscious that with the ending of East-West conflict in Europe there is a reduced need for
sizeable standing and largely conscript armies and that instead, smaller, flexible, mobile and more pro-
fessional forces are required;
(iii) Bearing in mind, however, the imperative of maintaining a capability for home defence in
Europe which might be increasingly entrusted to reserve forces;(iv) Recognising the devotion to duty of the Atlantic Alliance's reserve forces and mindful of the sac-
rifices made by those who serve in the reserves;
(v) Underlining the important liaison r6le played by reserve forces in linking the armed forces with
the civilian population, which strengthens public spiritedness and promotes better understanding in
our nations of defence problems;(vi) Considering the current debate in many member countries on the relative advantages of con-
scription vis-i-vis all-volunteer and professional forces, although aware that the latter are propor-
tionally more costly;
(vii) Witnessing the general reductions in the length of national service in the majority of member
countries, or its abolition, and wishing to highlight the obvious effect on the availability of properly-
trained reservists;
(viii) Determined to promote full and frank debate in WEU on the subject of national service and
reserve forces in member countries;
(ix) Convinced that more coherent arrangements for assuring a cost-effective European security
system should be possible, given greater co-operation and consultation between member states, both
within WEU and together with the other nations of the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council;(x) Knowing that the Central European states would welcome the opportunity to discuss matters
such as national service and reserve forces;(xi) Supporting the efforts of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Oflicers (CIOR) to stimulate
informed discussion among its members on a wide variety of issues, and hoping that the CIOR will
soon include all Atlantic Alliance nations, at least as observers, and liaise with the Central European
nations which are full members of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council;
(xiil Recalling Recommendation 469 adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989;
(xiii) Believing that multinational units such as the Franco-German Brigade serve as a channel for the
enthusiasm of those who wish to place their national service in a European context and that the idea of
attributing reserve forces for the European Corps provides a further opportunity for integration;
(xiv) Considering the increasingly strong calls by the armed forces for modern, varied technologies
enabling them to provide further training, particularly for the volunteers who are required to serve for
a long enough period, which will be useful for their subsequent employment as civilians;
(xv) Asserting that the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces in Austria, Finland,
Sweden and Switzerland may serve as a future model for both the Western European and especially the
Central European states,
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1992 during the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session ( l3th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1338).
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RrcouurNps rHAT rnr CouNclt"
l. Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any
member countrybenefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion
on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting;
2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised r6les for reserve forces as well as on
reductions in and possible restructuring of national service;
3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria,
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states;
4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of
those which already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national
service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves;
5. Explore the idea of creating a European * national guard " for territorial defence, using the
reserve forces of WEU member states;
6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to * take specific action to allow at an
individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of
European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work envi-
ronment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making
recruiting most difficult' (Recommendation 469);
7. Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces whose training
would be continued for long enough after their return to civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a
useful complement to regular military personnel;
8. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular
and reserve personnel 
- 
taking part in WEU operations;
9. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Oflicers (CIOR); .
10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national senrice
and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for cooperation;
ll. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 534
l. Questions pertaining to the " debate on reserve forces and national service in any member
country " are not, at present, on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. Discussion on the
subject of reserve forces and national service in any member country could possibly be included on the
agenda of a future meeting of the WEU chiefs of defence staff.
2. The Council welcomes any " informed debate in member countries on revised r6les for reserve
forces as well as on reductions in and the possible restructuring of national service ".
3. As questions pertaining to the " debate on reserve forces and national service in any member
country " are not, at present, on the agenda of the Council and its working groups, it would be pre-
mature for the Council to consider the creation of " a forum for discussion of such matters among
member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central
European states ".
4. The Council has no competence for " strongly encouraging WEU countries without volunteer
reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset'.
5. The idea of establishing a " European 'National Guard' for territorial defence, using the reserve
forces of WEU member states " is not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.
6. The Council welcomes any " specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of mil-
itary personnel " between member states of WEU or the Atlantic Alliance, be it on a bi- or multilateral
basis.
7. As questions pertaining to the " debate on reserve forces and national service in any member
country " are not, at present, on the agenda of the Council and its working groups, it would be pre-
mature for the Council to reply to the Assembly's request in paragraph 7 of the recommendation.
8. Preliminary discussions on a possible official symbol to represent WEU have already taken place
in the Council. The Council hopes to make progress with this question in the near future.
9. The Council is aware of the importance and constructive r6le played by the Interallied Confeder-
ation of Reserve Offrcers (ICRO).
10. A * thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member
states and of the possibilities for co-operation " could possibly be the subject of a future study to be
prepared by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
I l. As questions pertaining to the " debate on reserve forces and national service in any member
country " are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups, it would be premature
for the Council to invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th February 1993.
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RECOMMENDATION 535 
'
on Eurupean secafity - resene forces and ndional semice2
The Assembly,
Further developing the theme of " European security 
- 
reserve forces and national service ",
RncoruurNos rHAT rnr CotrNcrr,
l. Encourage member states to consult with a view to:
(ai safeguarding the status of national servicemen or reservists from both the public and the
private sectors to allow them * leave of absence " to serve in the forces;
(D/ introducing Iiscal advantages for firms which employ reserve servicemen;
(c/ proposing European noilns for equipment, service structures and command organisation;
2. Consider forthwith the idea of establishing a 'European guard " composed of reserve forces
which would be used to help defend the common European territory of all member states;
3. Propose that member states which shorten the length of, or abolish, conscription should make
the terms of voluntary military service more attractive especially with regard to pay and allowances
and also give those leaving the forces priority treatment for employment within the public sector;
4. Urge member states abandoning the practice of conscription to suspend legislation relating to
national service rather than revoking it entirely, thus leaving current legislation on the statute books in
case of future requirements;
5. Ask the ministries of defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appropriate
information regarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those who have no
service background.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1992 during the second part of the thirty<ighth ordinary session ( I 3th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1338
supplementary draft recommendation).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 535
l. 
- 
9uestions pertaining to the status of national servicemen or reservists and to fiscal legislation do
not fall within the competence of the WEU Council. Questions related to " European norms for
equipment " could be a field of activity for a future European armament agency. The Council has no
plans for discussions on 'European nonns " for service itructures and commind organisation.
2. The idea of establishing " a 'European guard' composed of reserve forces " is not, at present, on
the agenda of the Council and its working groups.
3. T!r. questions raised in paragraph 3 of the recommendation do not fall within the competence of
the WEU Council.
4. The WEU Council has no competence for " urging member states abandoning the practice of
conscription to suspend legislation relating to national service rather than revokinglt entirely ".
5. Questions 
.pertaining_ to- the " 4issemination of appropriate information regarding military
mattersby the ministries of defence of the WEU member states to all parliamentarians and especially
those who have no service background are within the competence of the respective governments o?
WEU member states, not within that of the Council.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l8th February 1993.
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RECOMMENDATION 536 
'
on the enlargement of WEAT
The Assembly,
O Welcoming the Council's energetic action, which resulted in a protocol of accession to WEU
with Greece, a declaration on WEU observers regarding Denmark and Ireland and a document on
associate membership regarding lceland, Norway and Turkey within ayear after the WEU declaration
on enlargement issued at Maastricht on 10th December 1991;(iil Regretting that the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
(iil Noting that at an earlier stage it strongly expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be
admitted simultaneously as full members and regretting that the Council was not willing to accept this
view;
(iv) Welcoming the fact that, according to the document on associate membership of WEU, Iceland,
Nonray and Turkey will become associate members on the day that Greece becomes a member of
WEU;
(v) Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's
r6le and existence;
(vil Noting the Council's reply to Written Questions 300, 3l I and 312, where it suggests that the
existence of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty does not preclude the Assembly retaining its full
autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in the Assembly's activities of representatives
from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU;
(viil Stressing that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, l,atvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic should also find expression in
specific relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
(viiil Considering that national parliaments, when examining for ratification the protocol of Greece's
accession to WEU, will have to take account of the proposed suspension of Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty and of Greece's r6le in European efforts to solve the crisis in former Yugoslavia;(ix) Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives from new member states, asso-
ciate member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will be a significant burden on
the budget, personnel, office space and chamber required for the Assembly to perform its task properly,
RrcouurNos rHAT rsr CouNcrt
1. Confirm the Assembly's full autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in its activ-
ities of representatives from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU and provide
sufficient accommodation and financial means for the Assembly to implement the consequences of the
accession of Greece, associate membership of lceland, Nonvay and Turkey, and observer states of
Denmark and Ireland, as decided in Rome on 20th November 1992;
2. Indicate which countries will be asked to participate in the budget of the Assembly, and their
respective contributions to the financing of this budget, so that the Assembly may keep an account of
the effective participation in WEU;
3. Indicate whether Greece, which has not signed the document on associate membership, is never-
theless committed to this text;
4. Take no steps to promote ratification of the protocol of Greece's accession to WEU before
Greece has clarified its position regarding the solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
l. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on l9th April 1993.
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ward on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1360).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Recommendation 536
No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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QUESTTON 306
pat to the Council by lard Finsberg
on 15th October 1992
Does the answer of the Council in para-
graph 16 of its reply to Recommendation 517
mean that it refuses to refer to independent arbi-
tration?
QUESTTON 309
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on lSth Ouober 1992
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty
draws a clear distinction between the high con-
tracting parties to the treaty which, account
being taken of Article I to Protocol No. I,
include Germany and Italy, and any other state
invited subsequently to " become a party to the
treaty' " on conditions to be agreed between
them and the state so invited'. In these condi-
tions, can the Council say, basing its answer on
serious legal considerations:
l. Whether it is possible to consider
Germany and Italy as high contracting
parties and at the same time claim that
the period of fifty years provided for in
Article XII started in 1948?
2. Whether, in the event of Greece
acceding to the modifred Brussels
Treaty, it would be entitled, as a state
acceding to the treaty, to participate in
the decision relating to the conditions
for the accession of other countries as
they have to be agreed with the high
contracting parties to Protocol No. I?
3. If the Council is prepared to submit to
recognised experts in international law
the Assembly's well-founded consider-
ations concerning the interpretation of
Article XII of the treaty or whether it
intends to confine itself to its
" opinion " which has never been jus-
tified, even in the answer to Written
Question 297, in order to reject the
Assembly's point of view on this
matter?
QUESTTON 314
put to the Council hy Lord Finsberg
on 29th lanuary 1993
At the meeting in Rome held on l8th
November 1992 between the Chairman-
in-Offrce of the Council of Ministers and the
1lth June 1993
Presidential Committee, the Minister agreed to
invite legal experts to consider the views of the
Assembly which believes that the fifty-year
period of the modified Brussels Treaty com-
menced in 1955 and the views of the ministers
which is that 1948 is the commencement date.
Will the Minister now say when that exami-
nation will take place and will the Assembly be
invited to make available to the experts, either
orally or in writing, its opinion and evidence.
QUESTTON 315
put to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 22nd February 1993
What is meant by'The Council takes due
note " of the request in paragraph I (6) of Rec-
ommendation 526 and in paragraph 2l of Rec-
ommendation 517?
May it be assumed that " due note "
means that the Council intends to take further
action along the lines indicated in Rome by the
Chairman-in-Offlrce to the Presidential Com-
mittee.
REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 15th April 1993
A. Following further examination with the
participation of legal experts, the Council
remains of the opinion that the period of 50
years specified in Article XII (a denunciation
clause, not a termination clause) of the modified
Brussels Treaty, formerly Article X of the treaty
signed in Brussels on 17th March 1948, runs
from the date on which the Treaty of Economic,
Social and Cultural Collaboration and Col-
lective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on lTth
March 1948, came into force, i.e. 25th August
1948, the date of the deposit of the last
instrument of ratification. Indeed, a multilateral
treaty establishes a community of interests,
rights and obligations, the duration of which
must be explicitly defined and accepted by all
the parties. In no case can an extension of
'duration be imposed to parties by other parties
subsequently acceding. A change in the num-
bering of an article does not seem to constitute
grounds for considering this to be a new pro-
vision (this position of the Council has already
been explained in Council Reply to Written
Question 288). Moreover, the modified Brussels
Treaty was not conceived as a new treaty, but as
an evolution of the Brussels Treaty: interna-
tional practice and doctrine clearly show that a
Written questions 306 to 321 and replies of the Council
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modification in the provisions does not imply
the opening ofa new term ofduration, nor does
the fact that such modification occurs simulta-
neously with the accession of new members.
B. A legal obligation to submit diverging
interpretations or disputes to independent arbi-
tration cannot be found in the modified Brussels
Treaty, nor in any other binding act applicable
within WEU. There is no evidence of a constitu-
tional practice within WEU envisaging inde-
pendent arbitration upon request by one of its
bodies. Furthermore, there exists no general
legal obligation upon the bodies and organs of
an international organisation to submit
diverting interpretation or disputes to inde-
pendent arbitration. However, the Council does
not foreclose the possibility for further evalu-
ation of additional considerations that the
Assembly might wish to present.
C. In the event of accession to the modified
Brussels Treaty, Greece would be entitled to
fully participate in decisions and activities of
member states, including the decisions con-
cerning the accession of other countries, unless
otherwise specified (e.g. space activities during
the experimental period) in a binding act.
QUESTTON 307
pat to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992
According to the Petersberg declaration,
associate member states of WEU " will take part
on the same basis as full members in WEU mil-
itary operations to which they commit forces " .
In view of the fact that the two " bases "
for military action by WEU are Article V and
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, can
it be considered that these articles may be the
" basis " for a military commitment by countries
that will not be acceding to the modified
Brussels Treaty? Should it be considered that
WEU military operations might have other
" bases " than the modified Brussels Treaty and,
if so, which?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 15th April 199j
Legal bases for military action of WEU
are to be determined in accordance with prin-
ciples of international law. Principally:
- 
exercise of right of individual and col-
lective self-defence as recognised in
Article 5l of the United Nations
Charter and Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty;
- 
resolutions adopted and measures
decided by the United Nations Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII and/or
VIII of the Charter (i.e. United Nations
Security Council resolutions) ;
- 
the consent of the state concerned
where (for example) peace-keeping
operations take place.
These legal bases for action are ofgeneral
application to all states.
The references in the Petersberg decla-
ration to associate members taking part in oper-
ations " on the same basis " as member states
does not refer to these points, but to the fact that
associates will be subject to the same rights and
obligations arising from their participation in
operations (for example, the right to participate
in command structures and the obligation to
contribute to costs).
QUESTTON 308
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992
Do the acts of accession of Portugal and
Spain to WEU imply that those two countries
subscribed to Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the
Paris Agreements? Do those countries assume
all the obligations implied by the said pro-
tocols?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 15th April 199i
Spain and Portugal bear the same rights
and obligations as all other member states, as
stated in the relevant protocols of accession.
QUESTTON 310
pat to the Council by Mn Caro
on 15th October 1992
The Petersberg declaration is an under-
standing between states with a view to creating,
modifying or abolishing a legal relationship
between them in two respects:
l. because it provides for non-application
of a fundamental article of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty (Article V) in the
event of a dispute between a country
acceding to that treaty and a country
having acceded to the North Atlantic
Treaty,
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2. because it creates a status of" associate
member " in an organisation set up by
the 1954 Paris Agreements.
Does the Council not consider that the
adoption ofacts having such effects requires the
intervention of constitutional authorities in
member states conversant with the conclusion of
treaties? Can it specify the nature ofthese acts?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 15th Apfl 1993
The Petersberg declaration is a joint
political declaration by WEU member states,
with the aim of, inter alia, preparing the political
framework for establishing new links with other
states and other international organisations.
Its adoption does not therefore require
those constitutional procedures followed by
states, when adopting legally binding interna-
tional acts.
QUESTTON 311
pat to the Council by lard Finsberg
on 3hh November 1992
Irrespective of any reasons the Assembly
may have, is the Assembly fully entitled to
assign voting rights to countries to which the
Council of Ministers have granted associate or
observer status?
QUESTTON 312
pat to the Council by Mr, StoJfelen
on 15th December 1992
In its reply to Written Question 300, the
Council stated thpt associate members of WEU
are not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty.
In conjunction with Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty, the Council then concludes:
" Hence it appears that only the representatives
of the 'Brussels Treaty powers' (i.e. full member
states of Western European Union) to the Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
could be full members of the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly " .
On the other hand, both the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council and the Secretary-General
have stated in public that in their opinion the
Assembly is " completely autonomous and sov-
ereign as regards the possibility of including rep
resentatives from associate member countries'
parliaments in its activities " .
These statements may have been intended
to be an update of the earlier answer to Written
Question 300 and a guideline for the Assembly,
but it is not clear on which article of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty they are based.
Could the Council provide clarification
regarding the apparent contradiction between
the two different opinions?
REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 24th February 1993
In its answer to Written Question 300, the
Council gave as its opinion that " only represen-
tatives of the Brussels Treaty powers... could befull members of the WEU parliamentary
Assembly ". In the Council's view, however, this
does not preclude full participation in the
Assembly's activities of representatives from
states who are associate members ol or
observers in WEU, on a basis to be decided by
the Assembly.
The Assembly therefore retains its full
autonomy for resolving the problems in
question. The Council is nevertheless confident
that the Assembly will, in its debates, take
account of the importance of the texts adopted,
and the declarations made by the Council
regarding the general position of associate
members and observers in the WEU structure
that each country has a balanced place within
the organisation.
QUESTTON 313
put to the Council by Mr. Pdcriaux
on 25th January 1993
At the close of the meeting of the WEU
Permanent Council, Mr. van Eekelen, the Secre-
tary-General, suggested to the press that WEU
should be prepared to take action to stop the
massacre in former Yugoslavia if the United
Nations was not prepared to do so.
Was this declaration the view of Mr. van
Eekelen alone or does it reflect a discussion in
the Permanent Council? What is the Council's
position on this matter? Is such a scenario for
intervention being studied by the WEU
planning cell?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on &th March 1993
The statements referred to in Written
Question 313 and attributed by the press to the
Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Willem van
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Eekelen, were not of a public nature and were
made in a personal capacity. The Secretary-
General has always refrained from making state-
ments that might give the impression that WEU
member states could take a military initiative in
former Yugoslavia without a clear mandate
from the United Nations Security Council.
For its part, the WEU Permanent Council
discusses the prospects for a political solution to
the Yugoslav crisis at its regular meetings. The
practical aspects of the commitment by WEU
countries are matters for the Ad Hoc Group and
the Contingency Planning Group in which rep-
resentatives of the planning cell participate.
The Council has always supported the
position that political decisions regarding action
by the international community in the Yugoslav
crisis must be taken within the United Nations
Framework.
QUESTION 316
put to the Council by Mr. hpez Henares
on 25th February 1993
Does Article IX of the modified Brussels
Treaty not imply that the Council informs the
Assembly of its organisation? Does the
organogram of the Council not come under
" every aspect of the application of the modified
Brussels Treaty " which the Council again
promises " to report effectively to the
Assembly " in paragraph I l. of its reply to Rec-
ommendation 526? How does the Council rec-
oncile this commitment with paragraph I 5 of
the same reply?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 5th April 1993
The Council regrets that it is unable to
give a positive reply to this question, which is a
restatement of Written Question 305.
The new version of the detailed and
updated organisational chart is still under dis-
cussion. The competent bodies will re-examine
it at the end of the transitional period set by the
Permanent Council for an evaluation of the
organisation's operation in Brussels. Once it has
been finally approved, this organisational chart
will be formally sent to the Assembly.
QUESTION 317
put to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on lst March 1993
Where the reply of the Council to the
Assembly states that an item * is not on the
agenda of the Council and its working groups "
is the Assembly to understand that this means
the Council is not even willing to place it on the
agenda for discussion and eventual report back
to the Assembly?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on Sth April 1993
The Council's agenda and that of its
working groups is determined by the mandate
given by the Ministerial Council and by pro-
posals made by member states' representatives
on instruction from their governments. The par-
liamentary Assembly of WEU is informed of the
resulting activities in accordance with the proce-
dures laid down in Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty. In this context, the Council
endeavours as far as possible to take account of
the suggestions made by the Assembly.
The wording quoted in the written
question is therefore simply intended to show
whether or not a particular subject debated by
the Assembly is on the Council's agenda for the
period in question.
QUESTION 318
pat to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 31st March 1993
Has the Council's attention been drawn to
the statement which appeared in London news-
papers that, according to European Community
officials, the blockade of Serbia and Montenegro
is being regularly broken by means of railway
trains transiting from Greece across Bulgaria? Is
the Council further aware that the Bulgarian
authorities are prepared to take the appropriate
action if proof of sanction-breaking is supplied
and will they urgently arrange for the proof,
apparently available to the European Com-
munity, to be given to Bulgaria?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTION 319
put to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 21st April 1993
Does the Council of Ministers ever intend
to take any action upon the unanimous proposal
of the Assembly contained in Recommendation
490 which requested that Article IX be so
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amended as to permit each parliament to decide
if its delegation to WEU should be the same as
that to the Council of Europe as it is now or if
parliaments appoint some, all or no members
holding such a dual mandate?
Why was the opportunity not taken to
make such a change, which was decided by the
democratic parliamentary assembly, when the
issue of Greek membership was under dis-
cussion?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTTON 320
put to the Council by lard Finsberg
on 21st Apfl 1993
Will the Council inform the Assembly
whether the legal experts referred to in its
answer to question 306 were employees of their
respective governments or independent persons?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTTON 321
put to the Council by Mn Pecriaux
on 6th May 1993
During the exchange of views between the
Political Committee and the Secretary-General
of WEU in Rome on Monday, l9th April 1993,
the latter said WEU might act independently on
the territory of former Yugoslavia if it con-
sidered it should do so in accordance with the
modified Brussels Treaty. He rejected the idea
that it was necessary to obtain the prior
agreement of the United Nations, although it is
clearly preferable for WEU to act with the
agreement of the Security Council. In particular,
Mr. van Eekelen rejected the argument that
WEU must be considered as a regional
organisation within the meaning of Article 52 of
the United Nations Charter.
On 22nd April 1993, the External Rela-
tions and Defence Committees of the Belgian
Chamber of Representatives and Senate jointly
met the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. At this meeting, I asked Mr. Boutros-
Ghali what was his point of view on this aspect
of the relationship between WEU and the
United Nations. Mr. Boutros-Ghali answered as
follows: " In accordance with Article 52 of the
Charter, a regional group can act only with the
agreement of the Security Council. If WEU
decides to act, it must obtain authorisation or a
mandate from the Security Council. "
What is the Council's position on this
essential juridical question?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
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The situation in East Timor
MOTION FOR A DECISION I
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Political Committee
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for urgent procedure
The Political Committee,
(i) Considering the Indonesian court's condemnation of " Xanana " Gusmao to life impris-
onment;(ii) Considering that the lndonesian Government's policy_ of forced annexation continues to be
aicompanied by i'on-respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and inde-
pendence;
(iit) Considering that the international community must take further action to bring about condi-
iions in which thelpeople of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence;
Rreursrs an urgent debate on East Timor to be held during the present session of the Assembly.
l. See lst sitting, t4th June 1993 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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The situation in former Yugoslavia
MOTION FOR A DECISION I
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Political Committee
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a reqaest for urgent procedure
The Political Committee,(i) Considering the recent developments in the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia;(ii) Noting that at present there still seem to be major obstacles to an early solution of the conflict,
which may spread to other regions;(iii) Noting that every new day of inconclusiveness by the international community constitutes
encouragement for the warring parties to make new territorial conquests,
Requesrs an urgent debate on the situation in former Yugoslavia to be held during the present
session of the Assembly.
1. See lst sitting, l4th June 1993 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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MOTION TO DISAGREE 
'
to the content of the thirty-eighth annual repofi of the Council
tabled by MM. Pdcriaux, Stoffelen, Soell and others
The Assembly,
Noting that the Council is showing less and less respect for the Assembly's prerogatives under
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, inter alia by:
- 
refusing, for the first time, to transmit to it the information necessary for preparing its annual
opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU in the very year when there have been
major changes in this budget;
- 
persisting, in spite of undertakings given in the reply to Recommendation 521, in refusing to
lransmitlts organogram (answers to Written Questions 305 and 316 and its reply to Recom-
mendation 526);
- 
refusing, in spite of requests by the Chairmanship-in-Office, any dialogue with the Assembly
about ihe modified Brussels Treaty, its possible revision and its interpretation (press
communiqud of 17th March 1993 which wrongly affirms that WEU has been in existence
since 1948 and replies to Recommendations 490,504,517 and 526 and answers to Written
Questions 297, 306, 309, 314 and 315) ;
- 
accelerating its exchanges with the Assembly, through its answers to recommendations and
written questions, only by omitting all substance from its communications;
- 
not applying undenakings made, inter alia, in the replies to Recommendations 298,319,330,-
420,4ii,569 and 526 to inform the Assembly about everything relating to the apalication of
the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this has been entrusted to organisations outside
WEU;
- 
refusing to give information on cases of violation of the embargo a-gainst the successor states
of Yugoslavia that have been noted by WEU naval forces when, far from being " classified " as
the Council claims in its reply to Recommendation 531, it has been communicated to the par-
liaments of certain member countries;
- 
feigning, in some of its press communiquds, not to consider the Assembly to be an organ of
WEU (communiqu6 of 27th April 1993);
- 
for the second time running, giving priority to an organ of the European Parliament when pro-
viding information on the results of ministerial meetings of the Council:
- 
refusing to adjust the Assembly's budget for 1993 to the new requiremel!-s arising from an
extension of iis activities, although this is in conformity with the Council's wishes;
- 
not following up the Assembly's proposal concerning the adoption of new procedure.for
approving its budget which would allow it to take cognisance of the Council's opinion in time
to organise its work correctly;
Considering that the communication of information necessary for preparing a report on 
.t!e
budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU is one of the obligations imposed on the Council by Article
IX of the modiflred Brussels Treaty,
Disapproves the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council
and asks the Council to resume satisfactory application of Article IX of the modified Brussels
Treaty and everything it implies.
Signed: Pdcriaux, Stoffelen, Soell, Davis, Godman, Holtz, Brito, Ferrarini, de Puig, Martinez,
Antrettei, Tummers, Cummings, Cunliffe, Baarveld-Schlaman
l. See lst sitting, l4th June 1993 (motion referred to the Political Committee for an opinion).
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The situation in Somalia
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
'
tabled by Mr. De Decler and others with a request for
urgent procedure under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,(i) Noting that the United Nations operation in Somalia is degenerating in a way that may be
harmful to the authority of the United Nations;(ii) Recalling that armed forces from four member countries of WEU are taking part in Operation
UNSOM 2;(ii, Considering that it is for WEU to ensure that any action in which forces of several of its
members are involved conforms with Articles VI and VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty,
RrcolarasNos rHAT rnn CouNcu-
Meet as a matter of urgency to co-ordinate the efforts of member countries in order to ensure
that the operation in Somalia respects the principles governing action by the United Nations.
Signed: De Decker, Baumel, Foschi, Goerens, Gottardo, De Hoop Schelfer, de Lipkowski, Parisi,
de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Soell, Geoffroy
l. See lst sitting, l4th June 1993 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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Document 1378 14th June 1993
The Assembly's communication policy
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations2
by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnnrr Onnrn
on the Assembly's communication policy
DRenr RrsolurroN
on the Assembly's communication policy
Dnnrr RrcouurNoetroN
on the Assembly's communication policy
Expr-RNntony MrlronnNourvr
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The 1988 communication plan
III. The Assembly's communication today
IV. Proposals
ApprNorcrs
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Memberc of the committee: Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer, Sir John Hunt (Alternate: Baroness Hooper) (Yice-
Chairmen); ]vlM. lyaral, Birraux, liihler, Caldgro, Colombo, Decagny, Sir Anthony Durant, Mrs. Err., MM. Ei,eisdijk(Alternate: Dees), Floch, \4rs. Frias, Mr. Ghesquidre,Dr. Godman, Mi. Gouteyron, SiiRasse// Johnston,MM. Kempinaiie,Lopez Henares, Nufiez, Pfuhl, Reimann, Rodotd, Speroni.
N.B. Tle names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Order
on the Assembly's communication pohcy
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Assembly's efforts in questions of communication in recent years and noting that
they have achieved significant results;(ii) Aware nevertheless that the public still has very little knowledge of the r6le and activities of
WEU as a whole and of its parliamentary Assembly in particular;
(iii) Convinced that priority should be given to communication policy,
INsrnucrs ns PnrsrosNrrel Coprurrree
1. To ensure that, in all its activities, the Assembly gives priority to its communication policy;
2. To make provision for the financial resources necessary for taking the following initiatives in the
immediate future:
(a) procurement of equipment allowing audiovisual presentations to be given to interested
members of the public;
(b) production of a video clip to be made available to television channels;
(c/ publication of a briel attractive booklet on WEU;
(d) invitation to a group of American journalists to the capitals of two or three member states to
meet the chairmen of national delegations and of foreign affairs and defence committees, the
visit winding up in Paris with a meeting of the Presidential Committee;
(e) creation of an annual prize to recompense work making a particularly significant contri-
bution to the security and defence of Europe;
fi pior study and installation of an electronic server allowing access to Assembly documents
by telephone;
3. To take appropriate steps to increase and organise regular visits to the Assembly, during or
outside sessions, by groups of interested persons 
- 
students, parliamentarians, officials, members of
specialised associations or institutes, journalists, etc. 
- 
by reaching agreements with the institutions to
which these persons belong;
4. To organise, at the seat of the Assembly, a seminar to consider WEU's means of communication
to be attended by committee members, staff of information services in the ministries for foreign affairs
and defence of member countries, staff of information services in national parliaments and staff from
the Assembly and the Secretariat-General responsible for information.
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Draft Raolution
oa the Assembly's communication policy
The Assembly,
(i) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress achieved in circulating detailed information
to the general public on its aims and activities;(i, Aware of the importance of the r6le that national delegations and individual parliamentarians
should play in order to offset the remaining shortcomings in keeping the public informed about WEU
as a whole and our Assembly in particular,
INvrrrs tne PnnunuENTS oF MrMsBn CouNrnrEs
l. To study the possibility of inviting groups of journalists from their respective countries to
accompany their delegations to the WEU Assembly during plenary sessions so that they may obtain
first-hand information on the activities of the Assembly and of the parliamentarians from their
countries;
2. To ensure that all activities in which their parliamentarians participate within the framework of
the Assembly's work and visits by Assembly committees are publicised as widely as possible;
3. To require their national delegations to produce regular reports of its activities to parliament
and to ensure the reports are distributed to the press;
4. To hold regular debates on the work of their national delegations and to encourage their foreign
affairs and defence committees to take an active interest in the work of WEU and its Assembly;
5. To encourage the participation of parliamentarians, in their capacity as members of the WEU
Assembly, in symposia, seminars and other similar activities dealing with European security and
defence policy.
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Draft Recommendation
on the Assembly's communication policy
The Assembly,(i) Convinced that the use by WEU of a form of graphic identification might help to ensure a
clearer perception of the organisation and eventually a better knowledge of it among the public;(ii) Considering it necessary therefore that WEU, on the one hand, and its subsidiary organs, on the
other, adopt a logo of their own;(iii) Taking into account paragraph 8 of Recommendation 530 asking that the Council:
'Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of
such a badge ".(iv) Recalling Order 74,
Rr,couuBNos rHAT ruE CouNcrr-
1. Arrange for WEU as an organisation and its subsidiary organs to adopt a form of graphic identi-
fication that might be based on the logos proposed in Appendix III to the report on the Assembly's
communication policy;
2. Include WEU's information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to examining
specific measures that it might take, including:
(a) the publication of guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council;
(b) the preparation and publication of basic information on WEU, presented in an under-
standable form with a view to wide circulation in all member countries;
(c) the establishment of WEU information offices in the European member countries of the
alliance, the United States and Canada;
(d) the development of initiatives taken by the Institute for Security Studies to strengthen
co-operation with groups, associations and private institutes that already exist in order to
increase the interest aroused by studies of Western European security matters;
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure closer co-operation between its own press and information
service and that of the Assembly.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submined by Sir Rassell lohnston, Rapporteur)
I. Intoduction
l. The Assembly's adoption and implemen-
tation of a communication policy, as from 1988,
implied making optimum use of the human and
financial resources available to it in a particu-
larly important area, that of communication.
2. At present, the r6le attributed to the
organisation by the treaty on European Union,
on the one hand, and the provisions of the
Petersberg declaration, on the other, led the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions to analyse communication policy, assess
the scale of progress achieved and try to
strengthen measures to make public opinion
better aware of the work of our Assembly in pro-
moting European security and encouraging the
participation of the public in attaining this aim.
3. The WEU Assembly will have to continue
to give priority to its communication policy and,
in pursuing it, must insist that the Council giveit the financial resources necessary for the
effective accomplishment of its work.
II. The 1988 communication plan
4. The Assembly's 1988 communication
plan established degrees of priority for imple-
menting the actions it proposed. There were
three categories of priority: essential, important
and useful, relating to four areas of action:
(a) Capital image
(D/ Press relations
(c) External relations(d) Evaluation of reputation
5. (a) As regards the first of these, capital
image, there is only one degree of priority to be
applied to the planned initiatives (logo and
graphic charter), i.e. essential.
6. It was absolutely fundamental to establish
this capital image for the Assembly to be seen
and distinguished. According to the plan, this
meant the essential creation of basic means to be
used in a pefinanent manner, i.e. a name, a logo,
a position and a graphic charter.
Since the name " Assembly of
Western European Union " already
existed, it had to be given a clearer
personality through the use of
graphics characteristic of each aspect
of its visual communication, i.e. the
logo.
The Assembly's logo is an important
and successful achievement. In the
appropriate chapter of this report,
your Rapporteur will present pro-
posals for the organisation as a whole
and its subsidiary bodies to adopt, in
accordance with the wishes previ-
ously expressed by our Assembly, its
own forms of identification taking
due account of the Assembly's logo.
(iii) Our Assembly's singularity is defined
in its position. The WEU Assembly is
the only European assembly to which
a treaty of alliance has given respon-
sibility for debating defence ques-
tions. This singularity has led to the
undisputed view that its position
must be that of a European security
parliament.
(iv) The graphic charter comprises all the
rules governing the harmonisation of
the appearance, size, colour, presen-
tation and use of the logo in the
Assembly's documents. Its aim is to
present a unity of graphic expression
in order to help to strengthen the
Assembly's internal and external
communication.
Definition of a complete, structured graphic
charter is a very important task requiring the
combined know-how of communication experts,
graphic artists, typographers and reproduction
experts. The general rule is to approach a
specialised communication agency that groups
all these branches and makes a synthesis in each
specific case. For instance, the French Senate
had its logo and graphic charter redefined last
year by a communication group. The budget
necessary for this operation is practically the
same as our Assembly's annual information
budget. Since there could be no question ofcon-
sidering such expenditure and the number of
documents we produce is relatively small, the
Assembly's Information Service had to confine
itself to defining a series of general rules that the
Reproduction Service applies on a case-by-case
basis.
7. (b) Regarding press relations, two actions
were considered essential: the extension of
mailing to what is called the strike force and the
press file. Considered important were the instal-
lation of a telex, more contacts abroad and mon-
itoring of the press. Finally, the production of a
video clip was considered useful.
8. The data given at Appendix I relating to
the dispatching of gtreater numbers of docu-
ments to a wider audience clearly show that our
Assembly has been able to respond effectively to
the challenges of the Gulf crisis, the treaty on
(i)
(ii)
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European Union and the crisis in former Yugo-
slavia.
9. (i) The periodic transmission to jour-
nalists of a press file containing basic infor-
mation on the Assembly was one of the initia-
tives described in the communication plan.
Updated before each session, this file briefly
reviews the background of our Assembly, its
r6le, its operation, its composition, the political
groups and committees and gives a few bio-
graphical notes on its presidents and chairmen
and the list of questions to be debated at the fol-
lowing session.
10. (ii) The importance of information and
its topicality are the main factors sought by a
press agency when providing information to
newspapers. To provide the Assembly with a
telex, an important means of communication
with press agencies, was therefore considered
extremely necessary for improving communi-
cation.
I l. Moreover, it was considered that more
intensive personal links between the Assembly's
Press Counsellor and journalists from member
countries would be significant in promoting a
better media coverage of our Assembly: it was
therefore proposed that the Press Counsellor
maintain personal contacts once a year in each
of the member countries.
12. (iii) ln the category of useful initiatives
was the production of a video clip which has still
not yet been achieved for lack of financial
means but to which your Rapporteur attributes
great importance. This matter will be discussed
later.
13. (c) Under external relations, the publi-
cation of the letter from the Assembly was con-
sidered essential and the category of useful
actions included a WEU scholarship, the devel-
opment of visits, audiovisual information and
the document presenting the Assembly.
14. (i) The quarterly publication of the letter
from the Assembly allowed the latter to contact
public opinion directly in the same manner as
the other parliamentary assemblies (European
Parliament, Council of Europe, North Atlantic
Assembly, etc.) and to propose opinions and
specific information on topical questions, its
activities, documents of interest and the time-
table of its future activities.
15. At present, 4 750 copies of the letter from
the Assembly are sent to parliamentarians in the
member countries and in the United States,
Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey
and also to the European Parliament, embassies
in Paris, the staff of heads of state and of gov-
ernment and the ministries for foreign affairs
and defence of the member countries and to
specialised institutes, the press and all persons
wishing to receive it. The graphs at Appendix II
show the geographic origin and category ofthose
receiving the letter from the Assembly, both glo-
bally and in WEU member countries.
16. It should be pointed out that, since the
letter from the Assembly was introduced, the
Information Service has been receiving a steady
flow of requests for reports referred to in the
letter. For instance, the letter from the Assembly
reporting on the last session in December 1992
has so far, four months later, produced 205 indi-
vidual requests for I 245 reports.
17. Many of these requests are from students
from universities or research institutes which
are increasingly equipped with data bases on
microcomputers and some of them have already
asked whether it was possible to receive
Assembly documents electronically, transmitted
directly through telephone lines. Anyone with a
computer and a modem, anywhere in the world,
could dial this telephone number and bring up
on the screen a list of Assembly reports and doc-
uments and, in a few minutes, load the desired
reports on to his or her own computer. The
development of such an electronic server would
make a major contribution to meeting this
growing need and at the same time extend the
circulation of our documents while reducing
postal charges and the already very heavy
workload of the mailing office of the Office of
the Clerk.
18. (ii) Among the proposals for action con-
sidered useful, first and foremost is the creation
of an Assembly scholarship for promoting the
study of European security-related questions
among diplomatic and political science students.
It has not yet been possible to implement this
initiative, although the WEU Institute for
Security Studies has already started such a pro-
gramme, but your Rapporteur recalls the pro-
posal by our Assembly's Press Counsellor to the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions at its meeting on 30th October 1992 con-
cerning the creation of a prize for the best book
dealing with European security.
19. Furthermore, our Assembly is already
receiving as trainees (at present three) for
periods of six months, students reaching the end
of their university studies or persons who havejust completed their studies. The Assembly's
budget allows them no remuneration and the
rules allow them no special status. In spite of
this not very enviable situation, the number of
candidates for traineeships is steadily increas-
ingly, while the Oflice of the Clerk still has very
limited space available to accommodate them. It
would be fair to consider introducing a remune-
rated status for trainees, who provide the Oflice
of the Clerk with considerable assistance.
20. Visits to the Assembly by persons or
groups interested in our organisation are an
excellent means of making our work and pro-
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cedure known to those who, by their attendance,
demonstrate that they are particularly receptive
to the work of the Assembly. The systematic
development of such visits will be proposed in
due course in this report.
21. The presentation of the Assembly by
audiovisual means, followed by comments or
discussions with its representatives, would make
individual or group visits more fruitful.
22. Finally, the plan provided for the prepa-
ration of a document presenting the Assembly
which should answer the following questions:
" who are you and what do you do? " .
23. This document, which might be in the
form of a booklet on the Assembly, should be
brief, precise and attractive. According to the
ideas in the 1988 communication plan, this
booklet should be in more or less publicity form.
It should be given to everyone having a first
contact with the Assembly, journalists, visitors
and students taking an interest in our work.
24. (d) ln the evaluation of reputation cat-
eBory, it was considered that a study of the repu-
tation and image of WEU and of its Assembly in
the member countries was a useful action. This
study should be in two stages: a first qualitative
one, directed towards the centre of the target
grouping leading people in the political and
social life of member countries with a view to
determining a certain number of guidelines; the
second would be a quantitative one, directed
towards a selection of from one to ten persons
per category with the aim of obtaining a clearer
idea of the statistical weight of the ideas
expressed and the goals of such ideas.
25. The financial assessment of the action
proposed for the plan was a deciding factor in
the implementation or abandonment of some of
the proposals already mentioned.
26. In an information document dated 3rd
December 1990, the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations noted that the
financial means earmarked for the Assembly's
public relations had increased from F 320 000 in
1988 to F 410 000 in 1989 and F 455 000 in
1990; inter alia, this increase had allowed two
table-top computers to be purchased for the
Press and External Relations Service of the
Assembly, better systematic monitoring of the
press, more press contacts abroad and the
organisation of a competition in member coun-
tries for the creation of an Assembly logo. The
document noted that the percentage the
Assembly devoted to public relations as a per-
centage of its overall budget was in the region of
2010, which was similar to the figure for national
parliaments and the Council of Europe. (No per-
centage was available for the European Par-
liament, but in 1990 the sum eannarked for
public relations reached a total of 12 792 000
ecus.) The figure of 20/o just quoted does not
signify that the means available to WEU are in
proportion to those of other assemblies since all
information services have identical fixed
expenditure quite independent of the size of the
service's budget: subscriptions to press-cutting
agencies and newspapers and the cost of
organising a press conference are identical. Once
these are paid, the level of 290 means simply that
the WEU Assembly has less financial resources
than other assemblies to guide its work in one
direction or another.
27. The same document included an estimate
ofthe cost ofcertain initiatives considered nec-
essary: in 1990 the production of a video clip
presenting WEU was estimated to cost about
F 300 000 and the publication and distribution
of a booklet as described in paragraph (c) (ii)was
assessed at F 350 000. 
'
28. The fact remains that the communication
plan was an appropriate move at the right time,
but for lack of adequate financing the efforts
made at an albeit favourable juncture failed to
overcome the shortcomings of information
about our organisation whether among public
opinion or among those who help to form that
oprnlon.
III. The Assembly's communication today
29. At its meeting in Paris on 30th October
1992, the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations was briefed by the Assembly's
Press Counsellor on the development of the
Assembly's communication activities. Mention
was first made of the overall environment of the
Assembly's communication policy: the crises in
the Gulf and the former Republic of Yugoslavia
and the treaty on European Union.
30. The Assembly is faced with this new situ-
ation at a time when many of the aims set out in
the 1988 communication plan have been
achieved: logo, graphic charter, press file, faster
communications, more contacts with and moni-
toring of the press, letter from the Assembly. All
these means are directed towards relays of
opinion: press, governments, national parlia-
ments and university and specialised circles.
The main trump card of our Assembly's rela-
tions with the press is the interest of its reports
whereas its weakness is the absence of decision-
making powers: a recommendation, even if it
obtains a unanimous vote in the Assembly, is a
formal obligation neither for the Council nor for
the governments of member countries. Two
types of person receive the Assembly's instru-
ments of communication: on the one hand, a
hard core, i.e. journalists who follow our activ-
l. It should be emphasised that the information budget in
1992 was F 445000 and that the estimate for 1993 is
F 460 000.
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ities very regularly and automatically receive
communiquds and press files, reports and docu-
ments for the sessions as well as the letter from
the Assembly, and, on the other hand, otherjournalists who receive only documents for ses-
sions and the letter from the Assembly.
31. Finally, a number of suggestions were
made at the committee meeting already men-
tioned and your Rapponeur will list them, while
pointing out that they will also be taken into
account in the conclusions of the present
report.
32. First, it was necessary to develop visits by
American journalists in Europe. It was clearly
necessary to direct action towards the United
States in order to improve knowledge of our
views, work and aims on the other side of the
Atlantic and to rectify the sparse, partial or even
lack of information on these matters and to
eliminate the distrust that the lack of communi-
cation could but engender or increase. In
response to this aim, in 1990 our committee
envisaged the possibility of engaging a lobbyist
or a public relations agency in Washington; your
Rapporteur believes, however, that visits byjournalists should be enough provided they are
on a regular basis.
33. Second, it was proposed to produce a
short video clip for television giving basic infor-
mation which might be used by television
channels in support of appropriate news items.It is certain that television channels are an
exceptionally effective means, or perhaps the
most effective, of transmitting a clear picture of
the Assembly, its activities and its aims. Priority
should be given to providing them with the
minimum facilities necessary (appropriate
lighting, a place for interviews, rooms for
viewing or editing) or providing them with the
finished product, i.e. offering them views of our
activities, be it of the session, observation of
manceuvres, a symposium or any other initi-
ative. However, one must be aware of the high
cost of undertaking anything whatsoever in the
audiovisual sector. A recent example is the
assessment of the possibility of holding our
plenary session in Strasbourg. Use of the normal
audiovisual facilities at the disposal of the
Council of Europe and the European Parliament
for each of their sessions was offered to us at a
cost of F 160 000 per day, which means that,
after two and a half days of normal use, the
Assembly's entire information budget would
have been spent. The service envisaged con-
sisted simply of having two cameras in the
chamber, using a control room, ensuring
reception of pictures and sound in the press
room and, possibly, recording a few moments of
the session for broadcasting by television
channels.
34. The third proposal was for national dele-
gations to invite journalists from their various
countries to attend sessions of the Assembly.
Thus, by observing the work and participation
of parliamentarians in the conduct of sessions,journalists might be able to obtain direct and
clear knowledge of work whose follow-up in the
various countries is generally quite limited. Such
a practice would also have had the advantage of
tightening links between parliamentarians from
each delegation and their national press. It
should be noted that the German Delegation has
some means of doing this and that it has already
done so on several occasions with good
results.
35. The use of committee visits to various
capitals was another proposal which is already
being implemented; it can be noted with satis-
faction that when efficient organisation pro-
duces broad coverage by the press these visits
are an excellent means of making WEU known
and interesting public opinion in a more tan-
gible, closer and more topical manner and of
demonstrating WEU's interest in specific
national problems.
36. The delegations as a whole and parlia-
mentarians individually can help by monitoring
the national press. Their answers, their state-
ments and their articles giving their opinions as
members of the WEU Assembly can clarify and
improve knowledge of the image, work and aims
of the Assembly.
37. Other proposals made and welcomed by
the committee were the issue of a commemo-
rative stamp on the occasion of the fortieth
anniversary of WEU in 1994, the creation of an
annual prize for security and defence in Europe
for a work making an important contribution in
this area and the adoption by WEU and its sub-
sidiary bodies of a logo in harmony with that
adopted by the Assembly. These matters will be
examined in greater detail later.
IY, Proposals
38. First, the Assembly should include com-
munication policy in its agenda as a matter of
priority; it should also endeavour to earmark the
necessary sums in the budget for implementing
those proposals which require financial
resources. The proposals set out below may be
subdivided into two categories: (a/ those with
financial implications and (b) those that seek to
make maximum use of personal abilities and
efforts without involving any expenditure at all
for the Assembly, as follows:
(a) fuoposals with financial implications
(y' Procurement of equipment allowing
audiovisual presentations to be given to inter-
ested members of the public. Ideally, this should
be a slide system with two projectors and means
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for programming it in several languages. The
cost of this equipment and the production of the
accompanying text (in the two official lan-
guages) is estimated at F 130 000.
(ii) Production of a video clip that might
be made available to television channels and
specialised institutes and associations on
request. These would be simple images, with no
sound, accompanied by a written commentary
summing up in three or four minutes the more
visual aspects of the life of the organisation.
Approximate cost: F 325 000.
(iii) Invitation to a group of ten Americanjournalists to the capitals of two or three
member states to meet the chairmen of national
delegations and of the foreign affairs and
defence committees, the visit winding up in
Paris with a meeting of the Presidential Com-
mittee. Such an operation might cost about
F 200 000.
(ivl Publication of a brief, attractive
booklet in colour which would have to be widely
circulated. Approximate cost: F 390 000.
(v) Creation of an annual prize to recom-
pense work making a particularly significant
contribution to security and defence.
(vi) After a prior study of technical
requirements, creation of an electronic server
for Assembly reports. Approximate overall cost:
F 60000.
(b) Proposals to make maximum use of perconal abilities
and efforts without involving any expendilure
at all for the Assembly
O Adoption by WEU as an organisation
and by its subsidiary organs of a graphic means
of identification based on the logos proposed in
Appendix III to this report. For this purpose,
paragraph 8 of Recommendation 530 should be
stressed. This asks that the Council: " Design a
symbol of specific European identity to rep-
resent WEU and urge member countries to use it
to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, air-
craft, vehicles and personnel - taking part in
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the
planning cell should be among the first recip-
ients of such a badge. "
(ii) Adoption of the necessary measures
by chairmen of national delegations to ensure
the issue of a commemorative stamp on the for-
tieth anniversary of the organisation on 23rd
October 1994.
(iii) lnueased contacts with the press
during committee visits abroad; establishment
of contacts with specialised institutes and uni-
versity circles.
(iv) Co-operation of national delegations
as a whole or of individual members, as
members of the WEU Assembly, in organising
symposia and seminars in their respective coun-
tries and contributing to publications in liaison
with specialised institutes, universities and gov-
ernmental bodies. Parliamentary delegations to
the Assembly and individual representatives
should also encourage the publication of articles
containing opinions on WEU and its r6le in
European security and defence and try to partic-
ipate in university summer courses.
(v) Visits to the Assembly during or
outside sessions by groups of university stu-
dents, parliamentarians who are not members of
the Assembly, officials dealing with security and
defence, members of specialised associations or
institutes, journalists or any group of persons
interested in the subject; these visits should be
encouraged and, as far as possible, they should
become regular thanks to agreements with the
abovementioned institutions, thus allowing a
time-table to be prepared and the presence of
parliamentarians and/or members of the Office
of the Clerk to welcome them.
(vi) ln accordance with the opinion
expressed at the committee meeting on 30th
October 1992, it would be useful to organise, at
the seat of the Assembly, a seminar on means of
improving the organisation's communication.
This seminar should last not more than one day
and group members of the committee, staff of
information services in the ministries for foreign
affairs and defence of member countries, staff of
information services in national parliaments,
staff from the Assembly and the Secretariat-
General and two or three representatives of the
press (who would help to stimulate thinking
through " outside " views).
(vii) Finally, the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations should examine
the need to prepare a working paper or, ifexpe-
dient, a report considering the possibility of pro-
moting the creation in member countries of
national associations to support WEU on the
lines of the Atlantic Associations: in this way, an
organisation would be set up in each member
country with the aim of facilitating the spread of
the ideals upheld by our organisation. This
could be done through publications, seminars
and other activities, which might be financed
from public funds and private contributions, as
is the case for the abovementioned associa-
tions.
39. These proposals are intended, on the one
hand, to help to complete programmes already
started and, on the other, to make maximum use
of existing possibilities while involving the
national delegations to a greater extent in thejoint effort to ensure that the WEU Assembly,
through better communication, interests the
public in the establishment of European security
and defence.
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Letter trom the Assembly
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Document 137E
Amendment I 15th June 1993
The Assembly's communication policy
AMENDMENT I 
'
tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares
l. Leave out paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper and add a new paragraph as follows:
'Arrange for WEU to adopt a specifically European form of graphic identification;"
Signed: Lopez Henares
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l. See 6th sitting, lTth June 1993 (amendment agreed to).
Document 1378
Amendment 2
16th June 1993
The Assembly's communication policy
AMENDMENT 2 
'
tabled by Mr. Paire
2. At the end of the draft order proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" In consultation with the delegations of national parliaments, to organise a press and infor-
mation network in the capitals of member countries to act as a sound box for the activities of
WEU, including its Assembly, at a time that is crucial for the organisation, the delegations of
national parliaments financing the section of the network set up in their own country. "
Signed: Paire
l. See 6th sitting, lTth June 1993 (amendment negatived).
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Document 1379 15th June 1993
The situation in former Yugoslavia
DRAF"T RECOMMENDATION'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by Mr. Baumel, Rapportear
The Assembly,(i) Noting that the lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic
cleansing perpetrated by Serbian forces has created the precedent of impunity which has aliowed them
to continue their action and which has encouraged Croatian forces to adopt the same policy;
(ii) 
^ Considering that the.Security Council resolution authorising troops to be sent to protect the six
" safe areas " in Boslia-Herzegovina, combined with the apparent lack of willingness among the
United Nations member states to provide the additional troops and equipment requiied to imple-ment
this resolution effectively is. most probably further proof of the international community's ina^bility toput an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
(iii) 
_ 
Aware that defensive air protection of blue berets throughout Bosnian territory is to be ensured
pv NATO, under the control of the United Nations, on the basil of structures already-in place for mon-
itoring air space;
(lu/ 
. 
Considering that the lives of peace-keeping troops (blue berets) in Bosnia should not be put at
risk by what might seem to be an undermining of their neutral status following air strikes against
Bosnian Serb positions or a lifting of the United Nations arms embargo;
(!) 
- .Considering tqa! any plan of action which, on the one hand, in fact accepts the status quo,inclu9ing the territorial gains made by the Serbs, and, on the other hand, fails to include guarantees foi
terminating ethnic cleansing practices and protection for the Muslim population in the saTe areas is not
a.just and equitable solution to the conflict and may create a situation of permanent instability and
violence;
(li) Noting that, despite operation Deny_Flight, it is said that there have been some 500 violations by
Croat and Serb helicopters making night flights to transport equipment, ammunition, food and even
troop reinforcements to the Bosnian lines;
Qiil Noting _that there is still a serious risk of the present conflict spreading to the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia and Kosovo where heavily-armed Serbian security foices retain control 6rer a
900/o ethnic Albanian population, which is liable to lead to a further exiension of the conflict;
(v!ii) lwgre that the United States has decided to send 300 troops to the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia to avoid an extension of the conflict;
Qa Noting that both humanitarian aid convoys and United Nations forces in former Yugoslavia areincreasingly under deliberate attack by the warring parties;(x) Noting_that the sudden removal of Dobrica Cosic from the post of Federal President, the ill-
treatment of Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the largest oppositionparty, and his arrest together with his wife and other opposition politicians and journalists aie furttrer
evidence of the anti-democratic character of those holding power in Serbia-M6ntenegro;(xi) Noting that the action-programme has put a de facto end to the territorial integrity and the main-
tenance, wanted by some, of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, independently of iis future consti-
tutional organisation;
(*ii) Noting that the refusal of the WEU countries to accept any fait accompli in Bosnia-Herzegovinats coming up against the fact that they are proving incapable of ensuring application 6f ttre
Vance-Owen plan and the implementation of United Nationi resolutions on t-his iatter, including
those demanding the retreat of Bosnian Serb forces from the territories they have conquered;
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2..trlembers o!the commitlee:.Mr.. Stoffele4 (Chairman); Lord Finsberg,Mr. De Decker(Alternate for Mr. Wintgens) (Vice-
C.hairmen); IvlM. AartsrAgnelli (Alternate; Ferrarini), Alegre, Andreotti, Eenvenuti, Bowdei, OiUiip Sineger, Ehfi;;;, FJ;({]t_ea31e: Rodriguez-Gomez), Feld.mann, Foscfti, Goerens, Homs I rerret, Sir Russell Joh.iston, Mi. raiiirjit, ro.a r,in iiiMM..Kittelmann, de Lipkorvski (Alternate: Baumel), Maroni, Moya, liluller, d'ornano, piciiiui,-i5-iiA-ftda;il:
Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Ward.
N.B. The names of those taking part m the vote are printed in italics.
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(xiii) AJso noting the apparent resignation of the international community in face of this
situation;
(xiv) Noting that every new day of inconclusiveness by the international community constitutes new
encouragement for Bosnian Serbs and Croats to make new territorial conquests;(n) Convinced that, in spite of tacit agreement by the West on the " evolving " status quo in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including the territorial gains made at the expense of the Muslim population, such gains
will certainly be challenged by that population and this will lead to the creation of a Palestinian-type
situation in the heart of Europe;
(xvi) Wishing the working methods of the United Nations to be strengthened and a more effective
command to be created for its operations;
(xvil,) Noting that, at present, diverging opinions among Western European countries and the indif-
ference of the United States are major obstacles to any early solution of the conflict;
(xviii)Convinced that, in view of continuing hesitation and delay in implementing the Washington
common action programme, economic sanctions seem, for the time being, to remain the main means
of leverage for ending the fighting;
(xix/ Noting that, under the Security Council resolution adopted last April on tightening economic
sanctions against Yugoslavia, United Nations members are required to take action against firms iden-
tified as working on behalf of Belgrade;
(xx) Noting that, on its borders with Bosnia, the Republic of Serbia does not accept the deployment
of United Nations monitors responsible for ensuring that it stops sending supplies to the warring Serbs
in Bosnia, except for food and medical supplies,
RrcourrrcNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Support and strengthen the action of the United Nations, now involved in a series of regional
conflicts which are bringing it face to face with a serious crisis of responsibility;
2. Ensure the strict application of Resolution 836 on the creation of security areas on the territory
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993;
3. In particular, help the adjustment and reinforcement of forces of WEU countries that may be
required by the implementation of Resolution 836 and consider assigning some of these forces to the
support of units responsible for protecting security areas;
4. Help to strengthen measures to apply economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and to
maintain the embargo on anns for all the belligerent parties, including Croatia;
5. Make every effort to avoid the conflict spreading to Vojvodina and Kosovo;
6. Arrange to send WEU units to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to ensure stability
and security in that area of the Balkans;
7. Strengthen the operational structures and arrangements of WEU so that it may play a major rOle
in preventing future crises under the aegis of the United Nations and, if necessary, in agreement with
NATO.
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The situation in Eost Timor
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by Mn Roseta, Rapponeur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr ResolunoN
on the situation in East Timor
Expr-nNetonv MruonaNouvr
submitted by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur
I. The situation in East Timor
II. East Timor and the United Nations
III. Other developments
L Adopted in committee by 2l votes to I with 0 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Mr. De Decker (Alternate for Mr. Wintgens), Lord Finsberg (Yice-
Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli (Alternate: Fenarini), Alegre (Alternate:.Brilo), Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop
Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret (Alternate: Rodriguez-Gomez), Sir Russell Johnston, Mr.
Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, de Lipkowski (Alternate: Baume[), Maroni, Moya, Miiller, d'Ornano, Picriaux, de
Przrg, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Ward.
N.B. Zhe names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Resolution
oa the situation ia Easl Timor
The Assembly,
(t) Recalling its Resolution 84 on the situation in East Timor adopted in December l99l;
(ii) Considering the Indonesian court's condemnation of " Xanana " Gusmao to life impriso^nment
ior " rebellion ", '-secessionism " and " illegal possession of fire-arms " and the arbitrary arrest of many
other Timorese;(iit) Recalling that the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia has still not been recognised by the
United Nations;
(iv) Considering that the Indonesian Government's policy- of forced annexation continues to be
icbompanied by non-respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and inde-
pendence;
(v) Considering that the international community must take further action to bring about condi-
iions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence,
a right recognised 
-by tie Charter of the United Nations and resolut-ions olthat organisation's Security
Corincil an-d Geneial Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the
European Parliament,
1. Calls upon the Indonesian Government:
(a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human
' ' 
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and to free political
pnsoners;
(b) towithdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions
necessary for the free exercise of self-determination;
(c) to allow international aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to
exercise their humanitarian activities on the territory of East Timor and assess the situation
in regard to the violation of human rights;
2. Asks all member states of WEU:
(a) to place an immediate embargo on arrns for Indonesia;
(b) to suspend immediately military agreements with and assistance to Indonesia;
(c) to encourage Portugal and Indonesia to approach their dialogue on East Timor with a view
to securing an inteinationally-acceptable solution to the East Timor problem.
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I. The situation in Eost Timor
l. The territory of East Timor was part of
the Portuguese colonial empire from the
beginning of the sixteenth century. While, before
the arrival ofthe Portuguese, the inhabitants of
East Timor already had their own identity, the
consequences of colonisation further accen-
tuated their specific character compared with
neighbouring peoples. Nor can one ignore the
influence of the catholic church which, since the
sixteenth century, has helped to create and
develop Timorese national awareness and
culture.
2. In 1951, East Timor changed its status
from that ofa colony to an overseas province, ajuridical strategem which allowed the island to
be considered an integral part of Portuguese ter-
ritory on the same basis as the metropolitan
provinces. In 1960, the United Nations General
Assembly decided, as for the other territories
under Portuguese administration, that East
Timor was a non-self-governing territory within
the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the
United Nations, a status that Lisbon never
recognised before the fall of the Portuguese dic-
tatorial r6gime.
3. With the overthrow of the Portuguese dic-
tatorial r6gime in April 1974, a process of
decolonisation began which also concerned East
Timor. By the end of the same year, three pro.
independence movements had been started on
the territory of Timor:
- 
the UDT (Democratic Union of
Timor), whose programme advocated a
progressive process of autonomy under
the Portuguese flag;
- 
the ASDT (Timorese Social Demo-
cratic Association), which later became
the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for
Independence), calling for the total
independence of East Timor;
- 
the Apodeti (Timorese Democratic
People's Union), which wanted East
Timor to be integrated in Indonesia.
4. In July 1975, the Portuguese Government
passed a bill putting an end to colonisation in
East Timor. The law provided for the estab-
lishment of a provisional authority to organise
elections in the territory. A constituent assembly
was to be elected in October 1976, responsible
for defining the future status of East Timor.
5. Shortly afterwards, in August 1975, a civil
war broke out in which the two main Timorese
Erplanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Roseta, Rapponew)
political factions, the UDT and Fretilin, tried,
each in turn, to seize power. On 28th November
1975, at the end of the civil war, Fretilin unilat-
erally declared the independence of Timor. This
was not recognised by Portugal, lndonesia or the
United Nations. On 3fth November 1975, sec-
tions of the UDT and Apodeti appealed to Indo-
nesia to intervene against Fretilin. On 7th
December 1975, taking this as a pretext, Indo-
nesian armed forces invaded the territory of
East Timor, a provisional government was
formed, a " popular assembly' was created,
many thousands of people were killed and, on
lTth July 1976, the Indonesian Republic pro-
claimed the integration of East Timor as its
twenty-seventh province, a situation that the
international community has never recognised.
6. After Indonesia had invaded Timor and
taken power, Fretilin took over the leadership of
the resistance movement. In 1986, Fretilin and
the UDT, once opponents, united to strengthen
resistance to Indonesian occupation and formed
the Timorese Nationalist Convergence coa-
lition.
II. East Timor and the United Nations
7. On l2th December 1975 the United
Nations General Assembly (at its thirtieth
annual ordinary session) adopted Resolution
3485 condemning the Indonesian invasion and
recognising Portugal as the power responsiblefor administering East Timor. On 22nd
December 1975, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 384
on the same subject, drafted in like terms,
insisting that Indonesia withdraw its armed
forces from East Timor and recalling the right of
the Timorese people to self-determination and
independence.
8. Between 1976 and 1982, the General
Assembly adopted, on the initiative of several
countries, seven resolutions on the situation in
East Timor.
9. On 23rd November 1982, in Resolution
37130 the General Assembly mandated the Sec-
retary-General to seek, in consultation with all
the parties concerned, a global solution to the
problem of East Timor. Since then, there have
been regular contacts between Portugal and
Indonesia through the intermediary of the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, who
submits an annual report to the General
Assembly on this question. However, on the
spot the situation is unchanged, in spite of con-
276
DOCUMEI.rI I38O
tinued resistance between Fretilin forces and
Indonesian troops.
10. On lTth December 1992, the first of a
series of meetings sponsored by the United
Nations was held at United Nations head-
quarters in New York between the new Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Mr. Durao
Barroso, and his Indonesian opposite number,
Mr. Ali Alatas. No significant result was
obtained and another meeting was fixed for
20th April.
I l. The meeting on 20th April merely allowed
it to be noted that the two parties' views on the
matter differed and the authorities in Djakarta
continue to assert that East Timor belongs to
Indonesia. However, the two countries agreed to
continue the dialogue on confidence-building
measures designed to improve the atmosphere
surrounding the negotiations and to allow
progress towards a solution to the substance of
the question. Another meeting was fixed for
17th September.
III. Other developments
12. On 22nd February 1991, Portugal
appealed to the International Court of Justice,
contesting the validity of the agreement signed
on llth December 1989 between Australia and
Indonesia on the exploitation of oil deposits off
the coast of East Timor (the Timor Gap). On
l2th November, Indonesian security forces fired
on unarmed Timorese demonstrators, killing
scores of people. This massacre was strongly
criticised by several countries and the WEU
Assembly condemned it in Resolution 84
adopted unanimously on 5th December 1991. In
the meantime, the Indonesian authorities have
lightly punished a few senior anny officers who
had some responsibility for the shooting in
November 1991, while a group of young
Timorese accused of organising the demon-
stration or taking part in it were condemned to
long terms of imprisonment, and even a life sen-
tence for one of them.
13. The consequence of Indonesia's policy
towards East Timor is that negotiations on a
new EEC/ASEAN agreement have still not
started.
14. On 20th November 1992, Jos6 Alexandre( " Xanana " ) Gusmao, leader of the pro-
independence movement and of the armed
resistance movement, was arrested by the Indo-
nesian authorities. His trial was started in Dili
on lst February 1993 in conditions that are
open to criticism. Gusmao was not allowed to
choose his lawyer, the lawyer he was given did
not attend the hearing and Amnesty Interna-
tional was not authorised to attend the hearings.
On 17th May, at the penultimate hearing, thejudges forbade " Xanana " to read out a
twenty-six page document that he had prepared.
His lawyer said that this was contrary to Indo-
nesian law. Held up at the stopover in Bali, the
United Nations observer was able to attend only
two of the trial's last four hearings, contrary to
undertakings given by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Ali Alatas. On 2lst May, "Xanana"
Gusmao was given a life sentence.
15. In the meantime, on 5th April 1993 the
Indonesian anny announced the capture of
Antonio Gomes da Costa, alias Ma'huno
Bulerek Karathayano, who had taken over the
leadership of Fretilin following the capture of
Gusmao. At the time of writing, nothing is
known about the situation of Ma'huno Bulerek
and many other prisoners arrested after
Gusmao.
16. In March 1993, Mr. van den Broek,
European Commissioner responsible for the
Community's external political relations,
insisted that a political solution must be found
by attempting to bring Indonesia and Portugal
closer together since the situation in East Timor
was affecting relations between the Community
and Indonesia and also those between the Com-
munity and ASEAN.
17. The United Nations Committee on
Human Rights, meeting in Geneva on l lth
March 1993 during the forty-ninth session,
adopted a resolution criticising Indonesia's
policy of repression and the use of torture in
East Timor. This condemnation was rejected by
the Indonesian authorities who did, however,
say they were willing to receive a personal repre-
sentative of the United Nations Secretary-
General.
18. At the present juncture, while bilateral
negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia are
desirable in the context of the search for a diplo-
matic solution, it must be borne in mind that the
question of East Timor brings into play prin-
ciples and rules that concern the entire interna-
tional community. The utmost pressure must
therefore be brought to bear on the Indonesian
Government to bring about the restoration of
law and order in East Timor and in particular to
allow the Timorese people to exercise their right
to self-determination while taking into account
the geopolitical environment.
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